JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. 1. This is defendants' appeal. 2. Facts relevant as found by the courts below are briefly these. Niranjan Lal, defendant, was a member of the Co-operative Housing Society Limited Koil (district Aligarh) (hereinafter referred to as the Society). The plaintiff is his brother-in-law. The plaintiff was an employee in the East India Railway from where he retired on May 27, 1944. On August 16, 1934, the Society made allotment of plot no. 235 (area 600 Sq. yards) to the defendant. The defendant wrote to the plaintiff on August 19, 1934. suggesting that the latter might acquire for his use a plot measuring 600 sq. yards near the plot of Manmohan Lai and a sum of Rs. 450/- be sent to him for this purpose. The plot held by Manmohan Lal was numbered 237. The plaintiff gave a sum of Rs. 450/- to the defendant in October, 1934. On March 23, 1935. the plaintiff applied for membership of the Society. On this application, 45 shares of the value of Rs. 10/- each were allotted to him on May 31, 1931. The plaintiff's share money being, however, not deposed the Society forfeited these shares in about1936-37 On September 24, 1939, the plaintiff advanced Rs. 4,000/- to the defendant. Of this, according to his instructions, Rs. 500/- were to be spent in the digging and laying of foundation of plot no. 235; the rest was to be invested on behalf of the plaintiff by being given on loan to one Bans Gopal against a mortgage. This investment was, however, not made a sum of Rs. 500/- was given as loan by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff by way of investment to one Mohan Lal against a promissory not executed on 12-12-1940. The plaintiff later acquired this promissory note. 3. On October 11, 1940, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that the members of the Society had to pay enhanced price at the rate of 8 annas per sq. yard with in October 31, 1940. The plaintiff gave Rs. 300/- to the defendant accordingly in October, 1940. The defendant informed the plaintiff through his letter dated November 23, 1940 that the amount to the defendant-Society had been deposited and he would transfer the plot standing in his name to the plaintiff and get for himself plot no. yard with in October 31, 1940. The plaintiff gave Rs. 300/- to the defendant accordingly in October, 1940. The defendant informed the plaintiff through his letter dated November 23, 1940 that the amount to the defendant-Society had been deposited and he would transfer the plot standing in his name to the plaintiff and get for himself plot no. 236 which was held by his cousin brother, Raghunath Dayal, vide Ext. 17. A further sum of Rs. 100/-was given by the plaintiff to the defendant in October, 1943. 4. In this manner, according to the findings of the courts below, the plaintiff in all gave Rs. 1350/- to the defendant under the belief that the defendant would convey plot no. 235 (area 600 sq. yards) to him. In accordance with the bye-Jaws of the society, the transfer could not be made without the plot having been built upon. The defendant assured the plaintiff that he would get a room constructed on the land and then execute the transfer. The transfer was, however, not made, whereupon the plaintiff gave notice dated November 17, 1949 to the defendant. The suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted on January 20, 1950. The relief claimed by the plaintiff was that the defendant be directed to transfer plot no. 235 to him and make such steps that might be necessary for effectively putting the plaintiff in the possession thereof, failing which the court might be pleased to execute the necessary deed of transfer in favour of the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 1350/-, besides Rs. 150/-as interest. He also claimed a decree for a sum of Rs. 3000/- and a sum of Rs. 600/- as interest thereon. The defendant refuted that he ever held out to the plaintiff that he would transfer plot no. 235 to him; and further that he did not receive any amount from the plaintiff in this connection. The suit was decreed on April 23, 1955 by the trial court. Operative portion of the judgment of the trial court says : "The suit is decreed for recovery of Rs. 3,032/- with 3% pendente-lite and future interest. The defendant is further directed to transfer plot no. The suit was decreed on April 23, 1955 by the trial court. Operative portion of the judgment of the trial court says : "The suit is decreed for recovery of Rs. 3,032/- with 3% pendente-lite and future interest. The defendant is further directed to transfer plot no. 235 situate in Visbnu-puri, Aligarh to the plaintiff within six months from today and shall take such steps as may be necessary under the rules of the Housing Society in order to put the plaintiff in possession of the said plot. A room shall be built on the said plot out of the money found due against the defendant and the amount spent in building the same shall be deducted from the decretal amount. In case of default by the defendant, the plaintiff shall be free to get a room constructed at his own expense through the court, and thereafter get the the plot transferred to himself. He shall get costs in proportion to the successors. The defendant shall bear his own costs." 5. The appeal filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the trial court was dismissed on November 15, 1972. The defendant being dead, his legal representatives were substituted in his place. 