JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. 1. ON July 28, 1955, District Board, Jaunpur, published a set of bye-laws for "vehicle stands." Bye-law no. 1 stated :- "1. No motor cars, lorries, carts, ekkas and such other vehicles plying for hire shall be allowed to halt for purposes of searching passengers at any public street or place other than stands fixed or within the radius of one mile of the addas or the stands." Bye-law No. 2 fixed the various stands in the rural territories of the District Board, Jaunpur. Bye-law No. 3 stated :- "The places cited in bye-law No. 2 above shall not be used as a stand for any motor vehicle or hackney carriage as decided in bye-law no. 1 unless the following charges are paid :- Name of vehicle Daily Charges Each motor bus or carrier Four annas Each motor car Two annas Each hackney carriage, Tonga, Ekka, cart etc. ONe anna" Bye-law No. 4 provided that the right of collection of the charges may be leased out, and the payment of the fee shall be made forthwith on demand to a person duly authorised in this behalf by the Board. 2. IT appears that by a notification published on 28th May, 1976, the rates mentioned in the aforesaid bye-law No. 3 were changed. For motor bus or public carriers the rate was increased to Re. 1/- per day ; for motor cars etc. the rate was increased to fifty paise per day. The petitioners operate stage carriages. Their journey appears to commence from the city of Jaunpur. While going to their destination, they halt at various places within the territory of the District Board, Jaunpur, for picking up and setting down passengers. At the places which have been fixed as stands by the aforesaid bye-laws they are made to pay the parking fee as mentioned in the bye-laws. Aggrieved they have filed the instant writ petitions. 3. THE petitioner's case, inter alia, is that the aforesaid bye-laws were ultra vires the powers of the District Board/Zila Parishad. THEy were hence not legally liable to pay the parking fee demanded from them. 4. Aggrieved they have filed the instant writ petitions. 3. THE petitioner's case, inter alia, is that the aforesaid bye-laws were ultra vires the powers of the District Board/Zila Parishad. THEy were hence not legally liable to pay the parking fee demanded from them. 4. IN support of this submission the petitioners relied upon a single-Judge decision of this Court in Jagdish Chandra v. State of U. P., 1975 ALJ 571 and Division Bench decisions in M. P. Jain v. Nagar Palika Hapur, W. P. No. 517 of 1977 D/- 8-11-1979 and Sita Ram v. Zila Parishad, Ghazipur, W. P. No. 6130 of 1973 D/-22-8-1979. Learned counsel for the respondent Board, on the other hand, invited the attention of the Bench to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mewa Ram v. Municipal Board, Muttra, 1939 AWR 525. 5. THE Division Bench hearing the writ petition felt that the Full Bench decision in Mewa Ram (supra) was applicable. Unfortunately the Full Bench decision was not brought to the attention of the Division Benches deciding the above mentioned cases. It also felt that the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti, AIR 1973 SC 2420 was not correctly understood or applied in Sita Ram's case supra. In the situation the Division Bench referred the following question of law to a larger Bench :- " Whether bye-law framed by District Board/Zila Parishad, Jaunpur, to the effect that no motor cars, lorries, carts, ekkas, and such other vehicles plying for hire shall be allowed to halt for the purposes of searching passengers at any public street or place other than stands fixed or within the radius of one mile of the addas or the stands, was within power conferred off it under section 174 (2) (b) to (q) of U. P. District Boards Act". 6. THE impugned bye-laws made by the District Board for vehicle stands purport to have been made under clause (a) of section 174 (2) of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922. 6. THE impugned bye-laws made by the District Board for vehicle stands purport to have been made under clause (a) of section 174 (2) of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922. Section 174 provides- " (1) A board by special resolution may, and where required by the State Government shall make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the rural area of the district, consistent with this Act, and with any rule, for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants of such area and for the furtherance of the administration of the district under this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (I), a board may, in the exercise of the said power, make any bye-laws described in the list below- (g) providing for the regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic on any public road where such regulation or prohibition appears to the board to be necessary". Clause (q) provides for traffic on public road. The term "public road" has been defined by section 3 (6) of the U. P. District Boards Act to mean "any road, street, bridge, culvert, thoroughfare, passage or place over which the public have a right of way and which is vested in or maintained by the Government or a local authority". 7. IN Mewa Ram's Full Bench decision the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board, Mathura, under clause H (b) of List I appended to section 298 (2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, were challenged. 