JUDGMENT : B.D. Agrawal, J. Certain questions in these cases have been referred to larger Bench by learned Single Judge since there was doubt raised with regard to the correctness of the decisions of Division Bench in Om Kumar v. District Judge, Gorakhpur 1980 ARC 144 and Union of India v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer 1980 AWC 95 and the decision of learned single Judge in Civil Revision No. 712 of 1978 State Bank of India, Faizubad v. Sri Hari Narain decided on April 13, 1979. 2. Facts relevant are common. The Petitioners are admittedly Public Sector corporations within the meaning of Section 3(p) of the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 being corporations owned and controlled by the Government. The respective buildings are held by them under tenancy. The landlords have determined the tenancy by giving notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act. They instituted suits in the concerned Courts of Small Causes seeking the relief for eviction of these Corporations on the basis that the tenancy had been determined by notice besides the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The suits Instituted were subsequent to the enforcement of the? U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 on July 5, 1976. These were decreed by the trial court including for eviction. In original suit No. 42 of 1981 from which the writ petition before us arises, the trial court passed the decree on April 12, 1983 and the revision preferred by the tenant u/s 25, Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was dismissed also on July 8, 1983. 3. In Civil Revision No. 1639 of 1979 a learned single Judge has referred the following questions to the larger Bench; (1) Whether the view taken by this Court in 1980 Allahabad Rent Cases, 144, 1980 Allahabad Weekly Cases 95 and in Civil Revision No. 712 of 1978 is correct? (2) Whether the protection against eviction available to a tenant under U.P. Act No. 12 of 1972 is not available when the tenant happens to be a Public Sector Corporation? In Civil Revision No. 79 of 1982 the questions referred by the learned Single Judge are as follows;-- (1) Whether Section 2(1)(a) and 3(o) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 are retrospective in operation? In Civil Revision No. 79 of 1982 the questions referred by the learned Single Judge are as follows;-- (1) Whether Section 2(1)(a) and 3(o) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 are retrospective in operation? (2) Whether the bar of Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will affect a suit filed subsequent to the enforcement of U.P. Act 28 of 1976 regarding a building occupied by a tenant envisaged u/s 3(o) of the Act from before the said enforcement? 4. The other Civil Revision No. 1302 of 1979, 133 of 1982, 692 of 1982 and the writ petition No. 8036 of 1983 are connected with Civil Revision No. 79 of 1982 the questions referred being the same. 5. We have heard the learned Counsel on both sides. 6. Sri K.L. Grover learned Counsel for the Petitioner's side urged that ever since the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 came in force the scheme underlying has been that the Government or a public body in capacity as tenant could not be evicted on mere notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act without the landlord specifying any one or more specified grounds for eviction. The protection accorded was to tenancy created by the Government or a public body. Provision is made under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, where they seek eviction of unauthorised occupants in their premises subsequent to the expiry of the lease or licence. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)(Amendment) Act, 1976 extends this exemption to Public Sector corporations also. In the result, it was argued, a Public Sector Corporation cannot be evicted from a building let out to it on the mere basis of notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act without the landlord making out any one or more grounds laid in Section 20 the 1972 Act. The submission is that this also serves to ensure harmonious interpretation of the Act consistently with Section 21(8) thereof and the transitory provision contained in Section 26(3)/(4) of the Amendment Act, 1976. The submission is that this also serves to ensure harmonious interpretation of the Act consistently with Section 21(8) thereof and the transitory provision contained in Section 26(3)/(4) of the Amendment Act, 1976. In addition it was contended that the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Ordinance (U.P. Ordinance 8 of 1984) makes it plain that the exemption intended u/s 2(1)(a) of the 1972 Act has throughout been in respect of any building of which the Government or the local authority or a Public Sector corporation is the landlord. 7. Sri S.N. Varma appearing for some of the Petitioners adopts these arguments. He raised an additional ground and submitted that the amendment brought about by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1976 in Sections 2(1)(a)/3(o) of the 1972 Act is not retrospective and, therefore, a lease granted to a Public Sector Corporation before July 5, 1976 remains unaffected. His contention also is that Section 20 of the U.P. Act, 1972 is available in defence to the corporations in the suits instituted after July 5, 1976 even though the tenancy in their favour had been created before this date. According to the learned Counsel, moreover, The U.P. Ordinance 8 of 1984 is declaratory in character and, therefore, this has retrospective effect, It cannot be said to deprive the landlord of any vested or accrued right. 8. On the Respondents' side Sri S. Harkauli, the learned Counsel argued that the 'words taken on lease' appearing in Section 3(o) of the U.P. Act of 1972 be given literal interpretation and nothing beyond the same. On being thus construed they imply that nothing in the Act applies. Where the eviction is sought of a corporation by the landlord and, therefore, the landlord is free to move for eviction after determining the tenancy by giving notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act. The submission of Sri S.P. Srivastava appearing for certain Respondents is that the substantive part of Section 21(8) of the U.P. Act of 1972 is redundant and that the first proviso of this sub-section may be taken as tagged to Section 2(1)(a) of this Act. According to his submission the amendment made by the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 in Section 2(1)(a)/3(o) is retrospective in effect. According to his submission the amendment made by the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 in Section 2(1)(a)/3(o) is retrospective in effect. Sri G.D. Srivastava counsel for the Respondents landlord in the writ petition urged that the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 is declaratory in kind and hence it is retrospective but the U.P. Ordinance 8 of 1984 is, according to him, remedial in nature and hence it may not effect vested or accrued rights of the landlord. 9. Control of letting, rent and eviction in relation to urban buildings is one of the felt necessities of the times we live in. The pinch began to he experienced in early forties. The after math of the Second World War, the movement of vast millions in the wake of the partition of the country, the steep rise in population, the continuous increase in the cost of buildings and their maintenance are some of the factors which steadly contributed to what is now recognised an unhappy problem of special justice. B. Banerjee Vs. Smt. Anita Pan, (1975) 1 SCC 166 . 10. In response the Government of India took powers under the Defence of India Rules, 1939 for the regulation of letting of accommodations and in particular for controlling rents, restricting eviction and prescribing the persons to whom the accommodation was to be let. The Defence of India Act, 1939 was to expire on September 30, 1946. The State Government came up with the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance (III of 1946) effective from October 1, following. The U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (the old Act) replaced the Ordinance. The U.P. Ordinance Mo. V of 1948 that amended the Act inserted also with effect from 26th September, 1948 a proviso which, in so far as relevant, read-- Provided that-- (a) Nothing in this Act shall apply to-- (i) any premises belonging to the provincial or Central Government, (ii) any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government. 11. The old Act changed yielding place to the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 13 of 1972) which came into force on July 15, 1972. 11. The old Act changed yielding place to the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 13 of 1972) which came into force on July 15, 1972. In Section 2(1) of this Act provision was made for 'Exemption from the Act' including that-- Nothing in this Act shall apply to-- (a) any building belonging to or vested In the Government of any State or any local authority, or (b) any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. 12. The expression "local authority" was defined as meaning a "Nagar Mahapalika, municipal board, notified area--committee or town area committee" Section 3(m). 13. Another land mark was reached when the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)(Amendment) Act, 1976 came into force on July 5, 1976. For Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2(1) above quoted the following were substituted-- (a) any public building; or (b) any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution. In Section 3 the following clauses were among others inserted by this Amendment;-- (o) 'public building' means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any Public sector corporation; (p) 'Public sector corporation' means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, and includes any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty percent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government. 