JUDGMENT - Waikar, M.R. J.-This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india seeking quashing of the notice served on the petitioner under sec-tion 31-A (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1950 by the respondents. 2. Under the Middle Income Housing Group Scheme, the respon-dent No. 1 Board, proposed to construct double sioreyed buildings and invited applications for allotment of tenements. The two buildings, each consisting of two ground-floor and first-floor flats, were ready for allotment. Flat No. 8 on the first-floor of Building No. 2, which was earmarked for the then Chairman Shri Gedam, was allotted to him, while ground-floor Flat No. 5 in that building was allotted to the present petitioner. The other flats in the two buildings were allotted to Dr. Miss Mukadam, Shri A. W. Kekre, Shri R. G. Kesharvani and Smt. Vatsalabai Kitey. Cost of the land, including the development charges, has been recovered from all the Flat owners. Admittedly, the petitioner has paid the cost of the flat that was allotted to him. The petitioner was allotted Flat No. 5 on the ground-floor on 14-8-1968 and within a month thereafter, he sent a letter to the Housing Commissioner of the Board on 9-9-1968 (Annexure E), wherein he referred to a meeting dated 31-7-1968 which had taken place in the office.of the Board attended by him and the other 4 flat owners in which it was agreed that the ground-floor occupants will have exclusive right to use the court-yard and they may put up a fencing, while the first-floor occupants shall have exclusive right to the use of the terrace. It was stated in this letter that pursuant to the said decision, the ground-floor flat owners, namely, (1) Shri L. M. Mahurkar, petitioner, (2) Dr. Miss Mukadam, (3) Shri Kesharvani, and (4) Smt. Kitey have put up a fencing. This letter was also counter-signed by the said 4 persons. 3. The Assistant Secretary of the Board by the reply dated 12-11-1968 (Annexure F) informed the petitioner that possession of the flat only was given to him and the open land was not allotted to any one. However, no reference to the alleged meeting dated 31-7-1968 was made by him in this reply. A long correspondence thereafter ensued between the petitioner and the Board. However, no reference to the alleged meeting dated 31-7-1968 was made by him in this reply. A long correspondence thereafter ensued between the petitioner and the Board. It is, however, not disputed that on occupation of the flats, no written agreements have been executed by the allottees in favour of the Board. 4. The 7 flat owners of the two buildings, including the petitioner, then wrote a joint letter dated 16-5-1970 (Annexure L) to the Chairman of the Board suggesting a thoughtful and a reasonable solution in the matter which was as follows : - (a) The first floor occupant should be allowed the exclusive right to the use and occupation of the terrace without interference of others. (b) The ground floor occupant should be allowed the exclusive, right to the use and occupation of the open plot area, with permission to enclose car garage within the said plot vide N. L. T. Building Regula- tions No. 28 (4) (d) for garage. (c) The first floor occupant should be provided with 12ft x 25ft open space for car in the land adjoining the building plots, which land is not permissible for any constructional activity either under the Scheme or the Trust Rules and with permission for building car garage thereon by the first floor occupant at his own cost. The flat owners again jointly wrote to the Board on 19-12-1970 (Annex. N) pointing out. that recognising the right of first floor allottees for some space for keeping a car and denying the same right to the ground-floor allottees was incomprehensible, inconsistent and arbitrary and requested the Board to reconsider the matter. 5. The Board by its reply dated 1-8-1973 (Annexure T) reiterated that it did not recognise the right of the ground-floor allottees for an open space for garage or compound, though it proposed to consider the petitioner's request only as a matter of concession in case he was prepared to use the open space admeasuring 175 sq. ft. for parking his car as shown in the sketch. 6. ft. for parking his car as shown in the sketch. 6. As the issue remained unsolved and the Board was not prepared to consider the request to treat uniformly the flat owners in the matter and as the petitioner had constructed a structure on the open space for parking his car and had put up a fencing to the front open space (as the other ground-floor allottees also did), the Secretary of the Board finally served the impugned notice dated 22-5-1974 (Annexure CC) on the petitioner under section 31-A (J) of the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Act calling upon him to vacate the flat within one month of the date of service of the notice. 7. The petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition for quashing the said notice. Though, he also prayed for an appropriate writ compelling the Board to execute the written Hire Purchase Agreement as per Regula- tions of the Board incorporating all the terms therein as agreed at the time of the allotment, this relief was not pressed during the hearing of this petition. 8. In the return, it is admitted by the Board that each building was proposed to be fenced on three sides and that on the spot an area apper- taining to each building was shown and actually demarcated, but its conten-tion is that the said demarcation was not for any particular allottee, but for common use of the occupants. 9. It was submitted by Shri K. H. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the respondents that in the advertisement (Annex. R-1) published by the Board, a representation was made vide clause 6 that all the occupants of the first-floor would get the advantage of terrace as well as some space for keeping a car, but no such representation was made so far as the ground-floor allottees were concerned. What was offered and allotted to the ground-floor allottees was only the flat and nothing more. He, there- fore, submitted that the construction of a shed for car parking and putting up of a fence to the open space as a court-yard by the petitioner, which he admittedly did, would be unauthorised acts and occupation of that space in breach of the agreement. Under the circumstances, the Board was justified in taking necessary action under section 31-A (i) of the Act. 10. Under the circumstances, the Board was justified in taking necessary action under section 31-A (i) of the Act. 10. Shri Manohar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the cost of the land having been recovered from all the allottees, whether of the ground-floor or of the.first-floor, to allow the first-floor occupants only a parking space and to deny that right to the ground-floor occupants was clearly arbitrary and discriminatory. He submitted that the term in the advertisement promising parking space to first-floor occupants was only an inducement or a clarification in the matter of parking space for them, but a similar facility regarding reason-able user of the open space to the ground-loot occupants who had no advantage of the terrace was in fact implied. The stand takes by the Board, he submitted, in recognising the right of first-floor occupants to the use of the terrace and to a parking space on the ground below and granting just a concession or a licence (to be withdrawn or revoked at any thus) to the ground-floor occupants to use similarly the open space, was discriminatory. He also submitted that when all the occupants of the two buildings had mutually adjusted amongst themselves the user of the open space for parking cars and as a court-yard, when the petitioner's construction and fencing had in no way caused any obstruction, disturb-ance or nuisance to the other occupants and when all the occupants had also erected temporary sheds for the cars and put a fencing, the act of the Board in serving a notice of eviction on the petitioner alone was malicious and motivated. His last submission is that admittedly there has been no contravention of any term so far as the allotment of the flat is concerned. The contravention, if at all, is in respect of the alleged wrongful occupation or user of the open space. The notice issued by the Board calling upon the petitioner to vacate the flat, he submitted, was illegal and bad. 11. Now, admittedly, the advertisement (Annex. R-l) is silent so far as the use of the open space by the ground-floor occupants is concerned. It no doubt specifically mentioned that the occupants of the first-floor would get the advantage of the terrace as well as some space for keeping a car. 11. Now, admittedly, the advertisement (Annex. R-l) is silent so far as the use of the open space by the ground-floor occupants is concerned. It no doubt specifically mentioned that the occupants of the first-floor would get the advantage of the terrace as well as some space for keeping a car. Having charged all the occupants of the buildings with the price of the open ground and its development, the Board could not discriminate by granting first-floor occupants, besides exclusive user of the terrace, the parking space on the ground as of right and a total denial to the ground-floor occupants of any user of that space for any purpose whatsoever. The distinction or discrimination so made is certainly arbitrary, invidious and without any basis. It Appeared that from the initial stand of total denial, the Board relented a bit and agreed to consider the request of the peti-tioner, but only as a matter of concession for keeping his car as shown in the sketch (Annexure T) as against the recognition of the right of the first-floor occupants to so park their vehicles. There is reason to believe that clause 6 of the advertisement (Annexure-R-1) holding out a representation that the first-floor occupants would get the advantage or facility of the terrace and car parking space on the ground-floor, was mentioned only te attract applicants for the first-floor flats. Even in the absence of any such representation, the occupants whether of the ground or the first-floor would have been entitled to a reasonable use of the open space around the build-ing, particularly when the Board had charged from all the cost of the open space. Because such a representation was held out to prospective occu-pants of the first-floor, it cannot be said that the user of the open space to the gronnd-floor occupants was totaliy denied. It was no doubt open to the Board to have such a term incorporated in the written agreement to be executed by the ground-floor occupants. But, as pointed out above, there-is yet no written agreement executed by any of the occupants. A non-mention of any clause in the advertisement about any user of the open space certainly cannot be equated with or construed as a denial or non-grant of the reasonable user of the space. But, as pointed out above, there-is yet no written agreement executed by any of the occupants. A non-mention of any clause in the advertisement about any user of the open space certainly cannot be equated with or construed as a denial or non-grant of the reasonable user of the space. There is no mention in the advertisement of the user of the space to approach their respective flats and yet a user for that purpose is certainly implied. The Board, therefore,. was not justified, on the basis of clause 6 of the advertisement, in saying that the ground-floor occupants had no right at all to use the open space and to discriminate between the occupants of the ground-floor and of the first-floor in such a manner. 