Hansaria J. — A Division Bench of this Court having desired, in view of the stand taken by this Court in Civil Rule No. 620/72 (L. Sailo vs. Union Territory of Mizoram disposed of on 27.4.75) on the question set out below, that it be examined by a larger Bench, the matter has been placed before us on this order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. We desired the assistance of the Advocates General of Assam and Meghalaya also but could receive the assistance of the latter only. The question referred reads as below :- “Who would be the employer of a person who immediately before the appointed day was holding or discharging duty in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam and which duty became a duty in connection with the affairs of the State of Meghalaya or administration of the Union Territory of Mizoram if the person concerned continued to hold the post despite any allocation order relating to having been passed ?” The question arises out of the provisions of the North Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, hereinafter the Act, which had made 21st January, 1972, the appointed day and provided for establishment, on and from that date, of the State of Manipur and Tripura, formation of a full-fledged State of Meghalaya and Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh by reorganising the existing State of Assam. 2. Part-VIII of the Act deals with the provisions as to services, and it has a scientific scheme. Section 61 is related to the Central Services like the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service and the Indian Forest Service and has provided for “joint cadre” for some States, Other units could, it seems, constitute their own cadre. Section 62 deals with the persons who were in the services of the Union Territories of Manipur and Tripura before the appointed day, and has provided that, unless otherwise directed by an order of the Central Government, such persons “shall be deemed to have allocated for service......in conne­ction with the affairs of the State of Manipur or, as the case may be, of the State of Tripura.” We are not concerned with section 63 in the present case. Section 64 is material for our purpose and has to be read in full :- “64. Section 64 is material for our purpose and has to be read in full :- “64. (1) Such persons serving in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam (including person borne on any cadre of that State and serving under the Government of the autono­mous State of Meghalaya or on deputation to any other Govern­ment or authority) as may be determined at any time before or after the appointed day : a) by agreement between the Government of the existing State of Assam and the Government of the autonomous State of Meghalaya or between the Government of the State of Assam and the Government of the State of Meghalaya, as the case may be, or b) in default of any such agreement, by the Central Government, may, notwithstanding anything in their terms of appointment or their conditions of service,- i) in a case referred to in clause (a), by one or more orders made by. the Government of existing State of Assam or the Government of the State of Assam, as the case may be, or ii) in a case referred to in clause (b), by one or more orders made by the Central Government, be required to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Meghalaya and every such person shall accordingly be deemed to have been allocated to that State with effect from such date may be specified in the order. 2) Such persons serving in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam (including persons borne on any cadre of the existing State of Assam and serving under the Government of the autonomous State of Meghalaya or on deputation to any other Government or authority), as the Central Government may, at any time before or after the appointed day, determine after consultation with the Government of the existing State of Assam or the Government of the State of Assam, as the case may be, may, notwithstanding anything in the terms of their appointment or their conditions of service, by one or more orders made by the Central Government, be required to serve in connection with the administration of the Union territory of Mizoram, and every such person shall, accordingly, be deemed to have been allocated to the Union with effect from such date as may be specified in the order. Provided that every person borne on any cadre of the existing State of Assam and serving in the Mizo District immediately before the appointed day shall, unless otherwise directed by the Administrator of the Union Territory of Mizoram, continue to serve, on and from the appointed day, in conne­ction with the administration of that Union Territory until any order is made under this sub-section in respect of such person or the expiry of a period of three years from the appointed day, whichever is earlier.” Sections 65 and 66 are not material for the case at hand, but section 67 is and we read the whole of it:- “67 (1). Every person who, immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the administration of the Union Territory of Manipur, or Union Territory of Tripura, shall continue, to hold the same post or office in the State of Manipur,, or, as the case may be, in the State of Tripura and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Government of, or other appropriate; authority in the State concerned. (2). Where a person who immediately before the appointed day . is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam and as from the appointed day, such duties become duties in connection with the affairs of the State of Meghalaya or admi-. nistration of the Union Territory of Mizoram, then, he shall continue to hold the same post or office in that State or Union Territory and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Government or Administrator of, or other appropriate authority in, that State or Union Territory as the case may be. (3) Where a person who immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the autonomous State of Meghalaya and, as from the appointed day, such duties become duties in connection with the affairs of the State of Meghalaya, then, he shall continue to hold the same post or office in the State of Meghalaya and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Government of, or other appropriate authority in, the State of Meghalaya. (4) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub­section (3) shall be deemed to prevent a competent authority, on and from the appointed day, from passing in relation to any person referred to in that sub-section any order affecting