JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - The applicants have come forward with a pray that the order dated March 25, 1982 of state passed tinder Section 146(1) Cr. C. in a proceeding tinder Section 145 Cr. C. may be quashed. It is urged that the r is mala fide to deprive the petitioners to the fruit of their sowing, there was no trial for any emergency attachment, the magistrate could not rely upon the report of dhan and S.O. 7 amania which required of, an enquiry was not conducted coming possession before directing attach and the police report and the report of a dhan were of much earlier dates and not want. The prayer has been opposed by opposite parties. filing a counter affidavit from the averments contradicting the stations in the affidavit concerning merits the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. it is maintained that the attachment had been played and the account of emergency and no k had been played and the emergency aperient is justified by the materials on record and it is always a matter of satisfaction of the Magistrate. and any question of filing of affidavit by Station officer and Gram Pradhan does not arise and the crop has already been attached and an order has also been passed that the attached crop be sold by auction. Rejoinder affidavit was filed reitcrating the allegations in the affidavit and dwelling upon the merits of the case, it is further asserted therein that when the crop got ripe the opposite party in this case moved for attachment just for harassment. A supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed stating that the order of mutation in favour of the present applicant has been stayed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in appeal. As regards earlier attachment in some previous years it was stated that the order dated' latch ':9, 1978. for attachment in that order was confirmed and the other order of attachment was not undone as such but the case was simply remanded in revision. There are certain other allegations also touching the merits of the case. 2. Admittedly the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is proceeding and that proceeding as such is not assailed. for attachment in that order was confirmed and the other order of attachment was not undone as such but the case was simply remanded in revision. There are certain other allegations also touching the merits of the case. 2. Admittedly the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is proceeding and that proceeding as such is not assailed. The Magistrate will decide the question of actual possession on the date of the preliminary order and within two months prior t) it under the relevant "' sub-clause of Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the matter has to he left to him. 3. A number of arguments have been urrtd assailing attachment under Section 146 Cr.P.C. It is being submitted that when at the time of initiating the proceeding ai attachment was not made such attachment should not have been directed later. It is further urged that once an order under Section 14o Cr.P.C. is passed, while proceeding under Section 145 (4) may continue, the attachment will be governed by the later part of Section 146(l) and a competent court of civil Jurisdiction was to determine the rights of the parties with regard to the person entitled to possession and effect would be given to the sane. It is also urged that any materials for passing any orders under Section 146 did not exist and the Police report and their report of the Pradhan could not be read unless the makers of the report are examined in court. It is also urged that the police report can be read only for passing a preliminary order under Section 1 45 without evidence but not for any attachment under Section 146 and the two sections in that connection are to be read separately. It is also urged that once mutation has been directed in favour of the applicant notwithstanding any appeal or stay order granted therein the trial court's order would remain effective and the very direction concerning mutations would entitle the applicant to possession and he is to remain in possession and no attachment under Section N6 Cr.P.C. will be permissible. Learned counsel for the applicant in support of his stand relied upon number of case,. In the case of Laxman Bhikaji v. Bahim Khan, 1976 Cr. L.J. 1492, a Bombay High Court single Judge pronouncement. it was held that an attachment order under Section 146(ll cannot be made simultaneously with the preliminary order. Learned counsel for the applicant in support of his stand relied upon number of case,. In the case of Laxman Bhikaji v. Bahim Khan, 1976 Cr. L.J. 1492, a Bombay High Court single Judge pronouncement. it was held that an attachment order under Section 146(ll cannot be made simultaneously with the preliminary order. Firstly this Court has itself held that even preliminary No. order and order of attachment can he contained in the same order and it will simply be an irregularity which is curable and not an illegality. Similar view was taken in Cuttak Law Reports 172 Orissa. Apart from it so far as this case is concerned the present attachment order is subsequent to the preliminary order and neither simultaneously nor contained in the same order. In the aforesaid Bombay ruling it was held that the Magistrate could take evidence before directing any attachment. So far as the : Court is concerned a Division Bench of this Court has taken a view that for directing any attachment under Section 146 Cr.P.C. it is not required that the party should necessarily be heard and any inquiry should be conducted. the following observation made in paragraph 11 in the case of Indra Deo v. Bhagwati Devi Division Bench are important: "While making an order under Section 146 for attaching the property in dispute the Magistrate is not required to make any inquiries to adjudicate upon the property in dispute or to make am other adjudication of any other type. All that he has to be satisfied is that there is a case of emergency namely, that breach of peace is likely to occur even before he has been able to hold a proper inquiry Ninth regard to possession under Section 1.15 of the Code and if that be so, he can take steps to attach the properties and to arrange for its management with the twin object of avoiding breach of peace being committed by either of the two party which may be found to be entitled to its possession either in accordance with final orders made under Section 145 or a decision given by competent Civil Court. Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the order for attachment of property under Section 146(1) of the Code made during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 145 is an order partly of an intermediate or temporary nature. Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the order for attachment of property under Section 146(1) of the Code made during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 145 is an order partly of an intermediate or temporary nature. It neither decides:tor purports to affect any legal right or any of the parties.," 4. Reliance has further been placed upon the case of Amrit Singh v. Gvandeo, 1978 Cr. L.J. 671. It has been held in this case that merely that a breach of peace might take place at any time is not sufficient because in every proceeding tinder Section 145 Cr.P.C. there is an apprehension of breach of peace as one of the ingredients while attachment is not a must in every case. I may, however, mention that in the very case it has been Laid down that even if the Magistrate does not say that there is a case of emergency, the superior court. if it thinks that the case was one of the emergency may consider and it will depend upon its individual facts and circumstances. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Avadh Pati Singh v. Raj Rahadur Singh, 1978 Cr. L.J. (NOC) 288 (L.B.). It has been simply laid down that the order of attachment must be passed afterwards and not simultaneously. with the preliminary order. Any reason are not contained the short notes. I have already referred to another case of this C also which it was held that it is not an illegality but merely an irregularity. Basic on the facts of this case the ruling is not applicant Reliance was also placed upon case of Abdul Sayeed Khan v. Jagarnath, 1967 Cri. L.J. Pat. 1243. What has been Laid down in that ruling is that while conducting inquiry into the question of possession under Section 145 Cr.P.C. reports could not be considered by the Magistrate unless supported by an affidavit, being permissible at that time. In the present case the Magistrate has not considered the report while enquiring into question of possession. It has considered the report only for emergency attachment under Section 146 Cr.P.C. and the Patna Cast is distinguishable on facts. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Japan Mahanta and other v. Dubba Munda, 1970 Cri. L.J. 1194 (5). In the present case the Magistrate has not considered the report while enquiring into question of possession. It has considered the report only for emergency attachment under Section 146 Cr.P.C. and the Patna Cast is distinguishable on facts. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Japan Mahanta and other v. Dubba Munda, 1970 Cri. L.J. 1194 (5). It was observed in that case that the Magistrate is entitled to peruse the Police report for limited purpose of satisfying himself as to likelihood of breach of peace and as to identify the subject matter of dispute. and it is inadmissible as evidence in inquiry relating to possession of parties. This ruling will also not apply to the farts of this case because report has not been looked into during inquiry concerning possession of the proper. tics. It has been looked into concerning apprehension of breach of peace and emergency situation under Section 146 Cr.P.C. Reliance was also placed upon the case of' Sardari Lal v. State of Punjab, 1980 Cri. L.J. 1151 Punj. and Har.. W has been held in that case is that the order must reflect the subjective satisfaction and record grounds of his satisfaction and canon merely adopt suggestion of the police report, The crux is always whether the Magistrate has exercised his mind and any material exist and each case has to depend upon its individual facts and circumstances. Reliance has been placed upon the case of Emperor v. Abdul Aziz, AIR 1918 Lah. 390. It was held that when I on-. party has been put in possession by Revenue Officer under Section 36 of the Land Revenue Act criminal court cannot interfere. Reliance has also been placed upon the case of Mst. Ram Sri v. Kihan, AIR 1924 Alld. 777 in which; was held that the order of revenue court in mutation proceeding is an order of,oiapetcnt court determining the person entitled to possession. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Bansdeo v. Badri Narain, AIR 1952 Alld. 186. In that case the Magistrate authorised the Sub-Inspector of Police to attach property if he was satisfied that there was an apprehension of breach of peace. That order was per se illegal and held to be illegal because the Magistrate has to satisfy himself rather than to leave it to some one else. This; ruling is thus distinguishable on facts. In that case the Magistrate authorised the Sub-Inspector of Police to attach property if he was satisfied that there was an apprehension of breach of peace. That order was per se illegal and held to be illegal because the Magistrate has to satisfy himself rather than to leave it to some one else. This; ruling is thus distinguishable on facts. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Sri Chand v. Dhundi Ram, AIR 1955 Alld. 56. In that case one party was admittedly in possession and in that background it was held that it could not be said that the evidence of neither party was such as would lead to positive conclusion about the factum of possession hence an attachment leaving the competent court to decide the matter was bad. This ruling is again distinguishable on facts. Reliance was also placed upon the case of, State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 85 but that is totally on a different point. 5. I may now refer to the impugned order and the materials before further considering other laws. Annexure 2 is the application referring to earlier application stating that the crop is ripe and all other three parties are preparing to cut the crop which may lead to serious occurrence (kand). It is also stated that the sowing may also lead to breach of peace and serious occurrence may take place hence action he taken in the matter. Ex. 3 is the police report. Besides stating other facts it is recited therein that after the death of Raghunath Tiwari the post land-holder a serious dispute had developed between three parties and litigation is going on and the second and third party want to take forcible possession and the relations of all the three parties have got strain and breach of peace may take place at any time and seeing this situation of apprehension of breach of peace it is requested that an order for attachment of the property may be passed. Annexure 5 is the order of the Magistrate dated March 25, 1982. Annexure 5 is the order of the Magistrate dated March 25, 1982. He has stated that the first party has asserted that there is an apprehension of breach of peace while the second party maintaining that so far as the search of peace has not taken place the Magistrate thereafter stated that he has perused the report of the station officer dated August 8, 1981 and that of Pardhan dated July 20, 1981 and after considering the materials and hearing the arguments he is of the opinion that there is a tension between the parties concerned which continues and there is an apprehension of breach of peace and emergency. He has then stated that the property be attached and given in Supurdgi of a reliable Supurdgar. 6. It is urged that the reports in question could he read only for a preliminary order under Section 145(1) and not for any other under Section 146 Cr.P.C. Section 145 Cr.P.C. lays down that whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace .... . " he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and directing the parties to appear and to put in written statements etc. It is urged that this is an exception to the general rule of evidence contained in the Evidence Act and would apply only to preliminary order under Section 145 Cr.P.C. but such reports cannot he read for an order under Section 146 Cr. f .C. As has been held by this Court also as well as by the Supreme Court in the case of Mathura Das, 1980 ACC 32 SC. Section 146 is not an independent section. It is complementary to Section 145 Cr.P.C. and in continuation of the same. In fact, in the old Cr.P.C. the provision for attachment was also contained in Section 145 Cr.P.C. but for the purposes of clarity in the new Cr.P.C. Section 146 Cr.P.C. concerning attachment has been provided. But this does not mean that they are independent section. Section 146 Cr.P.C. is lust a continuation of 145 Cr.P.C. and the two sections 12. In fact, in the old Cr.P.C. the provision for attachment was also contained in Section 145 Cr.P.C. but for the purposes of clarity in the new Cr.P.C. Section 146 Cr.P.C. concerning attachment has been provided. But this does not mean that they are independent section. Section 146 Cr.P.C. is lust a continuation of 145 Cr.P.C. and the two sections 12. 1980 A.C.C. 32 S.c', are to be read together as combined provisions, the latter section being complementary to the former and when that is the position of law the materials provided under Section 145 Cr.P.C. for passing a preliminary order can also be taken into consideration for passing an order under Section 146 Cr.P.C. and the police report and other materials can well he taken by the Magistrate into consideration for making an emergency attachment. If one locks to the scheme of the Act it would be found that a preliminary order is recorded under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in which satisfaction is recorded that there is apprehension of breach of peace century round the dispute over immovable property and once that order is passed the Magistrate has a complete jurisdiction over the proceeding and thereafter an attachment can be made at any stage. As observed earlier the satisfaction is subjective and the court will simply consider whether the Magistrate has referred to any materials and exercised his mind. If it is satisfied on these two points it will be, reluctant to interfere unless it finds the order to be mala fide or motivated. I do not find the order to be mala fide or motivated. Litigation is going on between the parties. Each party must be keen to grab the possession by having resort to sowing or reaping by force and such a situation is bound to create a serious and grave danger to immediate breach of peace as to create a situation of emergency. In what manner the order is recorded is immaterial. The court has to look into the substance of the order and after going through the order I am satisfied that it cannot be termed as mala fide or motivated. It has been held in the case of Indra Deo v. Bhagwati Devi, 1981 All. In what manner the order is recorded is immaterial. The court has to look into the substance of the order and after going through the order I am satisfied