JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---The petitioners, that is, Simonds Marshal Ltd. are carrying on business of manufacturing and selling a product known as 'Nyloc self-locking nut', (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners' product). Initially from year 1971 to 1975 i.e. till the tarrif item 68 was introduced, the petitioners were paying the duty at the rate specified in Tariff Item 52. The Tariff Item 68 was introduced on 1st of April, 1975. Thereafter correspondence took place between the petitioners and the Excise Authorities on the question of classification of the said petitioners' product vide order dated 17th of June, 1976 the Authorities held that the petitioners' product was rightly classified under T.I. 52. Against this order the petitioners filed an appeal to the Appellate Collector. The Appellate Collector vide his order dated 23rd of August, 1976 allowed the appeal filed by the petitioners and held that the petitioners were liable to pay duty at the rate specified in T.I. 68 and not T.I. 52. On that basis the petitioners paid duty and were allowed to clear the product. On 15th of June, 1977 a show cause notice was issued by the Central Government under section 36(2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1844. The petitioners submitted their reply to the said show cause notice and also forwarded various enclosures, including the Certificates from dealers, consumers and consultants etc. An opportunity of being heard was also given to the petitioners and vide order dated 31st of March, 1978 the Central Government came to the conclusion that the product of the petitioners squarely falls under T.I. 52 and, therefore, the petitioners were directed to pay tax accordingly. Vide order dated 25th of April, 1978 the applications filed by the petitioners for refund of tax for the period from June 1971 to June 1976 and July 1976 to May 1977 were also rejected. The petitioners then submitted a new classification list under T.I. 52 obviously under protest. A notice for short levy of the tax and claiming an amount of Rs. 4,79,728.50 by way of difference of the duty for the period from 27th May, 1977 to 18th April, 1978 was also served on the petitioners. The petitioners by their reply dated 24th April, 1978 opposed the said notice. A notice for short levy of the tax and claiming an amount of Rs. 4,79,728.50 by way of difference of the duty for the period from 27th May, 1977 to 18th April, 1978 was also served on the petitioners. The petitioners by their reply dated 24th April, 1978 opposed the said notice. Ultimately present writ petition came to be filed in July 1978 challenging the order passed by the Central Government classifying the petitioners' product under T.I. 52. The petitioners have also prayed for consequential reliefs including the refund of duty already paid. 2. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench of this Court i.e. Masodkar Kanade, JJ. on 24-2-1981 this Court passed an interim order calling for a finding. Para 3 of the said order reads as under :--- "We have gone through the record of the case with the assistance of the learned Counsel on both sides. As far as the return is concerned, to say the least, it makes cryptic statements with regard to the product in issue. In fact, it does not explain the trade notices right from 1971 to 1977. The impugned order made by the Government of India merely states that the trade notice does not support the view that the type of nuts manufactured by the party would be outside the scope of Entry No. 52. No reasons are available in the order itself. In fact the impugned order does not record a finding as to whether this type of product is known to the commercial world as a nut or not. Unless such a finding is recorded, it will be difficult to uphold the classification one way or the other. In want of sufficient material on record, we think the ends of justice will be met by directing the Government of India, which made the order produced at Ex. L on March 31, 1978, to hear the petitioners and the department and thereafter make an appropriate order recording a finding as to whether such a product manufactured by the petitioners is known in the commercial world as a nut or as any other product. If any evidence is tendered by either the petitioners or the department on this aspect, the Government of India will take the same into account before recording a finding one way or the other. If any evidence is tendered by either the petitioners or the department on this aspect, the Government of India will take the same into account before recording a finding one way or the other. The finding shall be certified to this Court in the present petition within a period of three months. There parties are at liberty to apply." After this order was passed the petitioners received a letter from the Collector furnishing some documents on which reliance was placed by Central Government for the classification of the petitioners' product. The petitioners submitted their reply together with the relevant evidence. The petitioners were also granted personal hearing by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India when the petitioners furnished further certificates. After appreciating all the evidence on record the Government of India vide order dated 9th September, 1981 came to the conclusion that the product of the petitioners squarely falls under T.I. 52. As a result of this finding the petitioners amended the petition. Thus in the present writ petition initial order as well as second order dated 9-9-1981 are challenged on various grounds. 