8. SECTION 298 (1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act authorised the Municipal Boards to make bye-laws for promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality and for the furtherance of municipal administration under the Act. The impugned clause H (b) empowered the Municipal Board to make bye-law " providing for the regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic in the streets where such regulation or prohibition appears to the board to be necessary ". In exercise of the power under clause H (b) the municipal Board framed bye-laws which enjoined that no motor car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purposes of searching passengers at any public street or place other than the stands fixed for the purpose. 9. In exercise of the power under clause H (b) the municipal Board framed bye-laws which enjoined that no motor car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purposes of searching passengers at any public street or place other than the stands fixed for the purpose. 9. SECTION 2 (23) of the Municipalities Act defined " street " as meaning " any road, bridge, footway, lane, square, court, alley or passage which the public or any portion of the public, has right to pass along and includes..... The bye-law impugned in Mewa Ram's case was virtually identical to the bye-law impugned in the present case. Both the sets of bye-laws were framed under provisions which were identical, namely, bye-laws " providing for the regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic in the streets where such regulation or prohibition appears to the board to be necessary ". It cannot be gain said that the two provisions being in pari materia and identical, the decision of the Full Bench in Mewa Ram's case is applicable, on all fours. 10. IN Mewa Ram's case three questions were referred to the Full Bench :- " (1) Whether the Municipal Board of Muttra was competent to make a bye-law that 'no motor car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purpose of searching passengers at any public street or place other than the stands fixed for the purpose' ? (2) Whether the levy of any charge for the use of stands within the municipal limits of Muttra was within the competence of the Municipal Board or not ? (3) Whether the right to the said charge and the right to collect it can be transferred and whether the contract for such a transfer is valid ? " For the purposes of the present reference the first question decided by the Mewa Ram's Full Bench is material. On this question there was a difference of opinion. Allsop, J. and Ismail, J. held that the bye-laws were within the aforesaid clause H (b), and so were valid ; while Iqbal Ahmad, J. held to the contrary. Allsop, J. held that the term " traffic " is not defined in the Act, and must be deemed to be used in its ordinary sense. Allsop, J. and Ismail, J. held that the bye-laws were within the aforesaid clause H (b), and so were valid ; while Iqbal Ahmad, J. held to the contrary. Allsop, J. held that the term " traffic " is not defined in the Act, and must be deemed to be used in its ordinary sense. Even if it does not include in its denotation the vehicles themselves, it certainly means the coming and going of vehicles. His Lordship observed- " I have no doubt at all that to the ordinary man in the street the right to regulate traffic would appear to include the right to stop vehicles at certain places and to prevent them from stopping...............The meaning of the bye-law that no motor car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purpose of searching passengers at any public street or place other than the stands fixed for the purpose is...............that vehicles of this type shall not stop in any part of the public streets except the stands fixed for the purpose, that is, they must not stop on the carriage way or on the verges except at the stands. The Municipality could surely make a rule that no vehicle of this nature should stand in the middle of the carriage way or at a corner or at a cross-road or something of that kind on the ground that it would, if it did so, impede other traffic. If it can do that, it can also prohibit such vehicles from standing anywhere else in a public street either in the carriage way or on the verges. It could, as far as I can see, prevent any such vehicle from stopping anywhere at all on the public streets including verges within the municipal area and therefore if it makes an exception to its general prohibition by allowing these vehicles to stop in certain areas described as stands I cannot see how a prohibition of that kind is beyond its powers. " His Lordship then dealt with the argument based upon the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act and observed- " A reference has been made to the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act which provide that the registering authority may fix stands for motor vehicles. " His Lordship then dealt with the argument based upon the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act and observed- " A reference has been made to the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act which provide that the registering authority may fix stands for motor vehicles. I do not see how these rules can affect the statutory provisions given to a municipality under the Municipalities Act. If two different statutes allow different authorities to forbid certain acts for different purposes it does not appear to me that the provisions of the two statutes are necessarily inconsistent. There might be an inconsistency if the statutes allowed different authorities positively to permit certain acts, but this contingency is provided for in the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act because stands are to be fixed by the registering authority only in consultation with the municipality. The registering authority therefore cannot permit any place to be used as a stand without the consent of the Municipality and it seems to me that this provision has been made for the very reason that the Municipality is entitled to forbid the use of any place as a stand for motor vehicles. For these reasons I think the first question should be answered in the affirmative ". 