JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. - In these writ petitions authority of the Mandi Samiti to charge market fee on certain transaction of goods under section 17 (iii)(b) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been challenged. Both these writ petitions involve identical questions of law and are, therefore, being disposed of together. 2. The petitioners Indodan Milk Products and Foremost Dairies are public limited companies with their head office at Bombay. They produce Ghee, condensed milk and other milk products in their factories installed within the market areas of Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur respectively. The factories of the petitioners are situate within the market areas but outside the market yards. They have also established their depots at Ghaziabad, Delhi and other places in the country for the purpose of carrying on the aforesaid business. 3. Ghee is a specified agricultural produce and, as such, the petitioners have obtained licences for carrying on the business of Ghee from their respective Mandi Samities. According to the petitioners a very small quantity of the Ghee produced by them is sold within their factory premises to the consumers and rest is transferred to their depots at Ghaziabad and from there to Delhi from where it is distributed to their various sale depots in the country. No market fee is payable under Section 17 (iii)(b) of the Act either on the sale made within the factory premises directly to the consumers or on the stock transferred from their factory premises to their depots at Ghaziabad, Delhi etc. but the Mandi Samities are insisting for payment of the market fee on it without any authority of law. The Mandi Samities have framed bye laws under section 39 of the Act. According to bye-law 68 the petitioners are required to take gate passes from the Mandi Samities in Form 54 for taking Ghee outside the market area. Since no market fee is payable on the transfer of Ghee from their factory premises to their depots, they are entitled to gate passes from the Mandi Samities without making any payment. The Mandi Samities are, however, not prepared to issue gate passes to them without payment of market fee. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 5. The Mandi Samities are, however, not prepared to issue gate passes to them without payment of market fee. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 5. The petitioners have raised several points in their writ petition but their learned counsel has argued only three points before us, Firstly, no market fee is payable by them on the sale of agricultural produce directly to the consumers. Secondly, the market fee is payable only on the transaction of sale and as the transfer of agricultural produce from their factories to their depots at Ghaziabad or Delhi does not amount to sale, no market fee is payable on it and thirdly even assuming that transfer of agricultural produce from their factory premises to their depots amounts to sale, no market fee can be charged by the Mandi Samities from the petitioners as they are not rendering any service. 6. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samities while conceding that no market fee is legally payable on the transaction of sale made directly to the consumers, contested the claim of the petitioners that whatever sale is made by them in their factory premises is to the consumers only. Regarding the transfer of agricultural produce by the petitioners from their factory premises to their depots learned counsel contended that these transactions amount to sale and, therefore, the petitioners are liable to pay the market fee. He has further contended that the Mandi Samities are rendering sufficient service and, as such are entitled to charge market fee. 7. In order to appreciate arguments of the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to have a look at the aims and objects for enactment of the Act before examining, the relevant provisions of Section 17 (iii)(b) of the Act. The aims and objects are as under : "An act to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefore in Uttar Pradesh." 8. We find that the Act was enacted for the purposes of regulating of sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The word 'Sale' is a concept of Transfer of Property Act and has been defined under section 54 as under : "54. "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised. 9. The word 'Sale' is a concept of Transfer of Property Act and has been defined under section 54 as under : "54. "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised. 9. Under Section 2(r) of the Act word 'sale' has been defined as under : "2.(r). "Sale" includes barter or deposit of goods by way of pledge or as security for the amount received as advance". 10. It is noticeable that the original concept of sale has not been materially changed even according to the definition in this Act. Now we have a look at the provisions of section 17 (iii)(b) which empowers the Mandi Samiti to levy the market fee. Section 17 (iii)(b) runs as under : "17. (iii)(b)- market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than one and half percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such, fee shall be realised in the following manner : (1) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee, (2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee : (3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee, and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchasers hall be liable to pay, the market fee to the Committee." 11. A plain reading of section 17 (iii)(b) of the Act shows that market fee is payable on transaction of sale on specified agricultural produce in the market area. All the four sub- clauses of clause (b) are mutually exclusive. A plain reading of section 17 (iii)(b) of the Act shows that market fee is payable on transaction of sale on specified agricultural produce in the market area. All the four sub- clauses of clause (b) are mutually exclusive. The sale of agricultural produce directly to the consumers does not come under sub- clauses (1), (2) and (3) and is covered by the residuary sub-clause (4) which provides that in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee." This being so, no market fee is payable by the petitioners on the transaction of sale made by them within the factory premises directly to the consumers. So far as the claim of the Mandi Samities that the petitioners were not selling the agricultural produce within their factory premises only to the consumers, it is suffice to say that the petitioners shall not he required to pay market fee only on those transactions of sale made by them within the factory premises directly to the consumers and not other and, as such, the factual controversy raised on behalf of the Mandi Samities is not going to affect this proposition of law. 12. Now we have to determine whether the petitioners are liable to pay market fee on the agricultural produce transported by them to their depots at Ghaziabad and Delhi and other places. Section 17 (iii)(b) empowers the Mandi Samiti to levy market fee on transaction of sale on specified agricultural produce in the market area. The transfer of agricultural produce by the petitioners from their factory premises to their depots is not sale, and therefore, in our opinion, the Mandi Samiti is not legally entitled to charge any market fee from the petitioners on these transactions. 13. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti contended that as the agricultural produce was weighed and measured by the petitioners within the factory premises before transferring it to their depots at Ghaziabad, Delhi and other places it will amount to sale with the aid of Explanation attached to Rule 66. 14. In order to appreciate this argument of the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti we have to read and compare the provisions of section 17(iii) (b) as enacted originally and as they now stand after the amendment of 1978. 14. In order to appreciate this argument of the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti we have to read and compare the provisions of section 17(iii) (b) as enacted originally and as they now stand after the amendment of 1978. The amended provisions of Section 17(iii) (b) have been quoted above and now we are quoting the provisions of that section as enacted originally : "17(iii) (b) .....Market fees on transactions of sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce in the principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards from such persons and at such rates as may be prescribed but not exceeding one-half percentum of the price of the specified agricultural produce sold or purchased therein." 15. The original section 17(iii) authorised the Mandi Samiti to levy market fee on transaction of sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce in the Principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yard from such persons and at such rate but not exceeding one-half per cent of the price of the specified agricultural produce sold or purchased therein. 16. The rules which were framed in 1965 prescribed the rate of and the liability of persons to pay the market fee. Rule 66 which relates to the market fee is quoted below. "66. Market fee-section 17 (iii) (i). The Market Committee shall have the power to levy and collect fees on the specified agricultural produce brought and sold in the Market Yards at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws but not exceeding one-half of the percentum of the price of the specified agricultural produce : Provided that the market fee shall be payable by the seller : Provided further that no market fee shall be levied and charged prior to the date on which provisions of section 10 of the Act are enforced. Explanation- For the purposes of this sub- rule, a sale of specified agricultural produce shall be deemed to have been effected in Market Yard if it has been weighed or measured by a licensed weighed or measurer in the Market Yard for the purpose of sale, notwithstanding the fact that the proprietor- ship of such agricultural produce has by reason of such sale passed to a person in a place outside the Market Yard. (2) No market fee shall be levied more than once on any consignment of the specified agricultural produce brought for sale in the Market Yard if the market fee has already been paid on it in any Market Yard of the same Market Area and in respect of which a declaration has been made and a certificate has been given by the seller in Form No. V." 17. Although section 17(iii)(b) was amended in 1973 and again in 1978 but no -corresponding changes were effected in Rule A6. Thus, while section 17(iii)(h) has been drastically changed during this period. Rule 