JUDGMENT - D.N. MEHTA, J.:---The plaintiffs in this suit seek a decree against the defendants for a sum of Rs. 55, 950/- or such other sum as this Court may deem fit, together with interest on the said sum at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till judgment and thereafter at the rate of 6% per annum till payment. The plaintiffs also pray for costs of the suit. 2. In their plaint, the plaintiffs have stated that they were a Company registered under the Companies Act. The defendants were a statutory body incorporated under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1965 as amended by the Major Port Trusts (Amendment) Act, 1974. The plaintiffs imported from Japan Rubber Plasticizers under their Import Licence No. PL/2683652 of 23-11-1973 through their local agent Messrs.. R.S. Kandalkar and Co. The goods were shipped to the plaintiffs by steamer s.s. ''State of Bihar''. The C.I.P. value of the said goods was Rs. 52,182-28 p. The said steamer s.s. ''State of Bihar'' arrived in Bombay on 16th May, 1974. The landing date given was 13th June, 1974. The date entered for Home Consumption was 26th June, 1974. 3. The plaintiffs stated that according to the law and procedure in force in the Bombay Customs, the Bombay Port Trust authorities would not deliver goods to a consignee unless and until all the Customs formalities were completed, the Customs duty was assessed and paid and the Import Bills of entry were produced before the Bombay Port Trust authorities. The said goods belonging to the plaintiffs were detained by the Customs Authorities due to Import Trade Control formalities with regard to the acceptance of the licence. In the month of August 1974, the appraiser of the Customs Department questioned the validity of the plaintiffs' Import Licence. The plaintiffs by their letter dated 28th August, 1974, gave the necessary information and explained in detail as to how the said goods fell within the category of rubber plasticizers. The case was then put up before the Deputy Collector of Customs. The plaintiffs explained all the facts to the Deputy Collector of Customs. However, the Deputy Collector by his Order No. S/10-183/74 dated 7th December, 1974 levied a penalty of Rs. 21,000/- on the plaintiffs. 4. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Appellate Collector of Customs on or about 15th January, 1975. The plaintiffs explained all the facts to the Deputy Collector of Customs. However, the Deputy Collector by his Order No. S/10-183/74 dated 7th December, 1974 levied a penalty of Rs. 21,000/- on the plaintiffs. 4. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Appellate Collector of Customs on or about 15th January, 1975. The Appellate Collector of Customs, after hearing the parties, by his order dated 7th July, 1975 held that the material imported by the plaintiffs viz. rubber plasticizers were within the meaning of the entry in the list attached to the relative Import Licence and, therefore, allowed the plaintiffs' said appeal and waived the penalty levied by the Deputy Collector of Customs. 5. Thereafter the goods were released without penalty or even a caution Memo. The plaintiffs applied for and obtained from the Collector of Customs, Bombay full detention certificate for the period from 20-7-1974 to 19-7-973 against the Bill of Entry bearing No. 242/206 dated 16th May, 1974 for the goods which had arrived by s.s. ''State of Bihar''. 6. The plaintiffs submitted the relevant Bills of Entry along with the said Detention Certificate to the Bombay Port Trust authorities for calculation of the Port Trust charges. The charges as calculated by the Bombay Port Trust authorities already included demurrage charges on the said goods instead of giving full benefit of demurrage charges under Detention Certificate. The Bombay Port Trust authorities, however, gave a concession of only about Rs. 8000/- and demanded a sum of Rs. 50,004-70 p. as demurrage charges. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs were compelled to pay the said charges vide Bombay Port Trust Dock's receipt for Rs. 50,004-70 p. dated 25th August, 1975. 7. Being aggrieved by the levy of the demurrage charges, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust in the month of October 1975. The Chairman by his letter dated 13th January, 1976 rejected the plaintiffs' appeal for the refund of the said illegal demurrage charges. 8. The plaintiffs stated that the consignment consisted of goods liable to duty under section 20 of the Customs Act as it was in force at the relevant period. The plaintiffs stated that the said consignment was detained by the Customs Department due to the operation of the Import Trade Control Procedure. 8. The plaintiffs stated that the consignment consisted of goods liable to duty under section 20 of the Customs Act as it was in force at the relevant period. The plaintiffs stated that the said consignment was detained by the Customs Department due to the operation of the Import Trade Control Procedure. The period of such detention was not attributable to any fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiffs. The defendants were, therefore, not justified in charging demurrage charges from the plaintiffs for the period of such detention. The defendants had wrongfully demanded from the plaintiffs demurrage charges in respect of such periods and wrongfully recovered from the plaintiffs the said sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. on 25th August, 1975. 9. The plaintiffs stated that in demanding and recovering such demurrage charges, the defendants had taken advantage of their own wrong and so had failed to discharge the statutory duty imposed upon them by the said Act and had acted wrongfully and unjustifiably and contrary to the provisions of the said Act. The plaintiffs submitted that the defendants were bound and liable to pay to the plaintiffs the said sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. which the plaintiffs were compelled to deposit with the defendants in order to take delivery of the said consignment containing the goods which had arrived as per vessel s.s ''State of Bihar''. 