11. MOHAMMAD Ismail, J. concurring with Allsop, J. held- " It has been urged that under section 298 H (b) bye-laws can be made only to safeguard public safety and to provide for the convenience of the public. It is not suggested that in the present case the bye-law will not be conducive to public safety and convenience. It is obvious that to allow a large number of vehicles to halt or run for the purpose of searching passengers will result in causing inconvenience to the public using such streets and may even endanger their safety...........................................It is contended that the Board may regulate or prohibit traffic but has no authority to fix stands. In my judgment this argument proceeds on a misconception of the scope of the bye-law. The Board has undoubtedly the discretion to exclude any public street or place from the application of the prohibition imposed by the bye-law. It is immaterial whether the street or place so excluded from the operation of the bye-law is styled as "stand' or any other name". 12. The Board has undoubtedly the discretion to exclude any public street or place from the application of the prohibition imposed by the bye-law. It is immaterial whether the street or place so excluded from the operation of the bye-law is styled as "stand' or any other name". 12. REFERRING to rule 95 framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, his Lordship observed- " There is no reason to believe that the rules appended to the Motor Vehicles Act have the effect of nullifying or amending the statutory provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act. It is true that under the rules the registering authority may fix stands in concurrence with the local body concerned. It may possibly be within the power of the registering authority to disagree with the Board in the selection of places as stands. There is nothing to show that such a situation has arisen nor such a plea has been taken in the written statements. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the Municipal Board was fully competent to make the bye-law that no motor-car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purpose of searching passengers at any public street or place other than stands fixed for the purpose ". With respect we agree with the line of reasoning of the two learned Judges which formed the majority in Mewa Ram's case (supra). 13. IN the present case also the Transport Authorities have not passed any order designating any place as bus stand under rule 95 of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is hence no question of any inconsistency. 14. LEARNED counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to three Supreme Court decisions. We may first take up the decision in Municipal Council, Bhopal, (Supra). In that case the Municipal Council, Bhopal, framed a bye-law providing that no person in charge of a motor bus plying for hire shall for the purpose of taking up or setting down or passengers, park or stop his bus anywhere within the limits of the Bhopal Municipality except at the Municipal Bus Stand. The validity of this bye-law was challenged on the ground that it was beyond the powers of the Municipal Council. For the Municipal Council reliance was placed upon clause (m) of section 358 (7) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act. The validity of this bye-law was challenged on the ground that it was beyond the powers of the Municipal Council. For the Municipal Council reliance was placed upon clause (m) of section 358 (7) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act. This clause provided for making bye-laws for- (m) regulating and prohibiting..................the using of such ground as halting place of vehicles or animals or as a place for encampment.................." The Supreme Court held that the power to regulate or prohibit the use of municipal land as halting place of vehicles cannot be used to compel people to use such land as halting places. It was also held that provisions for use of landing places, halting places and cart-stands do not deal with places for setting down or taking up passengers. The Court held- " The power to compel persons in charge of motor buses to stop only at certain places for the purpose of taking up or setting down of passengers is a matter which relates to motor traffic........." This decision is distinguishable. The relevant statutory provision was entirely different. Clause (m) aforesaid dealt with using of municipal land as halting places. It did not include the power to compel people to use such land as halting places for purposes of taking up or setting down passengers. Such power to compel relates to motor traffic. In our case the relevant statutory provision provides for regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic. The observation of the Supreme Court that the power to compel persons incharge of motor buses to stop for the purpose of taking up or setting down of passengers is a matter which relates to motor traffic is the only material and relevant part of the judgment. It goes to sustain the validity of the bye-law impugned in the present case, because the bye-law has been framed in exercise of the power for regulating traffic. 