SUDARSANA BABU v. STATE OF KERALA — 1983 DIGILAW 96 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, complaining about the denial of press pass to the staff correspondent of the "Desabhimani", for the session of the Kerala Legislative Assembly which commenced from the last week of February. It is alleged that the practice has been to issue passes to accredited correspondents, that Sudarsana Babu, the correspondent concerned, has been enjoying this facility for three years, and that when the current session commenced, the usual pass was denied to him on the directions of the Speaker, though passes were issued to all the other 74 accredited correspondents. The facility was denied to Babu alone, without assigning any reason, without even informing him, and without a hearing also. The first respondent is the State of Kerala, which is said to be the accrediting agency. The 2nd respondent is the Speaker. The 3rd respondent is the Secretary of the Assembly, responsible for signing the pass. The action is challenged on the following, among other grounds:- [i] Babu has been singled out for discriminatory treatment, in a manner violative of Art.14 of the Constitution; [ii] denial of the necessary facility to report the proceedings of the Assembly amounts to a violation of the rights recognised by Art.361A of the Constitution; [iii] R.309 of the Rules of Procedure made under Art.208 of the Constitution can only be subject to the provision of the Constitution, and therefore the Rule and the action taken in exercise of power thereunder cannot affect the fundamental and other constitutional rights of the petitioner; and [iv] Art.212[2] is not attracted, because admission of strangers to the Visitors' Gallery or the Press Gallery is not a matter pertaining to regulation of procedure and conduct of business in the Legislature. 2. When the petition was posted for admission before me on 7-3-1983, I felt that it raised important questions about the scope of Art.14,19(1)(a), 208, 212 and 361A of the Constitution, and admitted it. R.149 of the High Court Rules reads: Every petition shall, soon after it is numbered, be posted for orders of Court for admission. The Court may upon hearing the petitioner or his advocate, either admit the same or reject it. R.149 of the High Court Rules reads: Every petition shall, soon after it is numbered, be posted for orders of Court for admission. The Court may upon hearing the petitioner or his advocate, either admit the same or reject it. On admission notice shall be ordered to the respondents and along with the notice copies of the application, affidavit and annexures shall be served on the respondents." But on 10-3-83, before office could issue notice, the Advocate General filed a "statement" in court on behalf of the 1st respondent, suggesting that the Speaker and the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly be removed from the party array. The relevant part of the statement reads: 'I have been instructed by the State Government to apprise this Hon'ble Court of the correct constitutional provision regarding the issuance of notice to the Speaker and the Secretary of the Kerala Legislative Assembly so that the names of respondents 2 and 3 may be removed from the party array in the above Original Petition " That is how the matter has come up again; and the question is whether any constitutional provision precludes this Court from issuing notice to the Speaker and the Secretary of the Assembly, in a matter like the present. 3. The proper method for reviewing an order passed by a Court, or for striking off parties improperly joined, is not the filing of a statement; but considering the importance of the question raised, and having due regard to the impassioned plea of the Advocate General that this Court shall not embark on a course of confrontation with the Legislative Assembly, I shall proceed to examine it. 4. The short point raised is this. Art.208 of the Constitution empowers the legislature of a State to make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business; and in exercise of this power, the Kerala legislature has framed certain rules. R.309 of these rules provides that admission of strangers to portions of the Assembly chamber not exclusively reserved for members shall be regulated, in accordance with orders of the Speaker. R.309 of these rules provides that admission of strangers to portions of the Assembly chamber not exclusively reserved for members shall be regulated, in accordance with orders of the Speaker. A discretion has thus been conferred on the Speaker in the matter of granting or denying admission to strangers; and Art.212 (2) provides that an officer or member of the Assembly in whom such regulatory powers are vested, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. In so far as Babu has been dented admission to the Assembly in exercise of powers "vested by or under the Constitution" on respondents 2 and 3, it is contended that no notice at all could issue to them in proceedings under Art.226, in respect of the alleged action. 