By this application the petitioner questions the validity of the judgment and order dated 18.8.82 passed by Shri B. K. Gohain, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hamren, Karbi Anglong Dis­trict in M. R. Case No. 23/77. 2. On 6.9.77 the Opp. party as 1st party filed an appli­cation u/s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code stating, inter alia, that the 2nd party along with others dispossessed him from the land as far back as on 30.4.77 by constructing a house there­on. On the basis thereof a police report was called for and a proceeding u/s 143 Cr.P.C. was drawn up on 9.11.77. 3. The impugned order has been challenged on three grounds. First, the disputed land was not within the local juris­diction of the learned Magistrate as the same falls under Habe Terongaon falling under Kampur P.S. in the district of Now-gong. Learned counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the police report submitted in connection with this case. The second contention is that there is no finding that on the date of the drawal of the proceeding the 1st party was in actual physical possession of the land and as such the impuged order is liable to be quashed. Learned Magistrate merely decided the merits of the claim of the 1st party to a right to possess the subject matter of the dispute but did not decide the question as to who was in actual physical possession of the land on the date on which the proceeding was drawn up, namely, on 9.11.77. Third contention is that the 1st party was dispossessed on 30.4.77 and the complaint about dispossession was made on 6.9.77 and the proceeding u/s. 145 Cr. P.C. was drawn up on 9.11.77, and, as such the dispossession being beyond 2 months of the police report or the information received by the learned Magistrate, he had no jurisdiction to render an order u/s. 145 (4) of the Code. 3. Indeed, learned Magistrate merely decided the merits of the claims of the parties to a right to possess the subject matter of the dispute. It did not decide as to who was in actual physical possession of the land on the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code. 3. Indeed, learned Magistrate merely decided the merits of the claims of the parties to a right to possess the subject matter of the dispute. It did not decide as to who was in actual physical possession of the land on the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code. As the learned Magistrate violated the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 145 of "the Code" in deciding the merits of the claim of the opposite party to aright to possess the sub­ject matter of the dispute, leaving aside the core question as to who was in actual physical possession of the land on date of the order passed by him under sub-section (1) of Section 145 of the Code, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the second ground urged by the petitioner. 4. The third contention has a strong force. Proviso to sub­section (4) of section 145 empowers a Magistrate to treat a party "forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed" within 2 months next before the date on which the report of the police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), to treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order u/s. 145 (1) of the Code-Admittedly, in the instant case, the 1st party was dispossessed on 30.4.77 and the complaint was made on 6.8.77 and as such the act of dispossession was beyond the period of 2 months. The police report was submitted on 2.12.81. Under these circum­stances, when the dispossession was beyond the period of 2 months as proscribed in proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145, learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to declare possession in favour of the 1st party who had been dispossessed far beyond the period of 2 months prescribed in the proviso. On this count as well the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Further, there is no finding that the dispossession was "forcible and/or wrongful". Under these circumstances the third contention of the petitioner merits acceptance and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 5. The first contention is also fatal. On this count as well the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Further, there is no finding that the dispossession was "forcible and/or wrongful". Under these circumstances the third contention of the petitioner merits acceptance and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 5. The first contention is also fatal. It appears from the police report that the land in dispute falls under Kampur P. S. in the district of Nowgong, and, does not fall within Karbi Anglong District. The police report reads as follows : "It is ascertained that the D/L in question falls under Kampur P. S. under Nowgong District and the landowner of the surrounding D/L pacing land revenue to Nowgong". It follows, therefore, that the disputed land falls under Now­gong District, and does not fall within Karbi Anglong District, As such, the learned Magistrate had no 'local jurisdiction' over the disputed land. It goes without saying that u/s. 145 of the Code a Magistrate can make an order in respect of "any land or water or boundary thereof falling within his local jurisdiction". Under the circumstances on this court as well the petition must be allowed. 6. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned order is, not sustainable in law, and, accordingly the same is set aside. 7. In the result the petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.