JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - These four connected writ petitions arise from a judgment of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, dated July 27, 1982, deciding twelve Urban Ceiling Appeals of 1981. These appeals before the District Judge were devided into two groups. One of the groups of these appeals had been filed by Hari Ram Kamani and his four sons and the other group of the appeals was preferred by Atma Ram Agarwal and his six sons. These appeals had challenged the order of the Competent Authority dated 27th Aug. 1981 passed under sub-sec. (4) of S. 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Out of the four writs in the High Court, Writ Nos. 9227 and 10478 of 1982 have been preferred by Hari Ram Kamani and others and Atma Ram Agrawal and others respectively. Writ Nos. 13162 and 13222 of 1982 have been filed by the State of U. P. 2. Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal purchased plots Nos. 129 (M), 130, 131 measuring 5.93 acres which is equivalent to 23998.71 sq. metres from one Hamid under two sale deeds dated 7-2-62 and 22-1-63. These sale deeds were executed jointly in favour of the aforesaid two persons. 3. Since the land in dispute was Nazul, the State Government out of the area aforesaid, resumed 2165.04 sq. metres for construction of a hospital and acquired. 88 acres for public purposes. After deducting the area resumed and acquired, the balance left was 18272.32 sq. metres. 4. On the enforcement of the Act, Hari Ram Kamani and his sons, who are petitioners 2 to 5.. in writ petition No. 9272 of 1982 filed separate returns under S. 6(1) of the aforesaid Act. According to these statements, none of the petitioners had any excess vacant land which could be acquired under the Act. The Competent Authority got the property of the petitioners Hari Ram Kamani surveyed and, thereafter, issued a notice under S. 8(3). On the basis of this survey made on 28-2-1981, 4725.02 sq metres land was found to be excess vacant land. The Competent Authority got the property of the petitioners Hari Ram Kamani surveyed and, thereafter, issued a notice under S. 8(3). On the basis of this survey made on 28-2-1981, 4725.02 sq metres land was found to be excess vacant land. The petitioners filed an objection to the draft statement and claimed that the land purchased by the two sale deeds mentioned above was from funds of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons, therefore, petitioners 2 to 5 who are sons of Hari Ram Kamani had a right in the land aforesaid. It was said by the petitioners that in a family settlement dated 8-1-76 arrived at between the petitioners, the land in question was partitioned and that settlement was recorded as a memorandum. 5. Atma Ram Agrawal and his sons who are the petitioners of Writ No. 10478 of 1982, filed separate statements under S. (1) claiming right separately over the land purchased in the years 1962 and 1963 by Atma Ram Agrawal along with Hari Ram Kamani. They claimed that Atma Ram Agrawal had purchased the land as a Karta of the joint family consisting of himself and petitioners 2 to 7. According to their statements, none of the petitioners was possessed of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. On survey, the Competent Authority found that 5095.49 sq. metres was surplus with Atma Ram Agrawal. He, therefore, issued a draft statement under sub- sec. (3) of S. 8 of the Act proposing to declare the aforesaid area as excess vacant land. The petitioners filed separate objections. 6. By his judgment and order dated 27-8- 81, the Competent Authority rejected the objections to the draft statements. He held that land under the sale deeds dated 7-2-62 and 22-1-63 had been purchased jointly by Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal. These plots did not belong to the Hindu Undivided Family and, as such, could not be treated to be the property either of Hari Ram Kamani and his sons or that of Atma Ram Agrawal and his sons. The land belonged to them individually with which the Hindu Undivided Family had no concern. On that basis, the Competent Authority declared finally that Hari Ram Kamani had 4725.82 sq. metres and Atma Ram Agrawal 5095.49 sq. metres as excess vacant land. The land belonged to them individually with which the Hindu Undivided Family had no concern. On that basis, the Competent Authority declared finally that Hari Ram Kamani had 4725.82 sq. metres and Atma Ram Agrawal 5095.49 sq. metres as excess vacant land. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Competent Authority, Hari Ram Kamani and his sons preferred five appeals, the details of which have been given in the beginning of this judgment. Atma Ram Agrawal and, his sons filed seven appeals before the District Judge. These details have also been mentioned. 