10. By their Advocate's letter dated 12th March, 1976 the plaintiffs served a statutory notice on the defendants of their intention to file a suit. The defendants had acknowledged receipt thereof, but did not care to reply to the same. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed the present suit with prayers as aforesaid. 11. The defendants in their written statement have firstly submitted that the suit was barred by limitation under section 87 of the Bombay Port Trusts Act, 1879 and/or section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 as amended by the Major Port Trusts (Amendment) Act, 1974. 12. The defendants stated that no responsibility attached to the defendants in respect of the goods in question after 7 days of the landing of the said goods in charge of the defendants, by reason of the provisions of section 61-A(2) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 and/or by reason of the provisions of section 4 of the Regulation dated 1st February, 1973, viz. the Port of Bombay (Responsibility for Goods) Regulation made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 126 read with sections 42 and 43 of the said Act. The defendants submitted that the plaintiffs had not given a proper and valid notice setting out the cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the goods in the suit as required by section 87 of the Bombay port Trust Act, 1879 and/or section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, as amended by the Major Port Trusts (Amendment) Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as ''the said Act''). The defendants stated that for the reasons aforesaid, the suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. With prejudice to their aforesaid submissions, the defendants set out the further written statement. 13. The defendants stated that a consignment of 46 drums said to contain ''Sorbitol'' was imported by the plaintiffs ex. s.s. ''State of Bihar'' which arrived at Bombay on 16th May, 1974. The General Landing Date and the Last Free Day for the Cargo of the said ship fell on 7th June 1974 and 13th June, 1974 respectively. The said goods were landed at Bombay on 13th June, 1974. Messrs. R.S. Kandalkar and Co., plaintiffs' clearing Agents, noted the relative Bill of Entry with the Customs Authorities as late as 26th June, 1974. Delivery of the said goods was not applied for by the plaintiffs until the customs released the said goods on 12th July, 1975. 14. The defendants then stated that under the provisions of section 61-A(1) of the Bombay Port Trusts Act, 1879, which were in force at the material time, the Trustees were enjoined to take into their custody the goods landed by the ships coming into the Port of Bombay. Accordingly the Trustees took charge of the said consignment when it landed. The goods were stored by the defendants in the Docks pending delivery thereof and the owners were expected to take delivery from the defendants on completion of the Customs formalities within seven days of their landing. The defendants could not deliver the consignment to the owner thereof until the consignment was placed out of Customs charge. The goods were stored by the defendants in the Docks pending delivery thereof and the owners were expected to take delivery from the defendants on completion of the Customs formalities within seven days of their landing. The defendants could not deliver the consignment to the owner thereof until the consignment was placed out of Customs charge. The goods landed in the custody of the defendants, however, remained in the Docks at the risk and expense of the owners of the goods if they were not removed from the premises of the defendants within seven clear days of the landing thereof by the ship. The consignment in suit was cleared and removed by the plaintiffs from the premises of the defendants within seven clear days from the landing thereof and under the provisions of section 61-A(1) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, the goods in the suit remained with the Trustees at the sole risk and expense of the plaintiffs. The defendants stated that they were not aware of the real reasons for which the said goods were not removed by the plaintiffs from the premises of the defendants, except that the defendants were subsequently informed that the goods were detained for Trade Control formalities by the Customs. 15. The defendants, however, admitted that the consignment in suit was detained by the Customs for Import Trade Control formalities for a period from 20th July, 1974 to 19th July, 1975. The defendants admitted that the Collector of Customs, Bombay, issued the Detention Certificate (copy of which was annexed as Ex. A to the plaint) for the period from 20th July, 1974 to 19th July, 1975, endorsed on the Bill of Entry as referred to by the plaintiffs. 16. The defendants stated that in view of the Detention Certificate and as resolved by the Trustees, the plaintiffs were allowed remission in the demurrage charges on a graduated scale limited to 150 days from the Last Free Day of the ship's cargo i.e. upto 10th November, 1974. Under the relevant resolution of the defendant's predecessors on the subject, 1/6th only of the demurrage rate was leviable for the first two months after the landing of the consignment from the Last Free day of the ship's cargo. Under the relevant resolution of the defendant's predecessors on the subject, 1/6th only of the demurrage rate was leviable for the first two months after the landing of the consignment from the Last Free day of the ship's cargo. Thereafter 1/3rd demurrage was charged for the next one month, thereafter ½ demurrage was leviable for further one month and 2/3rd demurrage of the remaining period upto an aggregate of 150 days. Thereafter full demurrage charges were levied. In respect of the consignment in suit since the detention period started after 36 days from the Last Free Day of the ship's cargo, demurrage at 1/6th of the full rate was charged for the next 24 days and thereafter charges at the graduated scale aforesaid were levied upto 150 days from the Last Free Day. Thereafter full rate of demurrage became chargeable. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs were not entitled to full remission of demurrage charges despite the said Detention Certificate. The remission due to the plaintiffs was duly granted to them in respect of the said consignment and a sum of Rs. 50,004.74 P. remained to be paid by the plaintiffs. The said sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. was due for the wharfage charges of Rs. 128-50 P. and demurrage charges of Rs. 49,874-20 P. which remained due and payable by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' Clearing Agents, after availing of the said remission on the graduated scale, paid the said charges of Rs. 50,004-70 P. due on the said consignment on 23rd August, 1975 and cleared 42 drums on 25th August, 1975 and 4 drums on 1st September, 1975, the latter on payment of further charges of Rs. 131-27 P. due thereon. The said charges were levied according to the scale in force and the defendants in the discretion conferred on them under section 53 of the said Act (corresponding to section 43-B(2) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879) allowed the said remission in demurrage charges according to the graduated scale aforesaid and the charges due were duly paid by the plaintiffs. 17. The defendants then stated that there was no cause for the plaintiffs being aggrieved on account of the levy of the said charges and the same were levied according to law. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs appealed to the Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust in October 1975. 17. The defendants then stated that there was no cause for the plaintiffs being aggrieved on account of the levy of the said charges and the same were levied according to law. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs appealed to the Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust in October 1975. The Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust by his letter dated 13th January, 1976 rightly and justifiably rejected the said appeal for the refund of demurrage charges. The defendants denied that the demurrage required by the defendants to be paid were illegally recovered or were illegally charged, as alleged. 18. The defendants did not admit that the period of detention of the said goods by the Customs authorities was not attributable to any default or negligence on the part of the plaintiffs. The defendants stated, without prejudice, that the period of detention on account of Trade Control formalities was duly taken into account by the defendants, and in exercise of the powers vested in the defendants under section 53 of the said Act, the defendants granted remission as aforesaid on a graduated scale as resolved upon them. The defendants denied that they were not justified in taking demurrage charges from the plaintiffs for the period of detention for Trade Control formalities. The defendants denied that they wrongfully demanded from the plaintiffs demurrage charges in respect of the period of detention for Trade Control purpose and wrongfully recovered a sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. from the plaintiffs on 25th August, 1975. 19. The defendants denied that in demanding and recovering the demurrage, the defendants had taken advantage of their own wrong or had failed to discharge the statutory duty alleged to be imposed upon them by the said Act. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs had not given any particulars of the wrong alleged to have been done by the defendants or the advantage of their own wrong vaguely alleged to have been taken by the defendants. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs had also not given or pointed out any of the provisions of the said Act which imposed a statutory duty upon the defendants not to charge demurrage when the goods were detained for the Trade Control Regulation. The defendants stated that the allegations made by the plaintiffs were vague and ought to be disregarded. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs had also not given or pointed out any of the provisions of the said Act which imposed a statutory duty upon the defendants not to charge demurrage when the goods were detained for the Trade Control Regulation. The defendants stated that the allegations made by the plaintiffs were vague and ought to be disregarded. The defendants denied that they were bound to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. The defendants stated that the charges demanded by them were in accordance with the law and the provisions of the Bombay Port Trust Act and of the said Act. The defendants denied that they were bound to pay to the plaintiffs the said sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. or any other sum. The defendants stated that there was no question of depositing the said sum purported to be wrongfully and falsely made out by the plaintiffs. The defendants stated that the said amount was not taken as and by way of deposit as purported to be wrongfully and falsely made out by the plaintiffs. The defendants denied that the plaintiffs were compelled to deposit the said amount. The plaintiffs were bound and liable to pay the said charges before they could take delivery of the said goods from the defendants and the plaintiffs' Clearing Agents had paid the said amount the defendants. 20. The defendants stated that under the provisions of the Bombay Port Trust Act and the said Act, the scale of rates for demurrage charges was duly prescribed under the provisions thereof and the plaintiffs were bound and liable to pay the demurrage charges, except the amount which in the discretion of the defendants, under the provisions of section 53 of the said Act, the defendants thought fit to remit. The defendants had permitted the sum of Rs. 8,352-50 P. on the scale aforesaid in their discretion to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim any further remission. The defendants stated the remission was not a matter of right in the plaintiffs, but the remission was granted in the discretion of the defendants which the defendants exercised according to the principles laid down by them. The defendants denied that the plaintiffs were entitled to the sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. or any interest thereon. The defendants stated the remission was not a matter of right in the plaintiffs, but the remission was granted in the discretion of the defendants which the defendants exercised according to the principles laid down by them. The defendants denied that the plaintiffs were entitled to the sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. or any interest thereon. The defendants stated that the suit was false and vexatious and should be dismissed with costs. 