14. In terms of Section 3(1) of the old Act (U.P. Act III of 1947) a suit against a tenant for eviction could not be filed without the permission of the District Magistrate except upon the existence of one of the grounds specified therein such as default in payment of rent, causing substantial damages to the accommodation, unauthorised sub-letting, the denial of the landlord's title and the like. In the new Act (U.P. Act 13 of 1972), Section 20 was enacted providing in effect that no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner save upon one or more of the grounds enumerated in Sub-section (2) which we need not reproduce. Section 21 replaced the old Section (3) which had provided permission of the District Magistrate to sue for ejectment of a tenant. Provision made in Section 21(1) is for release of a building under tenancy in favour of the landlord on his application to the Prescribed Authority upon the ground inter alia-- (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-- (a) That the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is he'd by him, either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust. 15. Explanation to Section 21(1) made provision in Clauses (ii) and (iv) namely that-- In the case of a residential building: (ii) where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment, away from the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and by reason of the cessation of such engagement, he needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes; such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of Clause (a); (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part thereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. 16. The U.P. (Amendment) Act, 1976 deleted these Clauses (ii) and (iv). 16. The U.P. (Amendment) Act, 1976 deleted these Clauses (ii) and (iv). At the same time it inserted Sub-section (8) of Section 21 which reads-- (8) Nothing in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a public sector/corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the prescribed authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom Clause (ii) or Clause (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) is applicable: Provided that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable therefore to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth often percent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application: Provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made alter the expiration of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement. Section 26(3) and (4) of this U.P. Amendment Act 28 of 1976 also made transitory provisions as below: (3) Where an order of eviction under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the principal Act in respect of a building let out to the State Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation or a recognised educational institution has been passed before the commencement of this Act out such tenant has not been actually evicted and continues to be in possession of the building at such commencement, then the order of eviction so passed by the prescribed authority or by an appellate authority shall, on the tenant's application to the prescribed authority in accordance with Sub-section (4) stand discharged and no such order of eviction shall be executed. (4) Every application referred to in Sub-section (3) shall be made within two months from the date of commencement of this Act and the tenant shall make an unconditional offer therein or pay rent of one-twelfth of ten percent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and thereupon, the prescribed authority shall determine the revised rent accordingly, and such revised rent shall be payable with effect from the date of the order referred to in Sub-section (3). 17. 17. This State also has had on the Statute Book the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 22 of 1972). This provides for summary proceedings to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. The expression 'public premises' is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act to mean "any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government", and including, inter alia, any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of-- (1) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956* In which not less than fifty-one percent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government; (ii) any local authority; or (iii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under an Uttar Pradesh Act and owned or controlled by the State Government; or 18. The U.P. Act 28 of 1976 amended the U.P. Act 22 of 1972 also in certain respect but the definition given to the expression "public premises" as extracted above, was retained. 19. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)(Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 (U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983) promulgated on May 18, 1983 substituted for Clause (a) of Section 2(1) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 the following-- (a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord; or. 20. This Ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Ordinance 43 of 1983 dated 12-8-1983 which was succeeded by the U.P. Ordinance 6 of 1984 and the last in the series is the U.P. Ordinance 8 of 1984 promulgated on May 7, 1984 which too contains the aforesaid provision. 21. This in brief has been the legislative history of the relevant provisions. To reiterate, the Old Act (U.P. Act 3 of 1947) exempted from the purview of the Act (i) any premises belonging to the State Government or the Central Government and (ii) my tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the State Government or Central Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. To reiterate, the Old Act (U.P. Act 3 of 1947) exempted from the purview of the Act (i) any premises belonging to the State Government or the Central Government and (ii) my tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the State Government or Central Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. u/s 2(1) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (as originally enacted) the exemption was in favour of (a) any building belonging to or vested in the Government of India or the Government of any State or any local authority and (b) any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. The U.P. Act 28 of 1976 put these Clauses (a) and (b) into a compendious expression "public building" providing that nothing in the Act shall apply to any 'public building' which expression was given a definition in Section 3(o) as meaning "any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government or any other State), and includes any building to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation.' Public sector corporation was defined in Section 3(p), quoted above. The U.P. Ordinance 8 of 1984 substitutes Clause (a) of Section 2(1) by saying that nothing in the Act shall apply to "any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord." 22. Upon analysis it is clearly revealed that ever since September 26, 1949 when the U.P. Ordinance V of 1949 was promulgated any premises belonging to or requisitioned by Government has been kept exempt from the restraints of the Rent Control Act. It amounts to this that if Government lets out such premises and were to seek eviction of the tenant it did not have to take recourse to Section 3 of the old Act or Section 20/21 of the new Act, 1972. The constraints of these provisions in other words did not extend to claim for eviction by Government from the premises belonging to it or requisitioned by it. The constraints of these provisions in other words did not extend to claim for eviction by Government from the premises belonging to it or requisitioned by it. This exemption under the old Act applied also, moreover, to any tenancy created by Government in respect of premises taken by Government on lease or requisitioned by it meaning thereby that if Government obtained on lease some premises and created a tenancy in respect thereof in favour of some third person taken to secure eviction of such person the lesson namely, the Government did not have to fulfil, the pre-requisite which otherwise hold good for similar action by another landlord. The significant fact is that every premises leased to or requisitioned by Government was not exempt from the operation of the Act. The exemption clause would come into play only when a tenancy or like relationship is created by the grant of Government In respect of such premises. Where a premises is hired or taken on lease by Government for accommodating its own office, no tenancy is created by a grant from it and consequently the landlord could sue for eviction of the Government on any one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 8 but not otherwise. If Government after hiring or requisitioning the premises were to let it out to its officers and a tenancy is created in the manner provided the bar of Section 3 could not be pleaded in an action brought by the Government. This same position was maintained under the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 as originally enacted with this modification that the benefit of exemption was extended also to building belonging to or vested in a local authority. Until July 4, 1976 this exemption did not embrace within its purview a building belonging to or vested or taken on lease and given on tenancy to some third person by a public sector corporation. The U.P. Act 28 of 1976 for the first time brought in a public sector corporation also. Until July 4, 1976 this exemption did not embrace within its purview a building belonging to or vested or taken on lease and given on tenancy to some third person by a public sector corporation. The U.P. Act 28 of 1976 for the first time brought in a public sector corporation also. There can be no requisition as such by a local authority or any public sector corporation and, therefore, in the definition Clause (o) of Section 3 in relation to such body the provision is "and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation" while in reference to Government it says "any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government." In the net result the exemption from the constraints of Section 20 and 21 of this Act to secure eviction of tenants available to Government in respect of building that belongs to it or is taken on lease by it or requisitioned by it was also made applicable to a building which belongs to or has been taken on lease by the public sector corporation. 