7. Before the District Judge, Hari Ram Kainani and Atma Ram Agrawal filed in their appeals, applications 15 Ga and 16 Ga for admission of additional evidence. These papers were filed with an intention to prove that the land did not belong to each one of the two persons individually but to the joint family. The papers consisted of the copies of Bahi Khatas and the orders of the Income Tax Officers. The learned District Judge rejected the applications for admission of additional evidence on the grounds - firstly that O. 41 R. 27 of the Civil P.C. did not apply to the appeal under S. 33 of the Act and secondly, that no grounds for admission of papers at the late stage of the appeal had been made out. On merits, the District Judge held in agreement with the competent Authority that Hari Ram Kamani had not purchased the land with Atma Ram Agrawal for the joint Hindu family and out of its fund and secondly that the family settlement dated 8-1-76 filed by Hari Ram Kamani was unreliable and untrustworthy. Since he was of the opinion that the land constructed upon and the land appurtenant thereto were liable to be excluded from consideration of excess vacant land, he allowed the appeal of Hari Ram Kamani by reducing the excess vacant land to 2725.82 sq. metres. The appeals of his sons were rejected. 8. Similarly, in the case of Atma Ram Agrawal, the application of admitting additional evidence was rejected and after considering the evidence, the District Judge held in agreement with the Competent Authority that the theory of the property having been purchased for the joint family had not been established. metres. The appeals of his sons were rejected. 8. Similarly, in the case of Atma Ram Agrawal, the application of admitting additional evidence was rejected and after considering the evidence, the District Judge held in agreement with the Competent Authority that the theory of the property having been purchased for the joint family had not been established. He further found that the decree filed by Atma Ram Agrawal for proving partition in between himself and his sons was inadmissible and further was collusive, hence, was not liable to be believed. In this case also, the District Judge excluded the area constructed upon and thereafter, reduced excess vacant land to be declared as 3095.50 sq. metres. 9. Against the judgment of the District Judge, Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal have filed the two petitions, a mention of which had been made in the beginning. The grievance is that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the property did not belong to the joint family. Other two writ petitions 13162 and 13222 of 1982 have been filed by the St 0te of U. P. challenging reduction of the area of the land declared surplus. The State of U. P. has alleged that the learned District Judge committed an error in excluding the land constructed upon from consideration of excess vacant land. 10. After hearing counsel for the parties, I consider it appropriate to take up the writ petition of Hari-Ram Kamani and others i.e. 9227 of 1982 first. 11. The first argument of the learned counsel was that the District Judge committed an error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners under O. 41 R. 27 of the Civil P.C. for admission of papers in the appeal on an erroneous ground that as a court of appeal sitting under S. 33 of the Act, he had a limited jurisdiction of deciding the rights of the parties on the basis of the evidence already led and that he was not sitting as a court of appeal dealing with the civil matter, therefore, the application filed under O. 41 R. 27 was not maintainable. 12. S. 33 of the At provided that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Competent Authority may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. The appellate authority will be such authority as may be prescribed. 12. S. 33 of the At provided that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Competent Authority may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. The appellate authority will be such authority as may be prescribed. The State of U. P. by issuing notifications have appointed District Judges of the districts to which the Act applies, as the appellate authority. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33 provides that the appellate authority after giving an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. Sub-sec. (3) deals with the finality of every order passed by the appellate authority under sub-sec. (2) of S. 33. There is nothing in the Act applying the Civil P.C. to the proceeding in an appeal which is filed against an order of a Competent Authority. S. 31 lays down that the Competent Authority has got powers of a civil court while doing a civil suit in respect of the matters enumerated in cls. (a) to (f). S. 31 was enacted with a view to confer on a Competent Authority the power of a civil court. A Competent Authority, appointed under this. Act, is not an officer working on the judicial side and thus is not a court. So far as the appellate power is concerned, that has been given to the District Judge, A District Judge stands on a footing different from a Competent Authority. 