Judgment SATYA BRATA SANYAL, J. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has. prayed for quashing that part of the order bv which the petitioners complaint under S. 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been held to be barred by limitation in view of the provisions of S. 26 (2) of the Act. 2. The petitioner is said to be a muster roll employee of the Bihar State Electricity Board (respondent No. 2) and he was employed on the 10th April 1974 He was. however, stopped to sign the attendance register with effect from the 25th Jan. 1977. The petitioners attendance was stopped from the said date. The petitioner made several representations to the authorities (Annexure-5 series) as to the reason for not taking his attendance, but his representations were not d:sposed of. Ultimately, he made a complaint on the 12th May. 1978 to the Public Grievance Committee of the State Government (Annexure-6), whereupon the respondent Board communicated to the State authority on the 31st July. 1978 that his services had been terminated on and from the 25th Jan. 1977. The petitioner received a copy of the said letter (Annexure-7) on the 22nd Sept. 1978. from the Chief Ministers Secretariat, and. within three days of the receipt of the said letter on the 25th Sept. 1978. the instant complaint under S. 26 of the Act was filed. The said complaint was entertained by the Labour Court and the respondent Board was asked to show cause as required under law: but no written statement was filed. The Board, however, participated in the proceeding before the Labour Court and cross-examined the witnesses produced by the complainant in support of his complaint. The Labour Court recorded the finding that the termination of the service of the petitioner on and from the 25 Jan. 1977, was without any reasonable cause. The Labour Court, however, thereafter held that the petitioner had knowledge of his being shut out from work. Since the complaint was filed on the 25th Sept. 1978. long after the said knowledge, it was barred by tme. The Labour Court further held that no sufficient cause had been shown by the petitioner for condonation of about one years de.ay in filing the complaint Ultimately, because of its said finding on the question of limitation, the complaint petit:on was dismissed. 3. Mr. 1978. long after the said knowledge, it was barred by tme. The Labour Court further held that no sufficient cause had been shown by the petitioner for condonation of about one years de.ay in filing the complaint Ultimately, because of its said finding on the question of limitation, the complaint petit:on was dismissed. 3. Mr. Pandey, appearing for the petitioner-workman, contended that the Labour Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint on the ground of limitation. According to the learned Counsel. he could know for the first time on the 22nd Sept. 1973 that his services had been terminated from the letter of the Secretary of the, Board. Prior to that, he was under the impression that he was wrongfully not allowed to sign the attendance register. No order terminating his service was issued or served upon him. Therefore. the question of limitation does not arise at all. He further contended that S. 26 of the Act makes no distinction between various kinds of services, namely, whether one is permanent, temporary, casual or probationary, etc. He submits that if a person be in whatsoever category renders work for not less than six months. S. 26 of the Act extends certain protection to such persons. The protection provided under S. 26 of the Act. according to the learned Counsel of the petitioner. entitles them to one months notice or one months wages in lieu of such notice who have worked for not less than six months but up to one year. The law entitles persons who have, however, worked for more than one year, to compensation as well, that is 15 days wages for every completed year of service as provided under the second proviso to S. 26 (1) of the Act. The notice pay and the compensation is, however, not payable, where the termination f service is for a misconduct. If it is for a misconduct, then the conduct must be enquired into and. only after the completion of such an enquiry, the order of dismissal or discharge could be passed. Mr. Mishra, appearing for the Board, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner was only a muster-roll daily rated workman and he was, therefore, not entitled to any letter of termination or to any notice or to any compensation. He also submitted that the petitioner did not move the court with due diligence. Mr. Mishra, appearing for the Board, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner was only a muster-roll daily rated workman and he was, therefore, not entitled to any letter of termination or to any notice or to any compensation. He also submitted that the petitioner did not move the court with due diligence. On his own admission, according to the learned Counsel, the petitioner was aware that his services had been terminated and. therefore, he ought to have filed the complaint within the period laid down under S. 26 (2) of the Act. 4. Section 26 of the Act is prefaced by the words "Notice of the dismissal or discharge". The said section deals with two kinds of situation: firstly, where a persons service is terminated for reasons other than misconduct, and, secondly, of cases where the termination is on account of misconduct. In the first category of cases, it entitles the employee to a notice and further to compensation equivalent to fifteen days wages for everv completed year of service. but this is not allowable in cases of misconduct. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 26 of the Act contemplates that when the termination is brought about eiher by dismissal or discharge or otherwise, the concerned person is entitled to make a complaint in writing in the manner prescribed to the appropriate authority within ninety days of the receipt of the order of dis- misoai or discharge or termination of employment. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 26 also emphasises the receipt of an order of dsmissal or discharge. Prior to the amendment of the Act. the period of limitation prescribed was different. Rule 21 of the Bihar Shops & Establishment Rules. 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) lays down the procedure for filing a complaint. Rule 21 (2) envisages that the complaint must be filed in the form of a memorandum setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to_the order complained against and that the memorandum shall be accompanied by an affidavit. The memorandum is further required to bear a court fee. After all this is done, the Court is required to issue notice to the person complained against. 5. Sec. 26 of the Act confers benefit upon any employee who has been in employment continuously for a period not less than six months. The memorandum is further required to bear a court fee. After all this is done, the Court is required to issue notice to the person complained against. 