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1984 DIGILAW 1018 (ALL)

Paras Nath Singh v. D. D. C.

1984-11-30

K.N.MISRA

body1984
JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J. - The dispute in the present writ petition relates to land of Khata No. 24 situated in village Itaura, Pargana Birhar, Tahsil Tanda, District Faizabad, which was recorded in the basic year Khatauni in the name of Paras Nath Singh and Adya Prasad Singh, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. The opposite parties No. 2 to 4, namely, Hari Mohan and Narvadeshwar, sons of Bahadur Singh, and one Ran Vijai Singh, deceased, husband of Smt Panmati filed an objection claiming that the names of the petitioners are fictitiously recorded and their names be expunged and that the names of the objectors be recorded as tenureholders over the land of the disputed holding The said objectors had claimed half share in the disputed holding and they asserted that the remaining half share belongs to Gulab Singh. The case was contested by the petitioners No. 1 to 5 and they asserted that they are the tenureholders of the land in dispute and the objection filed by the objectors be rejected. After taking evidence of the parties the Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 29.2.1980, rejected the objection of the objectors excepting for plot No. 271. It was, thus, ordered that the names o the objectors, namely, Hari Mohan and Narvadeshwar and that of Ran Vijai Singh be recorded over plot No. 271 after expunging the names of the petitioners over the said plot. The entries in the name of recorded tenureholders in respect of other plots was maintained. Two appeals were filed one by the petitioners challenging the order passed by the Consolidation Officer so far as it related to plot No. 271; and the other appeal was filed by the contesting opposite parties No. 2 to 4. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide order dated 18.2.1982, dismissed both appeals and maintained the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer. Thereupon two revisions were filed; one by the petitioners; and the other by opposite parties No. 2 to 4. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation, after hearing the parties, allowed the revision filed by the petitioners, vide order dated 8.11.1983, and dismissed the revision filed by opposite parties No. 2 to 4. Thus, the claim of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 was dismissed in toto. A certified copy of the said order has been annexed as Annexure No. 2. Thus, the claim of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 was dismissed in toto. A certified copy of the said order has been annexed as Annexure No. 2. An application was moved on behalf of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 on 9.11.1983 for recalling the said order dated 8.11.1983. The ground urged in the said application, inter alia, was that certain material documentary evidence, which was filed by the opposite parties before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation concerning the land in dispute and regarding earlier litigation, were not taken into consideration while deciding the revision. It was further asserted that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, before whom the said documentary evidence was filed, had also not adverted to the said documents and without taking into consideration those material documents the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, had decided the appeals. The learned Deputy Director of Consolidation after hearing the parties allowed this application dated 9.11.1983 and recalled the earlier order dated 8.11.1983 and fixed the revision for hearing on merits. It was observed by the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation that the documentary evidence which was filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, was inadvertently not considered by him while deciding the revisions. This mistake on the part of the court, which was pointed out by the opposite parties in their application dated 9.11.1983 was, thus, apparently accepted and the order dated 8.11.1983 which was passed without considering the material documentary evidence on record, was recalled by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Aggrieved by this order, a certified copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. 5, the petitioners have come up to this Court. 2 Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri H. S. Sahai, vehemently urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally and without jurisdiction in entertaining the review application filed by the opposite parties No. 2 to 4, and in recalling the order dated 8.11.1983, which he had passed on merits in the revisions preferred by the parties. His contention was that the Deputy Director of Consolidation possessed no jurisdiction to entertain review application under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short 'the Act'). Thus, according to him, the order dated 18.1.1984 is per se without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon decisions of this court in: (1) Qadam Singh and another Vs. Thus, according to him, the order dated 18.1.1984 is per se without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon decisions of this court in: (1) Qadam Singh and another Vs. Ganga Saran and Ram Saran ( 1960 RD 347 ). (2) Mata Prasad Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others (1972 RD 9) (3) Ram Pratap Singh and another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1977AWC73) (4) Patel Narshi Thakershi and others Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, ( AIR 1970 SC 1273 ). 