his continuance in such post or office.” Other provisions of Part-VIII need not be adverted to answer the question referred to us. 3. A reference to section 64 shows that its two sub-sections deal with the persons who were serving in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam, but were required to serve in connection with the affairs of the newly formed State of Meghalaya, or the Union Territory of Mizoram following an allocation order to be made the Government named in the sub-sections. The proviso to sub-section (2), the type of which is missing in sub­section (1); stales that .every person born on any cadre of the existing State of Assam and serving in the Mizo District immediately before the appointed day shall continue to serve on and from the appointed day (unless otherwise directed by the Administrator) in connection with the administration of that territory until an alloca­tion order is made in respect of such person or the expiry of a period of three years from the appointed day, whichever is earlier. As such, if an allocation order is made under sub-section (2) in regard to a person, he would continue to serve in the Union Territory for all times, but if no such order is made, the person concerned has to serve for a period of three years from the appointed day. As such, if an allocation order is made under sub-section (2) in regard to a person, he would continue to serve in the Union Territory for all times, but if no such order is made, the person concerned has to serve for a period of three years from the appointed day. The provision of this type must have been made to take care of the continuity of the administration on the one hand, and to give option to the incumbents on the other hand to come back to their parent cadre keeping in view the difficulty of the terrain. 4. Section 64 does not throw any light as to who would be deemed to be or would become the appointing authority of the persons who continue to serve the newly formed States. This provision has rather empowered the Governments named therein to come to an agreement, or to enable the Central Government to decide, as to who should be finally required to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Meghalaya or the Union Territory of Mizoram. To find out an answar to the pioblem with which we are seized. We have to refer to section 67. Though the marginal role of this Sub­section is “Provisions as to continuance of officers in same posts,” a reading of the section shows that apart from 'saying that every person who, immediately before the appointed day was holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the territories in question, shall continue to hold the same post or office in the new territory, (if such duties became duties of the new units), it states that the person concerned shall be deemed, on and from “the appointed day, to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Govern­ment or Administrator of, or other appropriate authority in the State, or Union Territory” concerned. The need for such a provision is apparent, and the same is to regularise what would have been otherwise an irregu­lar state of affairs so far as public officers are concerned. On the appo­inted day they would continue to be the officers belonging to the parent State but would discharge duties in connection with the affairs of the newly created States and the services of such officers has to stand transferred to the newly created units. On the appo­inted day they would continue to be the officers belonging to the parent State but would discharge duties in connection with the affairs of the newly created States and the services of such officers has to stand transferred to the newly created units. But, as such officers would not ipso facto cease to belong to the former State a question may arise as to their competency to act as officers in an area which is no longer a part of that State. It is to overcome this difficulty that the aid of a fiction is sought and such officers are deemed, as from the appoin­ted day, to have been duly appointed to their respective posts and offices by the Governments of the new States (See V. K, Balakrishnan vs. State AIR 1957 Madras 697 which was referred with approval in Mysore S. R. T. C. vs. Khaja Mohiyddin, AIR 1969 Mysore 41,) As per the decision in N. Chandramouli vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1971 Mysore 53, a provision like section 67 merely substitutes the successor State as the appointing authority in the place of the parent State. 5. At this stage, we may point out that the provisions of the type finding place in sections 62, 64 and 67 of the Act had first appeared in the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 whose sections 115 and 116 are parallel to the aforesaid provisions and had been interpreted in the decisions referred in the above paragraph. In the Bombay Reorganisa­tion Act, 1960, section 82 has dealt with the continuance of officers and is parallel to section 61 of the Act. A similar provision can be found in section 28 of the State of Nagaland Act, 1962 and in section 65 of the Assam Reorganisation ( Meghalaya ) Act, 1969, 6. Before analysing the provisions of section 67, it may be stated that a deeming provision of the type mentioned in sub-sections (1) t (2) and (3) had become necessary as, in fact, the succeeding States were not really the appointing authorities. As is known, aid of a deeming provision is taken in a great deal of modern legis­lations sometimes 10 include what is obvious, at times to make clear what is uncertain, and on other occasions to impose for the purpose of a statute an artificial construction that would not other­wise prevail. As is known, aid of a deeming provision is taken in a great deal of modern legis­lations sometimes 10 include what is obvious, at times to make clear what is uncertain, and on other occasions to impose for the purpose of a statute an artificial construction that would not other­wise prevail. In each case, however, it would be a question as to “with what object the Legislature has made the deeming provision (See Consolidated Coffee Limited vs. Coffee Board, AIR 1980 SC 1468 ). Whatever be the object, there can be no denial that a legal fiction is adopted in law for a definite purpose and the fiction must be allowed to operate in its legitimate field, while limiting it to the purpose for which it has been created. (See K- S. Dharamadatan vs. Central Government, AIR 1979 SC 1495 , in para 10 of which some earlier decisions on this point have also been noted.) 