ORDER N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondent 3 is the landlord of a shop of which the petitioner is the tenant. An application was made by respondent 3 in the year 1976 for release of the said shop under cls. (a) and (b) and sub-s. (1) of S. 21. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that it was needed by him bona fide for his own use. His case, as is apparent from the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 10th Feb. 1978, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, was that he was badly in need of the sad shop for carrying on business along with his brothers and that they had no other shop at their disposal for the said purpose. His case further was that the petitioner was not carrying on any business in the said shop and was keeping it locked. He further asserted that the petitioner had taken on rent another shop in the name of Chandra Kiran Devi near the railway station and did not really require the shop in question. By asserting these facts respondent 3 apparently emphasised that great hardship will be caused to him if the shop in question was not released and that on the other hand no hardship of in all events much lesser hardship would be caused to the petitioner if the application for release was allowed. He also pleaded that the shop in question was in a dilapidated condition and he wanted to reconstruct it. An affidavit in support of the application was also filed by respondent 3. The summons of the application was served on the petitioner and it appears that even though he filed a written statement he did not care to file any affidavit in support of the facts stated in the written statement. The case seems to have been got adjourned from time to time and ultimately 10th Feb. 1978 was the date fixed for hearing. On that date the petitioner abstained and the application for release was allowed ex parte relying on the affidavit filed by respondent. 3. in support of the aforesaid application. The case seems to have been got adjourned from time to time and ultimately 10th Feb. 1978 was the date fixed for hearing. On that date the petitioner abstained and the application for release was allowed ex parte relying on the affidavit filed by respondent. 3. in support of the aforesaid application. Subsequently an application was made by the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte order on 6-3-1978 i.e. a few days before the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the said purpose. This application was dismissed on 17-3-1979. The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed on 27-3-1979 summarily on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order allowing the respondent's application under S. 21 of the Act. Not only that the petitioner had chosen not to file an appeal against the order dated 10-2-1978 within the prescribed period of limitation before the District Judge, he also chose not to file any such appeal against that order which was the order whereby the application of respondent 3 under S. 21 had been allowed notwithstanding the order passed by this Court on 27-3-1979 in the writ petition referred to above. On the other hand, he now chose to file an appeal before the District Judge against the order dated 17-3-1979 whereby his application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 10-2-1978 was dismissed. This appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on 4th May, 1979 on the ground that an appeal against that order was not maintainable. It is then that he filed an appeal against the order dated 10-2-1978 after about thirteen months thereof on ;-5-1979 along with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. This application has been dismissed by the District Judge on 11-8-80 on the finding that no sufficient cause had been made out of condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. The present writ petition has been filed to quash the aforesaid order of the District Judge dated 11-8-1980 as also the order dated 10- 2-1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the application of respondent 3 under S. 21 of the Act. 2. The present writ petition has been filed to quash the aforesaid order of the District Judge dated 11-8-1980 as also the order dated 10- 2-1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the application of respondent 3 under S. 21 of the Act. 2. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the appeal which had been filed by the petitioner before the District Judge consequent upon the dismissal of his earlier writ petition on 27-3-1979, against the order dated 17-3-1979 whereby his application for setting aside the ex parte order of the Prescribed Authority dated 10-2- 1978 was dismissed and not against the order dated 10-2-1978 itself on the basis of an advice given to him by his counsel and consequently the District Judge should have allowed the application for condonation of the delay. In the alternative, it has been urged that the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 10-2- 1978 was liable to be quashed inasmuch as the Prescribed Authority had not recorded any finding that the need of respondent 3 was bona fide or that greater hardship would be caused to him in the event of the application for release being dismissed than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner on the said application being allowed. It was also urged by counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 10-2-1978 was vitiated in law inasmuch as the application made by respondent 3 for release of the shop in question was a composite application under S. 21 (1)(a) and 21 111(b) of the Act and the application insofar as it was under S. 210)(b) of the Act, was allowed even though no finding was recorded that the requirements of R. 17 framed under the Act had been fulfilled. 