ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition arises out of a case under section 240-G of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. 2. The contesting opposite party Madhu Ram and others had claimed tenancy right in the disputed plot No. 135111, 18 Bighas 18 Biswas. The claim of Madhu Ram and others was contested by Syed Ali on the allegation that Madhu Ram and others had no concern with the disputed land nor they were in possession over the same and after depositing 10 times rent and obtaining Bhumidhari Sanad he had transferred the land to Nazir All. The present petitioner had also got himself impleaded in the case and had claimed bhumidhari right in the disputed land. 3. The Compensation Officer through his judgment dated 23-6-67 accepted the claim of the contesting opposite party Madhu Ram and others. Against the judgment of the Compensation Officer the petitioner had preferred an appeal which was dismissed as is evident from the judgment dated 16-11-68 (Annexure 3). Thereafter the petitioner had also filed a second appeal which has been dismissed by the learned Member through his judgment dated 30th July 1974. Aggrieved by the judgments of the revenue courts the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the Second Appellate Court has patently erred in holding that the appeal against the order of the Compensation Officer was not maintainable and hence the second appeal was also not maintainable. He stressed that in the circumstances of the present case the Second Appellate Court should have treated the second appeal as a revision and it should rave decided the claims of the parties on merits. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in the circumstances of the present case the trial court had acted illegally and with material irregularity in deciding the case as it had failed to frame proper issues in the case and also had failed to refer the issue to a competent court, hence its, judgment deserves to be quashed. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to justify the impugned judgments on merits and on the reasonings given in the impugned judgments. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to justify the impugned judgments on merits and on the reasonings given in the impugned judgments. Consequently he has submitted that on the findings recorded by the Revenue courts the petitioner did not acquire valid title to the disputed land hence at his instance the impugned judgment should not be interfered with and the writ petition should be dismissed. 6. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, S. 240-G of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 reads as follows : "Any person interested or the State Government may in the manner prescribed file before the Compensation Officer an objection upon such statement within the period of one month from the date of its publication." 7. S. 240-H reads as below : (1) Except as provided, in sub-section (2), the Compensation Officer shall after hearing the parties, if necessary. on the objections filed under Section 240-G, dispose of the objections in the manner prescribed. (2) Where the objection filed under sub -section (1) (a) is that the land is not referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 240A, the Compensation Officer shall frame an issue to that effect and refer it for disposal to the Court which would have jurisdiction to decide a suit under Section 229-B read with Section 234-A in respect of the land and thereupon all the provisions, relating to the hearing and disposal of such suits shall apply to the reference as if it were suit; (b) involves a question of title and such question has not already been determined by a Competent Court, the Compensation Officer shall except in cases in which S. 240HH applies refer the question for determination to the Court of competent jurisdiction. Explanation : - Whether a person is or is not an adhivasi shall not be deemed to raise a question of title within the meaning of this clause. (3) The District Judge shall determine the question referred to him under cl. (b) of sub -section (2) in the manner prescribed and his decision therein shall be final." 8. Explanation : - Whether a person is or is not an adhivasi shall not be deemed to raise a question of title within the meaning of this clause. (3) The District Judge shall determine the question referred to him under cl. (b) of sub -section (2) in the manner prescribed and his decision therein shall be final." 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party before me was to the effect that the petitioners had not raised any specific plea that the disputed land was not land referred to in sub-s. (1) of S. 240-A of the Act No. I of 1951, hence it was not obligatory upon the Compensation Officer to frame an issue and refer to the competent court. 9. A perusal of S. 240-A of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 quoted above indicates that the Compensation Officer is required to refer the question of title also to a competent court. In the circumstances of the case one of the questions involved is whether the petitioner or the transferor was bhumidhar of the disputed land or not? The trial court did not frame proper issue in this case and did not refer the issue arising out of the pleadings of the parties to a competent court. It has committed procedural illegality in dealing with the claims of the parties. Therefore its judgment suffers from patent error of law. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a ruling reported in AIR 1969 SC 1114 , Sukhram Singh v. Harbheji and has emphasised the paragraph 15 of the aforesaid ruling which reads as under: "The next point is about the finality of the order of October 25, 1956 passed by the Compensation Officer. We cannot refer that order to his capacity as the Assistant Collector. An act would, no doubt be referable to a capacity which would give it validity. But the law required the compensation officer to frame an issue and refer it to the Competent Court. He could not decide the matter without doing so. One of the parties was before to an a ought to have asked the party to prove its cause. He did nothing ................. But the law required the compensation officer to frame an issue and refer it to the Competent Court. He could not decide the matter without doing so. One of the parties was before to an a ought to have asked the party to prove its cause. He did nothing ................. In our opinion, the order of the Compensation Officer did not have that finality which is claimed for it. That finality attaches only to the order of the Assistant Collector on a reference of an issue from the Compensation Officer." 10. To my mind in the present case the trial court acted illegally in not framing proper issues and in not referring the same to a competent court. 11. As regards the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is sufficient to indicate that the Second Appellate Court is right in observing that the First Appeal against the judgment of the trial court was not maintainable. In the eye of Law the simpliciter order of the Compensation Officer is neither appealable or revisable before the Revenue courts. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1958 All. 720 , Amod Kumar Verma v. Hari Prasad Burman and has contended that the Second Appellate Court should have treated the appeal as revision. I think that the ruling relied upon by the learned. counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable to the circumstances of the present case : neither appeal nor second appeal nor revision was maintainable. Where an appeal or revision is maintainable before a court it has discretion to convert the appeal into revision or vice versa. In the present case the Second Appellate Court had even no power to revise the order of the Compensation Officer therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard fails. 12. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that the delay in filing the writ petition against the judgment of the Compensation Officer be condoned and as the order of the Compensation Officer suffers from patent error of law it should be quashed and requisite relief should be granted to the petitioner. The findings recorded by the revenue courts, being without jurisdiction, in the circumstances of this case should not,be adhered to for refusing relief to the petitioner. 13. The findings recorded by the revenue courts, being without jurisdiction, in the circumstances of this case should not,be adhered to for refusing relief to the petitioner. 13. After weighing the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, I think that the writ petition should not be dismissed on the finding of the revenue court that the petitioner had not derived valid title to the disputed land. The Compensation Officer should adopt correct procedure in dealing with the claims of the parties and thereafter if the petitioner fails to establish the claim to the disputed land he would have no legs to stand. At the present the finding recorded by the revenue courts appears to me without jurisdiction hence I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the writ petition should be dismissed for want of title in the petitioner. I am condoning the delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court against the order of the Compensation Officer. The petitioner has been prosecuting remedies in wrong courts, hence the delay in coming to this Court stands sufficiently explained. 14. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgments of the revenue courts are hereby quashed and the Compensation Officer is directed to deal with the claims of the parties strictly in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court mentioned (supra). Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the parties are directed to bear their own costs.