7. Now, it is apparent that if a person, who after the creation of a new State continues to discharge the duties of his post or office in the succeeding State, the control over such person must remain with the succeeding State, as otherwise the administration of the new State would suffer immensely. We may with profit refer section 65 (2) of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, which had created an autonomous State of Meghalaya (which was given full State­hood by the Act) wherein it was specifically mentioned that the control of the person who was required to serve in connection with the affairs of Meghalaya shall vest in the Government of Meghalaya for so long as such person was required to serve in connection with the affairs of Meghalaya. It were the succeeding States (or their officers )who were made the competent authorities to pass any order affecting continuance in post or office of the concerned officers by the aforesaid Reorganisation Acts by making a specific provision in this regard in the concerned statutes. Section 116 (2) of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956; proviso to section 82 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, I960; section 28 (3) of the State of Nagaland Act, 1962 are such provisions. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with this aspect in some of its decisions. Section 116 (2) of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956; proviso to section 82 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, I960; section 28 (3) of the State of Nagaland Act, 1962 are such provisions. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with this aspect in some of its decisions. Instate of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521 , the power of the succeeding State to take action aginst the transferred employee was upheld on these facts : The respondents were the officiating Tahsildars in the erstwhile State of Pepsu. By a notification made by the Financial Commissioner, the respondents were confirmed as Tahsildars, but no posts were available in which they could be so confirmed. The notification was issued on October, 23, 1955, and on the next day Raj Pramukh created super-numerary posts of Tabsildars. On November 1, 1956, the State of Pepsu merged with the State of Punjab and from that day the respondents became the servants of the Punjab State. The earlier action was reconsidered by the Punjab Government and on 31. 10.57, the Punjab Government de-confirmed the respondents. This was challenged on two grounds: (1) the action amounted to reduction in rank and could not be taken without complying with the requirements of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and (2) the respondents who held the status of permanent Tahsildars in the State of Pepsu could not be deprived of the same by the successor Government of Punjab. Operation of Article 311 of the Constitution was rejected, reasons therefore being not our concern in the present case. Provision of section 116(2) was held to be wide enough to empower the successor Government (i. e. the Punjab Government) to pass the order of the kind, as that Government was held to be the competent authority under this sub-section. 8. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Saran, AIR 1964 SC 1361 , a reversion order had been passed in relation to an officer who was serving in the State of Ajmer but was deemed to have been allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the Rajasthan State under the State Reorganisation Act. 8. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Saran, AIR 1964 SC 1361 , a reversion order had been passed in relation to an officer who was serving in the State of Ajmer but was deemed to have been allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the Rajasthan State under the State Reorganisation Act. After the appointed day, the Deputy Inspector General of Police of Rajasthan ordered reversion of the incumbent to his substantive post which was challenged before the High Court, who set aside the order of reversion on the ground that it was violative of section 115 of the State Reorganisation Act. The High Court decision was set aside by the Supreme Court being of the view that the order did not violate section 115, and 116 (2) permitted or saved passing of the impugned order. The expression “competent authority” in section 116(2) was thus held to refer to the succeeding State or its officer in both these decisions. Of course whether under such a provision the succeeding State would be able to enforce punish­ment imposed by the old State is a matter which was answered in B. K. Talwar vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 P&H 48 by stating that effect to such an order could not be given by the new State without re-considering the matter and applying its mind. 9. From what has been stated above, we have no doubt in our mind that by virtue of section 67 (2), a person who was discharging Ms duties in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Assam which duty became the duty in connection with the affairs of the newly created State of Meghalaya or the Union Territory of Mizoram, shall, not only continue in the same post or office in the newly created units, but shall further become the employee of the newly created units and the Government, or the Administrator, or other appropriate authority of the succeeding State would be the competent authority to pass any order in relation to such persons affecting his continuance in the post or office. In this view of the matter, we respectfully differ from the decision rendered in this regard in L. Sailo's case (supra). In this view of the matter, we respectfully differ from the decision rendered in this regard in L. Sailo's case (supra). In our considered view the observation in that decision that section 67 contains (as if, only)” “the provision for continuance of the officers in the same post (relying apparently on what has been stated id the marginal note) was not corre­ctly made, as it further held on the basis that the parent State would continue to be appointing authority of the concerned person. We may, however, state that what has been stated by us above is subject to the final order of allocation which may be passed under section 64 of the Act. On such an allocation order being passed, it is apparent that the State to which a person is allocated would become the appointing authority. But till that is done or where no allocation order is passed, the State or Union Territory (or its officers) whose duty the person concerned continues to discharge would be the appointing authority of that person. 10. The above is our answer to the question referred to us. Let the records go back to the Division Bench for final disposal of the case.