13. The submission of the petitioners' learned counsel was that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that Order XLI R. 27 C.P.C. does not apply to an appeal under S. 33 of the Act. He urged that as the District Judge is a 'Court', hence whole of the Civil P.C. particularly O. XII R. 27 would be applicable to the proceedings of an appeal before him. This submission was sought to be met by the learned Standing Counsel on the ground that he does not act as a Court, but persona designata, and since O. XLI R. 27, C.P.C. has not been applied, the District Judge has - no power to admit additional or fresh evidence in appeal. 14. S. 33 of the Act lays down that appeal shall lie to such authority as may be prescribed. The word "prescribed" has been defined in S. 2(j) as prescribed by rules made under this Act. 14. S. 33 of the Act lays down that appeal shall lie to such authority as may be prescribed. The word "prescribed" has been defined in S. 2(j) as prescribed by rules made under this Act. R. 15-A has specified the authority in Column 3 of Schedule II. So far as the State of U. P. is concerned, every order under the Act other than an order under S. 11 or Sub-sec. (1) of S. 30 has been made appealable to the District Judge of the place where the Act has been applied. In the case of Meerut, it is the District Judge, Meerut. The submission is that as District Judge has not been empowered to decide an appeal by designation, but has been described as an individual, he acts as a persona designata. 15. Assuming that the argument of the State is correct, that the District Judge acts as persona designata, I think that under the general principles applicable to appellate jurisdiction additional evidence may be taken in the ends of justice. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a superior court to review, reverse, correct or affirm the decisions of inferior courts or tribunals, The appellate jurisdiction is derived from a statutory provision by which it is created. Grant of appellate jurisdiction implies inclusion of the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that may be essential in the ends of justice. 16. So far as admission of additional evidence is concerned, true it is that the general principle is that new evidence cannot be considered or received or produced before the appellate court. For this purpose, generally appellate authorities have to be expressly authorised. But, even in the absence of a specific provision, the necessity of doing justice in between the parties would require the Court to be conferred with the power of receiving additional evidence. For this view, I find support from a decision of this Court in Babu Ram v. Addl. District Judge, Dehra Dun 1983, All Rent Cas 15 : ( AIR 1983 All 170 ). Even though O. XLI R. 27 has not been applied, a fresh paper and additional evidence may be admitted on the grounds stated therein. This will be necessary "to keep control on the arbitrary exercise of discretion. District Judge, Dehra Dun 1983, All Rent Cas 15 : ( AIR 1983 All 170 ). Even though O. XLI R. 27 has not been applied, a fresh paper and additional evidence may be admitted on the grounds stated therein. This will be necessary "to keep control on the arbitrary exercise of discretion. If, therefore, no grounds of O. XLI R. 27 C.P.C. have been made out, there would be no justification for admitting additional evidence. 17. In the instant case, the District Judge, after considering the evidence found that the. Bahikhatas were in the possession of the two sets of the petitioners and the lack of legal advice was a lame excuse not inspiring confidence. On that basis, he rejected the evidence, and in my opinion, rightly. 18. In Natha Singh v. The Financial commissioner Taxation Punjab AIR 1976 S'I, 1053, the Supreme Court held that if additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on record will have to be ignored. The rejection of the applications, therefore, by the appellate authority, in the circumstances, was fully justified. The materials filed by the parties were already sufficient to enable the appellate authority to pronounce the judgment. 19. Counsel for the petitioners suggested that a good and honest case would be defeated on a technical ground if the principles of O. XLI R. 27 of the Civil P.C. are applied to. the reception of additional evidence. It was contended that in the interest of justice this Court should interfere, although no ground for receiving additional evidence had been made out. I am not prepared to accept this argument. It is impossible for the Court, within the limits which necessarily control it, to achieve abstract justice in every case. It must work within its prescribed limits and rules must be observed and complied with in the general interests of justice. 20. At this place, it may also be pointed out that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has a limited function to perform. It does not sit as a Court of Appeal and cannot scrutinise a judgment from that point of view. 21. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. 20. At this place, it may also be pointed out that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has a limited function to perform. It does not sit as a Court of Appeal and cannot scrutinise a judgment from that point of view. 21. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division AIR 1958 SC 398 , the Supreme Court has said : "The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial power do not exercise the powers in excess of their statutory jurisdiction but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the Statute creating them or stating those functions thereunder." 22. Coming to the merits, the learned counsel appearing in Writ No. 9272 placed reliance on the family settlement dated 8-1-76 and contended that the Competent Authority committed an error in discarding the said family settlement simply on the ground that it was effected after the enforcement in U. P., of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976. The learned counsel urged that the Act was enforced on the 17th Feb. 1976 and not on 17th Feb. 1975 as held by the Competent Authority, accordingly the ground for discarding the family settlement is illegal and renders his judgment invalid. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable. 23. S. 1 deals with short title, application and commencement. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 1 provides that i, shall apply in the first instance to the whole of the States mentioned in this provision. State of U. P. is one of the States mentioned in sub-sec. (2) S. 1. Cl. (a) of S. 2 defines the expression "appointed day". It reads as under : "(a) "appointed day" means (i) in relation to any State to which this Act applies in the first instance the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill 1976 in Parliament, and (ii) in relation to any State which adopts this Act under Cl. (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, the date of such adoption." 24. Explanation to sub-sec. (1) of S. 6 has a bearing on the controversy in issue. The relevant portion is as under : 6. persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, the date of such adoption." 24. Explanation to sub-sec. (1) of S. 6 has a bearing on the controversy in issue. The relevant portion is as under : 6. persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. Explanation- In this section, "commencement of this Act," means (i) the date on which this Act comes into force in any State, (ii) where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes' vacant land, (iii) where any notification has been issued under cl. (a) of S. 2 in respect of any area in a State in which this Act is in force, the date of publication of such notification. 25. So far as the State of U. P. is concerned, the relevant date would be 17th Feb 1975 and it is with respect to the property held on that date that the rights of the parties shall be determined. The Competent Authority was, therefore right in recording 17th Feb. 1975 as the relevant date for the purpose of the present case. 26. On consideration of merits, the District Judge found that the land had not been purchased by Hari Ram Kamani in the capacity of Karta of the joint family. He considered the sale deeds executed on 7-2-62 and 22-1-1963 and held that these sale deeds were taken by Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal in their personal capacities and not in the capacity of Karta. The District Judge rightly pointed out that since father of Hari Ram Kamani was alive, the sale deeds would have been in his name as a Karta. This was circumstance to reject the claim of the petitioner Hari Ram Kamani. It was also rightly emphasised that if the properties had been purchased for the joint family, there was no need to have a family settlement on 8th Jan. 1976 when the Act No. 33 of 1976 has come into picture. Settlement made on this date is indicative of an intention to device method to get over the provisions of the Act. The District Judge in agreement with the Competent Authority rightly concluded that this settlement was arrived at for fraudulent and deceitful purpose. 1976 when the Act No. 33 of 1976 has come into picture. Settlement made on this date is indicative of an intention to device method to get over the provisions of the Act. The District Judge in agreement with the Competent Authority rightly concluded that this settlement was arrived at for fraudulent and deceitful purpose. This was prepared to successfully evade the Act 33 of 1976. It is true, as was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that a memorandum regarding the family arrangement is not required to be registered but that was not the ground on which the settlement had been discarded. There were a number of grounds for not accepting it, 27. So far as Atma Ram Agrawal is concerned, he had filed a suit in the civil court and got a decree on the 5th March, 1976. This decree was discarded by the District Judge as well as by the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority found that the decree could not create right in favour of the sons of Atma Ram Agrawal and permit him to override the Act. The finding of the Competent and Appellate Authorities concurrently is that the property belonged exclusively to Atma Ram Agrawal. This civil court decree obtained after the enforcement of the Act was liable to be disregarded and that was rightly so done by the authorities. 