JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Chandra Pal Singh against the judgment of the first Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur, dated 19-1-1981 dismissing his appeal preferred under Section 18 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holding Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The case has a long history which starts with the issuing of notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act to Vijay Pal Singh, Respondent 4, Vijay Pal Singh filed his objections to the notice. The objection was partly accepted, and by the order dated 25th November, 1976, the prescribed Authority found 24.60 acres of land as surplus with him. He made a declaration to that effect. Against that judgment, Appeal No. 38 of 1977 was filed by Vijay Pal Singh, whereas State of U.P. also filed an appeal. Both of these appeals were decided on 15.12.1977 by the VIth Additional District Judge and the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. The Additional District Judge remanded the case for a fresh decision to the Prescribed Authority. 3. After remand, on 1-6-1978, the petitioner Chandra Pal Singh applied for being impleaded in the proceedings on the ground of his claim as a Sirdar over two Plots nos. 102 and 126. He asserted that he had been in possession of these two plots since long and that by virtue of his possession, he had become a Sirdar. The petitioner had filed an application for impleadment and also an objection. 4. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on 29-6-1978, Against this order, the petitioner Chandra Pal Singh filed an appeal, being miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1978 in the court of the District Judge, Shahjahanpur, which was transferred to the court of the II Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur, and was dismissed on 23-8-1978 on the ground that an order refusing to implead was not appealable under Section 13. 5. The petitioner Chandra Pal Singh thereafter again applied to the Prescribed Authority for setting aside the previous order dated 25.11.1976 declaring surplus land, including plots 102 and 126 of village Hathore, district Shahjahanpur. He pleaded that he was not given any notice under Section 19 (2). He claimed that as he had no notice of the proceedings, the delay in filing the objections was liable to be condoned. 6. He pleaded that he was not given any notice under Section 19 (2). He claimed that as he had no notice of the proceedings, the delay in filing the objections was liable to be condoned. 6. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 16-11-1978. Against this order, the petitioner went up in appeal, being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 207 of 1978. The appeal was dismissed on 15-12-1979. After dismissal of the appeal the petitioner went to the Prescribed Authority and pressed his objection with regard to the aforesaid two plots. The objection was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on 31-3-1980. By this order, the Prescribed Authority, found that Vijay Pal Singh had 27.58 acres of land as surplus. Against this decision. Vijay Pal Singh, the tenure holder went up in appeal, which was numbered as 29 of 1981. It was partly, allowed, and the area of the land declared surplus was reduced to 24.60 acres. 7. As the objection of the petitioner Chandra Pal Singh with regard to the two plots, mentioned above, was also dismissed on merits by the Prescribed Authority on 31-3-1980, he preferred an appeal which was Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1980. The appeal was dismissed by the First Additional District Judge on 19-10-1981. 8. Being aggrieved by this order of the Additional District Judge and that of the Prescribed Authority dated 31-3-1980, the present writ petition has been filed by Chandra Pal Singh. 9. Before the High Court, the petitioners learned counsel urged that in Suit No. 140 under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the petitioner had been found to be a Sirdar under the decree dated 13-3-1975 and as in that suit Vijay Pal Singh and Gaon Sabha both were parties, the finding in the same was binding on them. The submission made further was that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to go behind the decree and to ignore the rights of the parties found established in the same by means of the impugned judgment dated 31-3-1980. On that basis, the learned counsel claimed that the First Additional District Judge wrongly held that the decree under section 229-B was not binding. 10. On that basis, the learned counsel claimed that the First Additional District Judge wrongly held that the decree under section 229-B was not binding. 10. Before coming to the decree passed in the aforesaid suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, it may be mentioned that the petitioners application for being impleaded as party had been rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 29-6-1978 on the ground that he had no interest involved in the case and that he could not be either impleaded or heard in support of the claim set up by him. This judgment of the Prescribed Authority became final. On becoming final of this judgment, the petitioner was completely excluded from putting forward the same claim by means of subsequent applications and objections. The rejection of the application of the petitioner on the ground that he was not entitled to be impleaded and heard in the case conclusively determined his locus standi. This finding was in relation to the merits of the case as well. This is res judicata and could not be permitted to be agitated afresh or again Even if Section 11 of the Code of Civil procedure does not apply in terms, the principle behind it has to be applied for the purpose of achieving finality of the litigation. As it had been found by the Prescribed Authority that the petitioner had no interest in the subject matter, he could not at the subsequent stage of the same proceedings file objections and be heard in support of it. The proceedings had commenced against Vijay Pal Singh by means of a notice under Section 10 (2) and continued on that basis subsequently. 