JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. THIS is a reference made by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad under Section 57 of the Stamp Act. The following question has been referred to us : "Whether the documents in question termed as mining lease in accordance with the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963, are lease deeds within the meaning of section 2 (16) (c) of the Stamp Act or sale deeds of immovable property chargeable under Article 35 (b) or Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Act or mere licences chargeable under Article 5 (c) of the said Schedule." 2. TWO matters, one from Kanpur and another from Hamirpur, came up before the Board of Revenue raising identical question about the amount of stamp duty leviable on an instrument granting of right to opposite party no. 1, Mulakh Raj to remove sand from the bed of the river Ganga in Kanpur and an instrument granting a right for the removal of sand and morum in Hamirpur Tahsil by Mahendra Singh. In each case the question before the Collector was as to whether the instrument in question was to be treated as a lease deed or as a licence. The stand taken by the opposite parties was that the instruments were not lease deeds but licences. The plea of the Revenue was that the instruments were lease deeds and not licences. When the matter came up before the Board of revenue, a further plea was taken by the Revenue that in case the instruments were not held to be lease then the instruments were sale deeds of immovable property. It would be relevant to mention the facts in detail. First the Kanpur matter. It was stated that on 7th January, 1972 a lease deed was executed in accordance with the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 by Mulakh Raj, the lessee. Although the deed was required to be executed by the District Magistrate for and on behalf of the Governor of U. P., it was yet to be executed. The grant was for one year for a consideration amounting to Rs. 63000/. This amount was liable to be paid in four instalments. It was also stipulated that this right had been given in respect of a specific area. The grant was for one year for a consideration amounting to Rs. 63000/. This amount was liable to be paid in four instalments. It was also stipulated that this right had been given in respect of a specific area. The right to hold the mines, beds/veins seams of the river Ganges was granted and dmised for a term of one year. The lessee was also required to pay the royalty subject to handing over physical possession of the plots referred to in part I of the Schedule of the document. It was also stipulated that the liability would commence from the date of handing over physical possession. 3. IT is not in dispute that Mulakh Raj was put in possession and he removed sand during the period of one year from the date of his taking possession. The stipulated amount had also been deposited. Sri Mulakh Raj had been served with a notice requiring him to execute a deed in respect of the auction for the collection and removal of sand from the plots mentioned in the instrument. He filed a duly executed document on a stamp paper of Rs. 2.25 along with an application under section 31 of the Stamp Act for adjudication of the stamp duty on the said document. Appended to the above application was a written argument in support of the lessee's contention that the instrument was a licence and not a lease deed. The Collector, Kanpur having some doubt as to the amount of stamp duty referred the same to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Sec. 56 (2) of the Stamp Act vide his letter dated May 12, 1972. 4. THE second document was executed on 24th of March, 1976 by the District Magistrate, Hamirpur for and on behalf of the Governor of U. P. and Shri Mahendra Singh, opposite party no. 2. Mahendra Singh had applied to the State Government under the provisions of Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 for a mining lease for morum and sand of the entire Tahsil of Hamirpur. This had been accepted by the State Government under Rule 68 of the said rules for a yearly consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/. In the Schedule the yearly consideation has been described as the "Royalty reserved by this lease". THE period during which the morum and sand could be removed was two years commencing from 21st of February, 1976. This had been accepted by the State Government under Rule 68 of the said rules for a yearly consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/. In the Schedule the yearly consideation has been described as the "Royalty reserved by this lease". THE period during which the morum and sand could be removed was two years commencing from 21st of February, 1976. THE opposite party no. 2, Mahendra Singh, deposited a sum of Rs. 62, 500/ by way of security. A similar amount was deposited on 22-12-1975 as the first instalment. Reference may be made to the operative part of the document in the case of Mahendra Singh wherein the instrument has been termed as lease and the opposite party no. 2 as lessee. The opposite party no. 2, Mahendra Singh had also been served with an order dated 4th of February, 1976 by the District Magistrate requiring him to execute a deed in respect of the contract to win and remove morum and sand in Tahsil Hamirpur granted to him under Rule 68 of the Rules. He had submitted a duly executed deed in amended form MM 3 along with an application under Sec. 31 of the Stamp Act on 13-2-1976 for adjudication of stamp duty. He also filed another application purporting to be written argument in support of his contention that the document was a licence and not a lease. The Collector feeling some doubt as to the amount of duty referred the matter under section 56 (2) for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vide letter dated 25th of March, 1976. 5. THE question before us is whether the aforesaid documents which have been termed as 'Mining leases' under Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963, are lease deeds within the meaning of section 2(16) (c) of the Stamp Act or sale deeds of immovable property chargeable under Article 35 (b) or Article 23 of Schedule I-B of the Act or mere licences chargeable under Article 5 (c) of the said Schedule. 