5. I shall assume that immunity from jurisdiction of courts means immunity from notice under R.149 also.I shall further assume for a moment (and a moment only) that the respondents have only exercised power conferred on them under the Constitution in a matter covered by Art.212 Even so, the question arises whether the said powers or the exercise thereof can transcend the provisions of the Constitution, including those in Part III. 6. Under Art.12 every authority, including the legislature, is a 'State' for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution, When Art.13 (2) provides that the State shall not make any law abridging fundamental rights, the prohibition applies to the legislature as well; and "law", in the context, includes rules and regulations. Art.14 lays down that the State shall not deny equality or the equal protection of the laws; and without anything more, therefore, the legislature or its instrumentalities cannot claim immunity from Art.14. Art.208 specifically provides that the rules made by a legislature for regulating procedure and conduct of business shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution; the rules will be invalid, if they are opposed to Part III or any other provisions of the Constitution. Art.212(2) provides immunity only as regards exercise of powers for regulating procedure and conduct of business; and it is only reasonable to think that if the rules of procedure are themselves subject to the Constitution, exercise of powers thereunder must also be subject to the same limitation. Art.212(2) provides immunity only as regards exercise of powers for regulating procedure and conduct of business; and it is only reasonable to think that if the rules of procedure are themselves subject to the Constitution, exercise of powers thereunder must also be subject to the same limitation. In other words, the officers and members of a legislature cannot claim immunity when they exercise their powers in a manner opposed to the Constitution. And who is to decide whether they have transgressed the limits of their power? Art.226 of the Constitution confers power on the High Court to enforce fundamental and other rights; this power is not subject to Art.212. To my mind, therefore, when a citizen approaches the court with a complaint that his fundamental or other constitutional rights are being invaded, this Court has the power to look into it even if the complaint pertains to a matter covered by Art.212. 7. It was conceded that there are no direct authorities to support the proposition that notice could not go from this Court, under any circumstances, to the Speaker or the Secretary of the Assembly. In fact some of the decisions cited were themselves instances where such notices bad actually gone, and the actions of the Assembly bad been struck down. 8. G. K. Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan (A1R. 1954 SC. 636) was a case where one Homi Dinshaw Mistry was arrested in Bombay and taken to Lucknow to be produced before the Speaker of the U. P. Legislative Assembly to answer a charge of breach of privilege. He was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, but was kept under the Speaker's custody. In a petition filed under Art.32 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights of Mystery under Art.22(2) had been violated. The court ordered his release. This decision is clear authority to show that all fundamental rights do not disappear the moment the Legislative Assembly or its officers and members enter the scene. It is also authority for holding that the Speaker is subject to the writ jurisdiction of courts in a proper case. 9. The court ordered his release. This decision is clear authority to show that all fundamental rights do not disappear the moment the Legislative Assembly or its officers and members enter the scene. It is also authority for holding that the Speaker is subject to the writ jurisdiction of courts in a proper case. 9. Reference was made to M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (AIR 1959 S. C. 395) to point out that the fundamental, right under Art.19(1)(a) was held to be subject to the powers, privileges and immunities of the legislatures under Art.194(3), and to contend that all fundamental rights must likewise be treated as subject to Art.212. The decision did not examine the scope of Art.212, and no such general principle could be deduced therefrom, in view of subsequent decisions clarifying the position. Sharma was the editor of a newspaper, responsible for publishing the speech of a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, portions of which had been ordered to be expunged by the Speaker. A show cause notice was accordingly issued to him why he should not be proceeded against for breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly itself, and it was that notice which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The petitioner's case was that the proposed action amounted to violation of his fundamental rights under Art.19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. For our present purpose, it is enough to notice that the majority of the Constitution Bench reached the following conclusions on the points raised: [i] Art.194 [3] of the Constitution, as it then stood, laid down that the powers and privileges of an Assembly and its members shall be the same as those of the House of Commons in England. At the commencement of the Constitution in India, the House of Commons in England had the power or privilege of prohibiting the publication of even a true report of the debates and proceedings. Therefore the power of the Bihar Assembly to proceed against Sharma for publishing expunged portions of a speech had to be conceded. [ii] The fundamental right of a citizen under Art.19[1] [a] had to be reconciled with the above privilege of the Assembly, and the only way