that it cannot be termed as mala fide or motivated. It has been held in the case of Indra Deo v. Bhagwati Devi, 1981 All. L.J. 687 that where satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate during pendency of proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P C. is not main fide or motivated High Court cannot interfere with the order under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The following observations made at the end of paragraph 15 on page 693 are important: "The satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate in this regard does not appear to be mala fide or motivated. In these circumstances there is hardly any scope for saying that any process of the Court is being abused by any party." It was next urged that the expression 'he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties their, to with regard to the person entitled to possession thereof' applies to all the three situations mentioned in earlier part of Section 146 (1) including the case of emergency attachment and so on the strength absurd result. Once it is held that the property is to be released in favour of the applicants even in case of emergency attachment though the provisions under Section 145;4) May continue. I am unable to agree with such submission as it may lead to an absurd result. Once it s held that the proceeding under Section 145(4) is to continue and that is not disputed it is the Magistrate who would decide as to which party was in possession on the date of preliminary order and within two months of the same as to then release the property in favour of such party. It will be impossible situation to say that while the Magistrate may declare any party to be in possession after concluding the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. it should at the same time deliver the possession to any party pending such decision to the party in whose favour the mutation has been made. In fact, the law is well-settled by pronouncements of this Court in Kalap Din v. State, 1970 ALJ 873; Jafar Husain v. State, 1968 ALJ 1018; and Mst. Hasanki v. State, 1956 AWR Alld. In fact, the law is well-settled by pronouncements of this Court in Kalap Din v. State, 1970 ALJ 873; Jafar Husain v. State, 1968 ALJ 1018; and Mst. Hasanki v. State, 1956 AWR Alld. 81 as well as by the principles Laid down in the case of R.A. Bhutani v. Miss Mani, 1969 AWR 59 that once a preliminary order has been pass. ed and apprehension of breach of peace continues the Magistrate has to pass a final order under Section 145(6) after deciding the question of possession under Section 145 and even if there is a civil suit or injunction granted proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. can be taken as a court of independent jurisdiction. I may also mention that in the case of Chandu Naik v. Sita Ram, 1978 Cr. L.J. 356 (SC) where various provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. as well as that of attachment were considered in paragraph 7 as follows: "The Magistrate, in the first instance, will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of Section 145 of the Code. If he is able to declare the possession of either party on consideration of the evidence adduced or to be adduced before him he would do so. In that event the other party will be forbidden from creating any disturbance of the possession (including the deemed possession, in case the application of the proviso to sub-section (4) is found necessary) of the party declared in possession. The Magistrate, then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146, because, as per his order declaring a party in possession there would be no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if any elsewhere." 7. It is also noteworthy in the very case of Chandu (supra) it has been stated that where the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession of the disputed property he need not lift attachment until a competent court had determined the rights of the parties. It is also noteworthy in the very case of Chandu (supra) it has been stated that where the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession of the disputed property he need not lift attachment until a competent court had determined the rights of the parties. From the reading of this judgment also it is clear that the matter of determination of question by competent civil court will arise only when the Magistrate holds that he is unable to decide as to which party is in possession, and not in cases of emergency attachment. I may mention that an appeal has been preferred against the order of mutation court and a stay has also been granted. Reliance was placed upon the case of Sardar Mohd. v. Abdul Rehman, AIR 1942 Peshawar 11; and Vinai Kumar and others v. Om Prakash, 1980 Alld. L.J. 524. 1 have referred to the Division Bench case of Allahabad High Court that the Magistrate is bound to decide the matter as a court of independent jurisdiction. Any emergency attachment will not make any difference. I have already referred to a Supreme Court case on the point dealing with the matter in the case of Chandu (supra). 1 have also referred to another Supreme Court case of Mathura Lo, (supra) 1 and Division Bench case of Indra Deo (supra). On the principles Laid down in these rulings this Court will not exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the emergency attachment order is not vitiated and this application must fail. 8. In the result this application is dismissed but I may also observe that the case has become very old and otherwise also to avoid unnecessary rushing up to the High Court the Magistrate should dispose of the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. at the earliest without delay, say within three,3y6nths as to pass the order in that light.