23. The control question is whether the words "taken on lease" appearing In Section 3(o) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (as amended by the U.P. Act 28 of 1976) denote a building that has been obtained on lease by a public sector corporation and is let out by it or do the words signify nothing more than a building held by such corporation on lease. The deeper significance of the issue is whether the exemption from the constraints of Sections 20 and 21 of 1972 Act is available also to any landlord who seeks eviction of a public sector corporation from a building leased to it or is that confined to the case where such corporation seeks eviction of some tenant admitted to a building obtained by it on lease. 24. Sri Harkauli learned Counsel for one of the Respondents contends that the court may pickup a dictionary and give to the expression "taken on lease" the meaning which it bears. The solution thus suggested is simple enough but fallacious. 24. Sri Harkauli learned Counsel for one of the Respondents contends that the court may pickup a dictionary and give to the expression "taken on lease" the meaning which it bears. The solution thus suggested is simple enough but fallacious. The basic principle announced time after time is that if the statute is plain, certain and free from ambiguity, a bare reading suffices and interpretation is unnecessary, but interpretation may be required and justified by various factors. Besides the doubt created by the doubtful meaning of words and phrases, there are other instances where the words used do not express the legislative intent perfectly, in which interpretation is needed. Such is the case where the language used exceeds or falls exhort of expressing the meaning intended. The intention of the legislature 13 the essence of a statute. We must delve deeper. "At least, we must free the expression from any meaning or concept which may shade, obscure or completely hide its true nature" Crawfford: Construction of Statute p 246). It undoubtedly is useful to adhere to the ordinary meaning of (he words used, and to the grammatical construction unless however "that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further". Maxwell: Principles of Interpretation 12th edition p. 43). One of the basic rules of interpretation enunciated by Cross; In Statutory Interpretation (1976) at p. 43 is; The judge may read in words which he considers to be necessarily implied by words which are already in the statute and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible or absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with interest of the statute 25. In the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words lends to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature it is proper to look for some other permissible meaning of the word or phrases Lord Reid in Puiner v. Event (1969) 3 A. E.R. 257 at p. 258). In the words of Lord Denning; We go longer construe Acts of Parliament according to their literal meaning. In the words of Lord Denning; We go longer construe Acts of Parliament according to their literal meaning. We construe them according to their object and intent." (1963) 2 Q.B. 270 Engineering Training Board v. Sarnal Talbot (Engineers) Ltd. As Holmes J. puts this inimitably in fown v. Eigner 245 U.S. 418 a word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. In Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation (1948) 2 All E.R. 995 it was observed-- The first thing one has to do, I venture to think, in construing words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in vecuo, so to speak, and attribute to them what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary meaning. Fe* words in English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of their context. The method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify. It is to read the statute as a whole and ask on self the question. In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word? 26. The Supreme Court cited this passage with approval in Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala (1973) 1 SCC 225. The Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the word used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, it a purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress The Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1955 SC 661 , ; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla Vs. The Union of India (UOI), AIR 1957 SC 628 . Other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by the considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act are also relevant considerations. See In re Central Provinces and Bihar Act 1939 F.O.R 18; Kedar Math Singh v. State of Bihar 1962 Supple. (2) SCR 76). 27. Other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by the considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act are also relevant considerations. See In re Central Provinces and Bihar Act 1939 F.O.R 18; Kedar Math Singh v. State of Bihar 1962 Supple. (2) SCR 76). 27. The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is not mechanical. It is an attempt to discover the intent of the legislature from the language used by it and it must always be remembered that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be "drafted with divine prescience and perfect charity," observed Bhagwati, J. in K.P. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 173 . His Lordship cited in support Judge learned Hand:-- ...it Is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable source of interpreting the meaning of any writing; be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary: but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 28. In most felicitous language Judge Learned Hand pointed: ...the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collective create. 29. The legal history that we have traced above in brief bears out that far back on September 26, 1949 when the old Act, 1947 was in its inception it was felt necessary to provide exemption to premises belonging to Government and tenancy created by Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by it. This exemption was sustained intact for the entire tenure of the 1947 Act. The U.P. Act 13 of 1972 with effect from July 15, 1972 extended this benefit to a building belonging to a local authority. This exemption was sustained intact for the entire tenure of the 1947 Act. The U.P. Act 13 of 1972 with effect from July 15, 1972 extended this benefit to a building belonging to a local authority. The exemption was not conferred on a landlord who seeks eviction of Government in respect of a building taken on rent by the latter, but this was to Government in seeking to evict a tenant from building which the Government may have itself taken on lease. That is to say, a landlord who sought to evict Government had necessarily to proceed upon any of the grounds enumerated in Section 20 or in accordance with procedure laid in Section 21 of this Act. The U.P. Act 28 of 1976 for the first time brought in picture public sector corporations. The rest was retained and instead of specification appearing in two separate clauses, the Legislature roped in compendiously the entire into the caption "public building" defined in Section 3(a) and granted exemption thereto. This evidently is a mere drafting device. The legislative purpose or intention obviously was not to deny to Government the benefit of availing Section 20 (Act 13 of 1972) on being sought to be evicted by a landlord but on the contrary this was make this benefit available to public sector corporations also. If a landlord were to sue such corporations for eviction before July 5, 1976 there could be no escape from compliance to the grounds laid in Section 20 of the parent Act. Could the inclusion of public sector corporations by the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 be with the object to deprive them of the privilege that they earlier engaged? To our mind this does not in the context admit of the answers. The legislature could not remain oblivious of the manifold increases in the welfare activities of the State and the huge multiplicity of concerns of public utility including various instrumentalities or agencies in the public sector and Government Offices. It is hard to imagine that the legislative intention may have been to facilitate eviction of these concerns upon one month's notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act. We may not presume that the law makers would be ignorant of the fact that suitable alternative accommodation at comparative non exhorbitant rents is almost (sic) to secure. It is hard to imagine that the legislative intention may have been to facilitate eviction of these concerns upon one month's notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act. We may not presume that the law makers would be ignorant of the fact that suitable alternative accommodation at comparative non exhorbitant rents is almost (sic) to secure. Nor may the field have been left open to the landlords to exploit; in case especially of non residential buildings. The protection accorded under the Act rests thus on solid foundation and the view thereof is not under challenge. 