of doing so was to read Art.19[1] [a] as subject to Art.194[3]. Therefore the power of the Bihar Assembly to proceed against Sharma for publishing expunged portions of a speech had to be conceded. [ii] The fundamental right of a citizen under Art.19[1] [a] had to be reconciled with the above privilege of the Assembly, and the only way of doing so was to read Art.19[1] [a] as subject to Art.194[3]. [iii] The earlier decision of the Court in G. K. Reddy's case [AIR 1954 S.C.636] rested on a concession, and was no authority to hold that the privileges of a legislature could be subjected to fundamental rights like those embodied in Art.22[2]; and [iv] Even if Sharma's right to liberty was being threatened, that was being done in accordance with law, and therefore, no violation of Art.21 was involved. Subba Rao J. (as he then was) dissented. According to His Lordship, : [i] the House of Commons in England had no privilege in 1950 to prevent publication of correct and faithful reports save those in the case of secret sessions held under exceptional circumstances; it had only a limited privilege to prevent malafide publication of garbled, unfaithful or expunged reports of proceedings; [ii] there was really no conflict between Art.19[l] [a] and Art.194[3]' but if there was a conflict, the privilege should "yield to the extent it affects the fundamental right"; and [iii] the decision in G. K. Reddy's case [1954 S. C. 636] could not be explained away as attempted by the majority. 10. Pausing here for a minute, it is interesting to notice that Art.361A of the Constitution, introduced in 1978, affords protection to bona fide publication of true reports of Assembly proceedings, except as regards proceedings of secret sittings. The protection is available against civil and criminal proceedings only, but it is significant that the new provision is more in tune with the views of Subba Rao J. than those of the majority in Sharma's case. 11. It is also significant that even the majority is Sharma's case did not say that the fundamental right under Art.21 of the Constitution should yield to the privileges of the House under Art, 194(3). The majority recognised the availability of the fundamental right under Art.21, but thought that on the facts of the case, that right was not being infringed upon. 12. Some of the questions considered in Sharma (1959 SC. The majority recognised the availability of the fundamental right under Art.21, but thought that on the facts of the case, that right was not being infringed upon. 12. Some of the questions considered in Sharma (1959 SC. 395) came up for further examination by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in its advisory opinion in re. under Art.143, Constitution of India (AIR. 1965 SC. 745), under the following circumstances. On a warrant issued by the Speaker of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, one Kesav Singh was detained in prison for committing contempt of the Assembly, An advocate moved a habeas corpus petition before the Allahabad High Court, and a Division Bench ordered the release of Kesav Singh on bail. On receiving information of the release, the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution holding the judges of the Division Bench (and the advocate also) guilty of contempt of the House, and directed that they be brought in custody before the Assembly. The Judges thereupon filed a petition under Art.226 before the Allahabad High Court contending that the Assembly's resolution was without jurisdiction and amounted to contempt of Court. A full court consisting of 28 Judges considered the matter and passed orders restraining the Speaker from issuing the warrant in pursuance of the Assembly resolution. The President of India interfered in the controversy at this stage, and sought the Supreme Court's opinion on certain points; and Gajendragadkar C. J., speaking for six out of seven judges who constituted the Bench, expressed the following views: [i] There is really no conflict between the freedom of speech guaranteed to citizens under Art.19(1)(a), and the freedom of speech guaranteed to members of a legislature under Art.194(1); the two are distinct, and operate in different areas; [ii] Any law made by a legislature under Art.194(3) will have to satisfy the test prescribed by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution; [iii] The majority decision in Sharma's case (AIR. 1959 SC. 395) cannot be understood as laying down the general proposition that the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution should yield to the provisions of Art.194(3); [iv] The said majority decision is itself authority to show that the fundamental right of a citizen under Art.21 cannot yield to Art.194(3); [v] The decision in G.K. Reddy's case (AIR. 1954 SC. 395) cannot be understood as laying down the general proposition that the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution should yield to the provisions of Art.194(3); [iv] The said majority decision is itself authority to show that the fundamental right of a citizen under Art.21 cannot yield to Art.194(3); [v] The decision in G.K. Reddy's case (AIR. 1954 SC. 636) cannot be brushed aside as merely resting on consent; it is a binding decision which holds that the fundamental right under Art.22[2] can operate against the privileges and immunities of Art.194(3). and [vi] India is a federal State with a written Constitution, and the Constitution is supreme. Since