3. Shri Bhaba the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended before us that on the true construction of Item 52, an Article which is exclusively a fastener and which has no other functional utility alone can fall under Item 52. This position has been made amply clear by the Trade Notice issued by the Competent Authority dated 6th August, 1971 and the said notice could safely be described as contemporaneous exposition of the trade meaning of the said entry. In support of this contention Shri Bhaba has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922, (K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam another)1. According to the learned Counsel the petitioners' product has other functional utility and this position has been accepted by the Government of India in its orders. To prove this the petitioners have also produced overwhelming evidence. The test laid down in the Trade Notice dated 6th August, 1971 is also reiterated in other nine Trade Notice issued by the Competent Authorities from time to time. This test has been applied by the Central Government in the case of Gurumukh Singh as well as in the case reported in 1982 E.L.T. 531 Government of India (Revision Case) (In Re Sohadar Sovil Dunken Ltd.)2. This test has been applied by the Central Government in the case of Gurumukh Singh as well as in the case reported in 1982 E.L.T. 531 Government of India (Revision Case) (In Re Sohadar Sovil Dunken Ltd.)2. This test has also been applied by the Appellate Collector in M/s. Pioneer Iron Brassworks' case and in the case reported in 1979 Cencus 131 in (M/s. Western Cold Field Ltd.)3. According to the learned Counsel these Trade Notices have been issued by the Competent Authorities and are, therefore, binding upon the Government of India. In support of this proposition the petitioners have placed reliance upon the decision reported in 1980 E.L.T. 6 (Bom.) (Guest Keen Williams Ltd. v. Union of India and others)4, and 1980 E.L.T. 133 (Bom.) (Star Chemicals (Bombay) Ltd. v. Union of India others)5. It is further contended by Shri Bhaba that if the order passed by the Appellate Collector in the petitioners' case was in conformity with these Trade Notices and, therefore, was perfectly legal and valid, then the subsequent orders passed by the Government of India are wholly vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record and, therefore, are liable to be quashed. 4. It was also contended by Shri Bhaba that it is by now well settled that the articles referred to in an entry of the Schedule to the Excise Act have to be understood in the popular sense, that is to say, in the sense in which the articles are understood by those dealing in them. In support of this position he has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 1981 E.L.T. 325 (S.C.) (Indo International Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.)6, as well as the decision of this Court in 7 Bom. Law Reporter 534. (R.R. Syiem v. P.S. Lulla)7. According to the learned Counsel even in the I.T.C. schedule nyloc self-locking nuts are separately shown from nuts and thus it is clear that according to the trade understanding Nyloc self locking nuts are not nuts. This position is further clear from the voluminous evidence produced by the petitioners. This position is also accepted in the draw back scheme of the Government of India wherein also nuts are treated differently from Nyloc-self locking nuts. The Sectional Committee of the ISI consists of eminent persons in trade, industry and the Government as also consumers and others. This position is further clear from the voluminous evidence produced by the petitioners. This position is also accepted in the draw back scheme of the Government of India wherein also nuts are treated differently from Nyloc-self locking nuts. The Sectional Committee of the ISI consists of eminent persons in trade, industry and the Government as also consumers and others. The Supreme Court has stated that the view of the ISI as regards what a product is known in the trade should be accepted. In support of this proposition he has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in 1960 ELT 468 (Mad.) (M/s. Parry Confectionery Ltd. Madras v. Government of India and others)8, and 1977 ELT 199 (Union of India others v. Delhi Cloth Gen. Mills Co. Ltd. others)9. He has also placed reliance on IS 1367 and 7002 and contended that according to the understanding of Trade the self-locking nuts with Nyloc insert like the petitioners' product are not treated nor are understood as nuts or as fasteners. The petitioners' product is three to four times the price of ordinary nut. It is manufactured from the special material and has special specifications and designs, is used by a separate class of consumers, and is inter alia used for locking and providing seal to any liquid entering a particular area etc. and is not merely used for fastening as nuts is used. Thus if a cumulative view is taken of various reports as well as the opinions of the consumers and traders and experts, it quite obvious that the petitioners' product is not a nut. It is also not sold in the hardware market where nuts are sold. The petitioners' product is not made of base metal as required by Item 52 but it is also made of nylon inasmuch as it has a nyloc collar which is a critical and substantial part of the product. In any event if two views are possible, then benefit should go to the Assessee in the matter of levying tax and in this connection Shri Bhaba has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 1980 ELT 249 (Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India others)10. 