ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts, in brief, are these : Respondent No. 3 Sri Riaz Ahmad was treated as the tenure-holder and the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to him. He filed his objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter, it seems, he filed an appeal and the same was decided by the appellate court. Against the decision of the appellate court a writ petition was filed in this Court and a true copy of the judgment of this Court in the said writ petition is Annexure C. A. 1 to the counter-affidavit of Sri Riaz Ahmad. The case was remanded to the appellate court with certain directions given in the said judgment of this Court (Annexure C. A. 1). Thereafter it seems that the appellate court dealt with the controversy in accordance with the judgment of this Court. The appeal of the tenure holder was dismissed. It seems, that the tenure holder had given his choice of surplus land in the appellate court and the said court sent back the record to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the choice shall be accepted as far as possible. Thereafter the Prescribed Authority dealt with the question of choice. In the said proceedings and at the said stage the petitioners intervened and they claimed that the land, which had been sold to them by the tenure holder after 24th January 1971 and which transaction had been ignored by the authorities in the ceiling proceedings, should not be declared as surplus land of the tenure holder. The Prescribed Authority accepted the said prayer of the petitioners and gave a direction to the said effect while declaring the land of the tenure holder as surplus land. In other words, the land sold to the petitioners by the tenure holder was directed to be excluded from the tenure holder's surplus land. A certified copy of the said order of the Prescribed Authority dated 14th Oct. 1980 is on the record. The tenure holder feeling aggrieved with the said order dated 14th Oct. 1980 filed an appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the appellate court by its impugned judgment dated 26th August 1981, a certified copy whereof is on the record. A certified copy of the said order of the Prescribed Authority dated 14th Oct. 1980 is on the record. The tenure holder feeling aggrieved with the said order dated 14th Oct. 1980 filed an appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the appellate court by its impugned judgment dated 26th August 1981, a certified copy whereof is on the record. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners. I n opposition, I have heard Sri S. A. Shah, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. 4. Many controversies were raised by the learned counsel for the parties. Inter alia, Sri Jain contended that the petitioners stood recorded on 8th June 1973 in respect of the land which had been sold to them before the said date but after 24th Jan. 1971. This allegation has been made in paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 of the writ petition. It has been further averred that no notice under the first proviso to rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act was served upon the petitioners. These allegations have not been controverted in the counter-affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the State. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, placed reliance on the Full Bench decision in Shantanu Kumar v. State, 1979 All WC 585 : 1979 All LJ 174, to contend that the proceedings under the Act against respondent No. 3 were not binding upon the petitioners. 5. Sri Shah, on the other hand, contended that if the ratio of the Full Bench was to be applied then the orders passed in the ceiling proceedings by the Prescribed Authority, thereafter by the appellate court and thereafter the order passed by a learned Judge of this Court in the writ petition, will have to be quashed. However, this will be beyond the scope of the writ petition and even the petitioners have not sought any such direction. Sri Shah further contended that the petitioners were not entitled to get the benefit of clause (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act inasmuch as the word `transfer' used in Sections 5 and 6 of the Act will not be applicable to a case where the transfer is held to be sham. Sri Shah further contended that the petitioners were not entitled to get the benefit of clause (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act inasmuch as the word `transfer' used in Sections 5 and 6 of the Act will not be applicable to a case where the transfer is held to be sham. Learned counsel pointed out that in the instant case the transfer was held to be sham up to the stage of this Court in the earlier writ petition. According to the learned counsel such a sham transaction is no transfer in the eyes of law and, therefore, the word `transfer' used in Sections 5 and 6 of the Act will not cover such a transaction. In other words, he contended that only when there is a genuine transaction S. 5(6) of the Act will apply and such a transaction will be ignored where good faith and adequacy of consideration are not proved. He has placed reliance on certain observations made in the Division Bench pronouncement in Rajesh Pachauri v. State, 1975 All WC 606. It is well known that this decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 915 . However, Sri Shah contends that so far as the said observations are concerned they cannot be held to be overruled by the Supreme Court. 6. The points raised by the learned counsel are interesting and they would have needed serious consideration but in the present petition, I do not propose to go into them. The appeal in the court below was filed against an order under S. 12-A of the Act simpliciter. In my view, the appeal was not maintainable under section 13 of the Act. If the question of choice were a part of an order under S. 12 of the Act passed by the Prescribed Authority then only an appeal could be maintainable but in the instant case, the order which was passed was not an order under S. 12 of the Act but an order independent of S. 12 and the same could only be deemed to be an order under S. 12A simpliciter. I n this view of the matter, the appeal was not maintainable. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 says that this point was not taken in the writ petition. I n this view of the matter, the appeal was not maintainable. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 says that this point was not taken in the writ petition. Even though it is so, in my view, it is a pure question of law and it certainly can be pressed for deciding the writ petition. I should like to emphasise that respondent No. 3 is seeking to take advantage of technicalities even though his real aim is to take advantage of his own wrong. In effect, he says that he entered into a sham transaction and he is entitled to give the land of such transaction as surplus land. The court will not permit this kind of exercise. A tenure holder cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong in this manner. 7. The petition is accordingly allowed and the appellate order dated 26-8-1981 is hereby quashed. There will be no order as to costs.