28. Coming to the writ petitions of 'the State of U. P., the learned Standing counsel urged that the District Judge had committed an error in interfering with the judgment of the Competent Authority and reducing the surplus area from 4725.82 sq. metres to 2725.82 sq. m. in the case of Hari Ram Kamani and from 5095.49 sq. metres to 3095.50 sq. metres in the case of Atma Ram Agrawal. To the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal urged that calculation of ceiling land made by the District Judge as well as the Competent Authority were wrong being not in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson AIR 1983 SC 1303 : (1983 All LJ 1261). According to him, for the applicability of the provisions of S. 4(9), it is necessary that there should be two separate properties of the persons concerned - vacant land and land with building thereon having a dwelling unit. He urged that in the instant case, this was not actually the position at the spot, calculation of the ceiling limit was against the Act. 29. Dealing with the argument of the learned counsel for Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Agrawal, it may be observed that this High Court had taken the same view as was proposed by Sri Nigam. The Supreme Court has not approved the interpretation made by the High Court and has held that S. 4(9) would be attracted regardless of whether the- land holder owned a distinct part of the land on which there is no construction along with any other parcel of land where there is some construction. The Supreme Court said : "In other words, whether or not there is a surplus will not depend on whether the land holder holds a separate plot of land which is open land. To take the other view is to hold that if there is no separate plot but the construction is on the same plot, then even if the entire plot comprises 10000 sq. metres that would fall beyond the purview of S. 4 (9) even if the structure is built only on 1000 sq. metres of land." 30. A similar interpretation was attempted to be made by Sri H. S. Nigam but the same is unacceptable. 31. So far as the writ petitions of the State are concerned, it may be sufficient to point out that in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has held that : "S. 4(9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit, the extent of land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land." 32. Confusion is generally created on account of a fallacy that the land covered by construction, since cannot be taken possession of, therefore, the land underneath the construction cannot be calculated for any purpose. Confusion is generally created on account of a fallacy that the land covered by construction, since cannot be taken possession of, therefore, the land underneath the construction cannot be calculated for any purpose. It is true that while calculating the ceiling, the dwelling unit would have to be excluded but while calculating the extent of vacant land, the land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto has to be taken into account. S. 4(11) has laid down that nothing shall empower the Competent Authority to declare the land referred to in sub-clause (ii), or sub-clause (iii) of clause (q) of S. 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter. This thus prohibits a declaration of any land covered by these clauses as excess vacant land but it would be incorrect that the same cannot be taken into account while calculating the extent of vacant land. At this place the facts of. the case which the Supreme Court had before it, may be mentioned. In that case, the person liable to be proceeded with had 2530 sq. metres whereas the ceiling area was 2000 sq. metres. A dwelling house stood over 464 sq. metres. After excluding the land covered by construction and the land measuring 1000 sq. metres as appurtenant, the Supreme Court declared 530 sq. metres as surplus. This 530 sq. metres could be declared surplus only when the land surplus and appurtenant had to be taken into account otherwise if the submission of Sri H. S. Nigam is correct, in that event nothing would have been declared as surplus by the Supreme Court. 33. In the result, the two writ petitions of the State of U. P. i.e. 13162 and 13222 of 1982 succeed and are allowed and the judgment of the District Judge dated July 27, 1982 is quashed in so far as it reduced the surplus area and in other respects it is maintained. 34. Writ petitions Nos. 9272 of 1982 and 10478 of 1982 fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs in all the four writ petitions.