6. BEFORE the question is discussed and answered, it would be appropriate to consider the basic principle as to the interpretation of a document of the above kind. Undoubtedly, the document itself has to be read as a whole to discern the character of the document and also to discern the intent. 6. BEFORE the question is discussed and answered, it would be appropriate to consider the basic principle as to the interpretation of a document of the above kind. Undoubtedly, the document itself has to be read as a whole to discern the character of the document and also to discern the intent. It is well settled that it is the substance of the agreement that matters and not the form, for clever drafting may camouflage the real intention of the parties. -See Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262 , Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1275 . It is also well settled that if there is ambiguity in the language employed then it is permissible to look into the surrounding circumstances to determine as to what was intended. -See Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali, AIR 1954 SC 345 . But if the language is plain and clear, surrounding circumstances ought not to be taken into consideration-See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1288 . In the case of Smt. Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532 the document was labelled as a lease deed but that was held to be not conclusive since the true nature of the document could not be disguised by labelling it something else. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority considered as to whether the documents were instruments of lease, sale or licence. He was of the view that both the documents in question came within the term 'lease' and were neither sale deeds of immovable property nor licences. Neither party addressed this Court that the documents purported to execute sale deeds for immovable properties. The real contention was whether the documents were leases or licences, or something else. We will, therefore, consider this question now and see whether the documents are instruments of lease or are mere licences and further whether the documents are neither lease nor licence deeds. 7. THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the agreements amount to instruments of lease. We will, therefore, consider this question now and see whether the documents are instruments of lease or are mere licences and further whether the documents are neither lease nor licence deeds. 7. THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the agreements amount to instruments of lease. THE term lease has been defined in Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act as under ; " Lease "-Lease means a lease of immovable property, and includes also--- (a) Patta ; (b) a kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent, for immovable property ; (c) any instrument by which tolls of any description are let ; (d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to signify that the application is granted. " It is apparent from the above that a document to be a lease must pertain to an immovable property. THE expression " immovable property " has not been defined in the Stamp Act and its definition in the Transfer of Property Act says that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. However, Section 3 of the General Clauses Act defines immovable property as including benefits that arise out of the land. 8. IN the case of the first document all that was stipulated is removal of sand from the bed of river Ganga in the district of Kanpur. The question that would immediately arise is whether sand is an immovable property. The sand on the bed of the river Ganga is despoited there annually by the alluvial action of the river by washing up sand and earth. That sand is not fixed to the earth. It lies on earth. It has been brought there by the river during floods and on the receding of the rever after the floods the sand lies deposited on the bed or the bank of the river. Can it be said that this alluvial sand is attached to earth ? If it is not, then it will not be an immovable property but a movable property. It is a movable property, the document cannot be termed to be a lease, and unless the property has the character of immovable property, it would not come within the definition and the expression 'lease' as defined in the Stamp Act. If it is not, then it will not be an immovable property but a movable property. It is a movable property, the document cannot be termed to be a lease, and unless the property has the character of immovable property, it would not come within the definition and the expression 'lease' as defined in the Stamp Act. We may now refer to some of the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (67 of 1957) hereinafter referred to as Act 67 of 1957. "Minor Minerals " as defined in cl. (c) of section 3 of the said Act include " ordinary sand ". Clause (c) of Sec. 3 defines " mining lease " as a " lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations, and includes a sub lease granted for such purpose ". Clause (d) of the same section defines " mining operations " to mean " any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any minerals. " "In the case of Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jui v. V. D. Dey and Co., AIR 1979 SC 1969 their lordships of the Supreme Court observed : " The definitions of " mining operations " and " mine " noticed above, are very wide. The expression " winning of mineral " in the definition of " mining operations " is spacious enough to comprehend every activity by which the mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth. As pointed out by this Court in B. Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 1383, it is wrong to assume that mines and minerlas must always be sub soil and that there can be no minerals on the surface of the earth. " . Their Lordships further observed :- " .........Similarly, it is not a requirement of the definition of 'mining operation' that the activity for winning the mineral must necessarily be an underground activity. " . Their Lordships further observed :- " .........Similarly, it is not a requirement of the definition of 'mining operation' that the activity for winning the mineral must necessarily be an underground activity. The essence of 'mining operations' is that it must be an activity for winning a mineral, whether on the surface or beneath the surface of earth........." It is, therefore, evident from the above observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that even the scraping or digging of sand from the bed of the river or bank of the river would come within the purview of "winning of minerals". It is not necessary that there should be underground operation to make a mining operation. 