21. On the above pleadings, the following six issues were raised : 1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act and/or section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act as alleged in paragraph 1 of the Written Statement; 2. Whether the plaintiffs have not given a valid and proper notice to the defendants under section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, as alleged in paragraph 3 of the Written Statement; 3. Whether the defendants have charged demurrage and wharfage charges from the plaintiffs in respect of the suit consignment in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879; 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to remission of the demurrage and wharfage charges completely or at all as demanded by them? 5. Whether the defendants have illegally recovered the Bombay Port Trust charges from the plaintiffs, as alleged? and; 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. or any other amount as alleged? 22. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have led any evidence in this suit. Both learned Counsel appearing in this matter have chosen to argue on the basis of the documents produced. 23. Issue No. 1 : On the Issue of limitation Mr. Gokani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, pointed out the provisions of section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, which laid down :--- ''120. No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against a Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act until the expiration of one month after notice in writing has been given to the Board or him stating the cause of action, or after six months after the accrual of the cause of action.'' The question which, therefore, arises for decision is as to when the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs. According to Mr. Gokani, the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs on 25th August, 1975 i.e. on the date on which the plaintiffs were called upon to pay the sum of Rs. 50,004-70 P. and the plaintiffs ought to have filed the suit within six months of that date i.e. by 25th February, 1976. Since the suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 28th April, 1976, the suit was beyond the period of limitation and on this ground alone, ought to be dismissed. On the analogy of Article 24 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, Mr. Gokani argued that the cause of action accrued on the date when the money was paid by the plaintiffs to the Bombay Port Trust authorities i.e. on 25th August, 1975. Mr. Gokani relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of (A. Venkata Subbarao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh)1, reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1773. It will be sufficient to recite the Head-note of this case :--- ''Where, therefore, the money was received as tax by the defendant-State from the plaintiff which the plaintiff was not bound in law to pay but which he was compelled or forced to pay because of the threats or apprehension of legal process : Held, notwithstanding that the receipt by the defendant purported to be for his own benefit still it was money which at the very moment of the receipt in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff, rendering its receipt a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff and the suit claiming refund would be governed by Article 62. (of the old Act).'' 24. Mr. Gokani also relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (The Trustees of Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobiles Ltd. and another)2, reported on A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 923, wherein Their Lordships observed :--- ''The starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action. Two components of the ''cause'' are important, the date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port. Two components of the ''cause'' are important, the date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port. Two clear, though not conclusive indications of when the consignee ought to know are (i) when the bulk of the goods are delivered, there being short delivery leading to a suit, (ii) 7 days after knowledge of the landing of the goods suggested in section 61-A. Whichever is the later date ordinarily sets off the running of limitation. Letters or assurances that the missing packages are being searched for cannot enlarge limitation, once the goods have landed and the owner has come to know of it. To rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to make the law uncertain, the limitation liable to manipulation and abuses of other types to seep into the system.'' 25. Mr. Gokani, therefore, urged that in this case the period of limitation commenced from the date on which the plaintiffs were compelled to pay demurrage charges i.e. on 25th August, 1975. Since the suit had not been filed within six months from that date, the suit was barred under section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. 