JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Since in these two writ petitions a common question is involved whether these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable even though the petitioner in each of these petitions has an alternative remedy of making a reference to the Public Services Tribunal (for short Tribunal) constituted under the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for setting aside the orders impugned in these petitions, they are being decided by a common order. 2. The petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 14702 of 1983 has been reverted from the officiating post of a Supervisor Kanungo to the post of Lekhpal and he has prayed for quashing this order of reversion on the ground that in the background in which this order was passed it amounts to punishment and no opportunity of showing cause having been given to him before passing this order it violates Article 311 of the Constitution. It has also been asserted that juniors to the petitioner have not been reverted and as such the impugned order violates Article 16 also of the Constitution. 3. The petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14703 of 1983 on the other hand was a temporary Government servant and his services have been terminated on the ground that they were no longer needed. He has sought the quashing of this order on the ground that services of other temporary employees junior to him have not been terminated and as such the impugned order violates Article 16 of the Constitution. 4. That the petitioner in each case is a public servant within the meaning of the said term as defined in the Act has not been disputed nor has it been disputed that the relief of setting aside the order impugned in each of the two petitions can be granted by the Tribunal. The petitioners have, therefore, an alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal for the relief sought for by them in these petitions. 5. Counsel for the petitioners, however, has urged that these writ petitions still deserve to be entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of the following three grounds:- (1) the alternative remedy before the Tribunal is not speedy and normally considerable delay takes place in disposal of cases by the Tribunal. 5. Counsel for the petitioners, however, has urged that these writ petitions still deserve to be entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of the following three grounds:- (1) the alternative remedy before the Tribunal is not speedy and normally considerable delay takes place in disposal of cases by the Tribunal. (2) the Tribunal in view of Section 5(5B) of the Act is not competent to grant any interim relief in case of the nature specified therein. (3) Since the impugned orders have been passed in violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 16 and also in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution existence of an alternative remedy was no bar to the maintainability of these writ petitions. 6. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at some length we are of opinion that the petitioners should be required to exhaust their alternative remedy of making a reference to the Tribunal for setting aside the impugned orders before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. Before dealing with the submission of counsel for the petitioners on the aforesaid three grounds we may point out that we are aware that no act of Parliament or Stale Legislature can curtail the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are further aware that after the repeal of the necessary provision in this behalf, inserted in the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act, existence of an alternative remedy cannot be an absolute bar in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. As held by the Supreme Court in A.V. Venkateswaran v. R. S. Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1506 it will have to be seen on the facts of each case as to whether notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy a writ petition should be entertained or not. 8. Now we shall consider the submission made by counsel for the petitioners on the three grounds mentioned above seriatim. As regards ground No. 1 we may point out that it was held by the Supreme Court in Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. J. H. Industries AIR 1979 SC 1889 that unless the High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory remedy is likely to be too dilatory or difficult to give reasonably quick relief, it should be loath to act under Article 226. Collector, Central Excise v. J. H. Industries AIR 1979 SC 1889 that unless the High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory remedy is likely to be too dilatory or difficult to give reasonably quick relief, it should be loath to act under Article 226. As such it would not be proper exercise of discretion to entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy before a statutory Tribunal is available on the basis of the argument that the remedy before the Tribunal is likely to involve delay when the High Court itself is not in a position to grant a relief quicker than the Statutory Tribunal. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1 of 1983 Satish Singh Chauhan v. State of U. P. decided on 7-11-1983 while dismissing a writ petition at the admission stage or-the ground that the petitioners had an alternative remedy before the Tribunal against the impugned order it was held by a Division Bench of this Court, that there was no merit in the contention of the petitioner's counsel that remedy before the Tribunal was not efficacious and speedy inasmuch as at present in this Court too many writ petitions are being disposed of after eight or nine years. 9. Let us consider the effect of entertaining a writ petition by the High Court even though it is not in a position to grant relief quicker than the Tribunal. The obvious result would be that on the one hand the petitioner in such a case would not be able to get a quicker relief, on the other hand the disposal of those cases which have been pending in the High Court for several years and in which the persons aggrieved have no other remedy and are waiting for their turn in the long queue of pending cases will be further delayed. This proposition admits of no doubt that where reference is made to capacity of granting quicker relief it means granting of final relief in the case and not an interim relief. 10. This proposition admits of no doubt that where reference is made to capacity of granting quicker relief it means granting of final relief in the case and not an interim relief. 10. As regards ground No. 2 that since a Tribunal is not entitled to grant an interim relief in view of Section 5(5B) of the Act the alternative remedy of referring a claim to the Tribunal under Section 4 of the Act is not an equally efficacious remedy, it may be pointed out that a similar submission was made before a Full Bench of this Court in Gyan Chand v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer AIR 1966 All 57 . The question which came up for consideration before this Court in that case was whether applying for revision to the Commissioner or the State Government against an order passed under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, constituted an adequate and alternative remedy or not. One of the grounds on which it was urged that it did not constitute an adequate and alternative remedy was that the Commissioner or the State Government did not have the power to stay enforcement or operation of the impugned order during the pendency of a revision application. Repelling this submission it was held :- "I do not consider that the lack of power at all affects the question whether the remedy of applying for revision is adequate remedy or not. The question is of remedy against the impugned order which means the final remedy and not any interim remedy that may be given for the time being." 