30. The most useful, indeed almost indispensable, function of context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise over general words. In the words of Reed Dickerson; The Introduction and Application of Statutes, (1975) page 111: Although subordinate, the role of context is highly significant context that it presupposes is at best inadequately oriented and over general. Not only docs the context limits the normal sweep of primary (semantically) meaning, but it often also selects among the alternative potentialities of primary meaning. The elements of context that perform the letter function are usually factual assumptions or ethical norms that are either expressly recited in the document or, more usually, judicially noticed. The affected meaning by turning the potentialities of multiple, or alternative, primary meanings into the actualities of a single, relevant primary meaning. 31. Individual words are not considered in isolation, but may have their meaning determined by other words in the section in which they occur. Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) p. 105 endorses the view that before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or consequence which would result from it, for they often point out "the real meaning of the words". The author adds that if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practicable result. The author adds that if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practicable result. In his opinion, "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence" page 228. Cross in Statutory Interpretation (1978) opines that the notion that it was wrong for a court to look beyond the words with which it was immediately concerned if their meaning was clear when they were considered in isolation is outmoded. The context is to be regarded as including the whole of the statute in which it is contained, the place occupied by the provision within the statute; other statutes in pari materia; the circumstances in which the statute was passed, and it object in reference to the mischief to be remedied and the remedy provided being subserved (p. 509, Craies on Statutory Construction, (1971) at page 107 poses the question act times arising whether, admitting a statute to have a certain intention, it must, through defective drafting or faulty expressions, fail of its intended effect or whether necessary alterations may be made by the court. The answer that the suggests with the aid of the rule on this subject laid down by the Privy Council in Solman v. Duncombe 11 AC 627, is as follows: It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that, where the intention of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law. It may be necessary for a court of justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify if except necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. 32. In Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. It may be necessary for a court of justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify if except necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. 32. In Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 , one of the rules propounded for interpretation of statutory provisions is that if in any legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. Bhagwati, J. in K.P. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 173 , cities Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner 1963 AC 557 and observed; It is now a well settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even 'do some violence' to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. 33. In Superintendentend Remembrancer of legal Affairs to Govt. of W.B. v. Abani Maity AIR 1579 SC 1029, also it was laid down that "words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are, therefore, not to be construed in violation". His Lordship (Sarkaria, J.) cited with approval Viscount Sunion L.C. in 1940 A.C. 1014 wherein he said at page 1022: If the choice is between two interpretations the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avail a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. 34. Viewed in the light of the above it may be observed that there are certain intrinsic aids in the present which point unmistakably to the real or true meaning of the words "taken on lease" appearing In Section 3(o) which defines "public building": (1) The words "taken on lease" are sand witched between "belonging to" and "requisitioned by". 34. Viewed in the light of the above it may be observed that there are certain intrinsic aids in the present which point unmistakably to the real or true meaning of the words "taken on lease" appearing In Section 3(o) which defines "public building": (1) The words "taken on lease" are sand witched between "belonging to" and "requisitioned by". Building taken en lease by any public sector corporation is thus placed in the same class as a building belonging to it or any local authority or for that matter, any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by Government. The common denominator that runs through this entire category is that if Government, a local authority or a public sector corporation seeks eviction from such a building the constraints of Section 20/21 of the 1972 Act do not apply. As will presently appear provision has been separately made for eviction at their instance in summary proceedings under the U.P. Act 22 of 1972. After all what does exemption of such buildings from the purview of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 signify? It denotes in our opinion the immunity from the shakles of the Act to those who hold such buildings on title, upon lease or through requisition as the case may be. In their dealings with such property they do not have to abide by the conditions which otherwise hedge in the landlords. Certainly, there could be no question of a landlord seeking eviction of Government, local authority or public sector corporation from a building vested in these bodies or requisitioned by Government. It cannot be said that immunity avails a landlord in an action concerning buildings of which any of these bodies is the owner. This same status has been accorded to a building taken on lease by Government, a local authority or a corporation in the public sector. For all practical purposes such building is placed at par with a building vested in or requisitioned. This same status has been accorded to a building taken on lease by Government, a local authority or a corporation in the public sector. For all practical purposes such building is placed at par with a building vested in or requisitioned. Where thus Government, local authority or such corporation is in capacity of landlord of a building taken on lease; that is to say, if they have chosen to let out such building, then that would be protected against the ordinary requirements, to be fulfilled in the Act but for any other landlord who seeks to proceed in respect of a building let out to these bodies there is no exemption granted or contemplated. The Petitioners in the instant case have invoked and not without force the principle contained in the maxim noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by its companions). This is an extended and attenuated version of the ejusdem generis rule (Cross: Statutory Interpretation p. 115). It implies that words, even if they are not general words "like" whatsoever or "otherwise" preceded by specific words, are liable to be affected by other words with which they are associated. They are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the lest general (Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes P. 289). The decision in Rainbow Steels Ltd. Muzaffarnagar and Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., Delhi Vs. C.S.T., U.P. and State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 141 , is illustrative of the application of this maxim. The relevant words in the notification there under consideration were "old, discarded, unserviceable or absolute machinery." Contention on Appellants' behalf was that the word 'old' occurring in the entry would take colour from the other words (objectives) that follow it and the cumulative effect of all the words taken together showed that these words were either synonymous or near synonymous suggesting that the machinery in order to fall within the entry should become non functional or non usable. The Supreme Court observed that the four adjectives were susceptible to analogous meaning and had been clubbed together qualifying 'machinery' in the entry. The Supreme Court observed that the four adjectives were susceptible to analogous meaning and had been clubbed together qualifying 'machinery' in the entry. It was held that though all the four adjectives which qualify the word "machinery" had been used disjunctively, it was precisely for that are not that the adjective 'old' become vague, imprecise and ambiguous, being too general. The principle of noscitur sociis applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour from each other. In the case before us the qualifying words "taken on lease" take their colour from the words "belonging to" which proceeds them and "requisitioned by" which Immediately follow. In the context of Section 2(1)(a) which says that nothing in this Act shall apply to any public building, the words "belonging to" denote a building that belongs to Government etc. and is let out, the words "requisitioned by" signify similarly a building which after requisition is let out and "taken on lease" likewise take colour from them and are to be understood as implying "taken on lease and let out". There is no basis absolutely to interpret these words as conveying a sense distinct from those others with which there are dunned and even though these are disjuncted by the use of the word "or". (2) The exemption provided for in Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(e) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is in consonance with the scheme of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 13 of 1972 (U.P. Act 22 of 1972'. The expression "public premises" defined in Section 2(e) thereof (quoted above) canies practically the same meaning as "public building" defined in Section 3(o) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. U.P. Act 22 of 1972 is self contained in regard to the summary procedure open to Government local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State Government for eviction of an occupant subsequent to the expiry of a grant or lease in his favour. Similar provisions are made in the Central Act for this purpose. Since such bodies are empowered to secure eviction under these special provisions, it is in the fitness of things that the Rent Control Act provides that a case of eviction at the instance of any of these bodies in respect of such buildings is outside the purview thereof. These are thus manifestly interlinked. Since such bodies are empowered to secure eviction under these special provisions, it is in the fitness of things that the Rent Control Act provides that a case of eviction at the instance of any of these bodies in respect of such buildings is outside the purview thereof. These are thus manifestly interlinked. (3) Section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 makes provision for release of a building or specified part thereof on the application of the landlord based on ground of bonafide requirement of occupation by himself or his family or on the basis that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction. The U.P. (Amendment) Act 28 of 1*76 inserted Sub-section (8) to Section 21 whereby it was provided that in respect of a building let out to the State Government and to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution the landlord cannot avail of Section 21(1)(a) that is, he cannot seek release on ground that the building is bonafide required for occupation. It would be anomalous and clearly incongruous to maintain that while on the one hand this right available to other landlords in respect of buildings let out by them was taken away, they will have been left free to eject these bodies from the building let out to them on mere notice u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act without being put to proof of any of the grounds enunciated in Section 20. The provision to Section 21(8) reads: provided that incase of such a building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable there for to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of ten percent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application. This obviously entitles the landlord in the form of recompense to earn higher rent in relation to a building let out to State Government, local authority or public sector corporation. This obviously entitles the landlord in the form of recompense to earn higher rent in relation to a building let out to State Government, local authority or public sector corporation. It is not that the landlord is left with out remedy if the liabilities under the tenancy are not discharged, he has, however, to make out anyone or more of the grounds enumerted in Section 20 to secure eviction; Section 21(8) also therefore points strongly that as part of the: Scheme laid in the act eviction of these bodies from the buildings let out to them would not have been left unregulated. Sri S.P. Srivastava learned Counsel on the Respondents' side in his bid to counter this interpretation strenuously urged that the substantive part of Section 21(8) be taken as ineffective and the proviso quoted above be instead taken as tagged to Section 2(1)(a). In support he cited certain decisions which construed Section 27 of the Evidence Act as a proviso to Section 25 and 26 thereof. Learned Counsel does not dispute that an application by a landlord in respect of a building let out to the State Government, local authority or public sector corporation does not lie u/s 21(1)(a). For so long as this is the position, the Respondents do not stand to gain in any manner even if we treat the proviso fro Section 2(1)(a). The contention for the other side that when the legislature has gone to the extent of excluding eviction of the State Government, local authority or public sector corporation from a building let out to them even on ground of bona fide requirement for occupation by himself or the family of the landlord, it could not have left it open to him to secure eviction without proof of any of the grounds enumerated in Section 20 remains none the less valid. (4) The legislature, it was rightly submitted for the Petitioner, has gone a step further in this direction. By means of the transitory provisions contained in Section 26(3)/(4) of the U.P. (Amendment) Act 28 1976 there was a prohibition imposed against eviction from such buildings at the instance of a landlord even where he had succeeded to obtain an order to that effect in his favour prior to July 5, 1976. He could only claim in that event enhanced rent provided, of course, the eviction has not already taken place. He could only claim in that event enhanced rent provided, of course, the eviction has not already taken place. This also shows the true legislative intent behind these provisions which are closely print together. 35. In Om Kumar v. District Judge 1980 ARC 144 the landlord moved an application u/s 21(1)(a) for release of a building in the occupation of the Punjab National Bank as a tenant. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on ground that the need averred by the landlord was not bonafide. On appeal the District Judge, negative this finding but dismissed the appeal being of opinion that this being the case of a public building, the Act did not apply. The landlord moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench affirmed that "the building in question is a public building to which the Act does not apply and the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief u/s 21 of the Act." It was held: It may be noticed that Sub-section (8) refers to a recognised educational institution, to which the definition of "public building" as contained in Clause (o) of Section 2(1) is not applicable. Thus a building let out to a recognised. educational institution is not a public building. Further Sub-section (8) applies only to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution but t it does not apply to public buildings which either belong to or are requisitioned by the Government. It is obvious that Sub-section (8) is not co-extensive with Clause (o) which defines public building. In some respect it is narrower while in other aspects it is wider in operation. While Section 2(1) excludes all applicability of the Act in its entirety to a public building, yet Sub-section (8) of Section 21 makes Clause (a) of Section 21(1) applicable to a building which can fall within the definition of public building provided the landlord is a person to whom Clause (ii) or Clause (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 is applicable. Applying the principle of harmonious construction it may be said that Sub-section (81 of Section 21 is a proviso or an exception to Section 2(1)(a). Applying the principle of harmonious construction it may be said that Sub-section (81 of Section 21 is a proviso or an exception to Section 2(1)(a). Reading the two provisions in this manner the result will be that though the Act will not generally apply to a public building, yet Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) to Section 21 will apply to buildings mentioned in Clause (8) of Section 21 provided the landlord is a person to whom Clause (ii) or Clause (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 is applicable. The real problem, however, is created by the fact that by Amending Act of 1976 Clauses (ii) and (iv) to the Explanation to Section 21(1) have been omitted. They no longer remain in the statute. In such a situation it is not possible to apply Sub-section (8) as if Clause (ii) or Clause (iv) was hypothetically in existence. In ultimate analysis, Sub-section (8) cannot usefully be employed at all in any circumstances. After deleting Clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 their reference in Sub-section (8) is rendered meaningless. It is an example of clumsy and confused legislation and of no assistance in finding out the legislative intent behind the Amending Act Of 1976. 