JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J.- This is plaintiffs second appeal against the concurrent finding of the two courts below that the suit was barred by limitation. 2. The plaintiff was admittedly as Khalasi employed by the Railways and was dismissed from service by an order dated 17.2.1968. An appeal was taken against that order which was dismissed summarily on 3.9.1968. The plaintiff then filed the suit on 3.9.1969. If the starting point of limitation is taken from the date of dismissal of the appeal, the suit was well within time after adding to it two months period statutorily required for notice under Section 80 C.P.C. However, the suit would be barred by time of limitation is reckoned from the first order of dismissal dated 17.2.1968. 3. Sri S.P. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has urged that limitation will not run until the disposal of the appeal and for this submission of his, he relies upon Bans Gopal and others v. Basdeo Singh AIR 1917 Oudh 168., and the Province of Orissa and another v. Durjodhan Dass and others AIR 1961 Orissa 342.. In the case of Bans Gopal (Supra) a suit was filed challenging the order of the revenue court in proceedings for ejectment of the plaintiff. The Assistant Collector passed an initial order on 12th February, 1909 against which an appeal was taken which was dismissed on 20th May, 1909 and finally the appeal by the board was decided on 1.12.1909. The suit within time from the last order but beyond time from the order of the Assistant Collector. It was held that so long as adverse order was subjudice of was being challenged by the persons against whom the said order had been passed and was liable to be decided by higher Tribunal the limitation would run. The suit was, therefore, held to be within limitation. Similarly in the case of Province of Orissa (supra), the order of dismissal of the panches was passed on 3lst October, 1932 but the final order was passed by the Commissioner only in the year 1938. It was held that limitation would not be deemed to run so long as the adverse order was subjudice. Similarly in the case of Province of Orissa (supra), the order of dismissal of the panches was passed on 3lst October, 1932 but the final order was passed by the Commissioner only in the year 1938. It was held that limitation would not be deemed to run so long as the adverse order was subjudice. Whatever be the position of law as laid down in these two cases, the position has been substantially altered after the decision of the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1958 SC 1036 . The law declared by the Supreme Court now is that the right of appeal given to a person did not involve the consequence that the order of the dismissal could not be operative by its own force but would continue in abeyance until the decision of the appeal once an appeal was filed by the employee so that it could be said that the cause of action arose on the communication of the dismissal in appeal. In that case, a Municipal employee was dismissed on 5.3.1951, on the appeal was dismissed on 7.4.1952. The suit was filed 8.3.1951. It was held that under Article 58 (1) of the Limitation Act only a right to appeal has been given before the Government but did not prevent him from filing a suit straightway challenging the validity of the order of dismissal on the grounds available to him. It was, therefore, held that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Article 58 of the Limitation Act deals with suit relating to declaration and is in the following terms. "58. To obtain any other 3 years when the right to sue first declaration accrues". 5. The important words in the Article are "the right to sue first accrues. In this case it cannot be said that against the order of dismissal, the right to sue had not accrued to the plaintiff on 17.2.1968. By subsequent order the limitation states from the time then the right to sue first accrues to the plaintiff, the limitation would be deemed to run from that date. Any subsequent date which may also give rise to a right to sue cannot prevent the limitation from running once it was started. By subsequent order the limitation states from the time then the right to sue first accrues to the plaintiff, the limitation would be deemed to run from that date. Any subsequent date which may also give rise to a right to sue cannot prevent the limitation from running once it was started. It will not be right to say that although once the limitation had started on 16.2.1968 it would become suspended from the moment in appeal was filed and will continue to remain so until the appeal was disposed of. 6. The counsel submits that principle of merger will apply and after the dismissal of the appeal, the earlier order will merge in the appellate order. That may be so in some case but for the purpose of limitation when once the limitation has begun to run, nothing would stop it from running its full course. Even though an appeal was filed by the appellant, he should have waited only for a period of three years reckoned from the original order of dismissal even if the appeal had not been decided within time and where it had been disposed of within that period, then also he should not have waited for any thing beyond three years from the date of the original order. The theory of suspension of limitation does not apply. It is a principle benefit of certain time in computing the period of limitation which is envisaged under the limitation Act. That principle, however, will not be applicable in the present case. 7. In view of the decision on the question of limitation the appeal is also dismissed with costs.