JUDGMENT - Dharmadhikari C.S., J.-The petitioner in this writ petition was prosecuted on a criminal charge under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that he had committed offence of criminal breach of trust by misappropriating an amount of Rs. 7,831.64. The learned Trial Judge was pleased to convict the petitioner and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 or in default of payment of fine further Rigorous Imprisonment for three months. Against this decision of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Shevgaon, petitioner preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court at Ahmadnagar. The Sessions Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for retrial. This remand order was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in revision petition. The High Court vide its order dated 28th July 1976 set aside the order of the Sessions Court and acquitted the petitioner of the charge levelled against him. Thereafter by taking recourse to Rule 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad issued notice to the petitioner and ultimately came to the conclusion that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly justified and., therefore,-he is not entitled for any payment for the said period. It is this order passed by the respondent No. 2 which is challenged in this petition. 2, Shri Dudhat, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,, contended before us that the view taken by the Government that the petitioner was not wholly exonerated of the charge since only benefit of doubt was given to him is wholly perverse. According to him in law there is nothing like honourable acquittal or full exoneration so far as the criminal trial is concerned. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of division bench of this Court by Tulzapurkar J. (as he then was) and Shirnpi J. in (Madhukar Baburaoji Dhote v. State of Maharashtra)1. Shri Dudhat has also placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Brahma Chandra Gupta v. Union of India2 and the decision of this Court in (G. A. Shelkev. State of Maharashtra)3,by Jahagirdar and Kotwal JJ. He has also contended that even otherwise it is not correct to say that the acquittal of the petitioner was based on benefit of doubt only. State of Maharashtra)3,by Jahagirdar and Kotwal JJ. He has also contended that even otherwise it is not correct to say that the acquittal of the petitioner was based on benefit of doubt only. We find much substance in the contentions of Shri Dudhat. From the bare reading of the judgment of this Court dated 20th July 1976 in Criminal Revision Application No. 138 of 1976, it is quite clear that the petitioner was acquitted since the prosecution had failed to lead evidence to establish the guilt. In this context a reference could usefully be made to the observations of this Court in paras 12 and 13 of the said judgment which read as trader: “12. Bearing in mind these principles, in the present case it is apparent that the prosecution had failed to lead the evidence of Shri More and the Block Development Officer, It had not botheted to produce the stock book. The entry in the cash book clearly indicated that the cash amount had been expended for the purchase of seeds. That entry shows that instead of there being cash in hand, the cash was converted into goods. The entry reflected the position of the cash. The prosecution took no trouble to verify either from the vouchers or from the stock book or other books of accounts as to whether seeds of the value of Us. 8,788.88 were purchased or were in the process of being purchased. Surely, what the prosecution would do at the retrial would be to fill in these gaps in its case. In the face of these infirmities, the prosecution had to make an application for retrial. It is not in the ends of justice nor consistent with the principles of criminal jurisprudence to allow the prosecution to set its house in order by affording a second opportunity. It is only in exceptional cases, some of which have been indicated in the majority judgment in the case of (Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra)4, that a retrial is ordered, although the, list is not exhaustive and in appropriate cases and in the interests of justice the Court can order a retrial. The facts of the present case do not warrant an order for retrial. The facts of the present case do not warrant an order for retrial. The petitioner in the course of the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses had disclosed his defence and it was for the prosecution to encounter it, but it cannot be given another opportunity. The order of the learned Sessions Judge is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 13. On a reconsideration of the prosecution evidence, it is found to be unsatisfactory. The three infirmities pointed out earlier are glaring. It lacks in firmness. The explanation given by the petitioner is plausible and consistent with the entry in the cash book. In my view, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doubt, since the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt”. The last sentence that “the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable-doubt” cannot be read in isolation but will have to be read with the infirmities pointed out by the learned Judge in the earlier paras The learned Judge further observed that the explanation given by the petitioner is plausible and consistent with the entry in the cash book. Thus it was an acquittal on merits and not by giving benefit of doubt to the petitioner. Further as held by this Court in Madhukar Dhote's case the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration may be inappropriate qua the result of a criminal prosecution. After making a reference to the decision of the Madras High Court in Union of India