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1983 DIGILAW 91 (GUJ)

NARSINHBHAI DAHYABHAI VAGHELA v. STATE

1983-04-20

I.C.BHATT, S.L.TALATI

body1983
S. L. TALATI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge Baroda by which he convicted the appellant accused for an offence punishable under sec. 302 1. P. C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment on 30-1-1980 in Sessions Case No. 73 of 1979. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution there was no direct evidence against the accused and the prosecution relied upon the circumstantial evidence. The admitted facts were that the accused was working as a ward boy in the S. S. G. hospital at Baroda while the wife of the deceased was working as an Aya in that hospital. On the relevant day the wife of the deceased Bai Chanchal was in the hospital admitted for the purpose of delivery and therefore deceased Chimanbhai D. Parmar was alone at his house. Children were for the time being residing at the house of father-in-low of Chimanbhai. Now the circumstances on which the prosecution relied upon are the following circumstances;1 Accused was known to the deceased and he was frequently visiting his house. 2 Accused was working as a ward-boy in the S. S. G. Hospital and the wife of the deceased was working as Aya in that hospital. 3 The accused was absent in the hospital on 1-3-1979. It is admitted that those three circumstances are innocuous circumstances and if they are taken one by one and as a whole they can lead to nothing. However alongwith these circumstances the other circumstances which are tried to be linked up are the following circumstances and according to the prosecution it is these circumstances which reading together with other circumstances form a chain which point out to the guilt of the accused. The other circumstances are1 The accused last visited the house of the deceased at 9-00 p. m. On 1-3-19792 Love letter Ex. 35 was found from the house of the deceased written by the accused and it was suspected to have been written for Chanchal-wife of the deceased. 3 The accused produced a key of the lock of the house of the deceased from the toilet of Ward No. 20 of S. S. G. Hospital Baroda. 4 After smelling the towel the dog caught hold of the accused by pants from a line which was arranged by the prosecution. 3 The accused produced a key of the lock of the house of the deceased from the toilet of Ward No. 20 of S. S. G. Hospital Baroda. 4 After smelling the towel the dog caught hold of the accused by pants from a line which was arranged by the prosecution. ( 3 ) NOW these circumstances are required to be considered one by one and we have to see whether the requirement of law in regard to the circumstantial evidence is established or not as held by the Supreme Court in HANUMANT GOVIND NARGUNDKAR AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 343. In that case it was observed as under:in dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take place of legal proof. In cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to he proved. In other words there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. Now therefore we have to see and find out whether each circumstance is fully established. Thereafter from the circumstances which are fully established we have to take those circumstances only into consideration and then consider whether those circumstances form a chain which is so complete that it points to one and one conclusion and that conclusion is guilt of the accused. Now to take the first circumstance the circumstance is according to the prosecution that the accused last visited the house of the deceased at 9. 00 p. m. on 1-3-79. To establish this aspect oft he case the prosecution relied on the evidence of Laxmiben P. W. ( 4 ) EX. 19. Now to take the first circumstance the circumstance is according to the prosecution that the accused last visited the house of the deceased at 9. 00 p. m. on 1-3-79. To establish this aspect oft he case the prosecution relied on the evidence of Laxmiben P. W. ( 4 ) EX. 19. She in her evidence stated that on 1-3-1979 Chimanlal had gone to the house of his father-in-law at about 8 or 9 p. m. to give not milk for the baby and thereafter he returned home and went upstairs. Thereafter she heard the noise of chain and Chimanlal asked as to who the person was. The person who was tapping the chain said I am Narsinh. She thereafter stated that she thereafter had not seen Narsinh. In cross-examination she stated that she had not seen Narshi on 1-3-1979 but she had heard the voice of Narsinh. That position is also stated in a doubtful way. She stated that she felt that the voice was of Narshi. She does not specifically say that she was sure about it. She further stated that she had no occasion to ever talk with Narshi. Now here was a lady who had no occasion to talk with Narshi. She does not say that she heard the voice of Narshi definitely or that she was sure about it. What she says is that she felt that it was the voice of Narshi. This would mean that she herself was in doubt. She felt that it was the voice of Narshi. It would mean that she felt that it may not be the voice of Narshi. May in such parlance is always to be considered as may not. Therefore this circumstance is a circumstance which is of doubtful nature. Therefore this circumstance in the eye of law is not fully established. 