legislative assemblies are also "State" within the meaning of Art.12, the power of the High Courts to issue writs under Art.226 even against legislative bodies have to be recognised and upheld. "The right of the judicature to deal with matters brought before them under Art.226 or Art.32 cannot be subjected to the powers and privileges of the House of Legislature under Art.194(3)" And in the light of the above formulations, the court furnished the following answers to the questions referred to it: [i] it was competent for the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court to entertain Kesav Singh's petition and release him on bail pending its disposal; [ii] the two judges bad not committed contempt of the U. P. Assembly by entertaining the petition and ordering bail; [iii] it was not competent for the Assembly to direct production of the two judges before it, in custody; [iv] it was competent for the Full Bench of the High Court to entertain the petitions of the two judges and to restrain the Speaker of Assembly from giving effect to the aforesaid direction; and [v] the legislature is not competent to take proceedings against a judge for entertaining or dealing with a petition filed by a citizen, challenging a decision imposing penalty on him or issuing any process for contempt. 13. It is true that the Supreme Court was here also mainly concerned with Art.194, and not with Art.212; but clearly, some of the broad inferences sought to be drawn from Sharma's case were not approved. More particularly, the court scotched in do uncertain terms the belief that all the fundamental rights in Part III are subject to the privileges in Art.194(3). More particularly, the court scotched in do uncertain terms the belief that all the fundamental rights in Part III are subject to the privileges in Art.194(3). It was also emphatically held that in a proper case, the High Court had power, under Art.226, to release a person ordered to be imprisoned by the Speaker, and also to restrain the Speaker from enforcing his warrant. No total immunity was recognised, and the power of the courts to act under Art.226 and 32 even against the Assembly and its officers, was asserted. I shall close this part of the discussion with extracting some more passages from the advisory opinion of the court, as they have a bearing on the sweeping assertions made in support of the theory of "the correct constitutional provisions": "Our Legislatures have undoubtedly plenary powers, but these powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh Schedule; but beyond the Lists, the Legislatures cannot travel. They can no doubt exercise their plenary legislative authority and discharge their legislative functions by virtue of the powers conferred on them by the relevant provisions of the Constitution; but the basis of the power is the Constitution itself. Besides, the legislative supremacy of our Legislatures including the Parliament is normally controlled by the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. If the Legislatures step beyond the Legislative fields assigned to them, or acting within their respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the relevant articles dealing with the said fundamental rights, their legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in India. Therefore, it is necessary to remember that though our Legislatures have plenary powers, they function within the limits prescribed by the material and relevant provisions of the Constitution." "Art. 212(1) seems to make it possible for a citizen to call in question in the appropriate court of law the validity of any proceedings inside the Legislative Chamber if his case is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to be scrutinised in a court of law, though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more than this, that the procedure was irregular." "If the power of the High Courts under Art.226 and the authority of this Court under Art.32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would be futile to contend that, a citizen cannot move the High Courts or this Court to invoke their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated. The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf; otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts and this Court would be rendered virtually meaningless. Let it not be forgotten that the judicial power conferred on the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection of the citizens' fundamental rights, and so, in the existence of the said judicial power itself is necessarily involved the right of the citizen to appeal to the said power in a proper case." "In this connection, we ought to add that there is no substance in the grievance that Keshav Singh acted illegally in impleading the House to the habeas corpus petition filed by him before the Lucknow Bench. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the House was improperly joined by Keshav Singh, because it was open to him to join the House on the ground that his commitment was based on the order passed by the House, and in that sense the House was responsible for, and had control over, his commitment.' 