9. LEARNED Chief Standing Counsel placed reliance on the observations of their Lordships in the above sase of Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. B. D. Dey and Co. (supra) to urge that their Lordships had held that the grant for excavating sand was a mining operation for the winning of minerals and amounted to a mining lease. Reference was made to the following passage : " It is important to bear in mind that the term lease occurring in the definition of mining lease given in section 3 (e) of Act 67 of 1957 does not appear to have been used in the narrow technical sense in which it is defined in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, as rightly pointed out by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Fala Krishta Pal v. Jagannath Marwari, ILR 59 Cal. 1314 = AIR 1932 Cal. 775 a settlement of the character of a mining lease is every where in India regarded as 'lease'. A mining lease, therefore, may not meticulously and strictly satisfy in all cases, all the characteristics of a lease as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless, in the legally accepted sense, it has always been regarded as a lease in this Country. " It is evident from what has been observed above that a " mining lease may not have all the characteristics of a lease as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. It must be borne in mind that the question involved in the present case is as to the nature of the documents and the amount payable as stamp duty thereon. It must be borne in mind that the question involved in the present case is as to the nature of the documents and the amount payable as stamp duty thereon. In this context what is required to be seen is whether the document partake the nature of a lease as defined in Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act. We are not really concerned in this case to consider the term 'mining lease' given in Section 3 (c) of Act 67 of 1957. The term 'lease' has not been defined in Section 3 (c) of Act 7 of 1957. In Section 3 (c) mining lease has been defined. A 'mining lease' is not the same thing as a lease under Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act. The above decision is, therefore, distinguishable. 10. WHAT is to be seen is whether the documents purport to be a lease within the meaning of Section 2 (16) of the Indian Stamp Act. As noticed earlier, the term 'lease' in the Indian Stamp Act has been defined. 'Lease' means a lease of immovable property. It is, therefore, apparent that there must be an immovable property involved. "Immovable property" has not been defined in the Indian Stamp Act. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act defines 'immovable property'. 'Immovable property' shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. In other words, the expression 'immovable property' comprehends all that would be real property according to English law. Consequently, every interest in immovable property or a benefit arising out of land will be immovable property for the purposes of section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Unless some right had been conferred under the deed in respect of the land, the question of a lease does not arise. The lease had to be in respect of an immovable property itself. The right that has been given in the present case is not a right in respect of the immovable property. The right merely permits the party to dig, excavate, scrape, collect and take away the sand from the river bed or from the banks of the river and there is no right conferred under the deed to the party in respect of the land on which the sand lay. The right merely permits the party to dig, excavate, scrape, collect and take away the sand from the river bed or from the banks of the river and there is no right conferred under the deed to the party in respect of the land on which the sand lay. There was a stipulation that all the constructions, erections, machinery etc. which had been brought on the bed of the river or the river bank for facilitating the digging, scraping, collection of the sand would be removed within a stipulated period of time after the conclusion of the period mentioned in the deed. This therefore did not give any right to the party in respect of the land. Whatever right under the deed had been given was for facilitating the operation for the removal of the sand. The sand lying on the river bed was not attached to the earth. It had come there by alluvial action. It had only to be collected and removed under the deed. 11. IN our opinion, therefore, no right had been given under the deed in respect of the land which lay underneath the sand. Consequently, no right was conferred in respect of any immovable property. Thus, there was no question of any lease in respect of any immovable property. We are also of the opinion that clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) in the definition of the term 'lease' under Section 2 (16) of the INdian Stamp Act was also not attracted in the present case to bring the deed within the meaning of the term 'lease' as defined above.. 