11. It is true that even if the petitioner was not given notice, he could apply for being heard under Section 11 (2) of the Act. He could do also similarly under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. These two were not proceedings one after the other. They went by their nature together. The application of the petitioner for impleadment having been rejected not only on any technical ground but also on merits with a finding to the effect that the petitioner had no interest in the property, which was the subject matter of the notice under Section 10 (2) issued against Vijay Pal Singh, he could not take any other proceedings. 12. The application of the petitioner for impleadment having been rejected not only on any technical ground but also on merits with a finding to the effect that the petitioner had no interest in the property, which was the subject matter of the notice under Section 10 (2) issued against Vijay Pal Singh, he could not take any other proceedings. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as the District Judge, Shahjahanpur, by his order dated 15-12-1979 dismissed the petitioners appeal No. 207 of 1978, preferred against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated In-11-1978, had left the controversy open and had permitted him to file another objection, the present proceedings could not be dismissed on the ground, mentioned above. The learned District Judge had not given any conclusive opinion on this controversy. Whatever, he had observed was subject to the legal position as it detained in the instant case. Since res judicata did not permit filing of another objection, filing of the same was not maintainable. In fact, the present is a third, proceeding. The second was found to be not maintainable. 13. Learned counsel next contended that as the plea of res judicata had not been taken in the proceedings before the courts below, the counsel for Vijay Pal Singh should not be permitted to raise it in the present proceedings. The plea of res judicata is a matter of jurisdiction. Although not raised in the courts below, but nothing prohibits the said respondent to take up that plea in the High Court while defending the writ petition. 14. The judgment in Suit No. 140 filed under Section 229-B was found by the two authorities below, against whose decision the present writ petition has been filed, to as in applicable. Although not raised in the courts below, but nothing prohibits the said respondent to take up that plea in the High Court while defending the writ petition. 14. The judgment in Suit No. 140 filed under Section 229-B was found by the two authorities below, against whose decision the present writ petition has been filed, to as in applicable. One of the reasons was that Section 28-B of the Act allowed the courts now dealing with the question of ceiling against Vijay Pal Singh to ignore the said judgment and to decide the rights on the basis of the evidence lead by the parties independently of the same Section 38-B reads : "No finding or decision given before the commencement of this section in any proceeding or on any issue (including any order decree or judgment) by any other court, tribunal or authority in respect of any matter governed by this Act shall bar the re-trial of such proceeding or issue under this Act, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as amended from time to time." 15. The impugned judgment relied upon by the petitioner was given on 13-3-1975, whereas the Act by which Section 33-B was added came into force in October, 1976. This judgment, therefore, would be liable to be ignored under this provision, Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that this provision will apply only if anything decided before the enforcement of U.P., Act No. 20 of 1976 barred the retrial of such proceeding. He urged that to a judgment between the private parties. Section, 38-B did not apply. To this submission, I find myself unable to agree. By the decree, the area of land of Vijay Pal Singh would get reduced, and that would be to the disadvantage of the State Government. The judgment of the suit filed under Section 229-B is being relied upon for the purpose of barring the retrial of the issue of ownership of plots 102 and 126. By this judgment, the petitioner was found to be the owner of the same. If this issue is reopened in the present proceedings and these two plots are found to be that of Vijay Pal Singh, more surplus laud would become available. Accordingly, in terms. Section J & B did not apply. 16. By this judgment, the petitioner was found to be the owner of the same. If this issue is reopened in the present proceedings and these two plots are found to be that of Vijay Pal Singh, more surplus laud would become available. Accordingly, in terms. Section J & B did not apply. 16. Thereafter, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for petitioner on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ziley Singh v. State of U.P., (1978) A.L.J. 772). In this case, Section 38-B had not been cited before the learned Single Judge. 17. Furthermore, the proceedings of Suit No. 140 filed, under Section were ex parte. The prescribed Authority had found that the entries made in the revenue records on the basis of which aforesaid suit was decreed were fraudulent, having been obtained in collusion with the Lekhpal. This judgment was, therefore, ignored by the Prescribed Authority on this basis and also on consideration of the merits of the claim of the petitioner advanced in this case. Those merits being that he had acquired Sirdari rights by virtue of adverse possession. The Prescribed Authority found that he did not acquire any rights on the date of the decision of the aforesaid suit and the declaration made to that effect by the court being ex parte and on the basis of fraudulent revenue entries was liable to be ignored. This finding has been endorsed by the learned Additional District Judge. He also considered the case of the parties on merits. This finding arrived at was a finding of fact. Accordingly, the decree of Suit No. 140 filed under Section 229-B was rightly ignored by the two authorities below, and the petitioner was rightly held to have no interest on the basis of adverse possession claimed by him. 18. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.