11. The matter can be looked into from another angle. The argument that even if the High Court may not be in a position to grant final remedy quicker than the Tribunal it should entertain a writ petition for granting the interim relief which the Tribunal is not empowered to do, is an argument which is an antithesis of the policy of the legislature contained in Section 5 (5B). The argument that even if the High Court may not be in a position to grant final remedy quicker than the Tribunal it should entertain a writ petition for granting the interim relief which the Tribunal is not empowered to do, is an argument which is an antithesis of the policy of the legislature contained in Section 5 (5B). The question is if the legislature in its wisdom considers it appropriate that in disputes of the nature specified in Section 4 of the Act raised by persons falling in a particular classification namely, public servants, no interim relief should be granted during the pendency of the adjudication of the dispute by the Tribunal will it be a proper exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court to entertain a writ petition merely for granting an interim relief even though it may not be in a position to grant final remedy by disposing of the writ petition quicker than the Tribunal. We must hasten to add that by making these observations we should not be taken to be of the view that the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in a suitable case to grant an interim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution stands in any way circumscribed by Section 5(5B). What we wish to emphasise is that normally it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to entertain a writ petition just for the purpose of granting an interim relief in respect of which the legislative policy as is apparent from S. 5(5B) is that no interim relief should be granted by the Tribunal, when this Court is not in a position to grant final relief quicker than the Tribunal. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree with the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that simply because the Tribunal is not empowered to grant an interim relief because of the bar created by Section 5(5B) of the Act the alternative remedy of making a reference to the Tribunal under Section 4 of the Act is not equally efficacious. 12. 12. In Writ Petition No. 5364 of 1981 (Jagdish Chandra Sharma v. State of U. P.) decided on 10th July, 1981, reported in 1981 U P L B E C 388, while dismissing a writ petition, challenging an order retiring the petitioner from employment, on the ground that he had an alternative remedy of making a reference under Section 4 of the Act it was held that the reluctance of this Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where an alternative remedy is available does not operate as an impregnable bar nor such a writ petition incompetent. It is, however, a rule of prudence and in conformity with the very nature of issuing a writ that unless an alternative remedy has been exhausted the extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court should not be exercised. It was also pointed out that generally in cases of retirement this Court also does not grant interim relief. Granting of an interim relief even under Article 226 of the Constitution on a writ petition being admitted is not imperative. The view taken in the case of Jagdish Chandra Sharma (supra) that a public servant should first exhaust his alternative remedy of making a reference to the Tribunal before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was reiterated by another Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 14387 of 1983 (Raghubans Misra v. U. P. State) decided on 17-11-1983. 13. In S. Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Animal College 1983 Lab IC 867 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1512 ) it was held by the Supreme Court that where the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of appeal writ petition challenging an order of reinstatement was not maintainable. 14. 13. In S. Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Animal College 1983 Lab IC 867 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1512 ) it was held by the Supreme Court that where the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of appeal writ petition challenging an order of reinstatement was not maintainable. 14. In support of the last ground mentioned above, namely, that since the impugned orders are being challenged on the ground that they have been passed in violation of Articles 16 and 311 of the Constitution existence of an alternative remedy is no bar in the maintainability of these writ petitions, reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioners on Himmatlal v. State of M. P. AIR 1954 SC 403 where it was observed that the principle that a court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. That was a case where a writ of mandamus was sought for directing, the authorities concerned not to use coercive machinery against the petitioner under such provisions of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act which had been declared to be ultra vires. It was urged that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the said Act and it was in this context that the aforesaid observations were made. It was pointed out that using of a coercive machinery of the Act for realisation of the dues was an infringement of the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. Reliance was also placed on similar observations made by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Behari Lal B. Prasad v. Commissioner, Jhansi Division AIR 1966 All 176 which too was a case challenging certain recovery proceedings. 15. Having considered the submission made by counsel for the petitioners in this behalf we are of opinion that the instant cases stand on a different footing. 15. Having considered the submission made by counsel for the petitioners in this behalf we are of opinion that the instant cases stand on a different footing. Clause (a) of Section 4 of the Act makes a provision for reference of claims to the Tribunal even where the case of a public servant is that the impugned order is not in conformity with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution. As such cases of orders said to be in violation of Articles 16 and 311 of the Constitution were also specifically intended to be dealt with by the Tribunal. Section 3 of the Act deals with the Constitution of the Tribunal. If, inter alia, provides that each Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. The Judicial Member shall be a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court and an Administrative Member shall be a person who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, Commissioner of a Division. Section 5 of the Act deals with the powers and procedure of the Tribunal whereas Section 6 provides for bar of suits. It is thus apparent that in enacting the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, the intention of the legislature was to constitute a high powered Tribunal to exclusively deal with cases of the nature specified in Section 4 of the Act relating to public servants which included cases where the allegation of the public servant was that an order to his prejudice had been passed in violation of the provisions of Articles 16 and 311 of the Constitution. Nothing has been brought to our notice which may indicate that in cases of infringement of fundamental rights of the nature referred to in Section 4 of the Act it is only the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution which could take cognizance of the matter and it is not necessary for the public servant aggrieved to approach the Tribunal notwithstanding specific provision having been made in this behalf in Section 4 of the Act. 16. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of opinion that the petitioners have an alternative remedy of making a reference to the Tribunal under Section 4 of the Act and should exhaust this remedy before the Tribunal before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter we do not find it necessary to go into the merits of the impugned orders. Both these writ petitions are accordingly dismissed in limine.