v. Jayaram5, a decision of the Gujarat High Court in (Ramsinaji Viraji v. State of Gujarat)6 and a decision of Punjab High Court in (Jagmohanlal v. State of Punjab)7, the Division Bench held that concept of 'honourable acquittal' or 'full exoneration' may be inappropriate qua the result of a criminal prosecution. After making a reference to rules 152 and 156, the division Bench has observed as under: “On a reading of the aforesaid provision, two things become at once clear. In the first instance, there is no reference to any concept of either 'full exoneration' or to the concept of suspension being 'wholly unjustified' and secondly, the provision clearly speaks of the Government servant 'being acquitted of blame in the criminal case that might have been launched against him'. In the first instance, there is no reference to any concept of either 'full exoneration' or to the concept of suspension being 'wholly unjustified' and secondly, the provision clearly speaks of the Government servant 'being acquitted of blame in the criminal case that might have been launched against him'. The first part of the rule 156(a) provides that there should be an automatic suspension of a Government servant whenever proceedings against him have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge, or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention, for that the provision in terms provides that a servant of Government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt, or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventing detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods, during which he is detained in custody, or is undergoing imprisonment. The second part is very material. It confers a right upon the Government servant for adjustment of his allowance for such periods of suspension according to circumstances of the case, the full amount being given in the event of the officer “being acquitted of blame”. Under this provision, therefore, what the State Government had to consider was whether the petitioner had been “acquitted of blame' and considerations whether there had been a full exoneration or not would be thoroughly irrelevant. Even when he was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt being given to the petitioner all the same he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him and he must be held to have been “acquitted of the blame”. In other words, on a proper interpretation of rule 156(a), we are clearly of the view that concepts of 'honourable acquittal' or 'full exoneration' are irrelevant and immaterial”. in the earlier part of the judgment while interpreting rule 152-the division Bench observed that rule 152 will have to be regarded as a rule of general application whereunder suspension orders are passed in different sets of circumstances would fall, whereas rule 156(a) is a special rule dealing with suspension orders passed in certain specified cases, one of them being suspension of a Government servant consequent upon his prosecution. The division Bench further observed that on a fair reading of rule 152 it will appear clear that the dismissal, removal or suspension spoken of by that rule is contemplated in cases where the State Government itself undertakes departmental inquiry against a Government Servant for neglect of duties or misconduct, for sub-rule (2) of Rule 152 speaks of the authority concerned forming an opinion that the Government servant has been 'fully exonerated' or in the case of suspension that it was 'wholly unjustified'. These expressions 'fully exonerated' and 'suspension being wholly unjustified' would be more appropriate to the holding of a departmental enquiry against a Government servant for a neglect of duty or misconduct in respect of which the Government servant could be fully exonerated and in respect of which the suspension could be decided upon to be either wholly unjustified or otherwise. Concept of 'honourable acquittal' or 'full exoneration' may be inappropriate qua the result of a criminal prosecution. In any view of the matter, there cannot be any doubt that the petitioner's case would be governed by the special provisions of Rule 156(a). 3. In the present case admittedly no independent departmental inquiry was held against the petitioner nor he was removed or dismissed from service as a result of the departmental inquiry. On the other hand after his acquittal when a show cause notice was issued under sections 152 and 156, he had specifically prayed for institution of a departmental inquiry against him. He had also prayed that an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on whose statements the Government wants to rely, should be given to him. The request made by the petitioner was refused, and the respondent No. 2 straightway passed the impugned order. This being the position in our view the present case is wholly covered by the division bench decision of this Court in Madhukar Baburaoji Dhole's case. 4. So for as the grievance made by the petitioner about his compulsory retirement under Rule 161 is concerned, the said challenge has become infructuous and therefore was not rightly pressed before us. 5. In the result therefore, the Rule is made partly absolute. 4. So for as the grievance made by the petitioner about his compulsory retirement under Rule 161 is concerned, the said challenge has become infructuous and therefore was not rightly pressed before us. 5. In the result therefore, the Rule is made partly absolute. The order passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar dated 7-11-1979 is set aside and the Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period of the petitioner as being the period spent on duty and pay him full pay and allowances for such period as if he had not been suspended. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs. Rule made partly absolute., -----