JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 3 Jai Bir Singh Bisht is the landlord of an accommodation which was let out to the petitioner. An application was made by the respondent No. 3 for release of the said accommodation in his favour under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that he needed it bonafide for his own use. The parties entered into a compromise before the prescribed Authority on 7th November, 1978. A copy of the compromise application has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The application for release was decided on the same day by an order which has been quoted in paragraph 5 of the writ petition. This order reads :- "Case decided in terms of compromise. File be consigned to Record Room." The counsel for the petitioner has conceded that the date of the order has wrongly been shown as 15th September, 1980 in paragraph 5 of the writ petition due to typing mistake. He admits that the said order was passed on the same date, viz, 7th November, 1978. Annexure 1, namely, the copy of the application for compromise indicates that the petitioner accepted the case set-up the respondent No. 3 in his application for release and the respondent No. 3 in his turn granted 1/2 year's time to the petitioner to vacate the accommodation in question. It was specially stated in the said application that the petitioner shall vacate the accommodation in question and hand over possession over the same to the respondent No. 3 on 31st May, 1980. 2. Subsequently, an application was made by the respondent No. 3 on 12th November, 1981 under Section 23 of the Act with a prayer that possession may be delivered to him over the accommodation in question after dispossessing the petitioner in pursuance of the order of release dated 7th November, 1978 inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to vacate the accommodation in question even after the expiry of the time granted to him for this purpose. The application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the respondent No. 3 had accepted rent from the petitioner even after 31st May, 1980, and consequently there was wavier of the determination of tenancy. The application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the respondent No. 3 had accepted rent from the petitioner even after 31st May, 1980, and consequently there was wavier of the determination of tenancy. His case was that indeed the parties had entered into a fresh contract of tenancy in April 1980, as is apparent from his objection, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure 3 to the writ petition and that the application under Section 23 was liable to be dismissed. The Prescribed Authority took the view that since rent for the period even after 31st May, 1980, had been accepted by respondent No. 3 a fresh contract of tenancy came into being and consequently the application under Section 23 was liable to be dismissed. On this view the said application was dismissed on 29th March, 1981. 3. Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order passed by the Prescribed Authority before the District Judge which was subsequently converted into revision which was allowed by the District Judge on 10th December, 1982. The District Judge relying on decision of this Court in Radhey Shayam & another v. The VIth Additional District Judge and others, 1977 Alld. Rent Cases p. 115, held that in a case there could not be any waiver merely by acceptance of rent. The District Judge decided the Prescribed Authority to take steps to evict the petitioner from the accommodation in question apparently under Section 23 of the Act. It is this order dated 10th December, 1982, which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 4. It was urged by the counsel for the petitioner that no revision lay against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside that order in the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 which was subsequently treated as a revision. 5. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am of opinion that there is substance in the this submission. However, I am further of opinion that in view of decision of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) the view taken by the Prescribed Authority also in its order dated 29th March, 1981 suffers from manifest error of law and cannot be sustained. However, I am further of opinion that in view of decision of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) the view taken by the Prescribed Authority also in its order dated 29th March, 1981 suffers from manifest error of law and cannot be sustained. In the case of Radhey Shyam, (supra) it was held :- "The last contention of learned Counsel is that, after the Additional District Judge, the landlord on June 10, 1975, accepted rent from the petitioner and, therefore, this amounted to a waiver of termination of the tenancy, sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, provides that on the expiration of a period of 80 days from an order of eviction under this section the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined. The tenancy is thus determined by a provision of law consequent upon order for release under Section 21 and not by the act of the parties. The legal consequence of the order passed under Section 21 cannot be arrested or nullified by the act of parties. Of course, even after the passing of an order under Section 21 and after the expiry of one month therefore, the parties may enter into fresh tenancy and may agree not to execute the order for release under Section 21. But that is not the case. Mere acceptance of rent in these circumstances may not amount to creation of a fresh tenancy." 6. As seen above, the Prescribed Authority in its order dated 29th March, 1981, took the view that fresh tenancy was created merely on the ground that rent for the period even after 31st May, 1980, had been accepted by respondent No. 3. This view is obviously in the teeth of the decision of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra). In this view of the matter it is not only the order of the District Judge but even the order of the Prescribed Authority which deserve to be quashed in the present writ petition with a direction to the Prescribed Authority to decide the plea as to whether a fresh contract of tenancy had been c created or not afresh and decide the application under Section 23 of the Act on the basis of its findings on this question. 7. 7. It was then urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of release on the basis of a compromise was itself without jurisdiction and consequently could not be executed under Section 23 of the Act. In this connection, it was pointed out that the Prescribed Authority while allowing the application for release on the basis of the compromise did not record any specific finding that the need of the landlord was bonafide. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that when respondent No. 3 had made an application for release on the ground that his need was bonafide and his case was accepted in the compromise application the petitioner by his conduct in accepting the case of the respondent No. 3 dispensed with the proof of the fact that the need of respondent No. 3 was bonafide. The Prescribed Authority was consequently perfectly justified in allowing the application for release on the basis of the admission made by the petitioners in regard to the need of the respondent No. 3. Simply because the Prescribed Authority did not record a formal finding that the need of respondent No. 3 was bonafide and disposed of the application for release in terms of the compromise, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It is not the form but the substance which is to be looked into in such matters. I accordingly find it difficult to agree with the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that the order of release is not executable on this ground. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the orders dated 29th March, 1981 and 10th December, 1982, passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge respectively are quashed and the Prescribed Authority, Uttar Kashi, is directed to decide the application made by respondent No. 3 under Section 23 of the Act afresh in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made above. Since the application for release was filed about five years back in the years 1978 the Prescribed Authority shall decide the aforesaid application expeditiously. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.