3. Having heard counsel for the petitioner at some length and given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by him I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the impugned orders do not deserve to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Having heard counsel for the petitioner at some length and given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by him I am of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the impugned orders do not deserve to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution. As seen above, even after having been served with the summons of the application for release made by respondent 3 and even after filing his written statement the petitioner chose not to file any affidavit in reply to the affidavit filed by respondent 3 and the hearing of the case was prolonged for more than a year on one ground or the other. It was ultimately on 10-2-1978 that the case was fixed for final hearing. On that date the petitioner abstained and the application for release was allowed ex parte. Then he made an application for setting aside the ex parte order. He could have simultaneously filed an appeal also against the order dated 10-2-1978 but he chose not to do so. Even the application for setting aside the ex parte order was made by the petitioner on false grounds and on the basis of an apparently forged medical certificate. as is clear from the order dated 17-3-1979 passed by the Prescribed Authority dismissing the aforesaid application, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit. Its perusal indicates that the application for setting aside the ex parte order had been made by the petitioner on the ground that on 3-2-1978 he had gone to Delhi and at Delhi he fell ill and it was in these circumstances that he was unable to attend the Court on 10-2-1978, the date fixed for hearing of the application for release. Medical certificate -from some Hakeem was also filed along with the said application. However, a-letter sent by the petitioner to one Dayanand from Ahmadabad which appears to have been filed by respondent 3 and the genuineness of which was admitted by the petitioner, indicated that the petitioner had not gone to Delhi at all nor had he fallen ill there but he had really gone to Ahmadabad in connection with some work and had written to Dayanand from Ahmadabad that he had come to Gujrat for 10 or 15 days. The Prescribed Authority has held that the ground of illness at Delhi taken in the said application by the petitioner for his non- appearance on the date fixed was a lame excuse. If the petitioner was not at all at Delhi during the said period and was at Gujrat the medical certificate indicating that he was lying ill at Delhi was apparently one which had been forged for the purpose of moving the application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 10-2- 1978. This conduct of the petitioner together with his conduct that he did not file any affidavit in reply to the application for release and the hearing of the said application had to be adjourned for more than a year, clearly indicates that the petitioner was, as has been found even by the District Judge, interested in delaying the disposal of the application for release as long as possible on one pretext or the other. From this and the subsequent conduct of the petitioner to be pointed out shortly, I am of opinion, that it would not be unreasonable to draw an inference that the petitioner did not have really any plausible defence to the application for release and the best defence on the facts of the instant case was to make an attempt to have the 'boon of delay by getting the disposal of the application for release deferred as long as possible. In view of the orders staying his ejectment passed in various proceedings taken recourse to by the petitioner after the passing of the order dated 10-2-1978 the petitioner has already succeeded in retaining possession over the shop in question till today even though the application ' for release was filed by respondent 3 about seven years back in the year 1976 on the ground that he wanted*to carry on business in the shop in question to earn his livelihood. Eden after the disposal of the application for setting aside the order dated 10-2-1978 on the basis of a finding which was essentially a finding of fact the petitioner did not choose to file an appeal against the order dated 10-2-78 forthwith but chose to file a writ petition in this Court. Eden after the disposal of the application for setting aside the order dated 10-2-1978 on the basis of a finding which was essentially a finding of fact the petitioner did not choose to file an appeal against the order dated 10-2-78 forthwith but chose to file a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was summarily dismissed on the ground, as already seen above, that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order allowing the application of respondent 3 under S. 21 of the Act. The order whereby the application of respondent 3 under S. 21 of the Act was allowed, was the one dated 10-2- 1978. Section 22 is the relevant section of the Act which provides for an appeal against an order under S. 21 of the Act. The said section in unambiguous terms provides that an appeal is maintainable ..against an order under S. 21". An order dismissing an application for setting aside an ex parte order is not an order which can by any stretch of imagination be said to be an order under S.21 of the Act. Notwithstanding the clear observation of this Court that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order dated 10-2-1978 and notwithstanding the unambiguous language of S. 22 of the Act the petitioner even after the dismissal of his earlier writ petition chose to file an appeal not against the order dated 10-2-1978 but against the order dated 17-3-1979 whereby his application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 10-2-78 had been dismissed. It is only after the dismissal of the said appeal as being not maintainable, that the appeal against the order dated 10-2-1978 was filed along with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (AIR 1962-SC 361) it was held that in construing S. 5 of the Limitation Act it is relevant to bear in mind that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not he lightheartedly disturbed. It was further held that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. If sufficient cause has been shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay and at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration. 5. I am aware as pointed out by Lord Mansfield in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2528 that discretion "means sound discretion guided by law. It must he governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful." On the facts of the instant case I have no doubt in my mind that the discretion exercised by the District Judge in not condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act was governed by rule, not by humour and it was neither arbitrary nor vague or fanciful. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the District Judge in dismissing the application under S. 5, Limitation Act, has exercised his jurisdiction in a judicial manner. That the order passed by the District Judge was in the exercise of his discretionary jurisdiction is a proposition of law which admits of no doubt. In regard to such an order it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Calcutta Corporation v. Mulchand ( AIR 1956 SC 110 ) that it is well settled principle that when the legislature entrusts to an authority the power to pass an order in its discretion, an order passed by that authority in exercise of that discretion is. in general, m'; liable to be interfered with by an appellate Court, unless it can be shown to have been based on some mistake of fact or misapprehension of the principles applicable thereto. This being the law in regard to the discretionary orders even in so far as an appeal is concerned the discretion exercised by the District Judge in a judicial manner, as in the instant case can certainly be not interfered with in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that the District Judge ought to have condoned the delay in filing the appeal and allowed the application under S. 5. 6. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that the District Judge ought to have condoned the delay in filing the appeal and allowed the application under S. 5. Limitation Act, inasmuch as the earlier appeal which was filed before him had been filed against the order dated 17-3- 1979 and not against the order dated 10-2- 1978 on the basis of legal advice. I am again aware that normally if delay occurs on account of a bona fide advice given by a counsel the party should not be allowed to suffer but to me it appears that it is not an invariable rule that whatever may be the nature of the mistake and even if it was apparent that the advice was given in a negligent manner the delay should none the less be condoned as a matter of rule. This question came up for consideration before me in Devi Prasad v. State of U. P. 1982 (2) Ren CJ 461 : (1982 All LJ 1275). On a conspectus of the various authorities on the point it was held that bona fide advice given by a counsel after due care and attention may constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay if acted upon by a party in good faith. It was further held that if the advice of the counsel however, indicated complete lack of care and attention on his part and the advice was on the face of it a cavalier one it could not make out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay and that taking a contrary view will result in nothing but light-heartedly disturbing the valuable right accrued in favour of the respondent. 7. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Badri Pandey v. Ram Chandra (1975 Allahabad Civil Nirnaya 46): (1975 All LJ 659). That was a case where an appeal had been filed against a decree of the Munsif by the plaintiff and 24-3-1971 was fixed for hearing of the appeal. An application was made by the respondents for adjournment which was allowed and 6-5-1971 was the date fixed for hearing. On this date also an application was made by counsel for the respondents for adjournment of the hearing of the appeal. This application was, however dismissed and the appeal was allowed on 24-5-1971. An application was made by the respondents for adjournment which was allowed and 6-5-1971 was the date fixed for hearing. On this date also an application was made by counsel for the respondents for adjournment of the hearing of the appeal. This application was, however dismissed and the appeal was allowed on 24-5-1971. After the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an application to set aside the order dated 24-5-1971 an application was made for setting aside that decree. The ground shown in the application for the delay was that the appellant had been advised to file a second appeal against the decree dated 24-5-1971 and it as only subsequently that he was advised by his counsel in the High Court that an application for setting aside the ex parse decree should be filed. The point which really arose for consideration in the above case was as to whether the provisions of O. 41 R. 17 (2) were attracted to that case or n,'t. It is well known that there was considerable divergence of opinion in regard to the applicability of the provisions of O. 41 R. 17 (2) Civil P. C. In this background it was held in Badri Pandey's case (supra) that the advice given by a counsel to file a second appeal which resulted in the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 24-5-1971 was bona fide and could constitute sufficient explanation for the delay. It was, however, pointed out even in that case that advice of the counsel could constitute sufficient cause for the delay if there was no negligence or laches. In the instant case even if it is accepted that the earlier appeal before the District Judge was filed by the petitioner not against the order dated 10-2-1978 but against the order dated 17-3-1979, on the basis of some legal advice, as asserted by him, the said advice, on the face of it, was given in a negligent manner without even looking into the order of this Court rejecting the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner and the plain language of S. 22 of the Act. 8. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mata Din v. Narayanan (AIR, 1970 SC 1953). 8. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mata Din v. Narayanan (AIR, 1970 SC 1953). In my opinion, that case also is not of any assistance to the petitioner in view of the facts already pointed out above. Even in the case of Mata Din (supra) it was held that mistake of counsel will not in every case by itself be sufficient ground to condone the delay. It was pointed out in Mata Din's case (supra) that there was nothing to show that error of counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive. It is true that in the instant case also, even if it is accepted that the earlier appeal was filed as aforesaid on the basis of legal advice, it may not be possible to say that the advice was necessarily mala fide but certainly the advice had been given not after exercising due care and caution but in a negligent manner and was a cavalier one. The possibility, however, cannot be said to be completely ruled out that the earlier appeal was filed against a wrong order in furtherance of the same object of delaying the final decision of the case as far as possible. It is for all these reasons that I am of opinion that the facts of the instant case do not justify interference with the order of the District Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Coming to the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 10-2-1978 itself was manifestly erroneous in as much as the Prescribed Authority had not recorded a categorical finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide or that greater hardship would be caused to him in the event of the release application being dismissed than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner on the said application being allowed, suffice it to say that a perusal of the order dated 10-2-1978 makes it clear that the Prescribed Authority believed the un-controverted affidavit filed by the petitioner. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Parikh & Co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay ( AIR 1956 SC 554 ). Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Parikh & Co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay ( AIR 1956 SC 554 ). A Division of Bench of this Court in Juggi Lal v. R. J. Gupta, ( AIR 1962 All 407 ) held that where the Court had before it a duly sworn affidavit of the pairokar of the plaintiff in support of his application under O.9, R. 9 for restoration of his suit dismissed for default of appearance and there was no counter-affidavit in traverse of the allegations contained in that affidavit, it was not open to the court to disbelieve the allegations of the plaintiff in the affidavit. Consequently the Prescribed Authority cannot be said to have committed any error of law in believing the facts stated in the un-controverted affidavit filed by respondent 3. All the ingredients on the basis of which an application under S. 21 of the Act could be allowed were apparently stated in the said affidavit and when the Prescribed Authority held that respondent 3 had succeeded in establishing his case on the basis of the un-controverted affidavit it has to be taken that the Prescribed Authority has been of the view on the basis of that affidavit that the need of the respondent 3 was bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to him in the event of the release application being dismissed than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner on the said application being allowed. 10. Now may be considered the submission made by counsel for the petitioner, that the application for release being a composite application under Ss. 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the Act it could not be allowed under S. 21 (1) (b) of the Act unless a finding was recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the requirements of S. 17 of the Rules framed under the Act had been fulfilled. In my opinion, this circumstance alone would not justify the quashing of the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 10-2-1978. In my opinion, this circumstance alone would not justify the quashing of the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 10-2-1978. Even if it is held that in the absence of a finding that the ingredients of R. 17 aforesaid had been fulfilled the application for release in so far as it purports to be under S. 21 (1) (b) could not be allowed, the impugned order will still be a good order in so far as the said application under S. 21 (1) (a) of the Act. Even if no ground under S. 21 (1) (b) is made out, an application for release can still be allowed under S. 21 (1) (a) of the Act if it is established that the need of the landlord was bona fide and that on the said application being dismissed greater hardship would be caused to him than the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant on the said application being dismissed. That being essentially the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority in its order dated 10-2-1978, the said order suffers from no such error which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. Lastly, if was urged that since the petitioner was the tenant of a shop and was using it for a non-residential purpose, the application for release could not be allowed unless compensation was granted to the petitioner as contemplated by the second proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act which was mandatory in nature. In so far as this submission is concerned, counsel for the landlord-respondent 3 made a statement that respondent 3 will deposit with the Prescribed Authority within a period of one month a sum of Rs. 1440/- which represents two years rent at the admitted rate of Rs. 60/- per month as compensation to be paid over to the petitioner under the aforesaid proviso. At this place it may be pointed out that the maximum compensation which can be awarded under the aforesaid proviso is of an amount representing two years rent. Since respondent 3 is prepared to pay to the petitioner the maximum compensation payable under the aforesaid proviso, the impugned order dated 10-2-1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority does not deserve to be quashed on the basis of the aforesaid submission made by counsel for the petitioner. 12. No other point has been pressed. 13. Since respondent 3 is prepared to pay to the petitioner the maximum compensation payable under the aforesaid proviso, the impugned order dated 10-2-1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority does not deserve to be quashed on the basis of the aforesaid submission made by counsel for the petitioner. 12. No other point has been pressed. 13. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The Prescribed Authority shall not, however, execute the order dated 10-2-1978 allowing the application for release made by respondent 3 until the sum of Rs. 1440/- as compensation has been deposited by respondent 3 for being paid over to the petitioner. The petitioner is granted one month's time to vacate the shop in question.