6. Sri Jagdish Swaroop, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the decree passed by the lower appellate court on the assumption that the case is for specific performance of the contract, cannot be sustained under the law. The reasons advanced by him in support of this contention are three-fold : (i) it is not proved that the defendant agreed to convey plot no. 235 to the plaintiff; (ii) the plaint does not aver that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the alleged contract ; and (in) the contract alleged was void being Without consideration. In so far as ground no. (i) afore-mentioned is concerned, that may be taken to be concluded upon the finding of fact recorded by the courts below. Both the courts below have considered the letters exchanged between the parties and also the oral evidence and inferred that the defendant had given out on November 23, 1940 by his letter (Ext. 17) that he would convey plot no. 235 (which was allotted to him on August 16, 1934) to the plaintiff and this is not open to be interfered with. 17) that he would convey plot no. 235 (which was allotted to him on August 16, 1934) to the plaintiff and this is not open to be interfered with. The fact, however, remains that there is no averment in any shape or form contained in the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing on his part to perform the alleged contract. Sec. 16 (c), Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. It is stated, no doubt, that the plaintiff gave a sum of Rs. 1350/- in this connection in different instalments to the defendant as specified above during the period of October, 1934 to October, 1943. But that, taken as a whole, does not constitute the performance of the entire contract on the part of the plaintiff as set up by him. According to his own averment, as appearing in paragraph 11 of the plaint, there could be no transfer to him without the plot having been built upon. The plaintiff has not averred that he had paid the costs of the construction to the defendant in advance nor does he express that he had given out that he would pay the costs and there is also no indication of the amount which was likely to be spent in the construction being raised. According to the plaintiff, moreover, the sum of Rs. 3500/- remained with the defendant for purposes of being invested for the plaintiff and out of this, Rs. 500/- were advanced as loan to Mohan Lal. It is not stated in the plaint that the rest of this amount was intended to be spent in raising construction on the plot in question. The notice given by the plaintiff to the defendant was on November 17, 1949, as mentioned in paragraph 17 of the plaint and the long gap of nearly six years between October, 1934 to November, 1942 is not accounted for in the pleading. It is true that Sec. 16 (c) was introduced in the new Specific Relief Act, 1963, which came into force on March 1, 1964. It is true that Sec. 16 (c) was introduced in the new Specific Relief Act, 1963, which came into force on March 1, 1964. But the position under the law prior to this was not different. In Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sasson, AIR 1928 PC 208, it was observed :- "In a suit for specific performance on the other hand, he treated and was required by the court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of bis suit. Thus it was that the commencement of an action for damages being, on the principle of such cases as Clough v. L. and N. W. R. (2) and Law v. Law (3), a definite election to treat the contract as at an end, no suit for specific perfromance, whatever happened to the action, could thereafter be maintained by the aggrieved plaintiff. He had by his election precluded himself even from making the averment just referred to, proof of which was essential to the success of his suit." 7. The requirement in this behalf, as now expressed also in Sec. 16 (c) has been regarded as mandatory constituting as this does part of the cause of action for a claim of specific performance (see Prem Raj v. D. L. F. Housing and Constructions IP) Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 1355 ; Quseph Verghese v. Joseph Alley, 1969 2 SCC 539 ; G. Pillai v. P. Naddar, AIR 1967 SC 868 ; Hoti Lal v. Karon Singh ; 1981 Alld. Civil Journal 250 ; Suraj Singh v. Sohan Lal; AIR 1981 Alld. 330 ; Kashi Nath v. Sidh Gopal, 1983 All. Civil Journal 582 ; Dhian Singh v. Tara Chand, AIR 1984 Alld. 4. Readiness and willingness, it is true, cannot be treated as a strait jacket formula as held in Ramesh Chandra Chandlok v. Chunni Lal, AIR 1971 SC 1238 , but in the instant case, as mentioned above, the plaint dose not at all aver to the plaintiff having been throughout the relevant period ready and willing to perform his part. 8. As regards the ground no. 8. As regards the ground no. (iii), mentioned above, the contention for the appellant is that there was no consideration for the alleged contract. It is true that parties were closely related; the defendant may have had regard and love and affection for the plaintiff who is his sister's husband. But that does not constitute consideration under the law, as is manifest from Sec. 25 of the Contract Act and on this account, too, the contract set up by the plaintiff would be void. In case the plaintiff respondent seeks relief of specific performance, there is additional difficulty existing in his way. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, it has been stated that as per rules of the Society, the transfer of the plot could not be made without having been built upon. Paragraph 49 of the bye-laws of the Society, as amended up- to 1944 (Ext. 28) provided : "49 (a). Transfer of a vacant plot or a portion of it shall not be allowed. The Society may resume it on payment of original share money together with interest at a rate not exceeding 6% per annum ; Provided that if any member desires to transfer his vacant plot in favour of any of his legal heirs or to any of his near relations, the committee may sanction the transfer on special and good reasons to be recorded. (b). Transfer of plot or plots with building thereon shall be made with the sanction of the committee previously obtaining and subject to the provisions of the bye-laws in favour of the person approved of by the Committee." 9. The trial court has directed in the operative portion of the decree passed by it that a room shall be built on plot no. 235 by the defendant out of the money found due against him and the amount spent in building the same shall be deducted from the decretal amount. It has further stated that in case of default by the defendant, the plaintiff shall be free to get a room constructed at his own expense from the court. In making this decree, the courts below have not taken notice of the provisions contained in Sec. 14(l)(b)/(d), Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the corresponding provision contained in the Old Act. It has further stated that in case of default by the defendant, the plaintiff shall be free to get a room constructed at his own expense from the court. In making this decree, the courts below have not taken notice of the provisions contained in Sec. 14(l)(b)/(d), Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the corresponding provision contained in the Old Act. According to these provisions, a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or otherewise from its nature, is such that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms, cannot be sued upon for specific performance and similarly a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise is also not capable of being enforced for the relief of specific performance. Clause (1) to the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Sec. 14 does not avail the plaintiff-respondent. The exception made therein is in respect of a case where the building is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building concerned. In the instant case, the terms are far from being defined any where with specification. We are not aware of the amount that was to be devoted towards the construction of one room on the land in dispute. The court evidently is not in position to ensure the construction thereof by the defendant and it is also not reasonably capable of getting the room built by itself for the plaintiff-decree-holder in the event of the defendant failing to abide by the same. 10. Further the courts below also seem not to have taken notice of the fact that in terms of the relevant bye-laws of the Society, there could be no transfer made without previous sanction obtained for the purpose from the Society. Clause 41 of the bye-laws (1927) provided : "41. 10. Further the courts below also seem not to have taken notice of the fact that in terms of the relevant bye-laws of the Society, there could be no transfer made without previous sanction obtained for the purpose from the Society. Clause 41 of the bye-laws (1927) provided : "41. The lease of the residential plots and shops shall be heritable but shall not be transferable except with the previous consent of the committee and shall be transferred only to persons approved by the Committee." In clause (55) of the Bye-Laws, 1944 also there was the provision similarly contained to the effect that the lease of residential plots, houses and shops shall be heritable but shall not be transferred except with the previous consent of the committee and shall be transferred only to persons approved of by the committee, it was urged for the respondent that it is upto the appellants now to seek permission of the Society. About a half century has lapsed since the plot was allotted to the defendant on August 16, 1934. The intention behind the scheme formulated by the Society was that there be buildings raised as soon as practicable on different parcels of land which may be leased out to various persons. It would be meaningless, in my view, to require the defendants- appellants how to move the Society and seek their permission for raising construction. It is unfortunate that the suit instituted prior to the commencement of the Constitution should have taken 34 years to reach this stage. The relief for specific perfromance is discretionary. As specified also in Sec. 20 (1) Specific Relief Act, 1963, the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. For these reasons, it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to grant relief of specific performance to the plaintiff even if he were otherwise eligible to it taking into consideration the terms and conditions upon the fulfilment of which alone the transfer of the plot could be made by the defendant, since dead. 11. Sri Murlidhar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that the claim is founded upon Sec. 82 of the Trusts Act, 1882. Sec. 82 of the Act reads: "82. Transfer to one for consideration paid by another. 11. Sri Murlidhar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that the claim is founded upon Sec. 82 of the Trusts Act, 1882. Sec. 82 of the Act reads: "82. Transfer to one for consideration paid by another. Where, property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person, and it appears that such other person did not intent to pay or provide such consideration for the benefit of the transferee, the transferee must hold the property for the benefit of the person paying or providing the consideration." 12. The obligation imposed under Sec. 82 is in the nature of trust and is known as that of a quasi-trustee. A benami transaction is, for instance, covered under this proviso. In benami transaction title vests from the inception in the person who pays or provides the consideration. If 'A' requires a plot in the name of his wife, 'B' the real owner would be 'A'. A transfer from 'B' to 'A' is not required. In such a case, the transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money and is the real owner, vide, Bhim Singh (dead) by L. Rs. v. Kan Singh, AIR 1980 SC 727 ; Controller of Estate Duty v. Alok Mitra, AIR 1981 SC 102 . Learned counsel argued, however, that Sec. 82 is wider in scope and may not be confined to a benami transaction. Assuming that be so, the question would be whether the facts established herein place this case within the purview of this section. There is