26. Mr. Hidayatulla, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, submitted that in the instant case, the cause of action was one under section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and under section 43-B(2) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, both the sections being pari materia. Mr. Hidayatulla submitted that the suit being one under section 53 of the said Act, the cause of action accrue only when the Board refused to exercise its discretion to remit the whole or any part to the demurrage charges which had been paid by the plaintiffs. Mr. Hidayatulla submitted that the plaintiffs by their letter dated 13th October, 1975 made out a special case under which the defendants were called upon to exercise their discretion under section 53 of the said Act and to remit the whole or part of the demurrage charges which the plaintiffs had paid to the defendants. The defendants by their letter dated 13th January, 1976 rejected the application of the plaintiffs for further remission. Therefore, according to Mr. The defendants by their letter dated 13th January, 1976 rejected the application of the plaintiffs for further remission. Therefore, according to Mr. Hidayatulla, the period of limitation commenced only from 13th January, 1976. 27. I am of the view that there is considerable substance in Mr. Hidayatulla's submission. The period of limitation could not have commenced from 25th August, 1975, as urged by Mr. Gokani, for the reason that the plaintiffs were not aware on that day whether the defendants would grant their prayer for remission or not. On that day the defendants had not rejected the application for remission under section 53 made by the plaintiffs. It was only when the plaintiffs made such an application on 13th October, 1975 that the defendants by their letter dated 13th January, 1976 categorically rejected the application of the plaintiffs. The defendants, therefore, had refused to exercise their discretion under section 53 only on 13th January, 1976. Mr. Hidayatulla is, therefore, justified in his submission that the cause of action in this case accrued only on 13th January, 1976. If that be the case, then the suit which was filed on 4th May, 1976, would be well within time. I, therefore, answer the first issue in the negative and hold that the suit was not barred under section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 or under section 87 of the Bombay Port Trusts Act, 1879. 28. Issue No. 2 : Issue No. 2 relates to whether the plaintiffs had not given a valid and proper notice to the defendants under section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act. Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act lays down that no suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against any person for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of that Act, without giving to such person one month's previous notice in writing of the intended suit or other proceeding, and of the cause thereof, nor after six months from the accrual of the cause of such suit or other proceeding. The answer to this issue depends mainly upon the outcome of issue No. 1 with regard to limitation. Mr. The answer to this issue depends mainly upon the outcome of issue No. 1 with regard to limitation. Mr. Gokani pointed out that the notice in the instant case was given by the plaintiffs on 12th March, 1976 and since according to him, the cause of action accrued on 25th August, 1975, the notice was invalid, inasmuch as it was given six months after the accrual of the cause of action. I have already decided, whilst considering Issue No. 1 that the cause of action in this case accrued only on 13th January, 1976. I am, therefore, of the view that the notice given by the plaintiffs to the defendants on 12th March, 1976 is a valid and proper notice. In the result, I answer Issue No. 2 in the negative. 29. Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 : Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 can be clubbed together and conveniently disposed of at this stage. Issue No. 3 is whether the defendants had charged demurrage and wharfage charges from the plaintiffs in respect of the suit consignment in accordance with the provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. Issue No. 4 is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to remission of the demurrage and wharfage charges completely or at all as demanded by them, and Issue No. 5 is whether the defendants had illegally recovered the Bombay Port Trust charges from the plaintiffs as alleged. With regard to Issue No. 3, I may state that Mr. Hidayatulla on behalf of the plaintiffs has not impugned the right of the Bombay Port Trust to charge demurrage and wharfage from an Importer, not has he challenged the rights of the authorities. Mr. Hidayatulla's challenge has been mainly under section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. In these circumstances, Issue No. 3 will have to be answered in favour of the defendants and in the affirmative. 30. On the 4th and the 5th issues, Mr. Hidayatulla's contention centres round the discretion to be exercised by the Board in the matter of remission. In these circumstances, Issue No. 3 will have to be answered in favour of the defendants and in the affirmative. 30. On the 4th and the 5th issues, Mr. Hidayatulla's contention centres round the discretion to be exercised by the Board in the matter of remission. Under section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act, the Board was given a discretion in special cases and for reasons to be recorded in writing, to exempt either wholly or partially any goods or vessels or class of goods or vessels from the payment of any rate or of any charge leviable in respect thereof according to any scale in force under that Act or remit the whole or any portion of such rate or charge so levied. Now, the Board had considered the case of the plaintiffs as a special case and had granted remission to the plaintiffs to the extend of Rs. 8352-50 P. However, Mr. Hidayatulla's contention is that the Board had not properly exercised that discretion and that his clients would have been entitled to a larger amount by way of remission had that discretion been exercised in accordance with the provisions of section 53 of the Act. Mr. Hidayatulla has placed three contentions for my consideration. Firstly, he stated that section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act conferred a discretionary power coupled with a duty to exercise that power in individual cases and on the merits of each case. Secondly, that the Resolution of the Trustees dated 13-11-1975 constituted a selfmade Rule or policy on the discretionary power under section 53 and thirdly, that the impugned decision dated 13-1-1976 having been passed admittedly without the discretion having been exercised by merely following the policy, was ultra vires section 53. 31. Mr. Hidayatulla submitted that he did not impugn the scale of rates fixed under section 43-B as being unreasonable, nor did he canvass the proposition that the Port Trust could levy any demurrage charges even when there was no default on the part of the importer. The proposition which he canvassed was that the provisions of remission contained in section 53 could not be rendered nugatory by a self made Rule of Policy. The proposition which he canvassed was that the provisions of remission contained in section 53 could not be rendered nugatory by a self made Rule of Policy. Learned Counsel further submitted that on a proper construction of the policy, it was an attempt on the part of the Board of Trustees to rigidly fetter the discretion they were bound to exercise in the facts and circumstances of a special case. According to Mr. Hidayatulla, each case had to be considered on its own merits. 32. The policy of the Bombay Port Trust has been formulated in Resolution No. 635 of 1975 which laid down a certain scale, which the authorities applied in a special case, for the purpose of exemption or remission under section 53 of the said Act. The scale is as follows :--- i) at 1/6th the normal rate of demurrage from the date of expiry of the last free day upto the 60th day; ii) at 1/3rd the normal rate from the 61st day upto the 90th day; iii) at half the normal rate from the 91st day upto the 120th day; iv) at 2/3rd the normal rate from the 121st day upto the 150th day; v) at the full rate thereafter. Mr. Hidayatulla's objection has been directed in respect of this graduated scale which, according to him, fettered the discretion of the authorities granted under section 53. Mr. Hidayatulla relied upon certain authorities in support of his submissions to which I shall refer presently. 33. Mr. Hidayatulla, in the first instance, relied upon a vintage decision in the case of (Frederic Guilder Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford)3, reported in 1879 Appeal Cases 214, wherein the House of Lords was pleased to observe :--- ''The question has been argued and has been spoken of by some of the learned Judges in the Courts below as if the words ''it shall be lawful'' might have a different meaning and might be differently interpreted in different statutes, or in different parts of the same statute. I cannot think that this is correct. The words ''it shall be lawful'' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power, and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. The words ''it shall be lawful'' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power, and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done; some thing in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty; and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so. ... ... ... And the words "it shall be lawful" being according to their natural meaning permissive or enabling words only, it lies upon those, as it seems to me, who contend that an obligation exists to exercise this power, to show in the circumstances of the case something which, according to the principles I have mentioned creates this obligation". 34. Mr. Hidayatulla next referred to a case of this Court (Herbert George Gell v. Taja Noora)4, reported in 5 Bom.L.R. 133. In that case, the Commissioner of Police had directed that back victories had to conform to a certain model prepared by him. The Division Bench of this Court observed :--- "In this case the power given is to refuse a licence only when the Commissioner considered that the conveyance for which it is required is insufficiently found or otherwise unfit for the conveyance of the public, or that the applicant is open to certain objections. This clearly calls for the exercise of discretion in each particular case, and an exercise of the power in the fetters of self-imposed rules, purporting to bind the authority in all cases, would not be within the Act". 35. Mr. This clearly calls for the exercise of discretion in each particular case, and an exercise of the power in the fetters of self-imposed rules, purporting to bind the authority in all cases, would not be within the Act". 35. Mr. Hidayatulla then referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and another v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.)5, reported in A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 218, where in Their Lordships observed :--- "It does not appear, on principle, sound to hold that these difficult questions should be left under the Stamp Act, to the final decision of the appellant, and if the party affected by the assessment has a grievance, there is no relief at all in law for him. The construction of a document is not always an easy matter and on the ground that it is a substantial question of law, parties have been permitted to take the matter upto the highest Court. If so, it appears difficult to start with the assumption that because this is a Revenue Act the decision of the appellant should be considered final and conclusive. The provisions of sections 56(2) and 60 giving power to the Collector and the Court to send a statement of case to the appellant and the High Court respectively, in our opinion, instead of helping the appellant, go against his contention. In those two sections this power is given when the referring authority has a doubt to solve for himself. The absence of the words "feels doubt as to the amount of duty to be paid in respect of an instrument" in section 57 supports the view that the reference contemplated under that section is not for the benefit of the appellant only but ensures also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. In our opinion, the power contained in section 57 is in the nature of an obligation or is coupled with an obligation and under the circumstances can be demanded to be used also by the parties affected by the assessment of the stamp duty". 36. Mr. In our opinion, the power contained in section 57 is in the nature of an obligation or is coupled with an obligation and under the circumstances can be demanded to be used also by the parties affected by the assessment of the stamp duty". 36. Mr. Hidayatulla then referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji)6, reported in A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16, wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe :--- "It is clear to us from a perusal of these rules that the only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of a building to be used for purposes of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police. It is also clear that under Rule 250 he has been vested with the absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any licence which has been granted under the rules. But the power to do so is vested in him and not in the State Government and can only be exercised by him at his discretion. No other person or authority can do it". ... ... ... ... ... "We have held that the Commissioner did not in fact exercise his discretion in this case and did not cancel the licence he granted. He merely forwarded to the respondent an order of cancellation which another authority had purported to pass. It is evident from these facts that the Commissioner had before him objections which called for the exercise of the discretion cancellation specifically vested in him by Rule 250. He was, therefore, bound to exercise it and bring to bear on the matter his independent and unfettered judgment and decide for himself whether to cancel the licence or reject the obligations". 37. Finally, Mr. Hidayatulla relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of (Binod Rao v. M.R. Masani)7, reported in 78 Bom.L.R. 125. After considering the various authorities, Their Lordships laid down the following principles :--- "(1) The Court's scrutiny and review are not totally barred in a case where, in exercise of statutory powers an authority is empowered to make an order in its discretion on its subjective satisfaction. (2) An order made by an authority on its subjective satisfaction can be set aside by the Court on the following grounds :--- (a) ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... (2) An order made by an authority on its subjective satisfaction can be set aside by the Court on the following grounds :--- (a) ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... ... (d) ... ... ... ... (e) ... ... ... ... (f) where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in other manner. ... ... ... 38. Mr. Hidayatulla submitted that the authorities cited by him supported his submission that where an authority having been granted a discretion restricted itself by self-made rules of policy, the Court would interfere in such a case, to strike down that decision. 39. Now, it is pertinent to state here that Mr. Hidayatulla does not impugn the scale of rates fixed by the Bombay Port Trust, nor does he impugn the right of the authorities to levy demurrage charges even in cases where the default was not that of the importer. All that Mr. Hidayatulla challenges is the fact that the plaintiffs' case being a special case under section 53, the Port Trust authorities had not exercised their discretion properly and that they had fettered their discretion by laying down a graduated scale of policy referred to by me heretofore. 40. At this stage, it will be relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Trustees of the Port of Madras v. Aminchand Pyarelal and others)8, reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1935, wherein the learned Judges held :--- "It is the Board thus constituted that frames the Scale of Rates and statement of conditions under which the services shall or may be performed by it. Every scale and every statement of conditions framed by the Board has to be submitted to the Central Government for sanction under section 44 and it is only when it is so sanctioned that it has the force of law. The requirement of sanction by the Central Government is a restraint on unwise, excessive or arbitrary fixation of rates. Section 44(2) confers on the Board the power, in special cases and for reasons to be recorded in writing, to remit the whole or any portion of rates or charges leviable according to any scale in force under section 44. The requirement of sanction by the Central Government is a restraint on unwise, excessive or arbitrary fixation of rates. Section 44(2) confers on the Board the power, in special cases and for reasons to be recorded in writing, to remit the whole or any portion of rates or charges leviable according to any scale in force under section 44. Thus, the statute provides for the necessary safeguards, checks and counter-checks as an insurance against fixation and levy of harsh or unjust rates". "Section 109 of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall affect any power vested in the Chief Officer of Customs under any law for the time being in force. Section 49 of the Customs Act, 1962 confers power on the Assistant Collector of Customs, if he is satisfied on the application of the importer that the goods cannot be cleared within a reasonable time, to permit that the goods may pending clearance be stored in a public ware-house and if such a facility is not available, then in a private warehouse. This provision together with section 44(2) of the Act constitutes a measure of mitigation. In face of these considerations, it is impossible to characterise the scheme for the levy of rates as arbitrary or unreasonable". 