JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition. 2. The landlord has filed an application praying for the release of the accommodation in question under the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The petitioner is a Teli by caste and has a small business of extracting oil for which purpose he used a Kohlu which is driven by bullocks. According to the petitioner, the accommodation in his possession on the ground floor consists of one small Astable divided into three portions one after the other, the front portion of which was used for extracting oil and the middle portion was used for residential purpose. It was asserted that there was neither any kitchen nor latrine, bath room, verandah or courtyard in the possession of the petitioner. The family of the petitioner consists of himself, his wife and eight children and it was averred that the accommodation in his possession was not sufficient for the petitioner to live in. It was then asserted that the tenant respondent who was living on the first floor, was not using the accommodation himself but unnecessarily retaining it in order to have some financial gain. It was further the case of the petitioner that the respondent-tenant had a House No. 152, in mohalla Sabungaran, Meerut and he was residing in that house with his family and living comfortably. 3. The tenant-respondent contested the application filed by the petitioner. It was asserted by the tenant that his tenancy was old and the had been a tenant for the last 40 years and he was both living in it and using it for storing fruit for his fruit business. 4. The Prescribed Authority considered two questions, namely (1) whether the premises in question was bonafide required by the petitioner and (2) the question of comparative hardship to the parties. 5. The Prescribed Authority found that the accommodation on the ground floor consisted of one small stable divided into three portions one after the other. The first portion which faced the road was used for working the Kolhu and the back portion was used for residential purposes. It was further found that neither there was any kitchen nor bath room, latrine, verandah and courtyard on the ground floor. The first portion which faced the road was used for working the Kolhu and the back portion was used for residential purposes. It was further found that neither there was any kitchen nor bath room, latrine, verandah and courtyard on the ground floor. The Prescribed Authority took into account the Commissioner's report and map and it then took up the case of the tenant that the petitioner was living in House No. 275 which consisted of two big shops and two big rooms. It noticed that the petitioner had denied this fact and it found that the Commissioner's report belied this fact. It further found that the petitioner neither owned nor possessed house Nos. 275 and 409 as alleged by the tenant. It then found that a portion of house No. 275 which was vacated by the tenant, was partitioned by a temporary wall and was joined with House No. 275 of which it was previously a part and became part of the old accommodation consisting of House Nos. 272 to 274. It found that the petitioner's family consisted of himself, his wife and seven children. The eldest daughter was found 20 years old. The other finding was that the petitioner required the accommodation for his own use. 6. Taking up the question of comparative hardship, it found that the tenant will undoubtedly suffer hardship if he is required to vacate the accommodation because the accommodation in his hands consisting of house No. 152 was insufficient to meet the requirement of his entire family but it found that the tenant's hardship will not be greater than the petitioner who will be required to hire some accommodation to accommodate his family, if the release is not granted. 7. Having come to the conclusion that the petitioner's need was genuine and bonafide on a comparative hardship it found that the landlord's hardship would be greater. The Prescribed Authority accordingly allowed the application of the landlord for release. 8. The tenant appealed. The appellate Court held that in view of the fact that two previous applications for release filed by the applicant had been rejected, the third application out of which the present proceedings have arisen, was barred by res judicata. The Prescribed Authority accordingly allowed the application of the landlord for release. 8. The tenant appealed. The appellate Court held that in view of the fact that two previous applications for release filed by the applicant had been rejected, the third application out of which the present proceedings have arisen, was barred by res judicata. This view of the appellate Court cannot be sustained as under Rule 18(2) of the Rules framed under the Act which provides that where an application of a landlord against a tenant under Section 21 for release of a building of any specified part thereof is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision, the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. In other words, the rule making authority has laid down that if a second application is made within one year of the rejection of an earlier application, the finding in that application shall be accepted. The rule making authority obviously did not rule out of the making of a second application for release after the period of one year has expired from the close of the proceeding. 9. In paragraph 16 of the writ petition it has been mentioned that the first application for release filed by the petitioner against the tenant was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 28.5.1973 and appeal against that order was also dismissed by the order dated 15.7.1976. It is then stated that the second application for release was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 19.4.1977 on the ground that the application was barred by the principle of res judicata under Rule 18(2) of the Rules. It is then stated that the instant application under Section 21 of the Act for the release of the accommodation was filed in June, 1978. The application was obviously not barred by any form of res judicata. The Appellate Authority was, therefore, in error in treating the application as being barred by res judicata. 10. The Appellate Authority further found that some accommodation which was part of house No. 272 and which was in the tenancy of Sita Ram, has come in the possession of the petitioner. That accommodation consisted of two Kothas. The Appellate Authority was, therefore, in error in treating the application as being barred by res judicata. 10. The Appellate Authority further found that some accommodation which was part of house No. 272 and which was in the tenancy of Sita Ram, has come in the possession of the petitioner. That accommodation consisted of two Kothas. It then went on to hold that the application was Teli by caste and his children were getting no education. The Appellate Authority held that : "It means that the landlord and his family does not command any high status and does not need any separate Kitchen and latrine in the accommodation in its possession. Further giving due consideration to the size of this Astable, it cannot apparently be said to be in any way inadequate for the family of the landlord." 11. It found the Astable in the possession of the landlord was obviously enough for both residential purpose and for running oil business which included pressing oil. 12. The Appellate Authority further found that the tenant had an ancestral house No. 152 in Mohalla Sabungara. It found that the sons of the tenant were living in the house. It also found that the two brothers were living in a portion of House No. 152. The size of the House No. 152 in mohalla Sabungaran is 25.6" x 16.9" and it was found to consist of one Kotha, one Kothari, verandah and a courtyard on the ground floor without any facility of latrine and bath room. On the first floor, it was found to have one Kotha and one tin shed. The house is very old. 13. The appellate Court then noticed the fact that in the accommodation in dispute, the tenant did store fruit and he sold the fruit near the accommodation in question. With these findings, the appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the petition under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 14. The appellate Court's finding that the petitioner being a man of low status did not require any separate accommodation or larine, is unwarranted. The lack of educational or financial status cannot deprive a landlord of his right to live reasonably in his own accommodation if he possesses it. 14. The appellate Court's finding that the petitioner being a man of low status did not require any separate accommodation or larine, is unwarranted. The lack of educational or financial status cannot deprive a landlord of his right to live reasonably in his own accommodation if he possesses it. As I have already held that the petition filed by the landlord was not barred by res judicata and that the appellate Court did not properly consider the comparative hardship to the parties while allowing the appeal, there is no option but to set aside the order of Appellate Authority, and direct the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal filed by the tenant-appellant afresh. 15. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the Appellate Authority is directed to decide the Misc. Appeal No. 300 of 1979, Sabu v. Shakur, afresh in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs.