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Allahabad High Court · body

1984 DIGILAW 1020 (ALL)

Jeevan Singh v. State of U. P

1984-11-30

J.N.DUBEY, R.M.SAHAI

body1984
JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Various Bhutnidhars and Sirdars whose land was situated in an area which was proposed to be acquired by the Kanpur Municipal Board as far back as 1945 have come to this Court against acquisition and award of compensation. It is claimed that the scheme having been originally notified in 1951 and the award having been given in 1963 the exercise of power was colourable, therefore, the entire scheme and acquisition proceedings should be quashed. It is also claimed that action of the opposite parties is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, The other attack is based on certain averments in the counter affidavit to the effect that the land under the Scheme has been acquired and constructions have already been raised. It is urged that as the purpose for which land was acquired, namely, for town expansion scheme and the same having been achieved by construction of Thermal Power Station etc., the land over which the petitioners are in possession should not be taken over now as that obviously is not needed by the opposite parties. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to mention that Chapter VII of the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act, 1945 (Act No. VI of 1945) provided for development schemes. Section 41 of the Act provided for various development schemes. Town-expansion was one of them. Section 49 permitted the Board to frame a town expansion scheme if it was of opinion that it was expedient to curtail and provide for the future expansion of the existing urban area. In 1958 notice was given under section 53 of the Act that the Board had framed a scheme known as Kalyanpur Panki and Green Belt Scheme No. 40. It mentioned boundaries and invited objections within sixty days. It was also mentioned that particulars of scheme and map of the area comprised in the scheme could be seen at the office of the Board. Notice under sub-section (i) of section 60 of the Act sanctioning the scheme and notifying that it came into force from the date of notification was given on 13th December, 1956, In July, 1959 another notification was issued under section 53 amending the earlier notification issued in 1951 and 1956. Fresh objections were invited. Notification under section 60 of the amended scheme was issued in July, 1959. Fresh objections were invited. Notification under section 60 of the amended scheme was issued in July, 1959. According to petitioners, first notification was issued in October, 1951 under section 53 which is equivalent to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was followed by another notification in December, 1956 under section 60 of the Act which is equivalent to section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The third notification was issued in December. 1959 under section 53 of the Act amending original scheme as notified in 1951 and this amendment was finalised in 1960 and a notification to this effect was also issued. The award was made in 1968._ The question is whether the scheme which was notified originally in 1951 and the award of which was made in 1968, i.e. after a delay of nearly 17 years, can be said to be in accordance with law. Reliance has been placed on P. Appalamurthy v. State of Andh. Pra. AIR 1981 Andh Pra 278 Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana AIR 1982 Punj and Har 519 (FB) and Smt. Ranjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 Punj and Har 332. These decisions lay down that if there is inordinate delay between issue of notification under section 4 and the date of award then the action of opposite parties unless satisfactorily explained gives rise to an inference that exercise of power was colourable. In Doctors' Sahkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. Agra, v. Avas Avam Vikash Parishad, Lucknow AIR 1984 All 234 a Full Bench of this court was also seized of similar matter. The Bench accepted the principle that if there was inordinate delay and the delay was not satisfactorily explained then the notifications for acquisition were liable to be quashed but on fact the Full Bench was satisfied that the delay had been satisfactorily explained. It is not necessary to consider the legal question which appears to be well settled except the factual aspect of it whether the opposite parties have been able to explain the delay so as to save the acquisition proceedings initiated in 1951. According to the counter affidavit the notification in .1951 was only a town expansion controlling scheme. It is claimed that it was not a notification under section 4 of the Act. According to the counter affidavit the notification in .1951 was only a town expansion controlling scheme. It is claimed that it was not a notification under section 4 of the Act. Although prima facie it does not appear that the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act contemplated any scheme to be known as the Controlling Scheme for which a notification could be issued under section 53 of the Act. At the same time the learned counsel has pointed out that compensation has been given to petitioners on the basis of notification issued in 1959. In other words the opposite parties have taken 1959 notification as date of notification under section 53 of the Act. As petitioners are being given compensation for acquisition of their land in 1959 the notification issued in 1951 can be conveniently ignored. Moreover, even assuming that a notification was issued in 1951 it admittedly having been amended in 1959 it is the amended notification which has to be taken into account specially when the compensation has been determined from this date. In counter-affidavit it has been stated that delay was caused as acquisition was approximately of 5000 acres and there was political pressure. It is true that opposite parties cannot be granted any benefit if they did not finalise the matters due to political pressure but it is also stated that various awards for area under acquisition were made in 1961. 