36. The correctness of this decision being doubted the matter was referred to a Full Bench in Sheo Narain Chaudhary v. The District Judge, Allahabad, 1982 AWC 489 . That arose directly from an application under the proviso to Section 21(8) by the landlord for enhancement of rent of a building in the occupation of a Government High Court. The rent was enhanced by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer but the District Judge allowed the appeal following the decision in Om Kumar's case, supra. The Full Bench of which Hon'ble M.N. Shukla, J. (as he then was) was a member took notice of the fact that in Om Kumar's case the question as to whether an application lay to enhance the rent under the proviso to Section 21(8) was not involved. In the opinion of the larger Bench it would be wrong to maintain that Section 21(8) had as a whole become meaningless and Om Kumar was overruled 10 that extent. In the opinion of the larger Bench it would be wrong to maintain that Section 21(8) had as a whole become meaningless and Om Kumar was overruled 10 that extent. The Bench accepted the contention that in exceptional cases the proviso may operate independently by making substantive provision and ruled that due to the detention of Clauses (ii) and (iv) the proviso was not rendered ineffective. It was laid down: In the present case the statute clearly indicates that the proviso to Section 21(8) deals with the matter of enhancement of rent while the first part of Section 21(8) deals with an application for release u/s 21(a). Thus the scope of the proviso is different from that of the first part of Section 21(8). It is settled that a rule of construction cannot override the clear language of statute. We cannot as such by adopting the normal rule of construction of a proviso obliterate the effect and the efficacy of the proviso to Section 21(8) for, the topic of provision different. It must be read as a substantive proviso. With respect we do not agree with the view taken in Om Kumar's case that Section 21(8) has been rendered meaningless by the deletion of Clauses (ii) and (iv) of the explanation to Section 21. We are of the view that the result of the deletion of Clauses (ii) and (1)(iv) of the Explanation to Section 21 is that an application u/s 21(1)(a) cannot be moved in respect Of buildings let out to the authorities specified in the first part of Section 21(8) Section 21(8) excludes from the operation of Section 21(1)(a) "a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution". Public' building defined in Section 3(o) means on the other hand "any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation." This clearly in distinct from the building referred to in Section 21(8). 'Public building' talks of title or requisition also and not merely a lease; it is in reference also to Central Government, but not an educational institution. 'Public building' talks of title or requisition also and not merely a lease; it is in reference also to Central Government, but not an educational institution. Section 21(8), however, deals with a building "let out" to an educational institution also and makes no reference to Central Government or to title or requisition concerning the building. The Division Bench in Om Kumar's, supra noticed that in some respect Sub-section (8) Is narrower in comparison to Clause (o) of Section 3, while in other aspects it is wider in operation but there was no interpretation made of the words "taken on lease" appearing in Section 3(o) in their proper context. With respect we are unable to agree that the real meaning of the expression "taken on lease" appearing in Section 3(o) could be ascertained on literal interpretation thereof divorced from the context in which it appears or the legislation intention which is manifest from the entire scheme of the Act as also the legislative history. The words "belonging to" and "requisitioned by" in the company whereof "taken on lease" appear in Clause (o) have some necessary adjuncts implicit therein i.e. "and let out" which cannot be overlooked because the words "taken on lease" take colour from the company in which these are placed. 37. In Union of India v. Kent Control & Eviction Officer 1980 AWC 95 which is the other case under review before us there was an application u/s 9A of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 for revision of monthly rent of a building let out by a public charitable Trust to the Union of India (Ministry of Railways). The Division Bench in this case also proceeding upon literal Interpretation assumed that building taken on rent by The Central Government was 'a public building' and hence as laid in Section 2(1)(o) nothing in the Act applied to it. For reasons already discussed above in dealing with the case of Om Kumar, supra we do not agree with this proposition. 38. Our attention was also drawn to the unreported decision of a learned Single Judge in Civil Revision 712 of 1978 The State Bank of India Faizabad v. Sri Hari Narain decided on 23rd April, 1979. This arose from a suit filed in 1978 in the Court of Small Causes for eviction in respect of a building let out to the State Bank prior to July 15, 1972. This arose from a suit filed in 1978 in the Court of Small Causes for eviction in respect of a building let out to the State Bank prior to July 15, 1972. One of the questions raised was whether the exemption clause applied and could Section 20 be considered applicable. The learned Judge found that the State Bank is a public sector corporation as defined in Section 3(p) the lease was to be deemed continuing from month to month under the provisions of holding over contained in Section 116 Transfer of Property Act; it is of no consequence that the lease taken was prior to July 15, 1972 because in the opinion of the learned Judge, "The Scheme of the Act is to protect tenants of all leases existing on the date of the Act came into force. Otherwise the very purpose of the Act would fail"; and that Section 10 would not be applicable to public buildings. With respect this decision as well rests on assumption In isolation from the proper context In which Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(o) are placed. 39. The discussion thus far made would be Incomplete without a reference in brief to the implications of the U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction Ordinance (U.P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1984). This substitutes the following for Section 2(1)(a) of the principal Act: (a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord. 40. In Section 1(2) of the Ordinance provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on May 18, 1983 this being the date when the U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 the earliest in the series was promulgated. Contention for the Petitioners is that this Ordinance sets at rest the doubts entertained with respect to the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) read along with the meaning given to public building in Section 3(o). But argue the learned Counsel on Respondents' behalf the Ordinance cannot be given retrospective effect. This in our opinion, does not reflect the true character of this Ordinance. Certain judicial pronouncements of this Court from time to time had created doubts in regard to the true legislative intention behind the use of the words "taken on lease" in the context of Section 3(o) and 2(1)(a). This in our opinion, does not reflect the true character of this Ordinance. Certain judicial pronouncements of this Court from time to time had created doubts in regard to the true legislative intention behind the use of the words "taken on lease" in the context of Section 3(o) and 2(1)(a). We mentioned above the decision of a learned Single Judge in Civil Revision No. 712 of 1978 dated April 23, 1979 and of the Division Bench in Om Kumar v. District Judge, Gorakhpur 1980 ARC 144 (Supra). Similar was the view taken for instance by learned Single Judge in Zila Basic Shiksha Samiti v. Additional District Judge 1981 ARC 52; U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. II Addl. District Judge 1981 ARC 474; Reserve Bank of India v. S.B. Srhastava 1982 A WO 884; State Bank of Patiala, Ghazipur v. Smt. Swaraj Devi 1982 AWC 766 ; State of U.P. v. N.C. Mukerji 1983 (1) ARC 836, which have followed the line of reasoning adopted in Om Kumar's case (Supra). The Ordinance aims obviously to clear these doubts and make explicit the legislative intention behind the enactment that was latent. These various aspects of the matter escaped consideration in State of U.P. v. P.O. Eye Hospital & Nursing Home 1984 (2) ARC 438 which cannot therefore be said to lay down good law on the point. 41. The law is settled that a statute which is declaratory as distinct from being remedial takes retrospective effect. Crawfford in the Construction of Statutes at page 107 points out that statutes declaring the meaning of an existing statute are to be construed "as intended to lay down a rule for future cases, and to act retrospectively. They closely resemble interpretation clauses, and their paramount purpose is to remove doubt as to the meaning of existing law, or to correct a construction considered erroneous by the legislature". If a statute is in its nature a declaratory Act, the argument that is not to be construed so as to take away previously vested Tight is inapplicable. (Maxwell; Interpretation of Statute", 12th Edition page 224). To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 , relying upon Craies on Statute Law: What is a declaratory Act? (Maxwell; Interpretation of Statute", 12th Edition page 224). To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 , relying upon Craies on Statute Law: What is a declaratory Act? The following observations in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition page 56-57 are apposite: For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the Interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word "declared" as well as the word "enacted". A remedial Act, on the contrary, is not necessarily retrospective; it may be either enlarging or restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment. 42. It was argued that in the Civil Revisions giving rise to these references the decrees in favour of the landlords were passed before May 18, 1983. Original Suit No. 42 of 1981 giving rise to writ petition No. 8036 of 1983 was decreed on 12th April, 1983 and the revision dismissed on 8th July, 1983. The aforementioned provision in the Ordinance being declaratory in nature there is no force in the submission that this deprives the Respondents of vested rights. In any view of the matter even if we do not take into consideration the Ordinance treating this is remedial, the position under the law does not change because in our view Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(p) always conveyed though not explicitly that the exemption was in respect of a building of which the Government, a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord. 43. This concludes the reference in Civil Revision No. 1633 of 1973. To both the questions In this reference our answer is in the negative. 