5. It was then contended by Shri Bhaba that the department had acted with hostile discrimination between the petitioners and 2 other concerns i.e. Pioneer and Gurumukh Singh. 5. It was then contended by Shri Bhaba that the department had acted with hostile discrimination between the petitioners and 2 other concerns i.e. Pioneer and Gurumukh Singh. In these case item belonging to the said manufacturers are treated as outside scope of Item No. 52 and the petitioners are being treated differently. The second order passed by the Government of India dated 9-9-1981, which now holds the field, is challenged by Shri Bhaba on the ground that it is passed in violation of principles of natural justice. It relies upon particular ISI without giving opportunity to the petitioners to meet the same. It relies upon STN again without giving such an opportunity. It does not refer to nor considers any part of the voluminous evidence produced by the petitioners. It relies on the opinions of Bajaj Auto Limited and Mahindra Oven Limited without giving an opportunity to the petitioners to cross examine the said persons. It places strong reliance on IS 1367 and 1363 which are not applicable to the present case when the proper IS is IS No. 7002. For coming to the conclusion that the product falls under Item 52 it places reliance on STN which is not permissible. It by-passes that Trade Notices issued by the Competent Authorities. Thus in substance it is contended by Shri Bhaba that the order passed by the Government of India is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record and is also contrary to the well established principles of natural justice. 6. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Tipnis the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that in the present case what is obvious is being disputed. From the bare reading of Entry 52 it is quite clear that the petitioners' product squarely falls in the said entry. According to Shri Tipins the Government of India rightly paced reliance upon the representations made by the petitioners to their customers and dealers, it being best evidence. The major portion of article is manufactured from the base metal. While considering as to whether a particular product falls within a particular entry, it is the article as a whole which will have to be taken into consideration. So construed, it is quite obvious that the petitioners' product is nothing but a threaded but which is mainly used as fasteners, though it may have some additional advantages. While considering as to whether a particular product falls within a particular entry, it is the article as a whole which will have to be taken into consideration. So construed, it is quite obvious that the petitioners' product is nothing but a threaded but which is mainly used as fasteners, though it may have some additional advantages. It could at the most be described as special type of fastener improvised nut. It is basically used as fastener and, therefore, it was rightly described as nut by the Central Government. Though nylon collar makes the nyloc self locking nuts of a distinguished character, the nuts remain nuts, which are primarily used as fasteners. It is not correct to say that fastening is only its incidental function. The trade notices issued by the subordinate authorities are neither binding upon the Government of India nor could be equated with the definition of the item. The decisions given by the Government of India in other cases are also not relevant since the matter therein has been decided having regard to the facts and circumstances of those cases qua a particular item involved therein. He has also contended that the matter regarding M/s. Pioneer Iron and Brass Works, is pending in this Court in Writ Petition No. 3030 of 1978. The trade notices have no statutory force nor the judgments of the Government of India in other cases could be equated with the judgments in rem. In this context Shri Tipnis had also placed reliance upon the petitioners' own conduct as well as the literatures issued by the petitioner. According to him right from the year 1971 to 1973 i.e. till the new Entry 68 was introduced in the schedule the petitioners have paid duty on the basis of Entry 52 itself. Reliance on ISI is not something which is unknown to the trade. It is not correct to say that IS has taken the product out of the general category of nuts, STN being based on international market may not themselves be relevant. However, ITC and other reports are based on STN and, therefore, it cannot be said