14. Turning now to Art.212 and taking a closer look at its provisions, what clause (1) says is that the validity of the proceedings in an Assembly shall not be called in question on grounds of irregularity of procedure. That means that the validity can be challenged on grounds other than irregularity of procedure. Turning now to Art.212 and taking a closer look at its provisions, what clause (1) says is that the validity of the proceedings in an Assembly shall not be called in question on grounds of irregularity of procedure. That means that the validity can be challenged on grounds other than irregularity of procedure. The principle behind clause (1) is only that the legislature is not like a local body or a company or a registered society absolutely bound by its own rules of procedure; it can depart from its own rules if found necessary, "Irregularity of procedure" means irregularity in the matter of observing the rules of procedure; it has nothing to do with violation of the provisions of the Constitution, as to the powers of the legislature. Clause (1) has no application when the question is not merely one of procedure, but of overstepping the limits of the Constitution itself. As for clause (2), it merely says that officers and members of the legislature shall not be answerable to the courts in the exercise of powers vested in them, if those powers pertain to regulation of procedure or conduct of business in the House, and are conferred by or under the Constitution. It is elementary that powers conferred by the Constitution or under the Constitution have to be exercised subject to all the provisions of the Constitution, and not in opposition thereto. It should have been far from the mind of the framers of the Constitution to clothe the officers and members of a legislature with power to flout the mandates of the Constitution itself. And they have not left it to inference alone: they have said it in so many words in Art.208, where it is stipulated that the rules for regulating procedure and business shall be "subject to the provisions of this Constitution". They have said it again in Art.12, with special reference to fundamental rights, when they included legislatures also within the definition of 'State'. Art.188 of the Constitution requires every member of an assembly to make an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution; and this is another indication that legislators cannot claim any exemption from the provisions of the Constitution when they function as representatives of the electorate. Art.188 of the Constitution requires every member of an assembly to make an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution; and this is another indication that legislators cannot claim any exemption from the provisions of the Constitution when they function as representatives of the electorate. Dicey has emphasised the distinction between parliamentary sovereignty and the system of federalism in the following teems: (An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution.) "A federal state derives its existence from the Constitution, just as a corporation derives its existence from the grant by which it is created. Hence, every power, executive, legislative, or judicial, whether it belong to the nation or the individual states, is subordinate to and controlled by the Constitution. Neither the President of the United States nor' the House of Congress, nor the Governor of Massachusetts, nor the Legislature or General Court of Massachusetts, can legally exercise a single power which is inconsistent with the articles of the Constitution. This doctrine of the supremacy of the Constitution is familiar to every American, but in England even trained lawyers find a difficulty in following it out to its legitimate consequences. The difficulty arises from the fact that under the English Constitution do principle is recognised which bears any real resemblance to the doctrine [essential to federalism] that the Constitution constitutes the supreme law of the land". "Every legislative assembly existing under a federal constitution is merely a subordinate law-making body, whose laws are of the nature of bye-laws, valid whilst within the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution but invalid or unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority". "There is an apparent absurdity in comparing the legislature of the United States to an English railway company or a municipal corporation, but the comparison is just..." It may be that Art.212(1) of our Constitution places the legislative assemblies on a slightly different footing, but that is only in respect of rules of procedure; and but for the said provision, it could probably have been said that our legislatures also could not depart from the rules made under Art.208. Even in England, where parliamentary supremacy is a constitutional fundamental, and parliamentary privileges are not ordinarily subordinate to any higher or paramount law, the courts have been reluctant to recognise the claims of the two Houses that they are the sole judges of the extent of the privilege. In Stockdale v. Hansard (1839)9 A& E.1, the Court of Queen's Bench rejected the plea of privilege and held that no resolution of the House could deprive the courts of their authority to interpret and apply the laws of the land in a matter affecting the rights of subjects. No doubt, habeas corpus was denied to the Sheriff of Middlesex when execution was levied and the House committed him for breach of privilege and contempt; but the decision has not received universal approval. Kier and Lawson ("Cases in Constitutional Law") comments upon it as "yielding the key of the fortress"; the authors also notice that for all practical purposes, some measure