JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. THIS writ petition arises out of a suit filed by the petitioners for partition of their share in the disputed property under section 176 of the UP ZA and LR Act. The plaintiffs-petitioners had claimed 1/3 share in the disputed property on the basis of the following pedigree ;- 2. THE petitioners had not accepted Smt. Sumaria as widow of Ajodhya and had claimed 1/3 share in the disputed property per pedigree given above. The claim of the petitioners was contested by the contesting opposite parties as would be evident from the issues framed in the suit. 3. THE trial court partly decreed the plaintiffs' suit as is evident from the judgment dated 6-5-1966 (Annexure 7'). THEreafter the petitioners preferred an appeal which was dismissed and in second appeal also the petitioners have failed, as is evident from the judgment dated 30-7-1975. Aggrieved by the judgments of the revenue courts the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the sale deed of the year 1906 was not binding upon the petitioners because it was not executed by Smt. Somaria as guardian of the petitioners. Before me it has been admitted that Smt. Somaria was widow of Ajodhya, though originally the petitioners had denied that Smt. Somaria was widow of Ajodhya. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the first appellate court has wrongly refused to examine the contents of various sale deeds. 5. THE third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the sale deed of the year 1906 did not relate to plot no. 290 in the present suit, yet the revenue courts have treated that plot as part of the sale deed of the year 1906. 6. LASTLY it has been contended that the statement of Bhagwati has not been considered while dealing with the claim of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that the petitioners' conduct in denying Smt. Sumaria as widow of Ajodhya is enough to disentitle them to press their claim in the present writ petition. 7. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that the petitioners' conduct in denying Smt. Sumaria as widow of Ajodhya is enough to disentitle them to press their claim in the present writ petition. 7. THE second submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties is that the sale deed of the year 1906 is fully binding upon the petitioners even though Smt. Sumaria has not described herself as guardian of the plaintiffs-petitioners while selling the property belonging to the petitioners. It has been stressed that the sale deed was for the benefit of the estate of the minor hence it was binding upon the petitioners. 8. THE third submission on behalf of the contesting opposite parties was that the mistake regarding plot no. 290 was only a clerical mistake in sale deed of the year 1906 and the revenue courts have correctly construed that document and they have arrived at correct conclusion. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties the revenue courts in the impugned judgments have considered relevant evidence on record and they have arrived at correct conclusions, hence their judgments need not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. In rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as Smt. Somaria did not transfer the property of the minor treating the sold property as the property of the minor, hence the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties based upon the dictum of law laid down in Mukundi v. Sarabsukh, ILR 6 All. 417 at 419 (1) and Mathu Nadar v. Chinnadorai Nadar, AIR 1951 Madras 643 should not be accepted. 9. I have considered the contentions raised on bernlf of the parties. I think that the petitioners wrongly asserted that Smt. Samaria was not widow of Ajodhya, and thereby they have weakened their stand. The finding of fact recorded by the revenue courts that Smt. Sumaria was widow of Ajodhya appears to me quite correct in the circumstances of the present case. 10. I think that the petitioners wrongly asserted that Smt. Samaria was not widow of Ajodhya, and thereby they have weakened their stand. The finding of fact recorded by the revenue courts that Smt. Sumaria was widow of Ajodhya appears to me quite correct in the circumstances of the present case. 10. THE bare perusal of the sale deed of the year 1906 indicates that Smt. Somaria had acted as guardian of the minor while executing a mortgage deed in the year 1897 hence in selling the property of the minor in the year 1906 along with other co-sharers of the property, if she had failed to describe herself as guardian of the minor, it would be a case of clear omission and on that count the petitioners cannot be permitted to take any benefit. THE sale deed of the year 1906 appears to me was for the purpose of paying previous debts, hence it was for the benefit of the estate of the minor. Moreover, the petitioners have failed to challenge the sale deed of the year 1906 within time after obtaining majority. I think that the sale deed was rightly held as binding upon the petitioners and the petitioners cannot be permitted to ignore the sale deed in this litigation. It is note-worthy that Smt. Sumaria has transferred the property of the minor as guardian in the year 1897 and she joined with other co-sharers while executing the sale deed of the year 1906 without describing herself as guardian of the minor and indicating herself as tenure-holder of the property sold, I think on the following observation of a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Mathu Nadar v. Ckinnadorai Nadar, AIR 1951 Madras 643 the sale deed would be binding upon the present petitioners. The relevant observation of the learned Judge in the case reads as below vide paragraph 7 :- " ...... If the purpose for which the alienation was made one which would be binding on the family and if the transferor was in fact the manager of the family even though the transferor purports to act on his own behalf and not as manager representing the junior members of the family still the transfer would be effective to convey the entire interest in the family property to the alienee. The transfer in such a case would be considered as having been entered into in the capacity in which the alienor could have conveyed the entire property. The mere fact that the manager does not describe himself as manager or sets up an exclusive title to the property conveyed is not such an assertion of a hostile claim in himself as against the other members of the family as would prevent the alienee from getting a title to the entire property if the purpose of the alienation was one binding on the family. In such a case the transferor might still be regarded as having entered into the transaction in the capacity in which he could bind the family. " 11. IN the present case Smt. Somaria had no right and title to the property and only her minor son had interest in the property, hence when she joined the other co-sharers in executing the sale deed of the year 1906 she purported to transfer the interest of the minor as she had no interest in the property. Added to this the adjustment of the mortgage deed executed by her as a guardian of the minor is also involved in the sale deed, hence it be inferred that she executed the sale deed in the capacity of being guardian of her minor son. 12. IN Mukundi v. Sarabsukh, ILR VI All. 417 it has been held that where a guardian conveyed the property of her minor son by a deed of sale in which she did not in terms describe herself as his guardian, the omission was immaterial and the sale deed conveyed the property of the minor. IN the present case also I think that the execution of sale deed by Smt. Somaria without describing herself as guardian of the petitioners did convey the property to the transferee. Since the petitioners have not challenged the sale deed within time after attaining majority, they cannot be permitted to ignore the sale did in the present litigation. As regards the petitioners' contention that plot no. 290 was not mentioned in the sale deed hence the revenue courts committed an error in treating the sale deed in respect of that plot also. As regards the petitioners' contention that plot no. 290 was not mentioned in the sale deed hence the revenue courts committed an error in treating the sale deed in respect of that plot also. The mistake in the sale deed is of clerical nature and looking to the area in question and the area mentioned in the sale deed it can be inferred that the sale deed really related to plot no. 290 which was wrongly mentioned as 590. 13. THE learned counsel for the petitioners has wrongly emphasised that the first appellate court did not examine the contents of the documents rather the first appellate court accepted the sale deed looking to the area conveyed by that deed, THE argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is about the appraisal of the documents by the revenue courts In the circumstances of the present case I am not prepared to hold that the revenue courts have patently erred in appraising the documents. 14. THE statement of Bhagwati would also not be material evidence to challenge the findings recorded by the revenue courts regarding the shares of the petitioners in the disputed land. In the circumstances of this case the trial court has rightly excluded the area sold by the tenure-holders and has correctly arrived at a conclusion about the share of the petitioners in the disputed land. I am not prepared to hold that the trial court has patently erred in determining the share of the petitioners in the disputed land. In this way all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail and the writ petition is devoid of merits. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.