that they are wholly irrelevant. Shri Tipnis conceded that it would have been better if each and every piece of evidence was referred to in the order of the Central Government but from this a conclusion cannot be drawn that said evidence is omitted from consideration. Shri Tipnis conceded that it would have been better if each and every piece of evidence was referred to in the order of the Central Government but from this a conclusion cannot be drawn that said evidence is omitted from consideration. According to him after taking into consideration the whole evidence on record Government of India rightly came to the conclusion that the product of the petitioners squarely falls under Item 52. Before coming to this conclusion a reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioners to adduce evidence and to put forward their case. Thus the finding of fact recorded by the Government of India is based on evidence on record which cannot be challenged in a writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Therefore, from the rival contentions raised before us it is quite clear that the controversy which falls for our consideration is in a very narrow compass. The relevant entry i.e. Entry 52 of the schedule reads as under : "Bolts and nuts, threaded or tapped and screws, of base metal or alloys thereof. In or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power." Explanation.---The expression "bolts and nuts threaded or tapped, and screws" used in this item shall include bolt-ends, screw studs, screw studding self tapped screws, screw, hooks and screw rings." It is by now fairly well settled that the words or expressions describing an article or commodity should be construed in the sense in which it is understood in the trade by a dealer or consumer. It is they who are concerned with it and it is the sense in which they understand it, that constitutes a definitive index of legislative intention. In a taxing statute words of everyday use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance. Therefore, the words 'bolts and nuts' in Item 52 of the Schedule will have to be interpreted according to their popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. (See A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 300 (Parritts spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryaya)11. Therefore, the words 'bolts and nuts' in Item 52 of the Schedule will have to be interpreted according to their popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. (See A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 300 (Parritts spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryaya)11. The Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary describes 'nut' as "a small block usually of metal, with a threaded hole through the centre, for screwing onto a bolt." The Central Government on the appreciation of all the evidence on record came to the conclusion that Nyloc Nut is basically a nut used for fastening and, therefore, falls under Entry 52. However, since a contention was raised before us that while recording the said finding the Central Government has not taken into consideration the material evidence produced by the petitioners, including the various reports and the trade notices, practically we have heard this writ petition as if we are hearing an appeal. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for both sides, we have gone through, entire evidence on record. The petitioners as well as the respondents have produced various certificates and opinions from the dealers, customers as well as consumers. ISI as well as other reports were also referred to during the course of arguments. Reliance was also placed on the notices issued by the Competent Authorities. First such trade notice dated 6-8-1971 was issued by the Collector of Pune. It was stated in this notice that mere existence of a thread or tapping would not render a product as bolts, nuts or screws unless its utility is exclusively that of a fastener. It appears that similar such Trade Notices were issued by the Collectorate of Bombay on 4-7-1977, Chandigarah Collectorate dated 19-5-1977, Baroda Collectorate dated 25-5-1977, Jaipur Collectorate dated 31-5-1977, West Bengal Collectorate 28-5-1977, Madurai Collectorate dated 28-5-1977, Bangalore Collectorate dated 27-5-1977, Delhi Collectorate dated 26-5-1977. The petitioner s are relying upon the expression, 'exclusively' as used in these trade notices. However, it is pertinent to note that these trade notices are issued by the Collectorates and not by the Government of India itself. The petitioner s are relying upon the expression, 'exclusively' as used in these trade notices. However, it is pertinent to note that these trade notices are issued by the Collectorates and not by the Government of India itself. It is no doubt true that the rule of construction by reference to contemporaneous exposition is a well established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. See A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922, K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another. If the trade notices were issued by the Government of India itself or the highest authority entrusted with the execution of provisions of the Act, in a given case