Lahiri, J.:- Is the Municipal Board competent to levy rents, tolls and fees for the right to expose goods for sale in a Muni­cipal market and for use of shops, stalls and stands therein under the provisions of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 "the Act" for short ? What is the contour of power of the Deputy Commi­ssioner u/s. 296 of "the Act" when he suspends a resolution or order of 'the Board' and/or prohibits the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done in pursuance of sanction or permission granted by 'the Board' in the exercise of their powers under "the Act" ? Could the Deputy Commi­ssioner, while exercising such powers of suspension, wield appellate and/or revisional powers in respect of the order or action and modify the resolution or order of the Board u/s. 296 of "the Act" ? How long does the order of suspension continue, and, whether during the continuance of the order of suspension the Municipal Board is competent to implement its order under suspen­sion and/or whether the Municipality can implement the order of Deputy Commissioner modifying the resolution or order of the Board, until the matter is referred to the State Government and the latter decides the legality and validity of the order of suspension rendered by the Deputy Commissioner? These are the questions raised in this writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution, under the facts and circumstances set forth below. 2. The North Lakhimpur Municipal Board, Respondent No. 1, has a Municipal market. The petitioner took two stalls in "the Municipal Market" stipulating to pay the rate of rents which had been determined by the Municipal Board. Since 1949 till March, 1978 the rate of rents, fees and tolls for the right to expose goods for sale in the municipal market and for use of shops, stalls and stands remained static notwithstanding steep rise in price index and the necessity of more fund for efficiently managing the Municipality. Realising the imperative necessity of enhancing the rate of rents, tolls and fees of the Municipal Market, the Board at a meeting held in March, 1978, decided to refix and thereby enhance rent, toll and fees of the market. Realising the imperative necessity of enhancing the rate of rents, tolls and fees of the Municipal Market, the Board at a meeting held in March, 1978, decided to refix and thereby enhance rent, toll and fees of the market. In the meantime the Board was superseded and an Executive Officer was appointed by the Government to conduct the affairs of the Municipality under the provisions of "the Act". Under Section 299 (1) (b) all the powers and duties, which under 'the Act, could be exercised and performed by the Board, whether at a meeting or otherwise, could be exercised and performed by the said Executive Officer appointed by the Government. The State Government authorised the Executive Officer to exercise the aforesaid powers, vide Notification No. MA-238/78/157 dated Dispur, the 8th May, 1980 issued by the Government of Assam. The petitioners made an abortive application to the Executive Officer and thereafter used the Municipality, questioning its power to levy rents, tolls and fees. But they withdrew from the suit on the ground that they had alternative right and remedy under section 296 of "the Act". Upon withdrawal of the suit petiti­oners made an application u/s. 296 of "the Act" before the Deputy Commissioner for suspending the execution of the resolu­tion of the Board brought into force by the Executive Officer, the Deputy Commissioner suspended the order of the Executive Officer enhancing the rate of toll, rent and fees. However, it appears that learned Deputy Commissioner heard both the parties and reduced the rates on the basis of concession and admission made by the petitioners. Yet, in the writ application the petiti­oners contend that they were never parties to the concessions and/or admissions, and, as such, the order is not binding on them and it is invalid. Thereafter, the Municipal Board attempted to realise the rent, toll and fees as determined by the Deputy Commissioner whereupon the petitioners has filed this writ applica­tion under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The first contention of the petitioner is that 'the Board' has had no jurisdiction vested in it by law to levy rent, tolls and fess without prior sanction of the State Government. The petitioners contend that the levy is violative of Section 63(1) (n) of "the Act". 3. The first contention of the petitioner is that 'the Board' has had no jurisdiction vested in it by law to levy rent, tolls and fess without prior sanction of the State Government. The petitioners contend that the levy is violative of Section 63(1) (n) of "the Act". The respondents contend teat on the same cause of action the petitioners, as plaintiffs, had sued the Muni­cipality but withdrew from the suit without obtaining any liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit, as required under O.XXIII, R.1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure and, as such, the writ application, on the same cause of action is incompetent. The Respondents further contend that the Board has had power to levy rear; tolls and fee under Sec. 148 "the Act". In the instant case we do not propose to decide as to whether the petitioners lost their right to question the powers and jurisdiction of the Municipality to levy rents, tolls and fees, in view of their failure to obtain liberty from the Civil Court to institute a fresh action. We shall consider the question in an appropriate case as in the instant case we find that the Board has undoubted power to levy rent, toll and lees under Section 148(2) of "the Act, which we extract herein below: "Markets. 148(1). The Board at a meeting may use their own land or building or, purchase, take on lease or otherwise acquire any land or building for the purpose of establishing a municipal market or improving any existing municipal market. (a). The Board at a meeting may levy rents, tolls and fees at such rates as it may think proper for the right to expose goods for sale in a municipal market and for the use of shops, stalls and standings therein and also may regulate such rates in respect of private markets or places used or declared by the Board as a market place by public notice in the locality. (3) * (4) * (5) * (6) & (7)*” It is thus seen that the Board can use their own land and building or purchase or take on lease or acquire any land or building for the purpose of establishing municipal market. (3) * (4) * (5) * (6) & (7)*” It is thus seen that the Board can use their own land and building or purchase or take on lease or acquire any land or building for the purpose of establishing municipal market. The Board at a meeting can levy rent, toll and fees for the right to expose goods for sale in a municipal market and for use of shops and stalls and stands in such markets, the property of the Board. The legislature empowered the Board at a meeting to levy rent, toll and fees as it may think proper in respect of the Municipal markets of the Municipality. In the instant case, the market in question is a Municipal Market and the Board at a meeting levid rent, toll and fees. As such, the levy made by the Board at a meeting squarely falls under Section 148(2) of "the Act". A fiant attempt was made by Mr. B.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner that the levy of rent, toll and fees is covered by Section 68(1) (n) of ''the Act", which we extract herein below: "68(1). Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder the Board may, from time to time at a meeting convened expressly for the purpose of which due notice shall have been given, impose within the limits of the municipality the following taxes, fees and tolls, or any of them : (a) to (m) * * (n) with the sanction of the State Government any other tax, toll, rate of fees; provided-'” A bare perusal of Section makes it clear that these are different and distinct classes of taxes, toll and fees. The tax, toll and fees referred in Section 68(1) (a) to (n) cover those tax, toll and fees on or in respect of property other than the properties of the Municipal Board, like taxes on holding, lattrine, drainage etc. The section and the sections following deal with taxes for providing public utility services, taxes of Government holding, taxes on holding situated within the Municipality but belonging to others. After exhaustively dealing with tax, toll and fees of the kind, a separate provision has been made u/s. 148 empowering the Municipal Board at a meeting to levy toll, fees and rents for using the municipal market. The provi­sions of the sections operate in two different fields. After exhaustively dealing with tax, toll and fees of the kind, a separate provision has been made u/s. 148 empowering the Municipal Board at a meeting to levy toll, fees and rents for using the municipal market. The provi­sions of the sections operate in two different fields. In our opinion, if the provisions of Sections 68 onwards are read alongwith Section 148 of " the Act" it becomes crystal clear that the provisions of Section 148 is an independent and sepa­rate power conferred by the legislature on the Municipal Board at a meeting to levy rents, tolls and fees in respect of their Municipal markets. There is no conflict between the provisions of Section 148 and Section 68 of "the Act". Reading as a whole every relevant provisions of "the Act" we find no con­flict between the provisions of Section 148 and Section 68 of 'the Act' dealing with levy of tax, toll and fees. On perusal of the entire scheme of the Act, its design and other connected provisions dealing with the tax, fee and toll we reach the irresistible conclusion that the interpretation that we have given to Section 148 accords with the intent of the legislature. We have given full effect to legislative intent following the maxim "ut res magis valiat quam pereat". If the provisions of Section 68 and 69 covered the entire field of power to levy tax, toll and fees there was no purpose in enacting a separate provi­sion like Section 148 dealing with the power of the Board to levy rent, toll and fees for use of municipal markets. For the fore goings we hold that the Municipal Board at a meeting had the power and jurisdiction to levy rent, toll and fees, and, as such the first contention of the petitioner fails. 4. Mr. B.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to wield appellate or a revisional power in respect of the order or action of ''the Board" and, as such, the impugned order is bad. Learned counsel further submits that the order of learned Deputy Commissioner altering the rates of rent, toll and fees on the basis of the admission and/or concession of the petitioners is illegal and void an no conclusion was made by the petitioners. Learned counsel further submits that the order of learned Deputy Commissioner altering the rates of rent, toll and fees on the basis of the admission and/or concession of the petitioners is illegal and void an no conclusion was made by the petitioners. As such, it is contended that the order of learned Deputy Commissioner is liable to be set aside. Learned coun­sel however, admits that the Deputy Commissioner had the power to suspend the operation of the orders rendered by the Executive Officer, and/or, the Municipal Board. To appreciate the contention it is necessary to set out the provisions of Section 296 of "the Act", which we extract hereunder : "296-Power to suspend action under the Act- The State Government, the Commissioner of Division, the Deputy Commissioner, the Additional Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-divisional Officer-in-charge of Sub-division may, by order in writing, suspend the execution of any resolution or order of the Board or prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done, in persuance of, or under cover of, this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the Board in the exercise of their powers under this Act, if in its or his opinion, the resolution, order or act mili­tates against the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India and the State Policy on the Directive Principles laid down in Part-IV of the Consti­tution of India is in excess of the powers conferred by law, or the execution of the resolution or order, or the doing of the act, is likely to lead to a serious breach of the peace, or to cause serious injury or annoyance to the public, or to any class or body of persons. When the Commissioner of Division or the Deputy Commissioner, the Additional Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-divisional Officer-in-charge of a Sub-division makes any order under this section, he shall forthwith forward a copy thereof, with a statement of his reasons for making it, to the State Government, which may there­upon rescind the order or direct that it continues in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit." It is thus seen that the Deputy Commissioner is a competent authority to suspend the execution of any resolution of the Board or prohibtit the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of the Act. Both parties agree that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to suspend the ex­ecution of the order or resolution of the Board enhancing the rate of rent, toll and fees of the Municipal Market and the follow up order of the Executive Officer. However, we are of the view that the power may be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner only when he forms an opinion that the resolu­tion, order or the act (i) militates against the fundamental rights conferred by part-III of the Constitution and the State Policy on the directive principles contained in Part-IV of the Cons­titution or (2) it is in excess of power conferred by law; or (3) the execution of the resolution, order or the act would lead to a serious breach of the peace; or (4) it would cause serious injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons. 5. Only upon the formation of the requisite opinion that one of the such grounds exists the Deputy Commissioner can exercise the power of suspension, otherwise not. It is a serious business to suspend an order, resolution or act of an autono­mous body like the Municipality. As such only under limited circumstances specified in the section the power of suspension can be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner u/s. 296. We have perused the order of suspension dated 30. 6. 81 made by the Deputy Commissoner. However we do not find that learned Deputy Commissioner had formed the requisite opinion before making the order. We leave the matter at that, as the State Government is the ultimate statutory authority to decide the question u/s. 296 of "the Act". 6. We have perused the order of suspension dated 30. 6. 81 made by the Deputy Commissoner. However we do not find that learned Deputy Commissioner had formed the requisite opinion before making the order. We leave the matter at that, as the State Government is the ultimate statutory authority to decide the question u/s. 296 of "the Act". 6. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the petitioners have questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate the matter as a revisional and/or appellate authority. There is sufficient force in the contention of Mr. B. K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners that the Deputy Commissioner is not empowered to determiae the validity or invalidity of the resolution, order or action u/s. 296 of "the Act". Indeed, in Section 296 A of 'the Act' the Deputy Commissioner may, while considering the validity of any proceeding of the Municipal Board, hear the parties and decide the validity of the proceedings and exercise adjudicatory function. We extract the provisions of Section 296 A, hereinbelow : "296 A-Control over proceedings of Municipal Board.- (1) The State Government, the Commissioner of Division and the Deputy Commissioner shall see that the proceed­ings of the Municipal Board are in conformity with law. (2) The State Government may, by order in writing, annul any proceedings which it considers not to be in conformity with the law and may do all things acce­ssary to secure such conformity: Provided that no such order shall be made without giving the Board an opportunity of expressing its views on the matter". Under this section, the Deputy Commissioner can decide whether the proceedings of the Municipal Board are in confor­mity with the provisions of law. Before annuling a proceeding he must hear the Board, give opportunity to it to express its view to justify the validity of the proceedings. U/s. 296 A quasi-judicial power or adjudicatory power has been conferred on the Deputy Commissioner. However, under Section 296 of the Act, the only power which has been conferred on the Deputy Commi­ssioner is to suspend the operation of a resolution, order or an act of the Municipality under certain contingencies. We are of the view that the Deputy Commissioner cannot determine the validity and invalidity of the order and/or exercise any adjudicatory power, which has been done in the instant ease. Under these circumstances accepting the contention of Mr. We are of the view that the Deputy Commissioner cannot determine the validity and invalidity of the order and/or exercise any adjudicatory power, which has been done in the instant ease. Under these circumstances accepting the contention of Mr. B. K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner, we hold that the impug­ned order re-fixing the rates of rent, toll and fees as deter­mined by the Deputy Commissioner is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed. 7. Mr. B. K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners bas very rightly contended that power of the Deputy Commissioner to suspend the resolution of Board and the order of the Exe­cutive Officer was limited and the Deputy Commsssioner was obliged to send "forthwith" a copy of the order of suspension with a statement of his reasons for making it, to the State Government. Learned counsel further submits that it is the State which can rescind the order of suspension or direct that it con­tinues in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. It appears that the Deputy Com­missioner has the power to suspend an action, order or reso­lution of the Board and thereafter the Deputy Commissioner is obliged to forward "forthwith" a copy of the order made by him appending a statement of his reason as to why the order was made. Thereafter, the State Government may rescind the order of suspension or direct that it should continue in force with or without modification of the order of suspension direc­ting that it would continue permanently or for a limited period. - 8. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the instant case the Deputy Commissioner is yet to forward the copy of the order of suspension with the statement of his season to the State Government for its consideration, accordingly the order of suspension continues. As such, the Municipal Board is incompetent to collect rents, tolls and taxes levied by it, in view of the continuance of the order of suspen­sion rendered by the Deputy Commissioner. Learned counsel for the respondents had no answer to it. We are of the opinion that the resolution of the Board is under suspension in view of the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The order continues until the State Government rescinds or makes any other orders. Learned counsel for the respondents had no answer to it. We are of the opinion that the resolution of the Board is under suspension in view of the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The order continues until the State Government rescinds or makes any other orders. As such, we are constrained to hold that Respondent No. I cannot collect rents, tolls and fees levied by it. 9. The next contention or Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Board cannot enforce the order of the Deputy Commissioner refixing the rents, tolls and fees deter­mined by him. We have already held that no such adjudicatory power to revise or alter an order, resolution or action of the Board has been conferred on the Deputy Commissioner U/s. 296 of "the Act". He can only decide whether the order, resolution or action of the Board should be suspended and give reasons for such suspension-that is the contour or limit of his power. No adjudicatory power has been conferred by or under Sec. 296 upon the Deputy Commissioner to decide the validity and invalidity of the order, resolution or action of the Board. As such, we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and hold that the order of the Deputy Com­missioner re-fixing the rate of rent, toll and fees is without jurisdiction and invalid as such. We accept the contention of Mr. Das, that the order of the Deputy Commissioner refixing the rate cannot be implemented by the Board as was sought to be done by it. However, if the order of suspension is rescinded by the State Government, the Board may collect the rent, toll and fees in terms of its resolution made effective by the Executive Officer. 10 Mr. A. N. Phukan, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 contends that the Municipal Board has been seriously affected due to continuance of the proceedings and as such the entire proceedings should be directed to be terminated at the ear­liest. We appreciate the contention made. We are of the View that the Deputy Commissioner performs a public duty while exercising power under Sec. 296 of 'the Act'. No order or resolution or action of the Board should be kept under suspen­sion 'sine-die'. This is the legislative intent expressed in Sec. 296 itself. We appreciate the contention made. We are of the View that the Deputy Commissioner performs a public duty while exercising power under Sec. 296 of 'the Act'. No order or resolution or action of the Board should be kept under suspen­sion 'sine-die'. This is the legislative intent expressed in Sec. 296 itself. Section 296 clearly states that immediately after making the order, the order of suspension the Deputy Commi­ssioner is duty bound to forward forthwith a copy of the order alongwith a statement of his reasons to the State Government. The order of suspension was made on 30. 6.81 and as yet no Deputy Commissioner has forwarded the order of suspension with the statement of the reasons for making it, to the State Government. The term "forthwith" inserted in Section 296 means immediately, without delay or within a reasonable time. The provisions of Section 296 makes it clear that the Deputy Commissioner, being satisfied that reasons exist for suspending an order, resolution or action of the Board, must make order, record his reasons in writing, and without any delay forward them to the State Government. The resolution, order or action of the Board should not be kept pending in "suspended anima­tion". Much delay has been caused, and, as desired by learned counsel for both the parties we direct the Deputy Commissioner, North Lakhimpur to forward a copy of the order of suspen­sion and all connected orders made by the then Deputy Commissioner to the State Government whereupon the State Government may rescind the order or it may pass such further or other order or orders as envisaged in Section 296 of "the Act", 11. In the result the petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, there will be no order as to costs. Send down the records forthwith.