3. It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Qadam Singh's ease (Supra) that Section 220 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 confers the power to review its own decision and it is not possible for the High Court to hold that under Section 220 read with Section 41 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act a power to review its own decision is conferred upon all the Deputy Directors of Consolidation. Section 48 of the Act confers upon a Deputy Director of Consolidation the powers to pass such orders as he thinks proper but having once passed such orders, it does not expressly, nor by implication confer upon him the power to set aside his earlier order and pass another order in its place. 4. In Patel Narshi Thakershi's case (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. In Mata prasad's case (Supra), U. S. Srivastava, J. referring to aforesaid Supreme Court decision observed that: It cannot be disputed that the power to review must be found within the statute itself and in the absence of any provision to that effect in that statute, no authority has got power to review its own order. As held by the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi Vs. Pradyuman Singhji there is no inherent power in a court to review its own order. Hence the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation reviewing his order was completely beyond his jurisdiction. 5. The Division Bench decision in Srimati lachmana alias Hubraja Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P., Lucknow (1966 RD 419) was held to be no longer a good law in view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation reviewing his order was completely beyond his jurisdiction. 5. The Division Bench decision in Srimati lachmana alias Hubraja Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P., Lucknow (1966 RD 419) was held to be no longer a good law in view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Division Bench in Srimati Lachmana's case (Supra) had drawn a distinction between the statutory power of review and the inherent power of review and it was held that every court had got inherent power of reviewing its own order if it deserves to be recalled on the facts and circumstances of the case. But in view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was observed that the power of review is not a inherent power and it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was quashed in the aforesaid case as it was found that when the review application was allowed, the decision already became final between the parties as it was not interfered with by this Court in extraordinary jurisdiction of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, and, as such, certain vested rights accrued to the parties, and so it was considered to be wholly against all canons of justice to unsettle that position by the illegal order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation reviewing the final order passed in the revision. 6. In the abovereferred decision it has been held that no Court can be said to be vested with an inherent power to review any final judgment or order passed in a case unless the power of review is conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. 7. In Debi Prasad and others Vs. Khelawan and others ((AIR 1957 Allahabad 67) the Division Bench of this Court has, however, enumerated under what circumstances the Court can review and vary its own order. In Para 16 of the report, the aforesaid rule is said to be subject to undernoted qualifications: 1. 7. In Debi Prasad and others Vs. Khelawan and others ((AIR 1957 Allahabad 67) the Division Bench of this Court has, however, enumerated under what circumstances the Court can review and vary its own order. In Para 16 of the report, the aforesaid rule is said to be subject to undernoted qualifications: 1. Until a judgment or order has been delivered and signed there is inherent in every Court the power to vary its own orders so as to carry out what was intended and to render the language free from doubt, or even lo withdraw the order so that the decision may be recognizedHalsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) Vol. 19, p. 261; 'Lawries v. Lees' (1881) 7 AC (35) (G). 2. After the judgment or order has been entered or drawn up or signed, there is power both under S. 152, Civil PC and inherent in the Judge who gave or made the judgment or order to correct any clerical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission so as to do substantial justice and give effect to his meaning and intention (1881) 7 AC 19 (G). 3. If an order or judgment has been made or judgment entered without notice to a party when that party had the right to be heard, the Court or Judge may set it aside. The Bolivier 19162AC 203 (H); Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Fd). Vol. 19 p. 262. 4. If an order has been signed by inadvertence or failure of memory when it was intended that it should not be signed at that stage, the Court or Judge may recall the orderJai Karan V. Panchaiti Akhara, Chhota Naya Udasi Nanak Sahai, AIR 1933 Allh. 49 (I). 5. Where a decree has been passed against a dead person, the order may be vacated and the case reheardDebi Bux Singh v. Habib Shah, ILR 35 Allh 331 (PC) (J). The same rule applies to an order passed against a company which has already been dissolved or which was nonexistentLazard Brothers & Co. v. Baraque Industrielle de Moscou 19321 KB 617 (624) (K) SC on appeal Lazard Brothers & Co. v. Midland Bank Ltd. 1933 AC 289 (296) (L). 6. A court has larger power of modifying or setting aside interlocutory orders than it has in respect of final orders. v. Baraque Industrielle de Moscou 19321 KB 617 (624) (K) SC on appeal Lazard Brothers & Co. v. Midland Bank Ltd. 1933 AC 289 (296) (L). 6. A court has larger power of modifying or setting aside interlocutory orders than it has in respect of final orders. Thus an order for sale of unsaleable property may be set asideTafazzul Husain Khan v. Raghoonath Prasad; 14 Moo Ind Appeal 40 (PC)(M). 