the matter might stand on a different footing. However, in the present case these trade notices are issued by the different Collectorate and not by the highest authority. Further the language of entry is plain and unambiguous. It is also equally well settled that if a controversy is raised it is the function of the Court to construe the entries and in reaching the correct meaning of the statutory provisions, opinion of the executive is hardly material. The Court cannot abdicate in favour of such opinion. From the plain reading of the Entry 52, as a whole, it is quite clear that it is worded in generic terms. It is all comprehensive. Therefore, it is quite obvious that expression 'exclusively' as used in trade notices is based on misunderstanding. Similar is the position about the Government of India's decision in other matters. From the bare reading of the order of the Government of India in Gurumukh Singh's case it is quite clear, that in that case Government of India was concerned with U bolts, U clamps which were specially designed for use in automobiles. The case of M/s. Pioneer Iron and Brass Works is still sub-judice as a writ petition is till pending. In our opinion Shri Tipnis is right in contending that the decisions in those case turn on facts of these case and the nature of product involved therein. No general rule is laid down in the said decisions. Therefore, the controversy raised before us will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioners as well as the department. No general rule is laid down in the said decisions. Therefore, the controversy raised before us will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioners as well as the department. It is true that voluminous evidence has been adduced in the present case both on behalf of the petitioners and department. The department is relying upon the following documents : "i) Copy letter dated 1-4-1981 from Bombay Cycle Motor, Poona Agency. ii) Copy of letter dated from 1-4-1981 Silver Jubilee Motor P. Ltd. iii) Copy of letter dated 1-4-1981 from Penosh Transport. iv) Copy of letter dated nill from Shri P.C.J. Jadhava. v) Copy of letter dated 3-4-1981 from Shri V.Y. Apte of Kirloskar Oil Engines. vi) Copy of letter dated 3-4-1981 from Automatic Components, Pimpri, Pune. vii) Copy of letter dated 6-8-1981 from Mahindra Owen Ltd. viii) Copy of letter dated nil from Bajaj Auto Ltd. ix) Translated Copy letter dated 3-4-1981 from Shri K.S. Walks or Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. x) Copy of opinion of M/s. Telco Ltd." On the other hand the petitioners are relying upon the letters received by them from various dealers and consumers. After the interim order was passed by this Court the petitioners produced before the Government of India following documents : "1. A reply to a questionnaire from M/s. Super Auto Parts Agency a separate automotive spare parts shop in a different locality alongwith the relevant questionnaire. 2. A certificate from M/s. Regal Hardware, Pune. 3. A certificate from M/s. Premier Iron Hardware Stores, Pune. 4. A reply to a questionnaire from M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. along with the relevant questionnaire. 5. A reply to a questionnaire (same as for M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd.) from M/s Mahindra Mahindra Ltd. 6. A certificate from Messrs. Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. 7. A certificate from Messrs. Roplas (India) Ltd. 8. A certificate from Messrs. Kirloskar commins Ltd. 9. A certificate from Messrs. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. 10. A certificate from Messrs. Rustom Hornaby (I) Ltd. 11. A certificate from M/s. Mahindra Owen Ltd." We have gone through these documents as well as certificates. We have also carefully gone through the expert evidence as well as draw back scheme of Government of India, view expressed by ISI and the evidence of traders and consumers, and other reports. A certificate from Messrs. Rustom Hornaby (I) Ltd. 11. A certificate from M/s. Mahindra Owen Ltd." We have gone through these documents as well as certificates. We have also carefully gone through the expert evidence as well as draw back scheme of Government of India, view expressed by ISI and the evidence of traders and consumers, and other reports. From the various certificates issued in the name of the petitioners it is quite clear that the product of the petitioners, nylocs are ordinarily stocked in the auto spare parts market as these nuts are used on special applications on all types of vehicles. They are somewhat different to the ordinary nuts as they have nyloc collar and in view of their special characteristics, such as self locking, sealing etc. they are used there vibration is a major problem. They are supplied against specific orders and they are not hardware items. Ordinary consumers of nuts do not purchase nyloc nuts because they are costlier then other types of standard nuts and are or specific use. These nyloc nuts are used by the consumers on critical applications which are subjected to stress and vibration where ordinary nuts are likely to work loose not having the locking action of the nyloc nut provided by the nylon ring. It appears from the certificate issued by the Industrial Fasteners