12. As observed by the Supreme Court in (Ramana v. I. A. Authority of India)1, the power of the executive Government to affect trie lives of the people is steadily growing, which renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbi-trary application or exercise. Every act of the Executive Government, the Supreme Court further observed, must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness which is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. Emphasising that the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal and it cannot, without adequate reason, exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily, the Supreme Court further observed : “The activities of the Government have a public element and, there-fore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with any one, but if it does so, it must do so fairly with, out discrimination and without unfair procedure. This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with, the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. The State need not enter into any contract with any one, but if it does so, it must do so fairly with, out discrimination and without unfair procedure. This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with, the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Govern-ment departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.” 13. The action of the Board in the instant case in serving the impugned notice on the petitioner is violative of Article 14 of the Consti- tution inasmuch as it arbitrarily discriminates the petitioner as a conces- sionary while recognising the rights of the first-floor occupants for the same facility of a car garage. 14. Now, the impugned notice mainly complained of some unautho- rised additional structures. It is alleged that the petitioner (1) constructed new sheds, (2) chopped off the top of the existing compound wall in between the two buildings, and (3) tampered with the side wall of the building by drilling holes therein while constructing such sheds. What is required of the petitioner by the notice is not removal of the alleged unauthorised constructions on the space, but vacation of flat No. 5, itself, within a month. 15. What is required of the petitioner by the notice is not removal of the alleged unauthorised constructions on the space, but vacation of flat No. 5, itself, within a month. 15. Now, section 31-A(1) of the M. P. Housing Board Act, which is relevant for our purpose reads thus : “31-A. (1) If the Secretary is satisfied, - (a) that the person authorised to occupy as a lessee on monthly rent any Board premises has, whether before or after the commence- ment of the Madhaya Pradesh Housing Board (Amendment) Act, 1955, (i) not paid rent lawfully due from him in respect of such premises for a period of three months or more, or (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such pre-mises, or (b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any Board premises the Secretary may, notwithstanding anything contained in any Jaw for the time being in force, by notice served (i) by post, or (ii) by affixing ; copy of it on the outer door or some other cons-picuous part of such premises, or (iii) in such other manner as may be prescribed, require that that person as well as any person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, shall vacate the same within one month of the date of the service of the notice.” 16. It can be seen that part (1)(a) deals with cases of non-payment of rent lawfully due in respect of the premises leased out, or any acts committed in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied under which the lessee is authorised to occupy such premises. This part thus refers to the premises which the person is authorised to occupy as a lessee and in respect of which he commits defaults in payment of rent or contra- venes any of the terms under which he is authorised to occupy the said premises. The second part deals with unauthorised occupation of the premises of the Board. The first part is not attracted here as it cannot be said that the petitioner acted in contravention of any terms, express or implied under which he was authorised to occupy the fiat. The second part deals with unauthorised occupation of the premises of the Board. The first part is not attracted here as it cannot be said that the petitioner acted in contravention of any terms, express or implied under which he was authorised to occupy the fiat. The hub of the controversy ot dispute here is about the user of the open space and for the so-called unauthorised occupation of the same by constructing the sheds-thereon, a notice under clause (1); (b) no doubt could be issued. 17. The concluding part of sub-section (1) of section Jl-A contains. an omnibus penal provision for all acts of commission and omission as referred to in sub-clause (a) or (b). Whether the Secretary was justified in calling upon the petitioner to vacate the flat for the alleged offending: act referred to in sub-clause (b) ? This penal provision obviously is meant to protect the property and suppress the mischief aimed at ami it must, therefore, be interpreted in consonance with the spirit of the enact- ment namely, to prevent the mischief and to advance the remedy It would be highly improper, nay preposterous to demand vacation of legitimate occupation of the premises because the person unauthorisedly fixed a pole-on the other property of the Board for an aerial or uses a space for sleeping at night during summer. It being a remedial legislation, the interpretation which advances the remedy and suppresses the evil as the legislation really envisioned, must find favour with the Court. Therefore, for the alleged: offending act of the petitioner falling under clause (b) a notice to quit the premises referred to under clause (a) which the petitioner has been law- fully occupying and in repect of which no offending act has been committed could not be issued. The notice in question, therefore, is bad. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, the notice under section 3I-A(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Act (Annexure CC) is hereby quashed. Rule absolute with costs. Notice quashed. ----