of tacit agreement was reached between the Courts and the Parliament thereafter, in regard to recurrence of similar controversies: "Never in fact since Stockdale v, Hansard has the House of Commons refused to admit the jurisdiction of the Courts when matters of privilege arose. It has thus by implication recognised that the nature and extent of parliamentary privilege are only such as the law allows". S. A. de Smith notes that the attitude of the courts in the Sheriff's case "is obviously open to criticism"; he contrasts it with the bold approach of Gajendragadkar C J. in the P residential Reference case (AIR. 1965 SC.745) See "Constitutional and Administrative Law"; See also "Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law for 1965" 15. State of Punjab v. Satyapal (AIR. 1969 SC. 903) was another case where our Supreme Court refused to recognise the finality of the Speaker's ruling on a question of adjourning the Assembly. It may not be necessary to set out the facts of the case, but the Court firmly held that the Speaker was also subject to an Ordinance issued by the Governor under Art.213, read with Art.209 of the Constitution, Speaking for a unanimous Constitution bench, Hidayatulla C.J. said: "One is tempted to think that the Speaker was not sure of his own position in a House in which he had probably lost a sustaining majority. But even if the most liberal View of the action of the Speaker is taken, one is forced to the conclusion that be acted contrary to law and the injunction of the Constitution that the law made under Art.209(7) is to prevail over the rules of procedure. We regret to record this conclusion which we would have willingly avoided but for some arguments advanced on the Hoes indicated although somewhat hesitatingly by the counsel representating the Speaker. Before tall claims are made which cannot stand against law and the Constitution, those that make them should reasonably be sure that they are right." 16. The decision of the Supreme Court of America in Powell v. Mc Cormack (395 U.S. 486) is also instructive. Powell was duly elected and he satisfied the requirements of age, citizenship and residence as laid down in the Constitution. The House of Representatives however passed a resolution excluding him from the House in purported exercise of power under Article I S.5 of the Constitution, providing that "each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualification of its own members"; but the Supreme Court found no difficulty in holding that the provision was not designed to confer on the House the sole adjudicatory power to determine a member's qualification, to the exclusion of the federal court. The court thought that the case required an interpretation of the Constitution on judicially manageable standards, and set aside the impugned resolution. If adjudicatory powers conferred by the Constitution on elected representatives of the people are thus reviewable by the courts, the position cannot be different when purely regulatory powers are likewise conferred, for being exercised in accordance with the Constitution. 17. It can readily be conceded that if the exercise of power in the present case is strictly confined to Art.212 (2), this Court will have no jurisdiction to interfere. But the petitioners have a definite case that something more is involved. According to them, the matter does not pertain to regulating procedure "in the legislature", if the term 'legislature' is understood in the light of Art.168. They have a further case that the regulatory process cannot trench upon Babu's rights under Art.14,19 and 36IA. Should not these questions be examined, particularly when Art.361A happens to be a provision newly introduced in 1978? They have a further case that the regulatory process cannot trench upon Babu's rights under Art.14,19 and 36IA. Should not these questions be examined, particularly when Art.361A happens to be a provision newly introduced in 1978? And how can they be examined except by giving an opportunity to the respondents to have their say? It is difficult to accept the Advocate General's contention, at least at this stage, that nothing more than denial of a pass to a stranger is involved. Whether Sudarsana Babu is a mere stranger, when he relies on the freedom of the press based on Art.19 and 361A, is itself a question of considerable importance. I am not disturbed by the forebodings of a possible confrontation between the Court and the legislature; the confrontation, if any, is between Babu and the legislature, the former asserting some constitutional rights and the latter declining to recognise the same. Under our federal scheme, it is the duty of the court to police the boundaries of the Constitution. In discharging that function, the court may allow some latitude to the chosen representatives of the people and their agencies, in a matter pertaining exclusively to their jurisdiction, and when nothing else is at stake. But that is something to be decided with notice to the parties, and not at the admission stage. On the averments made and the grounds raised in the writ petition, I was satisfied that the petitioners' case required further examination, and that was why notice was ordered on 7-3-1983. Despite the persuasive arguments of the learned Advocate General, I am unable to bold, as at present advised, that constitutional propriety precludes this Court from enforcing its own rules Office will therefore take immediate steps under R.149.