8. There can, thus, be no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions that unless authorised by statute, the Court or Judge, except in aforesaid matters, has no inherent power to set aside or modify any final order once made, merely because it is wrong. There is no provision contained in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act conferring power of review, except in matters covered by Section 42A of the Act, and, as such, the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be taken to be vested with the power of review under the said statute. In the absence of any statutory provisions contained in the Act conferring power of review on the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it cannot recall an order passed on merits in purported exercise of inherent power of recall a wrong order because the power of review is not an inherent power as held in Patel's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It may, however, be mentioned that if the case falls in one or the other ground stated in Debi Prasad's case (Supra) (AIR 1957 Allh. 67), which have been referred to above, and also in those cases as well where the order suffers from an apparent error occurring in the judgment due to own mistake of the court, the error or mistake in the judgment and order can be corrected by it, even if there is no express statutory power of review, on the maximActus curiae neminem gravabit, i.e. act of court should do no harm to litigant. If the mistake is due to the error on the part of the court itself while rendering judgment, it can be rectified by the court on the said well recognized maxim judicially noticed. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jang Singh Vs. If the mistake is due to the error on the part of the court itself while rendering judgment, it can be rectified by the court on the said well recognized maxim judicially noticed. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jang Singh Vs. Brij Lal and others ( AIR 1966 SC 1631 ) that: There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up on the maxim Actus curiae neminem gravabit. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri H.S. Sahai, had, however, urged that the present case does not fall in the aforesaid category of cases. He, thus, urged that since the Deputy Director of Consolidation had no power of review, and, as such the order dated 18.1.1984, by which he has recalled the order dated 8.11.1983 deserves to be quashed being without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, Sri S.K. Mehrotra, however, urged that even if the order dated 18.1.1984 be technically taken to have been passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in excess of jurisdiction vested in him, but since it is quite proper, equitable and just order, and, as such, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not issue a writ for setting aside that order. His contention was that even in those cases where the Court is found to have acted in excess of its jurisdiction, but the order is quite proper, equitable and just, and it does not bring about a gross miscarriage of justice, it would not call for interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Parahu and others Vs. In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Parahu and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., at Gorakhpur & others (1964 All law Journal 240) wherein it was held that where in a revision the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted in excess of jurisdiction vested in him under Sec. 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, but his order was proper, equitable and a just order, the High Court should not issue a writ for setting aside an equitable order. It was also laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman & Raman Ltd ( 1952 SCR 583 ) that: Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to iisue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice (Emphasis Supplied) 10. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. District Judge, Unnao and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1401 ) the Hon'bJe Supreme Court has again reiterated the view that: Article 227 or Art. 226 was devised to advance justice and not to thwart it. 11. In Balkaran and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1982 RD, Summary of Cases, 26), wherein I had the occasion of considering the question at hand, and I had expressed the view that, no doubt the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not possessed of any power of review under Section 48 of the Act nor he has got inherent jurisdiction of review. But since in the instant case the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to be just and proper order, I do not think it to be proper to interfere with that order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution because by setting aside the impugned order the earlier order dated 31st August, 1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation would be restored, which, in my opinion, was not a just and proper order. In Kundan Kishanlal Vs. In Kundan Kishanlal Vs. Board of Revenue, U. P. at Allahabad and others (AIR 1972 Allahabad 184) R.L. Gulati, J. in para 5 of the report has observed that: In the end, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to show any injustice having been done to him. This Court will not interfere when the petitioner merely relies on technicalities and does not show any injustice. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the Court will be hesitant to grant a relief under that Article to a petitioner when it finds that substantial justice has been done between the parties. 12. Thus, in view of the above, the question still remains is whether, even though the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation reviewing its earlier order suffers from wrong exercise of jurisdiction of review which he did not possess, this Court should interfere in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution or not in the instant case. Even if an order passed by the Court suffers from error of lack of jurisdiction in passing the order this Court will not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution if substantial justice has been done and the order has not resulted in manifest injustice. If the order is preeminently just and correct, this Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution is meant to advance justice and not to thwart it. It cannot be exercised to impose a wrong order by setting aside an order which is preeminently just and proper. 