1962, and 1963 as well. From copy of the award No. 42 dated 31st December, 1868 which relates to petitioner it is apparent that it was registered in 1961 but the award was given in 1968. It cannot, therefore, be said that opposite parties were delaying deliberately and were sleeping over the matter so as to give rise to an inference that the exercise of power was colourable. 3. Now, is there any merit in submission that mandatory requirements of publishing notice etc. as contemplated in section 53 having not been complied the notification issued in 1951 was bad. It has already been seen that the notification under section 53 which resulted in acquisition was issued in 1959. It is not claimed that it suffered from these infirmities. 4. Although acquisition proceedings have been mainly challenged on colourable exercise of power but after going through the various provisions of the Act it appears that the determination of compensation in the award cannot be upheld. It is not claimed that it suffered from these infirmities. 4. Although acquisition proceedings have been mainly challenged on colourable exercise of power but after going through the various provisions of the Act it appears that the determination of compensation in the award cannot be upheld. Although petitioners have not claimed any relief but it being apparent can be granted in the general relief claimed by petitioners. Section 14 of the Schedule appended to the Act reads as under : "14. New section 48-A. After section 48 the following shall be deemed to be inserted, namely "48A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within two years - (1) If within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 in respect of any land, the Collector has not made an award under section 11, with respect to such land, the owner of the land shall, unless he has been to a material extent responsible for the delay, be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by him in consequence of the delay. (2) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section." A perusal of this section indicates that it was contemplated that the award should be made within two years of the declaration under section 6 analogous to section 60 of Cawnpore Act was of any land and if it is not made then the person whose land was to be acquired was entitled to be compensated. How will the compensation be determined is mentioned in sub-section (2) of the Act as admittedly notification under section 6/60 of the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act was issued in 1960 and the award was made in 1968 the petitioners were entitled to be compensated in accordance with the section mentioned above. 5. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioners were also entitled to compensation under sub-section (4) of section 40 does not appear to be correct. This compensation was allowable only if a person has sought permission to erect, re- erect, add to or alter any building after a scheme had been notified under section 60 of the Act but the same was refused and the land was not acquired within one year from the date of such refusal. This compensation was allowable only if a person has sought permission to erect, re- erect, add to or alter any building after a scheme had been notified under section 60 of the Act but the same was refused and the land was not acquired within one year from the date of such refusal. As petitioners have not laid any foundation if any application was made on their behalf which was rejected they obviously are not covered by this clause. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the scheme for which the land was being utilised has been achieved and necessary constructions have been raised, therefore, the petitioner's land should not be acquired now cannot be accepted. According to petitioners, they are continuing in possession whereas according to opposite parties possession was taken over as far back as in 1976. In support of their claim petitioners have filed certain extracts of khasra and Khatauni. The acquisition of petitioners' land is a question of fact which cannot be adjudicated upon in writ petition. The petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to any relief on this score. 7. In the result, these petitions succeed and are allowed in part. The notifications issued under sections 53 and 60 are upheld. Opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4, Special Land Acquisition Officer and the Collector are directed to determine compensation of petitioners in accordance with section 14 of the Schedule of the Act. In view of divided success the parties shall bear their own costs. In case petitioners are in possession they shall not be dispossessed unless compensation as directed has been prepared.