5 The second circumstance is that love letter Ex. 35 was found from the house of the deceased. We have gone through that letter. In fact it is a love letter but it is not addressed to any person. It is found from one book. Prosecution is not specific about the fact that it was found with any of the articles of Chanchal. Prosecution thereafter examined P. W. 2 Ex. 11-Gajendraprasad Shantilal-handwriting expert and proved that the writing was in the hand of the accused. It is found from one book. Prosecution is not specific about the fact that it was found with any of the articles of Chanchal. Prosecution thereafter examined P. W. 2 Ex. 11-Gajendraprasad Shantilal-handwriting expert and proved that the writing was in the hand of the accused. Now that would never amount that that letter was addressed to Bai Chanchal. It may be that the accused and the deceased may be the friends and the accused might have written such letter for some one else to be delivered by the deceased to some other lady or that he might have written this letter for the deceased and the deceased wanted to deliver it to some other lady. Unless this letter was written to Chanchal or unless it was found from the exclusive possession of Bai Chanchal it cannot be suggested for a moment that this letter was written to or meant for Chanchal. This circumstance therefore cannot be considered to be sufficiently established to connect the accused with the crime. ( 5 ) THE third circumstance on which the prosecution relies is that the accused produced a key of the lock of the house of the deceased from the toilet of ward no. 20 of S. S G. Hospital Baroda. To establish this aspect of the case the prosecution examined panch witness Pravinbhai Bhikhabhai P. W. 20 Ex. 37. Pravinbhai in his evidence stated that at 5. 45 p. m. on 4-3-1979 when panchnama was to be prepared accused was present and he stated that the willingly shows a key. This would only mean knowledge of the key and not the possession of the key. Possession and knowledge are two different aspects in law. For establishing possession the statement under sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act would have been I have concealed a key or I have placed a key which I am willing to produce. Unless it is an admitted fact that it is he who has placed it possession cannot be imputed to him. Production can impute knowledge. If a person has a knowledge that a particular thing is lying at a particular place that will only establish that he knew that at a particular place a particular thing is lying. This would impute knowledge and not possession. Production can impute knowledge. If a person has a knowledge that a particular thing is lying at a particular place that will only establish that he knew that at a particular place a particular thing is lying. This would impute knowledge and not possession. Thereafter according to this panch witness accused took the police party to Ward No. 20 and produced two keys out of which one key of Godrej was taken possession of. Harshadrai Shukla P. W. 27 in his evidence stated that it was that key with which the lock article 11 could be opened. This fact is not deposed by the panch witness. Not deposed in the sense that he was not asked about it. It is one thing not to take a panch witness at all. It is another thing that a panch may not ultimately support. It is third thing to take a panch and not to ask a particular question to that panch. Under these circumstances it is highly doubtful whether the key that was produced by the accused was in his possession and it is more doubtful as to whether it was with that key that the lock was opened. That aspect is not satisfactorily established. ( 6 ) THE further circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that the dog caught hold of the accused by his pants and took him out from the line. For that purpose also the prosecution relied upon the evidence Pravinbhai Bhikhabhai Patel P. W. 20 Ex. 37 who in his evidence has stated that on 4-3-1979 at about 4. 00 p. m. he was called as a panch where dog was also brought and there was a line of nine person and the dog caught hold of the pant of the accused and the panchnama Ex. 38 was prepared. Now this panch witness is also not asked as to whether this dog was ever in his presence given the smell of the cloth which was taken out from the mouth of the deceased. This fact was never deposed because it was never asked to the panch witness. Now therefore this circumstance again becomes a useless circumstance. Now therefore none of these circumstances are fully established. There is no question of forming the chain. But before we close we may refer to the evidence of Laxmanbhai Vitthalbhai Parmar P. W. 4 Ex. 17-father-in-law of the deceased. Now therefore this circumstance again becomes a useless circumstance. Now therefore none of these circumstances are fully established. There is no question of forming the chain. But before we close we may refer to the evidence of Laxmanbhai Vitthalbhai Parmar P. W. 4 Ex. 17-father-in-law of the deceased. He in his evidence has stated that his daughter Chanchal was married to Chimanbhai about five years before and his son-in-law and daughter Chanchalben were residing in Vankarvas in the back portion of the house of Gopalbhai Chhitabhai. According to him Chanchal was admitted in the hospital for delivery and on the day of the incident she was in the hospital. His son-in-law was dining at his place. He further stated that on 1-3-1979 his son-in-law had taken food at his place. Thereafter on the second day he had not gone. On 3-3-1979 he had gone to the house of one Ganeshbhai but he could not get any information regarding Chimanbhai. Ultimately on 4-3-1979 Laxmiben informed him in the morning at about 8. 30 p. m. that foul smell was coming from the house of Chimanbhai and therefore he went at that place and ultimately he found that Chimanbhai was dead. He therefore filed complaint Ex. 18. His evidence is of very doubtful nature. If Chanchal was admitted in the hospital for delivery and his son-in law during that period was to dine at his place and he did take his meal on 1-3-1979 and thereafter he did not come on 2 3-79 and 3 it hardly stands to reason as to why the father-in law did not inquire about his son-in-law On 2-3-1979 and 3-3-1979 by at least going to his house and finding out whether he was present at that place or not. He could have gone at S. S. G. Hospital contacted Chanchal and asked her whether Chimanbhai had contacted her. He did nothing till Laxmiben informed him on 4-3-1979. This is the circumstance which pin points something else but we are not-concerned with this particular aspect of the case. It is sufficient to say that so far as the prosecution is concerned it has failed to establish any circumstance. The net result is that this appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside The accused is set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed. .