ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The facts, in brief, are these :- The petitioner is the State of U.P. before me. Respondent No. 3 Aditya Narain Singh was treated as the tenure-holder and the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to him. He filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter an appeal was preferred by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 before the appellate court and the same was allowed by the appellate court by its impugned judgment dated 10-3-82, which is annexure 2 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on record. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the State has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard the learned Chief Standing Counsel. In opposition, Sri A.P. Singh, Learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 3 and 4, has made his submissions. 3. The controversy is a short one. Aditya Narain Singh's father Roop Singh was possessed of landed property including some Sir and Khudkasht. He died in 1950 leaving behind his son Aditya Narain and his widow Smt. Davendra Kumari, who is respondent No. 4 in this petition. A contention was raised before the Prescribed Authority that in the Sir and Khudkasht which was left by the late Sri Roop Singh, his widow Davendra Kumari had an equal share along with her son Aditya Narain Singh. This contention was based on Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 as amended by the U.P. Act No. 11 of 1942. This contention was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. But was accepted by the appellate court. 4. Learned Chief Standing Counsel contended that the mother's share should have been clubbed with the share of her son Aditya Narain, who was treated as a tenure- holder. He invited my attention to the definition of `family' in S. 3(7) and to the definition of `tenure-holder' in S. 3(17) of the Act. In my view, this contention is not tenable. Learned counsel emphasised that in S. 3(17) the expression used in cl. (a) is `woman' and not the `wife'. In my view, this is really not decisive because the further phraseology used is "a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder". In my view, this contention is not tenable. Learned counsel emphasised that in S. 3(17) the expression used in cl. (a) is `woman' and not the `wife'. In my view, this is really not decisive because the further phraseology used is "a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder". This makes it clear that by the expression `woman' what is meant is the wife of the tenure-holder husband. In S. 3(7) the definition of [he family is such that the mother of a tenure-holder is not a member of the family. The clubbing which takes place under S. 5(3) of the Act is with reference to the family. Therefore, the contention that the mother's share also should have been clubbed with the tenure-holder sons' share is not acceptable. The appellate court's judgment, in my view, suffers from no error of law, much less an apparent error of law. There is no want of jurisdiction in the said judgment. 5. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.