12. THE next question is whether the instrument is a licence. THE distinction between a lease and a licence has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels v. R. N. Kapoor (supra) and Board of Revenue v. A. M. Ansari, AIR 1976 SC 1813 . In the former case their Lordships observed : " If a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. THE legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. THE legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property." In the latter case their Lordship observed : " .........that it is the creation of an interest in immovable property or a right to possess it that distinguises a lease from a licence. A licence does not create an interest in the property to which it relates while a lease does. THEre is in other words transfer of a right to enjoy the property in case of a lease. " THEir Lordships further observed : " As to whether a particular transaction creates a lease or a licence is always a question of intention of the parties which is to be inferred from the circumstances of each case. For the purpose of deciding whether a particular grant amounts to a lease or a licence, it is essential, therefore, to look to the substance and essence of the agreement and not to its form." After referring to the observation of Hon'ble Subba Rao, J. in the case of Associated Hotels v. R. N. Kapoor (supra) and the observations of Somervell, LJ and Denning, LJ in the judgment of Court of Appeal in the case of Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 AIR ER 1199 their Lordships laid down four propositions viz : (i) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form : (b) THE real test is the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease or a licence, (iii) If the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease, but if it only permits another to make use of the property of which the legal possession continues with the owner it is a licence ; and (iv) If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, 'prima facie' he is considered to be a tenant, but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease." Reference was also made to the observations of Lord Shaw in the judgment of the Board in Kaury Timber Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 1913 AC 771 (776). Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 1913 AC 771 (776). It was observed therein that an agreement can be said to partake of the character of lease, it is necessary that the grantee should have obtained an interest in and possession of land. If the contract does not create an interest in land, then the land would be considered as a mere warehouse of the thing sold and the contract would be a contract for goods. In the case of Board of Revenue v. A. M. Ansari, (supra) the Forest Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh held an auction in respect of various items of forest produce, viz., timber, fuel, bamboos, minor forest produce beedi leaves, tanning barks, mohwa etc. The Forest Department called upon the highest bidders to pay stamp duty, payable on the agreements to be executed by them which were leases of immovable property falling under Article 31 (c) of the Stamp Act. They were further called upon to pay stamp duty on the deposits made by them by way of secuirty as mortgages falling within Article 35 (c) of the Act. The highest bidders filed a writ petition and urged that the agreement amounted to a licence and not a lease. What was intended under the agreement was to take away the forest produce after plucking or collecting beedi leaves, to cut away bamboos and standing timber and all these rights were not a right or interest in immovable property. Their Lordships were of the view that the agreement was not a lease but a licence. 13. A similar view was taken in the case of Firm Chhotabhai Jethabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 108 which related to agreements entered into by persons with the previous proprietors of certain estate and Mahals in the State in which they acquired the right to pluck, collect and carry away tendu leaves, to cultivate, culture and acquire lac and to cut and carry away teak and timber and miscellaneous species of trees hardwood and bamboos. This was held in essence to be licences. Reference may be made to the case of Mahado v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 735 which brings out the distinction clearly. This was held in essence to be licences. Reference may be made to the case of Mahado v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 735 which brings out the distinction clearly. In that case apart from the bare right to take the tendu leaves, there were further benefits including the right to occupy the land, to erect buildings and to take away other forest produce not necessarily standing timber, growing crop or grass and the rights were spread over many years. It was held to be a lease. This case is clear pointer that a mere right to pluck, collect and take away tendu leaves or fruits or forest produce or cut away standing timber or grass does not create an interest as such and could not be lease. Their Lordships were of the view that this created a licence. 14. THE question in this case is whether the agreement entered into by the party was liable to stamp duty as payable on instrument to a lease under Article 35 or as an agreement under Article 5 of the Stamp Act. If the agreement is not a lease, and purports to be a licence then the stamp duty payable thereon would be as provided under Article 5. THE provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 5 would not be attracted in this case for the agreements did not relate to the sale of a Bill of Exchange nor did they relate to the sale of a Government security or share in an incorporate company or other body corportate. THE agreements, therefore, come under clause (c) of Article 5, viz., "if not otherwise provided for". A fixed fee is provided under Article 5 (c). THEre are two exemptions viz., an agreement or memorandum of agreement for or relating to the sale of goods of merchandise exclusively, not being a Note or Memorandum chargeable under Article 43 ; and made in the form of tenders to the Central Government for or relating to any land. None of these provisions are attracted in this case. Now it is an agreement and not a lease the only provisions which will be attracted in the case would be Article 5 (c). THE next question for consideration is whether the agreements in question are in the nature of "Profits a prendre". None of these provisions are attracted in this case. Now it is an agreement and not a lease the only provisions which will be attracted in the case would be Article 5 (c). THE next question for consideration is whether the agreements in question are in the nature of "Profits a prendre". THE chief standing counsel submitted that the agreements were not in the nature of "Profits a prendre". Learned counsel for the respondents, however, urged that the agreements would be in the nature of 'profits a prendre'. "Profits a prendre" has been referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Paragraph 240 as follows : " "A profits a prendre" is a right to take something of another persons land. It may be more fully defined as a right to enter anothers land and to take some profit of the soil, or a portion of the soil itself, for the use of the owner of the right." In Black's Dictionary, 4th Edition, at page 1476 the meaning of the aforesaid expression is given as follows : "Profits a prendre-called also 'right of common'. A right exercised by one man in the soil of another, accompanied with participation in the profits of the soil thereof. A right to take part of the soil or produce of the land. THE term includes the right to take soil, gravel, minerals and the like from another's land." In Bouvire's Law Dictionary, the expression profit a prendre has been dealt with as follows ; "THE right to take soil, gravel, minerals and the like from the land of another. Profit a prendre is a peculiar species of easements. It is 'the right to take something which is the produce of the land. It is in its nature an incorporeal right incapable of livery, though it is imposed upon corporeal or tangible property. It may be appurtenant to a dominent tenament, in the nature of easement or it may be a right in gross. Apart from the possession of land and differs therein from an easement, which requires a dominent tenement for its existence. THE right can be acquired only by grant of prescription. Such a right in the soil of another cannot be claimed by custom. Apart from the possession of land and differs therein from an easement, which requires a dominent tenement for its existence. THE right can be acquired only by grant of prescription. Such a right in the soil of another cannot be claimed by custom. THE right to profit a prendre acquired by grant or prescription as appurtenant cannot be used as a right in gross by one not holding any connection with the land." THE question was considered in the case of Bholanath Nundi v. Midnapore Zamindari to. Ltd., (1904) 8 CWN 425. THE matter was also considered in the case of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. M/s. Anti Biotic Project Virbhadra, Rishikesh, AIR 1979 All. 355 . In that case the agreement stipulated that the respondent company would be drawing 11 cusecs of water from river Ganga at Rishikesh annully for a period of 25 years in consideration of yearly payment of Rs. 6000/ per cusecs per annum. When the document was submitted to the Collector a doubt arose about its true nature. THE matter came up before the Board of Revenue and thereafter the case was referred. In the above case a Special Bench of the Court held that two things were necessary in order to be a 'profits a prendre'-firstly claiming an interest in the land and secondly, it must be in respect of produce or profit of the soil. THE Special Bench further held in that case that both the requirements were wanting. Reference was also made to the case of Anand Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 17 . In that case the dispute was about fishery rights. Their Lordships held that the rights were in the nature of 'profits a prendre' and the same could only be acquired by a document in writing. In that case both the requirements necessary for claiming the rights of 'profits a prendre' were satisfied. 15. IN the present case both the conditions were satisfied. What was being claimed was a right to take away the produce of the land i.e. river bed viz, the sand. The sand of a river bed was in the nature of profits of the soil. It was left there by alluvial process. It was required to be collected, stacked and taken away. What was being claimed was a right to take away the produce of the land i.e. river bed viz, the sand. The sand of a river bed was in the nature of profits of the soil. It was left there by alluvial process. It was required to be collected, stacked and taken away. Secondly, the right was not in respect of the land itself but an interest, in the sense, with the produce viz., sand on the specified piece of land. Similar is the question of sand and gravel which was also available on the land in the Tehsil of Hamirpur. 16. THE nature of the right in the present case was analogous to a profit a prendre. THE land itself was not the subject matter of the agreement. THE land could not be taken away or used in any way except that the produce viz., sand and gravel which lay on the land. It could not be taken away from any other land except the one which was specified. In the present case the intention of the parties was clear from the documents in question that only the produce had to be collected, stacked and taken away. It was a specified right without in any way affecting the land on which the produce was available. Since there was no transfer of immovable property the document was not intended to be lease but was in the nature of a licence i. e. to take away the produce of the land. In the case of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. M/s. Anti Biotic Project Virbhadra, Rishikesh (supra) the water of the river Ganga flowed on and all that was intended was to supply 6000 cusecs of water from the river to the respondents' premises. THE respondents had no right on the land on which the river flowed. THE agreement entered into with them did not give them any right whatsoever in the river or the river bed. What was being done was to supply water under a contract. That was a case which did not fulfil the two essential ingredients of the right known as profits a prendre. In the present case the position is entirely different as seen above. What was being done was to supply water under a contract. That was a case which did not fulfil the two essential ingredients of the right known as profits a prendre. In the present case the position is entirely different as seen above. In our opinion, the right guaranteed under the agreement only permitted the respondents to carry away the produce v\hich was available there on the surface of the land, whether it was sand or gravel. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the rights conferred on the petitioners under the agreement were in the nature of 'profits a prendre' and not, lease. It was liable to stamp duty as is required under Article 5 (c) of the Stamp Act. We answer the Reference accordingly. Reference answered.