JUDGMENT R.S. Varma, M. - Pharai had filed a suit under section 229-B/209 Z.A. and L.R. Act against Awadh Narain, Gaon Sabha and U.P. State. That suit was dismissed on 23-5-79. On 2-4-80 the plaintiff Pherai filed an appeal in the court of the learned Additional Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner on 21-2-1981 dismissed the appeal as time barred. Against that order this second appeal has been filed. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that his client had no notice of the date of judgment of the learned trial court and this is evident from the fact that on the typed judgment the date of order was first mentioned as 30-9-78 but it was signed on 23-5-79. It has been argued that the plaintiff had filed a revision against interlocutory order of the trial court and the proceeding in the trial court and the proceeding in the trial court had been stayed and that thereafter when hi revision was dismissed by the learned Additional Commissioner the trial court did not given him any notice of the date of delivery of judgment and hence he was ignorant of the fact that the suit had been dismissed by the trial Court on 23-5-79. Awadh Narain respondent filed an affidavit that Pherai plaintiff came to know about the judgment of the trial court on 24-9-79 and in support of this allegation he filed two applications, one given by him on 22-6-79 and the other given by Pherai plaintiff on 24-9-79 before the Tahsildar in a case under section 33/39 of the Land Revenue Act. Awadh Narain respondent was a defendant in the suit of the plaintiff he filed application before Tahsildar that he be recorded as tenant of the land in suit because in a suit under section 229-B/209 Z.A. and L.R. Act the trial Court had held him to be a tenant of the land in suit but had not issued any parwana amaldaramad because he was defendant in that suit. On 24-9-79 Pherai the plaintiff filed an application before the Tahsildar that he was a necessary party to that case. This application of Pherai fully prove the fact that atleast on 24-9-79 he knew about the judgment of the trial court because that very case was mentioned in the application of Awadh Narain in which Pherai had applied for being impleaded. This application of Pherai fully prove the fact that atleast on 24-9-79 he knew about the judgment of the trial court because that very case was mentioned in the application of Awadh Narain in which Pherai had applied for being impleaded. As he got knowledge of the judgment at least on 24-9-79 and filed the appeal on 2-4-1980 his appeal was apparently time barred and the learned Additional Commissioner rightly dismissed his appeal as such. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the appeal had been admitted and hence it would be deemed that the delay in filing the appeal had been condoned. There is absolutely no substance in this argument. The question of limitation was open before the learned Additional Commissioner and it had to be decided by him either at the time of appeal or later on. At the time of filing of appeal this question was not considered by the lower appellate court because there was a mention in the memo that he had no notice of the date of judgment of the trial Court. Later on the evidence came on the record that the plaintiff-appellant had notice of the judgment of the trial court atleast on 24-9-79 and it was found that his appeal was time barred and so it was dismissed. No illegality was committed by the learned Additional Commissioner in passing such an order. It was lastly contended that case should be remanded to the learned Additional Commissioner so that the appellant may file an application under section 5 Limitation Act. This is absolutely a novel idea. No such opportunity will be given by this second appellate court. It was for the appellant himself to apply to the first appellate Court under section 5 Limitation Act but he did no prefer any such application and now this Court will not set aside the order of the learned Additional Commissioner on the ground that the appellant had not given any application under section 5 Limitation Act and that he should now be allowed to give such application. 3. There is absolutely no merit in this second appeal and hence it is dismissed with costs and Rs. 50/- as Counsel's fee.