44. 43. This concludes the reference in Civil Revision No. 1633 of 1973. To both the questions In this reference our answer is in the negative. 44. Sri S.N. Vernm learned Counsel on the Petitioners' side submitted In the alternative that even if the meaning put by them to Section 2(1)(a) read with Section 3(o) is not accepted as the correct interpretation, the U.P. (Amendment) Act, 1976 is not retrospective and, therefore, the amendment made thereby to Section 2(1)(a) and Section 3 for the matter cannot effect leases granted before July 6, 1976 when this Act came into force. The amended provisions may if at all, it is argued, govern only such leases to public sector corporations as are granted subsequent to 5th July, 1976. In the view that we take of the true meaning of the relevant provisions this alternative question strictly speaking does not arise. But since arguments on both sides were addressed to us on this aspect also and this constitutes the subject matter of other references before us we deem it fit to record our opinion thereon as well. 45. The legislature is undoubtedly competent to take away vested rights by means of retrospective legislation. Similarly the legislature is undoubtedly competent to make laws which over-ride and materially affect the terms of contracts between the parties; but the argument is that unless a clear and ambiguous intention is indicated by the legislature by adopting suitable express words in that behalf no provision of a statute should be given retrospective operation if by such operation vested rights are likely to be affected. In Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition) Vol. 36 at page 423 it is stated: The general rule is that all statutes other than these which are merely declaratory, or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature. (See also: Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition Page 215; Craies on Statute Law, 7th edition at page 320; Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 . 46. These principles are unexceptionable and as a matter of law no objection can be taken to them. The Supreme Court recently in Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh and Others Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 . 46. These principles are unexceptionable and as a matter of law no objection can be taken to them. The Supreme Court recently in Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh and Others Vs. Central Government and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 206 , reiterated in para 17: All laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectively if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intention is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect could be given to it or not. 47. The question arising is, does the amendment made by the U.P. Act 26 of 1976 take away any vested or substantive rights of the tenants or the landlord? In construing the amended statute, the court should consider the change sought to be effected by the legislature. The amendatory act should be construed in relation to the conditions created by the Amendment Act as well as the subjects and purposes of the Act itself as therein defined. In short, regard must be had for the law as it was before being amended and the amendatory Act should be construed to repress the evils under the old law and to advance the remedy provided by the amendment, Crowford Construction of Statutes, p. 619. 48. Examined in the light of the above, it may be recalled that under the principal Act (U.P. Act XIII of 1972) a public sector Corporation was placed at par with any other person. There was no special protection accorded to it. If the Corporation had let out a building to some one it had to take recourse to the provision of Section 20 in order to evict its tenant. There was no special protection accorded to it. If the Corporation had let out a building to some one it had to take recourse to the provision of Section 20 in order to evict its tenant. In case the corporation itself was the tenant then in that event the landlord could not evict the corporation without establishing one or more of the grounds u/s 20 or by having recourse to Section 21 of the Act. As a result of the amendment the corporation may sue to evict its tenant independently of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 by giving notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act. A landlord seeking to evict a corporation cannot resort to Section 21(1)(a) on ground of bona fide requirement. According to our interpretation discussed above, he cannot obtain eviction by mere u/s 106 Transfer of Property Act without proof of one of the grounds, u/s 20. We are, however, considering at this stage the alternative contingency as it may arise in case the above interpretation is in the reverse. Then in that case, the landlord shall be free to evict the corporation on mere notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act. It would come to this in such an event that the facility which the corporation as tenant enjoyed u/s 20 upto July 4, 1976 would have been taken away from the date following. Will this amount to depriving the tenant of any substantive right? The answer to this is in the negative. The point is not res integra. 49. In Kewal Singh Vs. Smt. Lajwanti, (1980) 1 SCC 290 , explaining the policy underlying the Rent Control Acts in general the Supreme Court observed, at page 393: Prior to the enactment of the rent control legislation in our country, the relationship of landlord and tenant was governed by our common law, viz. the Transfer of Property Act (Sections 107 - 111). The tenant was inducted with his tacit agreement to be regulated by the conditions embodied in the contract and could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement reached between him and the landlord during that period. The tenant was, therefore, bound in law to vacate the premises either voluntarily or through a suit after he was given a notice as required by the Transfer of Property Act under the terms tad conditions of the lease. The tenant was, therefore, bound in law to vacate the premises either voluntarily or through a suit after he was given a notice as required by the Transfer of Property Act under the terms tad conditions of the lease. However, as a piece of social reform in order to protect the tenants from capricious and frivolous eviction, the legislature stepped in and afforded special protection to the tenant by conferring on him the status of a statutory tenant who could not be evicted except under the conditions specified and the procedure prescribed by the Rent Control Acts. Thus to this extent, the agreement of lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act stood superseded. At the same time, the Rent Control Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on certain specified grounds like bona fide personal necessity or default in payment of rent, etc. Thus any right that the tenant possessed after the expiry of the lease was conferred on him only by virtue of the Rent Control Act. It is, therefore, manifest that if the legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certain rights or facilities on the tenants, it could due to changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even take away such rights or the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction and leave the tenants to seek their remedy under the common law. 50. Referring to this in Ravi Dutt Sharma Vs. Ratan Lal Bhargava, (1984) 2 SCC 75 , it was laid down that, "Tenants cannot complain of any discrimination because the Rent Act merely gave certain protection to them in public interest and if the protection or a part of it afforded by the Rent Act was withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under the Transfer of Property Act was still preserved, no genuine grievance could be made. This was clearly held in the case of Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, supra. This protection extended to the tenant is treated as procedural being in the nature of a facility not to vacate until one of the statutory grounds is made out. 51. More directly on the point of retrospectively is the decision of the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah Vs. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202 . In that case the Municipal Board was the landlord and had sued for possession. 51. More directly on the point of retrospectively is the decision of the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah Vs. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202 . In that case the Municipal Board was the landlord and had sued for possession. This was when the old Act (U.P. Act HI of 1947) was in force. There was dispute whether the instrument relied by the Appellant was a lease or licence. An additional ground was raised by the Respondent (Municipal Board) before the Supreme Court that even if the instrument be taken to be a lease, the Board was entitled to ejectment in view of the exemption granted under the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 which came into force on July 16, 1972 and in Section 2(a) whereof it was provided that nothing in the Act shall apply to any building belonging to or vested in the State Government or the Government of India or any local authority. Counsel for the Appellant contended that a right had accrued to him under the old Act which could not be taken away by rts repeal since the later Act was not in terms a retrospective) one. For the Respondent the argument was that the Appellant-Defendant had no right or privilege under The old Act since Section 3 thereof was only a procedural restriction and did not create a substantive right and that Section 3 was more a procedural disability that was cast, not a substantive cause of action that was created. 52. Upholding this contention for the Respondent, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Division Bench held that "the argument of any vested right in the Defendant being taken away does not hold good" and "that a disability of the Plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the Defendant." His Lordship in this connection cited with approval the following observation of Evershed M.R. in Bdddington v. Wission (1951) 1 All. E.R. 166: ...nor do I think that the tenant's protection under the regulation could be fairly described in the words of Sub-section (2) (c) as a 'right' or 'privilege' or the limitation of the landlord's right be fairly described as an 'obligation' or 'liability', nor do I think that it is a penalty or a punishment of respect of an offence within para (d), 53. Section 20 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is for practical purposes in this behalf analogous to Section 3 of the old Act. The authority of the Supreme Court cited above leaves no room to doubt that if the interpretation placed upon Section 2(1)(a)/Section 3(o) Act XIII of 1972 be in the reverse the tenants cannot complain that the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 deprives them of any substantive rights in so far as it (this we say on assumption) enables the landlord to sue for eviction without resort to the grounds of Section 20. 54. For the Respondents-landlords, however, a contention put forward is that if we hold that in terms of the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 they cannot secure eviction of a public sector corporation without recourse to one or more of the grounds specified in Section 20 of the principal Act, this would deprive them of a vested right. The argument has only to be stated to be rejected. In none of the references before us was the suit for eviction brought before July 5, 1976. The nearest in point of time is Civil Revision No. 1302 of 1982 wherein the suit instituted was on August 16, 1976. In all other cases the action was commenced during 1979-81. In no case had the decree obtained for eviction before the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 commenced. Since the Principal Act stood amended the action for eviction had to be in conformity with the requirements thereof. The Respondents cannot be heard to say that since they had let out the premises the law relating to eviction could not be amended to their disadvantage. The decision in Indira Sohanlal Vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and Others, AIR 1956 SC 77 , is authority for the proposition that no vested right to obtain a determination with the attribute of finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. Even if there be in law, any such right at all or the right to a determination with the attribute of finality, it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right. "It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right..." see also; Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 . In Bimla Devi Vs. "It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right..." see also; Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 . In Bimla Devi Vs. First Additional District Judge and Others, (1984) 2 SCC 582 , no doubt Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) which provided that "the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the remaining part thereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purpose, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bonafide required by the landlord" was held to confer a substantive right upon the landlord but this was not merely a right distinct in nature from the requirement to prove one or more of the grounds u/s 20 to secure eviction, another distinguishing feature of that case was that the eviction proceedings were pending before the Prescribed Authority when the 1972 Act was amended by the U.P. Act 28 of 1976 with effect from July 5, 1976. 55. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. There is well recognized distinction between an existing right and a vested right. Where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included. Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar Vs. Assaram Hiraman Patil and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1758 . There was a subsisting lease of certain agricultural land in that case. The Appellant gave notice to the Respondents under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 intimating that the Respondents' tenancy was to expire on the specified date and calling upon them to deliver possession of the land to him immediately thereafter. Before the notice could be effectively enforced the Act was amended. The effect of this amendment was that the tenancy of the Respondents, who were till then ordinary tenants as distinct from protected tenants, could not be terminated on the expiry of the tenancy, except by, giving one years' notice and that too on the ground that the land was required by the landlord for bonafide personal cultivation and that the income of the said land would be the main source of income of the landlord. It was, Observed that the Amending Act which was undoubtedly a piece of beneficent legislation conferred on the Respondents additional rights and these additional rights were conferred on them before the lease in their favour had come to an end. Distinguishing between an existing right and a vested right, the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Jivabhai Purshottam Vs. Chhagan Karson and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1491 , and the decision reported in (1911) 2 Ch. D. 1 at pages 11 and 12 laid down: Besides, it is necessary to bear in mind that the right of the Appellant to eject the Respondents would arise only on the termination of the tenancy, and in the present case it would have been available to him on March 31, 1953 if the statutory provision had not in the meanwhile extended the life of the tenancy. It is true that the Appellant gave notice to the Respondent! on March 11, 1952 as be was then no doubt entitled to do, but his right as a landlord to obtain possesssion did not accrue merely on the giving of the notice, it accrued in his favour on the date when the lease expired. It is only after the period specified in the notice is over and the tenancy has in fact expired that the landlord gets a right to eject the tenant and obtain possession of the land. Considered from this point of view, before the Tight accrued to the Appellant to eject the Respondents, Amending Act XXXIII of 1952 stepped in and deprived him of that right by requiring him to comply with the statutory requirement as to a valid notice which has: to be given for ejectment of tenants. 56. On account therefore of the statutory amendment brought by the U.P. Amendment Act, 1976 even before the tenancy in favour of the Petitioners was terminated, the Respondents cannot complain that they were deprived of accrued or vested rights. The amendment in effect regulates the existing rights between the parties and would govern the adjudication of dispute between them flowing from the lease and arising in the action commenced subsequent to July 5, 1976. 57. The amendment in effect regulates the existing rights between the parties and would govern the adjudication of dispute between them flowing from the lease and arising in the action commenced subsequent to July 5, 1976. 57. This brings us to the end of the journey and on r answer is as I follows: Civil Revision No. 1639 of 1979 Question No. (1)--Whether the view taken by this Court in 1980 Allahabad Rent Cases 144, 1980 Allahabad Weekly Cases 95 and in Civil Revision No. 712 of 1978 is correct? Answer: No. Question No. (2)--Whether the protection against eviction available to a tenant under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is not available when the tenant happens to be a public sector corporation? Answer: No. Civil Revision No. 79 of 1982 Question No. (l)--Whether Sections 2(1)(a) and 3(o) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 are retrospective in operation? Answer: Yes, Question No. (2)--Whether the bar of Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will affect a suit filed subsequent to the enforcement of U.P. Act 28 of 1976 regarding a building occupied by a tenant envisaged u/s 3(o) of the Act from before the said enforcement? Answer: Yes. 58. This shall govern all these connected references. 59. The papers may now be laid before the appropriate Bench as the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice directs.