no denial that plot no. 235 was acquired by the defendant on August 16, 1934. This is the concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below. The Society created a long term lease in his favour on that date. It is on August 19, 1934, for the first time that according to the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the lower courts the defendant initiated the proposal by his letter marked Ex. 32 addressed to the plaintiff that the latter might acquire the land for himself. It cannot, therefore, be said, obviously, that the Society made transfer to the defendant on August 16, 1934, for consideration paid or provided by the plaintiff. The sum of Rs. 450/- came to be advanced by the plaintiff, according to his contention, to the defendant in October, 1934. It cannot, therefore, be said, obviously, that the Society made transfer to the defendant on August 16, 1934, for consideration paid or provided by the plaintiff. The sum of Rs. 450/- came to be advanced by the plaintiff, according to his contention, to the defendant in October, 1934. The plaintiff was not in the picture when the allotment/lease took place in the defendant's favour on August 16, 1934. True, the defendant later indicated the intention to transfer to the plaintiff but it cannot be said that on August 16, 1934, itself, he acquired the plot for the benefit of the plaintiff. In this connection, a note needs also be made of the fact that the Bye-laws of the Society under which the defendant acquired the plot, constituted a contract between himself on the one hand and the Society, on the other. Clause 41 of the Bye-laws (1927) (which was in force, admittedly, in 1934 when the allotment/lease took place) also constitutes part of the said contract entered into by the defendant with the Society. In view thereof,' it was not open to the defendant to have made the transfer to the plaintiff except upon the per- mission obtained from the Society. In face of this stipulation under which the allotment/lease was created in his favour, the defendant cannot be deemed, in my view, to have held the land for the benefit of the plaintiff. The defendant had in case, according to the averments of the plaintiff, to make the transfer in his favour of the said plot, no such transfer could be accomplished without the permission of the Society. Simitar was the position Under the Bye-laws 49/55, as amended in 1944, Which also have been noticed above. This, therefore, was not a case where the defendant held that the plot for the benefit of the plaintiff and the alleged transfer thereof to the plaintiff was not dependant upon his mere volition. The plaintiff-respondent is thus unable to place this case within the purview of Section 82, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. At the best, upon the facts established herein, this was a case where the defendant got the plot allotted to him on August 16, 1934, in his favour but later he indicated to the plaintiff that he might transfer the same to him. The defendant also received a sum of Rs. At the best, upon the facts established herein, this was a case where the defendant got the plot allotted to him on August 16, 1934, in his favour but later he indicated to the plaintiff that he might transfer the same to him. The defendant also received a sum of Rs. 1350/- in various instalments from the plaintiff in this connection. The defendant did not fulfil what he had held out to the plaintiff for which the plaintiff could sue him for damages. The, relief of specific performance could not be obtained except upon the requisite conditions in that behalf being fulfilled. Since the transfer involves necessarily a building to be raised on the land in question and there is no certainty about the amount that could be spent in raising such a construction, the civil court is not in position to ensure specific performance and also since this transfer is dependent upon the sanction of the Society, which has not thus far been obtained, the court could not carve out a new contract for the parties. There is no basis for the trial court, therefore, to have directed, or, for the lower appellate court to endorse that the balance of the sum of Rs. 3,500/- entrusted to the deceased defendant in another connection be spent in raising construction. This, therefore, in any event as said above, is not a fit case for exercise of discretion in favour of the plaintiff-respondent in this behalf. 13. In so far as the decree is in plaintiff's favour for the recovery of Rs. 3032/- is concerned, the counsel for the appellants has had nothing to say. This amount is constituted of the sum of Rs. 3,000/- which remained with the defendant out of Rs. 3,500/-that the plaintiff had given to him for the purpose of investment. The trial court has awarded Rs. 32/- as interest. However, in addition, the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to refund of Rs. 1,350/- advanced by him together with Rs. 150/- as interest, claimed in the alternative. Pendente lite and future interest has also been awarded by the trial court at the rate of 3% per annum. In the absence of cross appeal or cross-objection by the respondent in this behalf, the rate is not open to be enhanced in this appeal. 14. The appeal succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. Pendente lite and future interest has also been awarded by the trial court at the rate of 3% per annum. In the absence of cross appeal or cross-objection by the respondent in this behalf, the rate is not open to be enhanced in this appeal. 14. The appeal succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. The suit shall stand decreed for the recovery of Rs. 4,532/- with pendentelite and future interest at the rate of Rs 3% per annum simple and the proportionate costs recoverable against the assets of Niranjan Lal in the hands of the appellants. The rest of the suit shall stand dismissed. Appeal partly allowed.