5. Sec. 26 of the Act confers benefit upon any employee who has been in employment continuously for a period not less than six months. This section does not take notice of the character or the kind of services rendered by an employee. What it envisages is continuity of service for a given period. If it be for not less than six months. Sec 26 provides for certain benefits as well as confers a right on an employee to make complaint to the concerned authority within a certain period from the receipt of the order of termination. The scheme of Section 26 and R. 21. in mv opinion, particularly in cases of persons in continuous employment for not less than six months, contemplates bringing about disengagement only bv a written order of termination. The words "receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge or termination" in Section 26 (21 read along with the prefix of Sec 26 "Notice of the dismissal or discharge" exclude termination of the services of such persons by an oral order. If the termination. of such an employee is brought about by an oral order. I fail to conceive how a memorandum of complaint challenging the grounds of the order of dismissal can a all be made. Further, it would bring about uncertainty as to the date wherefrom the period of limitation is required to be reckoned. It is. therefore, manifest that the termination of service of a person continuously working for not less than six months can only be effected by a written order, duly communicated. Admittedly, in this case, there has been no written order of dismissal. There has been no communication of such a written order to the petitioner at any time prior to the filing of the complaint. The petitioner was forwarded a copy of the order vide Ext. 2 on the 22nd Sept. 1978. The complaint was filed within three days therefrom. The question, therefore, arises whether in those circumstances the Labour Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the petition of complaint is barred by time. 6. Limitation starts running as provided under the Act from the receipt of the order of dismissal/discharge/termination. 2 on the 22nd Sept. 1978. The complaint was filed within three days therefrom. The question, therefore, arises whether in those circumstances the Labour Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the petition of complaint is barred by time. 6. Limitation starts running as provided under the Act from the receipt of the order of dismissal/discharge/termination. The respondents have not been able to show the receipt of any such order prior to the 22nd Sept. 1978. Further, there could be no receipt of the order of discharge by the petitioner as the respondents themselves admit that there was no written order of termination of service as the petitioner was a muster- roll employee. As there has been no written order duly communicated terminating the services of the petitioner, there can be no question of limitation at all arising in this case. The limitation, if any. will run from the date when he received the letter terminating his service from the Grievance Committee, that is, 22nd Sept. 1978. 7. A question may arise can a workman make inoperative the period of limitation bv avoiding receipt of an order of dismissal or discharge? This question, however does not arise in the present case. According to the respondents, since the petitioner was a muster-roll workman, there was no need of a written order of dismissal either to be notified or to be communicated to the workman concerned. Learned Counsel has placed before us the Standing Orders of the respondent Board which show that the workmen have been classified into five categories, namely, permanent. probationer. temporary. casual and apprentice. There is no classification of muster-roll workmen in the Standing Orders. I have stated earlier. See. 26 makes no distinction between various classes of employees One has to be only an employee under Sec. 2 (41 of the Act Section 26 gives certain protection to "employees who have worked for not less than six months continuously. Admittedly, the petitioner has worked for about three years continuously. He was, as such, not only entitled to a notice and/ or notice pay under Sec. 26 of the Act, but he was also entitled to a compensation for fifteen days, average wages for every completed year of service. The Labour Court has found that there was no reasonable cause of termination of the petitioners service. He was, as such, not only entitled to a notice and/ or notice pay under Sec. 26 of the Act, but he was also entitled to a compensation for fifteen days, average wages for every completed year of service. The Labour Court has found that there was no reasonable cause of termination of the petitioners service. That being the finding of the Labour Court, such termination was reauired to he preceded by a mandatory notice as envisaged under Sec 96 (1) of the Act as well as com- pensation payable under the second proviso to Sec. 26 (1) None of these things having been complied with, the termination per se is bad. 8. The finding of the Labour Court that the petition of complaint is barred by time for the reasons aforesaid is fit to be quashed. Admittedly, there being no written order of dismissal or discharge, nor the . dismissal or discharge having been notified nor the same having been communicated and received by the workman, there is no question of any limitation arising in respect of the petition of complaint entertained by the labour court. 9. As I have found that the complaint petition could not have been treated as barred bv limitation, the consequential relief flows from the order of the Labour Court itself. Admittedly, the termination was not preceded by notice or notice pay accompanied by any compensation as envisaged under the second proviso to Section 26 (1) of the Act. The result would be that the petitioner would be deemed to be continuing in service throughout the period and would be entitled to all consequential relief flowing from the continuity of service. 10. In the result, the order of the Labour Court in so far as it held that the petition of complaint is barred by time is quashed and the respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service and give all benefits " arising out of the continuity of service till date. The petition is accordingly, allowed. The netitioner shall also, he entitled to costs: hearing fee Rs. 100/- (one hundred) only. I agree to the order proposed. I would, however. ]ike to add that the Board has to thank itself for the result of this application No written statement was filed on behalf of the Board before the authority under the Bihar Shops & Establishments Act. The netitioner shall also, he entitled to costs: hearing fee Rs. 100/- (one hundred) only. I agree to the order proposed. I would, however. ]ike to add that the Board has to thank itself for the result of this application No written statement was filed on behalf of the Board before the authority under the Bihar Shops & Establishments Act. In that view of the matter, the conclusion in regard to the removal of the petitioner from service without a reasonable cause had to be a foregone conclusion. The question whether a daily-rated workman can thwart the object of Section 26 of the Act seems to be Pertinent. but in that situation the employer should take precaution of pasting or putting un the termination order on thp notice hoard. There is no averment that anything of the kind was done. In that view of the matter. I agree with my learned hrother that the petition must be allow Petition allowed.