66 still remains in its original shape. By comparing the old and new provisions of section 17(iii)(b) we find that while old contained only broad principles for levying market fee the new section contains full details on the subject. Rule 66 was framed for providing details about the levy of market fee but those details have now been incorporated in section 17(iii) itself. Similarly, the original section 17(iii) (b) empowered the Mandi Samiti to levy market fee on the transaction of sale made in market yards and, therefore, Rule 66 framed thereunder also speaks of market yard. Section 17 (iii) (b) was subsequently amended and the Mandi Samiti was given power to levy market fee on the transactions of sale made within the entire market area. However, no corresponding change was made in Rule 66 with the result while the amended section 17(iii) (b) speaks of market area Rule 66 speaks of market yard. Admittedly, the factories of petitioners are situated outside the market yard and, therefore, Rule 66 is clearly inapplicable in the present case. 18. It is now well settled that Rules framed under a particular statute can operate only in the field not occupied by the statute itself and they will apply so long they do not come in conflict with the Statute. In our opinion, the provisions of section 17(iii) (b) as they stand after the amendment of 1978 are workable and can be given effect to even without the aid of the rules, and as such Rule 66 has become redundant. 19. In our opinion, the provisions of section 17(iii) (b) as they stand after the amendment of 1978 are workable and can be given effect to even without the aid of the rules, and as such Rule 66 has become redundant. 19. In Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Company v. State of U. P., AIR 1980 SC 1124 : (1980 All LJ 490) Supreme Court observed as under : "Then came the amended Section 17(iii)(b) of U. P. Act 7 of 1978, which had already been extracted above and it was made retrospective w.e.f. 12-6-1963. Under the present provision a liability to pay the fee is under four mutually exclusive clauses. The Rules which were framed in 1965 namely Rules 66 and 68 are so very different from the present provision of law that we had to express our distress in the beginning of this judgment for the failure of the Government to amend the Rules and bring it in conformity with the amended provisions of the Statute from time to time. Anyway, the Rules will apply as far as possible so long they do not come in conflict with the Statute and even without the aid of the Rules the provisions in Section 17(iii)(b) as it stands after the amendment brought about by U. P. Act. 7 of 1978 is workable and can he given effect to." 20. In this view of the matter we cannot take help from Rule 66 or the Explanation attached thereto while deciding the liability of the petitioner to pay market fee. 21. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samities has argued that no doubt the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Company (1980 All LJ 490) (supra) has held that Rule 66 has become redundant, the explanation attached to it was still in force and help can be taken from it in determining the liability of the petitioners to pay market fee on the said transactions. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the fact that when the rule itself has become redundant the question of the explanation operating independently did not arise inasmuch explanation was incorporated in the rule to explain something in the sub-rule (1) and there was no question of the explanation operating independent of it. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the fact that when the rule itself has become redundant the question of the explanation operating independently did not arise inasmuch explanation was incorporated in the rule to explain something in the sub-rule (1) and there was no question of the explanation operating independent of it. Learned counsel next contended that the explanation attached to Rule 66 may be read as an explanation to the amended section 17(iii) (h), We are unable to accept this argument of the learned counsel either. Section 17(iii) (b) is the Act of Legislature while the explanation was framed by the State Government in its rule framing power under section 40. Thus the explanation to Rule 66 cannot be read as an explanation in section 17 (iii) (b). In fact considering the language of amended section 17(iii) (b) there is absolutely no necessity of attaching any explanation to it and even if it was so that could have been done by the Legislature itself while amending these provisions and under no circumstances the provisions introduced by the State Government can he read as part of the Statute. 22. Although we have already held above that that explanation to Rule 66 cannot he availed of by the Mandi Samities for charging market fee from the petitioner on the transactions in question we still propose to consider whether the petitioners are liable to pay the market fee on the transfer of agricultural produce to their depots at Ghaziabad, Delhi and other places even with explanation to Rule 66. In our opinion the Mandi Samities are not entitled to charge market fee from the petitioners on transfer of stock of agriculture produce from their factories to their depots even with the help of the said explanation. The Explanation provides that for the purpose of this sub-rule, a sale of specified agricultural produce shall be deemed to have been effected in Market Yard if it has been weighed or measured by a licensed weighman or measurer in the market yard for the purpose of sale, notwithstanding the fact that proprietorship of such agricultural produce has by reason of such sale passed to a person in at lace outside the market yard. thus, according to this explanation also there has to be an element of sale in the transaction before any market fee can be charged. thus, according to this explanation also there has to be an element of sale in the transaction before any market fee can be charged. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samities has laid great emphasis on the words `weighed and measured' used in this explanation. According to him as the agricultural produce is weighed, measured and packed within the factory premises it shall be deemed to be a sale with the help of this explanation. We are unable to accept this contention. The words `weighed or measured' used in the explanation cannot be read in isolation. The explanation clearly provides that a sale of specified agricultural produce shall be deemed to have been effected in the market yard if it has been weighed or measured by a licensed weighman or measurer in the market yard for the purpose of sale. Thus, unless it can be proved that the stock was weighed and measured for the purpose of sale there was no question of charging any market fee. 23. In the end, learned counsel for the Mandi Samities contended that as the stock of agricultural produce sent by the petitioner to their depots at Ghaziabad and Delhi is subsequently despatched from there to various sale depots in the country where it is ultimately sold, the weighing and measuring of the agricultural produce done in the factory premises would be deemed to be for the purpose of sale. The words for the purposes of sale cannot be read as for the ultimate purpose of sale. In other words, if the petitioners weigh and measure stock of agricultural produce for supplying it against some orders placed on them by some third person it is only then weighing and measuring would be for purpose of sale and not otherwise. This is further proved from the words `notwithstanding the fact that the proprietorship of such agricultural produce has by reason of such sale passed to a person in a place outside the market yard' used in the explanation. These words clearly indicate that the explanation also talks of passing of proprietorship of the agricultural produce from the petitioners to some third person which is, in fact, nothing but sale. 24. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samities placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in British India Corpn. v. Market Committee, Dhariwal reported in AIR 1983 SC 162 . 24. Learned counsel for the Mandi Samities placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in British India Corpn. v. Market Committee, Dhariwal reported in AIR 1983 SC 162 . This decision, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the stock was weighed and measured in pursuance of an agreement of sale which is not the position in the present case. Here neither there is any agreement to sell nor the stock is being weighed and measured for the purpose of sale. In this case there is no sale within the meaning of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 2(r) of this Act. Mere shifting of stock by the petitioners from their factory premises to their Depots does not involve transfer of ownership or even of possession. Since there is no element of sale in the transaction in question the provisions of section 17 (iii) (b) are not attracted and the Mandi Samities are not entitled to charge any market fee. 25. Since the petitioners can be granted reliefs sought by them in the writ petitions on the decision on this point alone, we do not consider it necessary to decide other points raised in the writ petitions. 26. Under bye-law 68 the petitioners have to obtain gate passes from the Mandi Samities even for transporting Ghee from their factory premises to their depots at Ghaziabad and Delhi etc, which the Mandi Samities are not willing to grant without charging market fee. Since we have held that no market fee is payable by the petitioners on the transaction in question, they are entitled for gate passes from the Mandi Samities without being insisted to pay market fee. It is the duty of the Mandi Samities to issue gate passes to the petitioners under the said bye-law and they will be failing to discharging their obligations in not issuing the gate passes to the petitioners. 27. In the result, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The Mandi Samities are directed not to realise any market fee from the petitioners on the sale made by them to the consumers or the transfer of stocks from their factory premises to their various depots. 27. In the result, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The Mandi Samities are directed not to realise any market fee from the petitioners on the sale made by them to the consumers or the transfer of stocks from their factory premises to their various depots. They are further directed to issue gate passes to the petitioners as provided under bye-law 68 on the said transactions without insisting for payment of market fee. The petitioners shall be entitled to the costs of the writ petitions.