13. In the present case the Deputy Director of Consolidation has observed in the impugned order dated 18.1.1984 that certain material documents which were filed by the revisionist before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation and which were on record, have been completely omitted to be considered by him while deciding the revision by order dated 8.11.1983. The judicial fallibility committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing order dated 8.11.1983 has been accepted by him in the impugned order dated 18.1.1984, and it, thus, appears to me that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has corrected its own error by recalling the order dated 8.11.1983. The judicial fallibility committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing order dated 8.11.1983 has been accepted by him in the impugned order dated 18.1.1984, and it, thus, appears to me that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has corrected its own error by recalling the order dated 8.11.1983. Ordinarily where the court is possessed with the power of review, it can exercise jurisdiction in recalling the order on the ground that material documents have not been taken into consideration while deciding the case. In Ram Surat and others Vs. Shitla Prasad (AIR 1978 Allahabad 270), after considering several decisions on the point, M.P. Mehrotra, J. held that where an important piece of evidence showing the existence of the right of passage over the suit land was missed to be considered, review was maintainable. The judgment initially made was held rightly reversed. It was observed that: How and in what manner the said piece of evidence would have been considered by the lower appellate court in conjunction with other pieces of evidence on record is a matter on which no opinion was passed by the said court and I too cannot pass any opinion on the same. It was, however, felt by the said court that the said piece of evidence was an important one and was bound to be considered by the court while deciding the claim of the defendants to the right of passage. Thus there was an error apparent on the face of the record which justified a review under 0.47, R. 1 CPC I feel that the lower appellate Court was, in the circumstances, justified in setting aside the judgment on the said ground. 14. Although the aforesaid decision considered the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil PC but this case has been referred here to indicate that where material documents have not been considered by the court while deciding the case, the court can review, the order on said ground in exercise of power of review, if possessed by it. It has also been consistently held by this Court that where an appellate or revisional consolidation court has not applied its mind on every piece of material evidence on record, both oral and documentary, led by the parties, the order cannot be sustained (See Kaluram and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi and others, 1982 (1) Revenue Reporter 93). It has also been consistently held by this Court that where an appellate or revisional consolidation court has not applied its mind on every piece of material evidence on record, both oral and documentary, led by the parties, the order cannot be sustained (See Kaluram and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi and others, 1982 (1) Revenue Reporter 93). The Deputy Director of Consolidation, being the last court of fact, should analyse each and every aspect of the case and should consider all admissible evidence on record while deciding the revision on merits. If material evidence on record, which is relevant for determining the fact in issue has been blatantly ignored, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation would not be sustained and no time would be taken in quashing that order by this Court on being approached by the aggrieved party invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. In the present case the order dated 8.11.1983 was apparently an erroneous order as material evidence on record was not taken into consideration by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding the revision on merits. The contesting opposite parties had filed documentary evidence before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation to prove their title in the land in dispute. Those documents were of the earlier litigation in respect of the land in dispute, finally determining the claims of the parties thereto. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation omitted to consider those documents and in the memo of revision a plea was specifically raised on behalf of the revisionistopposite parties No. 2 to 4 regarding omission of consideration of those documents by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation while deciding the appeal. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, should have taken into consideration those documents while disposing the revision on merits. He omitted to consider the same and corrected this judicial fallibility in the order dated 18.1.1984 by which he recalled the order dated 8.11.1983 and directed the revision to be listed for hearing afresh on merits. It is well settled that where an important piece of evidence in respect of the claim of title setup by the parties in respect of the land in dispute was omitted from being considered, the judgment and order deserved to be setaside, being vitiated in law and facts of the case. 16. It is well settled that where an important piece of evidence in respect of the claim of title setup by the parties in respect of the land in dispute was omitted from being considered, the judgment and order deserved to be setaside, being vitiated in law and facts of the case. 16. It is, no doubt, correct to say that if the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is one of affirmance, having been passed after hearing both the parties, it would not stand vitiated merely on the ground that the entire evidence led by the parties has not been referred to and discussed in the order. If the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding the revision and passing the order of affirmance has generally agreed with the findings recorded by the subordinate consolidation authorities, then the order would not stand vitiated on the ground that any particular evidence has not been referred by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in his order. But where any particular relevant evidence material for the decision of the point in issue has not been taken into consideration by the subordinate consolidation authorities, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is a court of fact as well, should take into consideration that evidence while passing even an order of affirmance generally agreeing with the findings recorded by the subordinate consolidation authorities. 17. In the present case the above referred relevant documentary evidence was filed by the opposite parties No. 2 to 4 before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. He had omitted to consider those material documents. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, thus, should have taken into consideration those documents while deciding the revision on merits. Thus, although the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the present case was that of affirmance, the same stood vitiated on account of nonconsideration of the material evidence on record which was not considered by the lower appellate court. It, thus, deserved to be set aside. 18. The opposite parties No. 2 to 4 instead of approaching this Court for quashing the said order applied for recalling that order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who on accepting the judicial fallibility in his order regarding nonconsideration of the said material documentary evidence on record, recalled the same and directed the revision to be heard afresh on merits. The opposite parties No. 2 to 4 instead of approaching this Court for quashing the said order applied for recalling that order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who on accepting the judicial fallibility in his order regarding nonconsideration of the said material documentary evidence on record, recalled the same and directed the revision to be heard afresh on merits. Since the order dated 8111983 was manifestly erroneous and wrong and deserved to be set aside, I find that the impugned order dated 1811984 has not resulted in miscarriage of justice in the present case. 19. In view of the above, I find that the impugned order dated 1811984 is eminently just and proper and the only thing that can be urged against it is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation lacked jurisdiction to pass such order. It is, thus, to be seen whether this Court should interfere, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, with the impugned order dated 1811984 which is evidently proper, equitable and a just order. 20. In the present, case, I find that grave injustice was apparently caused by blatantly ignoring the material evidence on record by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing the order dated 8111983, and, as such, that order could not be sustained and it would have taken no time in quashing that order by this Court if the opposite parties No. 2 to 4 would have invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing that order. So, if that order which deserved to be quashed, has been recalled by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by order dated 1811984, admitting the judicial fallibility, I am of the opinion that it would not be proper to quash that order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and restore the said wrong and illegal order dated 8111983 which, as already mentioned above, deserved to be quashed. I, thus, find that no interference should be made with the impugned order dated 1811984, which is quite just and proper order although the Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to review its own order. I, thus, find that no interference should be made with the impugned order dated 1811984, which is quite just and proper order although the Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to review its own order. In my opinion, grave injustice would be caused in this case if by adopting a rigid and inflexible view of jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding his power of review the impugned order dated 1811984 is quashed and the order dated 8111983 which is evidently wrong and illegal order is restored. 21. It is, no doubt, correct to say that any order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and deserves to be quashed. But if as a result of quashing that order another wrong and illegal order would be restored, this Court would refuse to interfere with the impugned order which appears to be quite proper, equitable and just order. As mentioned above, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is devised to advance justice and not to thwart it. To me it appears to be well settled that an order which is illegal cannot be quashed or set aside in writ jurisdiction if quashing of it results to bringing on record another illegal order. 22. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that no case is made out for interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case I find that the impugned order dated 1811984 is quite just and proper order and its quashing would result in restoring the order which is evidently wrong and illegal. I, therefore, do not find it to be a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 23. In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs. (Petition dismissed)