JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. 1. THE two petitioners Kripa Ram and his son Shiv Kumar Mittal had filed the present writ petition. Kripa Ram is now dead. Kripa Ram was the owner of house no. 1/105 Mohalla Kayastwara, Deoband, district Saharanpur. Sri Jagdish Chand Tyagi was their tenant. 2. AN application was filed by Jagdish Chand Tyagi before the district Magistrate, Saharanpur praying that he be granted an authorisation to prosecute Kripa Ram and his son Shiv Kumar Mittal for having committed offences punishable under sections 26 (1) and 26 (4) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The authorisation was sought in view of the provisions of section 33 (1) of the Act as no prosecution can be instituted except on a complaint authorised by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate after notice to the petitioners authorised the filing of the complaint by Jagdish Chand Tyagi, against the petitioners for having contravened the provisions of sections 26 (1) and 26 (4) of the Act which were said to be punishable under section 31 of the Act. The basis on which the authorisation was sought by Jagdish Chand Tyagi was that the landlord Kripa Ram used to get the rent collected through his son Shiv Kumar Mittal who never gave a receipt for the rent received by the landlord. This was said to be a contravention of section 26 (4) of the Act which requires a landlord to give a receipt for rent payable to and received by him. The offence under section 26 (1) was said to be that the petitioners had got bricks stacked on a chabutara in the tenancy of Jagdish Chand Tyagi. 3. THE defence of the petitioners before the District Magistrate was denial of all the facts asserted by Jagdish Chand Tyagi. It was further stated that Jagdish Chand Tyagi had not paid rent and consequently no question of issuing receipt to him arose. 4. AGGRIEVED against the order of the District Magistrate authorising the sanction, the petilioners have filed the instant writ petition. So far as the offence under section 26 (1) is concerned, it is clear that what is laid down in the Act is that no landlord shall without lawful authority or excuse cut off, withhold or reduce any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. So far as the offence under section 26 (1) is concerned, it is clear that what is laid down in the Act is that no landlord shall without lawful authority or excuse cut off, withhold or reduce any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. The fact that the landlord has committed a nuisance by storing bricks on a chabutara in the tenancy of a tenant would not amount to cutting off or withholding or reducing any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. As such no offence under section 26 (1) is made out. No prosecution could be launched against either of the petitioner for having committed violation of the provisions of section 26 (1) of the Act. 5. SO far as the violation of the provisions of section 26 (4) of the Act by the petitioners is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that Kripa Ram, landlord, is dead. This fact is not controverted on behalf of Jagdish Chand Tyagi. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since Shiv Kumar Mittal was not the landlord, there was no legal obligation on him to give a receipt for the rent received by him and as such the authorisation for prosecution of Shiv Kumar Mittal should be quashed in respect of the alleged violation of the provisions of section 26 (4) of the Act is concerned. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri Jagdish Chand Tyagi has referred to me the definition of 'landlord' in section 3 (j) of the Act which is as follows : " 'Landlord' in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be, payable, and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, of such person. " He urges that as according to Jagdish Chand Tyagi, Shiv Kumar Mittal collected rent or behalf of his father Kripa Ram, he would be a landlord and it was he who would also be required under section 26 (4) to issue a receipt. 6. THEN it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 26 and particularly clause (4) thereof only speaks of certain obligations of the landlord and tenant and the violation of any of the provisions would not make either the landlord or the tenant punishable. 6. THEN it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 26 and particularly clause (4) thereof only speaks of certain obligations of the landlord and tenant and the violation of any of the provisions would not make either the landlord or the tenant punishable. He then refers to sections 27 and 28 which provide for enforcement of landlord's obligation regarding amenities, and section 28 which provides for enforcement of certain obligations of landlord regarding repairs etc. Section 31 of the Act provides that any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any order made there under or attempt or abets such contravention, shall be punished on conviction with imprisonment of either description, for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five thousand or with both. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 31 of the Act deal with acts for which a higher punishment is prescribed, Section 32 deals with the offences committed by companies. I cannot accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word 'landlord' given in section 26 (4) should mean only the landlord and not his agent where the agent collects the rent. In this case, on the case set up by Jagdish Chand Tyagi, Shiv Kumar Mittal collected the rent and if he did not give receipt, he contravened the provisions of section 26 (4) of the Act. The word 'landlord' has to be given the extended meaning of landlord provided for by section 3 (j) of the Act as reading word 'landlord' in a limited way would defeat the purpose of the Legislature. It is true that when a statute creating an offence is interpreted, that interpretation which is favourable to the citizen should be given but where the Legislature intent is clear, as in the present case the extended meaning has to be given. I am not expressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the factual case set up by any of parties to this dispute. 7. IN the circumstances the writ petition is partly allowed. I am not expressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the factual case set up by any of parties to this dispute. 7. IN the circumstances the writ petition is partly allowed. The authorisation for the sanction given by the Distridt Magistrate to file a complaint against the petitioner Shiv Kumar Mittal for having violated the provisions of section 26 (1) is quashed but the order of the District Magistrate, Saharanpur is upheld in so far as it authorises the institution of a complaint against Shiv Kumar Mittal under section 26 (4) of the Act is concerned. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition partly allowed.