41. I may also point out that the same graduated scale contained in the policy laid down by the defendants had come up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of (The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Indian Goods Supplying Co.)9, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1622, and referring to that scale Their Lordships were pleased to observe :--- "It is no doubt true that before clearance is given by the Import Trade Control authorities and the customs department, the goods cannot be cleared by the respondents. Neither can the Port Trust deliver the goods without the consent of the Import Trade Control authorities. Taking into account the hardship caused to the importer because of the delay, certain concessions in demurrage rates are permitted. Neither can the Port Trust deliver the goods without the consent of the Import Trade Control authorities. Taking into account the hardship caused to the importer because of the delay, certain concessions in demurrage rates are permitted. The Port Trust has prescribed the reduced demurrage levy which is 1/6th of the normal rate from the date of expiry of the free days upto the 60th day, 1/3rd of the normal rate after the expiry of the 60th day upto the 90th day, half the normal rate after the expiry of the 90th day upto the 120th day, 2/3rd of the normal rate after the expiry of the 120th day upto the 150th day and at the full rate after the expiry of the 150th day. As the scale of rates are framed by virtue of the statutory powers conferred on the Board under section 43 and the rates have been approved by the Central Government under section 43-B the rates have the force of law and cannot be questioned. Taking into account the hardship to the importers certain concession has been given but the legality of the rates which are being levied according to law cannot be questioned". 42. It is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court found nothing wrong or restrictive about in the scale laid down in the policy of the Port Trust. In fact, the Supreme Court approved of the scale as laid down by the Bombay Port Trust authorities. It is relevant to point out that what the plaintiffs seek in this suit is that the Bombay Port authorities should grant a larger amount by way of remission. As I have pointed out heretofore, the Bombay Port Trust authorities have already exercised their discretion under section 53 of the said Act and granted a remission of Rs. 8352-50 P. It appears that the plaintiffs are not satisfied with that amount. According to them, if the discretion granted to the authorities under section 53 had been properly exercised, they would have been entitled to a larger amount by way of remission. Since the Supreme Court has not found anything restrictive about the graduated scale laid down in the policy, I do not think that the argument of Mr. Hidayatulla can be accepted. Since the Supreme Court has not found anything restrictive about the graduated scale laid down in the policy, I do not think that the argument of Mr. Hidayatulla can be accepted. It appears to me that the policy laid down by the Bombay Port Trust is proper in the circumstances of a special case, being a yard stick to be applied in special cases under section 53. I do not think that the policy can be considered as restrictive of the discretion granted to the authorities. In these circumstances, I must reject the submission made by Mr. Hidayatulla. 43. Mr. Hidayatulla attempted to differentiate the facts in the case of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Indian Goods Supplying Co., A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1622 from the facts in the instant case by stating that the question before the Supreme Court was one of absolute liability or no liability at all, and the Supreme Court held that the importer was liable to pay demurrage even though he was not at fault for the delay. Mr. Hidayatulla pointed out that the plaintiffs had not claimed absolute exemption from liability. They merely claimed remission. The case before the Supreme Court concerned section 42-B(2) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, whereas the instant case was concerned with section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act. Mr. Hidayatulla is right in stating that the case before the Supreme Court was one under section 42-B(2) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, whereas the instant case was under section 53 of the Major Port Trusts Act. However what is to be taken into consideration is the fact that the same graduated scale or policy was considered by the Supreme Court in that case and Their Lordships found nothing objectionable about it. In fact the learned Judges stated that the levy cannot be questioned. I am of the view that the policy or the graduated scale cannot be termed as a fetter on the discretion to be exercised by the Port Trust authorities. The policy was laid down specifically in order to enable the Port Trust authorities to deal with 'Special case' expeditiously, failing within the ambit of section 53 of the said Act. I am of the view that the policy or the graduated scale cannot be termed as a fetter on the discretion to be exercised by the Port Trust authorities. The policy was laid down specifically in order to enable the Port Trust authorities to deal with 'Special case' expeditiously, failing within the ambit of section 53 of the said Act. Indeed if such a policy had not been enunciated, an element of discrimination might even have crept in and it is for this reason that a uniform policy on a graduated scale was laid down by the Port Trust authorities. I have already stated that in this case the discretion under section 53 had been exercised by the authorities. Only the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the amount allowed by the authorities. That is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the authorities. This Court cannot interfere with the quantum. I see nothing objectionable about the graduated scale or policy. 43. My answers to the Issues are the following :--- Issue No. 1 : In the negative. Issue No. 2 : In the negative. The notice is valid and proper. Issue No. 3 : In the affirmative. Issue No. 4 : In the affirmative. The plaintiffs are entitled to remission, but not as demanded by them. Issue No. 5 : In the negative. Issue No. 6 : In the negative. 44. In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs. -----