JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendants' writ petition arising out of a suit under Sections 229/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, filed by the contesting opposite party No. 1 Dharamshala, Kasba Bisalpur. 2. The contesting opposite party had filed the suit against the petitioners with the allegations that the disputed land was allotted to it during the consolidation operation and that it was Sirdar of the disputed land and that the entry in C.H. Form No. 5 was scored out without any order of competent authority and that the defendants were in unlawful possession over the disputed land, hence the suit for declaration of plaintiffs' title and recovery of possession. 3. The defence in the case was that the disputed land was let out to the defendants by the Gaon Sabha and that they had become Sirdars of the disputed land and that the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit. 4. All the revenue courts have decreed the suit filed by the contesting opposite party. Aggrieved by their judgments the defendants petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the plaintiff opposite party was not a juristic person, hence it could not hold the agricultural land and its suit was wrongly decreed by the revenue courts. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the revenue courts have patently erred in helping the plaintiff opposite party as Asami of the disputed land. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the revenue courts have patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioners. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the petitioners did not raise the plea that the plaintiff opposite party could not hold the property it was not a juristic person, hence the aforesaid plea should not be entertained at this stage. 7. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that substantial justice has been done in the present case, hence the impugned judgments need not be interfered with. 8. Third contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties is that the writ petition has been filed sufficiently delayed, hence the same should be dismissed. 9. 7. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that substantial justice has been done in the present case, hence the impugned judgments need not be interfered with. 8. Third contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties is that the writ petition has been filed sufficiently delayed, hence the same should be dismissed. 9. Fourthly, it has been submitted that the petitioners being trespassers on the findings recorded by the revenue courts, they are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Last submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that the investigation into the question whether the opposite party could maintain the suit involves investigation into questions of fact, hence that question need not be examined by this Court A large number of rulings has been cited on behalf of the opposite party in support of their various contentions. 11. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the impugned judgments of the revenue Courts, I find that during the trial of the suit the plaintiff opposite party has got its plaint amended and it has claimed Asami right in the disputed land. While answering issue No. 1 the trial court has accepted the claim of the plaintiff opposite party as Asami of the disputed land in provisions of Section 133 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The appellate Courts have also confirmed the judgment of the trial court and they appear to have held that the plaintiff opposite party is Assami of the land in suit. The appellate Courts have also confirmed the judgment of the trial court and they appear to have held that the plaintiff opposite party is Assami of the land in suit. Section 133 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act reads as below :- "Every person belonging to any of the following classes shall be called as Asami and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon Asami by or under this Act, namely - (a) every person who, as a consequence of the acquisition of estates, becomes an Asami under Sections 11, 13 and 21; (b) every person who was admitted before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 by a Bhumidhar or Sirdar or, after such commencement by a Bhumidhar as a lessee of land comprised in his holding, in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (c) every person who, on or after the date of vesting, is admitted by the Land Management Committee or the person entitled as a lessee of land described in Section 132; and (d) every person who in any other manner acquires the rights of an Assami under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force." 12. The trial court while answering issues Nos. 1, 7 and 8 has found that the plaintiff is Assami of the disputed land. The necessary fact found by the trial court is only to the effect that the disputed land was allotted to the plaintiff Dharam Shala during consolidation operation but it is not clear how the plaintiff became Asami of the disputed land. Bare reading of the provisions of Section 133 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act does not cover the case of the plaintiff. The discussions in the impugned judgment indicate that the plaintiff's claim of Assami right has been recognised on the basis of decision in Dharam Shala Bisalpur v. Amar Devi Saxena and others, Case No. 45 of 1968. It is note-worthy that the aforesaid judgment is not between the parties nor it relates to the disputed land, hence that judgment cannot be of any avail to the plaintiff opposite party in claiming Assami right in the disputed land. It is note-worthy that the aforesaid judgment is not between the parties nor it relates to the disputed land, hence that judgment cannot be of any avail to the plaintiff opposite party in claiming Assami right in the disputed land. The second appellate court has not addressed itself to the question as to whether the plaintiff opposite party has succeeded in acquiring Assami right in the disputed land for maintaining the suit under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. I think that the judgment of the second appellate court suffers from patent error of law as it has failed to examine an important question. 13. As regards the question whether the plaintiff opposite party could maintain the suit, the Board of Revenue has indicated that the plaintiff could maintain the suit. 14. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the petitioner had not raised a plea regarding non-maintainability of the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not a juristic person, I think that the defendant petitioner can take up that point in the absence of specific pleading in the circumstances of the present case as necessary issue was framed before the trial court and the points have been put for consideration be fore the revenue courts, However, I am quashing the judgment of the second appellate court on a different ground. I permit the parties to make their submissions on the point in the light of the decisions of this Court as well as the other High Courts so that the second appellate court may arrive at a definite conclusion discussing the dictum of law Laid down by the High Courts. 15. The learned counsel for the opposite party placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Mithai Lal v. Board of Revenue U.P., Allahabad and others, 1983 R.D. 11 for his contention that the claim of the opposite party has been recognised in similar circumstances and the writ petition of a trespasser has been dismissed. 15. The learned counsel for the opposite party placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Mithai Lal v. Board of Revenue U.P., Allahabad and others, 1983 R.D. 11 for his contention that the claim of the opposite party has been recognised in similar circumstances and the writ petition of a trespasser has been dismissed. In the reported case the plaintiff's title has been accepted and it has been observed that the petitioners were trespassers hence the writ petition was dismissed but in the present case I am not satisfied that the petitioner has succeeded in establishing its Assami right in the disputed land and it is well known that even a trespasser can be ejected only by person having title to the disputed land. Specifically a plaintiff in a suit under Section 229/209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act can only succeed if it is proved that the plaintiff is either Bhumidhar Sirdar or Assami at the relevant time. To my mind the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party is distinguishable in view of the facts and circumstances involved in the present case. 16. As regards the third contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party I am satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner in paragraphs 25 to 27 of the writ petition, hence I am not agreeable to the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party that this writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. It is a matter of common experience that after the decision by the second appellate court information is sent to the clients regarding decision in the second appeal. If in this case the petitioner had not received relevant information and on enquiry came to know about the result of the second appeal, it cannot be said that the petitioners are guilty of such latches that their writ petition should be thrown out on that ground. 17. As regards second contention when I am not satisfied with the title of the plaintiff opposite party on materials before me and I am sending the case back to the second appellate court for examining the question. I am not prepared to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that substantial justice has been done. 17. As regards second contention when I am not satisfied with the title of the plaintiff opposite party on materials before me and I am sending the case back to the second appellate court for examining the question. I am not prepared to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that substantial justice has been done. When the plaintiff's title to the disputed land is in doubt no question of substantial justice antes unless the plaintiffs title to the disputed land is proved. 18. As regards the 4th contention it is sufficient to indicate that even a trespasser can be evicted from the land in his occupation only by a title holder by a person better entitled to the disputed land, in the circumstances of his case the petitioners' writ petition regarding the disputed land cannot be thrown out on the ground that they are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. As regards the last submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party, it is noteworthy that I am quashing the judgment of the second appellate court on a different ground, hence that submission does not stand in the way of the petition being allowed. However, I permit the parties to take up all legal pleas before the second appellate court on this question. 20. In view of my discussions above, it is not necessary to deal with various rulings cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party in the present case. 21. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate court dated November 30, 1979 is hereby quashed and the second appellate court is asked to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above and strictly in accordance with law. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.