15. THE other two Supreme Court decisions, namely, T. B. Ibrahim v. THE Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, AIR 1953 SC 79 and Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 458 are also distinguishable. In both these cases the question for consideration was whether change of the place of bus stand fell within the purview of section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act or it flowed from the provisions in section 68 (2) (r) of that Act. In both these cases the question for consideration was whether change of the place of bus stand fell within the purview of section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act or it flowed from the provisions in section 68 (2) (r) of that Act. THE Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder make distinction between the phrases " parking place ", " halting stations " and " bus stand". THEse phrases are used in different rules and carry somewhat different meanings and connotations. THE Supreme Court examined the various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules minutely and came to the conclusion that the provision for bus stands can more appropriately be made under section 68, and not under section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 16. IN the first place, no such problem arises in the present case. Secondly, in these two decisions the Supreme Court was asked to determine as to which particular provision of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules specifically authorised the fixing of bus stands. The Act as well as the rules made detailed provisions for halting places, parking places or bus stands. IN none of these two decisions was the question considered from the point of view of a provision like the one involved in the present case which authorised the regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic in the streets. The Division Bench decisions of our Court were rendered in ignorance of the Full Bench decision. They hence do not lay down the correct law. 17. OUR attention was invited to a single-Judge decision in Jagdish Chandra (Supra). There the relevant bye-law provided- " (2) No driver of motor bus, Lorry, Truck, Jeep, Station Wagon plying on commercial basis will be allowed to park the vehicles within the limits of Nagar Palika unless he pays Rs. 2/-". It was held that this bye-law does not fall within the purview of clause H (b) of section 298 (2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, because it does not regulate or prohibit traffiic or the parking of vehicles. It merely seeks to collect revenue in the shape of parking fee, there being no restriction with regard to any locality or street where vehicles are not permitted to be parked. Thus far there may be no quarrel with this decision. It merely seeks to collect revenue in the shape of parking fee, there being no restriction with regard to any locality or street where vehicles are not permitted to be parked. Thus far there may be no quarrel with this decision. But then the learned Judge went on to make some general observations that the Full Bench decision in Mewa Ram's case did not lay down the correct law in view of the Supreme Court decision in Municipal Council, Bhopal. The learned Judge observed that Mewa Ram's case does not deal with the question arising in the case before him. The above observations were hence obiter. As shown above, Municipal Council, Bhopal's case does not lay down any proposition which may run contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench in Mewa Ram's case. 18. IN Chaudhary Atar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1970 ALJ 249 the validity of a bye-law saying that no loaded motor truck, motor lorry, motor bus, tractor or taxi car shall be allowed to enter into or ply in the municipal limits without the written permission of the executive officer, Municipal Board, Kairana, was challenged. It was held that this bye-law does not fall within the purview of clause H (b) of section 298 (2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Clause H (b) aforesaid does not touch the subject matter of entry of vehicles into the Municipal area, which was the basis for the levy of fee. Under the impugned bye-laws the mentioned fee was chargeable at the point of entry of the vehicle into the municipal area. The bye-laws are not at all related to traffic in the streets of the municipal area, much less for regulating or prohibiting the same. They do not contemplate that motor vehicles of the kind mentioned in the impugned bye-laws would not enter the streets, in stated periods of time, when the traffic may be unusually heavy on the streets without paying the requisite fee. The fee is chargeable at any time without consideration of the condition of the traffic on the streets. The bye-laws did not deal with the subject matter mentioned in Clause (b) and cannot be sustained by it. This decision is also distinguishable because the bye-law in the present case is of a different character, and is clearly covered by clause (b). 19. The bye-laws did not deal with the subject matter mentioned in Clause (b) and cannot be sustained by it. This decision is also distinguishable because the bye-law in the present case is of a different character, and is clearly covered by clause (b). 19. OUR answer to the referred question is that the aforesaid bye-law was within the power conferred on the District Board by clause (q) of section 174 (2) of the District Boards Act. 20. LET the papers be laid before the Bench concerned with this opinion and answer.