Association of India as well as the All India Automobile ancillary Industries Association, that the nyloc self-locking nuts are special fasteners used as original equipment on critical applications in the Automobile Industry. However one thing is clear that these nuts are manufactured out of metal and alloy and are used as fasteners. If the evidence produced by the petitioners and department is read as a whole, without laying undue stress on an individual quality of the product, it is quite clear to us that nyloc is a nothing but a self-locking nut. It is also so described in the literature issued by the petitioners, which is in the nature of representation made to traders and consumers. The nylon ring at the top of the nut only served to improve the fastening quality. It is meant for universal application. It is merely an improved variety of nut, which is basically a fastener having special property of holding fast. The nylon ring at the top of the nut only served to improve the fastening quality. It is meant for universal application. It is merely an improved variety of nut, which is basically a fastener having special property of holding fast. In case of ordinary nuts to achieve this object spring washer or quarter pin or one more ordinary nut is used. Even from the certificates on which reliance is placed by the petitioners. It is clear that nyloc nut has an additional function of locking, but this function is in additional fastening. It is the commodity as a whole which will have to be taken into consideration, while deciding the question as to whether it falls within a particular entry, and no undue stress can be laid on any isolated function or quality. 8. Much controversy was raised before us about the reports of ISI, B.T.N., I.T.C., I.S. 1362, IS 7002. All the I.S.I. reports will have to be read together and harmoneously. If so read it cannot be said that it takes out the product out of the category of nuts. In our opinion Shri Tipins was also right in placing strong reliance upon the literature issued by the petitioners company which could safely be described as representations made by them to the consumers and dealers. We have gone through the said literature. The literature itself described it as nyloc self locking nuts. It describes its principles, different advantages, such as economics and technical, but ultimately it is nothing but a self-locking nut. On a comprehensive consideration of the material before us, there is no escape from the conclusion that Nyloc is a nut, though it could be described as improvised or special type of nuts. It will make no difference whether it is readily available in ordinary hardware market or is available only in automobile shops, or is costlier than an ordinary iron nut. It is quite clear that if this nut could not be used basically as a fastener, then all other additional advantages will have no meaning. Therefore, it cannot be said that the view taken by the Government of India is not the correct view of the matter. This being the position we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Government of India was right in holding that the product of the petitioners is covered by Entry 52. Therefore, it cannot be said that the view taken by the Government of India is not the correct view of the matter. This being the position we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Government of India was right in holding that the product of the petitioners is covered by Entry 52. In any case it cannot be said that the said finding requires any interference in the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Though we have heard this writ petition as if it was an appeal, while exercising writ jurisdiction this Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of appeal, which it did not possess under the law. 9. In the view which we have taken it cannot be said that there is any discrimination against the petitioners. As already observed the cases of M/s. Pioneer or Gurunath Singh were decided on their own facts and no general rule of law was laid down in that behalf. To say the least it is not possible to lay down any general rule while deciding a question as to whether a particular article or commodity is covered by an item or the entry in the scheduled. This must obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. It is also not possible for us to come to the conclusion that the order passed by the Government of India is vitiated, it being contrary to the principles of natural justice. The petitioners were given reasonable opportunity of being heard as well as to produce their evidence. The petitioners were also heard personally before the matter was decided by the Government of India. While deciding the question raised as an aid to the construction Government of India has taken into consideration the opinions expressed by the consumers and dealers as well as I.S.I. and other reports. However ultimately the decision is based on the evidence produced before it. 11. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the various decisions cited before us, since the propositions of law laid down therein are not disputed. Ultimately the question will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Government of India. 11. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the various decisions cited before us, since the propositions of law laid down therein are not disputed. Ultimately the question will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Government of India. As already observed after going though the entire evidence on record we are satisfied that the predominant and basic function of product of the petitioners is fastening though in addition to it, it has certain additional advantages. It is quite clear from the material placed before us that if the additional advantages were not there, then for achieving the said purpose a pin or additional nut would be required. However this additional advantage will not take out the product from the category of nuts as popularly understood in the trade. Thus in substance it is a special kind of nut and nothing more. Therefore, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is covered by Item 52 of the Schedule. 12. It is not correct to say that order of the Government of India is based solely on visual inspection of the product and is therefore illegal. The decision of the Government of India is not based on visual inspection of the article. It is well settled that if the inspection of an article is made only for the purpose of understanding the evidence and is not used as substitute for evidence, then it will not vitiate the finding as the judgment in that behalf is not based solely on the result of the personal inspection. (See A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2541 (Ugam Singh another v. Kesrimal others)12. 13. However we find much substance in the contention raised by the petitioners that the demand made by the respondents vide their letter dated 21st April, 1978 is illegal and without jurisdiction. It is not disputed that the demand is referrable to Rule 1 of the Rules. It is not disputed by Shri Tipnis that this demand letter is a direct notice of demand and is not a show cause notice. 14. This being the position obviously the said letter of demand is beyond the scope of Rule 10. This is more so when now it is an admitted position that the amount shown therein is not correct. 14. This being the position obviously the said letter of demand is beyond the scope of Rule 10. This is more so when now it is an admitted position that the amount shown therein is not correct. In this context Shri Bhabha has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Misc. Petition No. 944 of 1973 (Messrs. Duke Sons Ltd. Co. another v. G.T. Kundnani Superintendent, Central Excise others)13, decided by Rege. J, On 8/11-10-1976. In the said decision Rege. J, held that the demand notice issued under Rule 10 of the Rules without first issuing a show cause notice as specifically provided under the said Rule is invalid and liable to be set aside. Similar view has been taken by Mody. J, in (Precision Steel Fasteners others. v. Union of Indian others)14, 1980 E.L.T. 692 Bombay. In 79 Bom.L.R. 438 (M/s. Jasmine Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. A.V. Venkateshwaran)15, this position was conceded by the Government of India. In view of this it was not possible for Shri Tipnis to argue otherwise, though it was faintly contended by him that if the demand is made in pursuance of an order passed by the Government of India reversing the Collector's order then it is merely an execution of the final order and nothing more. He has also contended that in such cases relevant date will be the date on which the matter is finally decided by the Government of India. However in view of the decisions in the field he did not pursue the matter any further. Therefore, it will have to be held that the demand made by the letter dated 21st April, 1978 is illegal and without jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot be enforced. However, in the view which we have taken the petitioners are not entitled to refund of the duty already paid. 15. In the result, therefore, petition is partly allowed i.e. to the extent that the letter dated 21st April, 1978 and the demand made therein is held to be illegal and without jurisdiction and, therefore, unenforceable. However, so far as the main controversy raised in the petition as to whether the petitioners' product falls within the ambit of Entry 52 is concerned, it is hereby held and declared that the petitioners' product squarely falls at T.I. 52 of the Act. 16. Hence Rule is partly made absolute. However, so far as the main controversy raised in the petition as to whether the petitioners' product falls within the ambit of Entry 52 is concerned, it is hereby held and declared that the petitioners' product squarely falls at T.I. 52 of the Act. 16. Hence Rule is partly made absolute. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be o order as to costs. 17. At this stage an oral prayer for leave to appeal to Supreme Court is made by Shri Bhabha on behalf of the petitioners. Since we have decided the controversy raised in this petition on the basis of the well established principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India itself, we do not find that this is a fit case for grant of such leave. Hence leave refused. However we direct that status quo should be maintained for a period of two months from today. -----