ORDER A.P. Misra, J. - The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 dated 24th October, 1975 and 20th June, 1975. 2. The dispute relates to plot No. 443 measuring 14.16 acres situate in village Lamaura, Pargana Charkhari, district Hamirpur. It is alleged that on the report of the Lekhpal the proceedings under section 4 of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 were initiated against the petitioners by issuing them a notice as to why should they be not ejected from the disputed land. According to the notice the said land belonged to Sri Kesar Singh and under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 the said land was declared as surplus land. The name of the petitioner was wrongly recorded on the disputed plot as Bhumidhar since 1362F. The petitioners filed objection. According to the case of the petitioners the said land was purchased by them by means of a registered sale deed dated 11th February, 1958 which was executed by the said Kesar Singh and in pursuance thereof their names were mutated in the revenue records. According to the petitioners' case they are in possession of the said Bhumidhari land thereafter respondent No. 2, however, by means of his judgment dated 20th June, 1975 rejected the objection of the petitioners and ordered that they would be ejected from the said plot. The case of the petitioners is that because of their reaching late in the court, they could not file certain essential documents in the case before the prescribed authority which they did before the lower appellate court. They filed the copies of Khatauni of 1366F. 1380F to 1382F, wherein their names were recorded as Bhumidhar and also filed the certified copy of the registered sale deed. They also filed Khasra extract from 1368F up to the relevant years when they filed those documents. The lower appellate Court also rejected the appeal filed by the petitioners by means of a judgment dated 24th October, 1975 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). They also filed Khasra extract from 1368F up to the relevant years when they filed those documents. The lower appellate Court also rejected the appeal filed by the petitioners by means of a judgment dated 24th October, 1975 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). The appellate Court held that the documents filed by the petitioners are inadmissible and further that since the petitioners did not file any objection under S. 14(3) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, hence their rights and title got extinguished and even though their names are recorded in the village record and the fact that they are in long possession and are paying the land revenue, the same will be of no avail. The petitioners being aggrieved by the aforesaid two judgments have filed the-present writ petition. 3. The petitioners' main contention is that the land in question is not covered by the word (premises' under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. Admittedly the land which is recorded as Bhumidhari land is not,being disputed by the respondents. In fact, in the appellate Court's judgment it is admitted that this land was declared as surplus land under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. In support of this the petitioners' counsel relied on the case of Sigdar Singh v. District Judge, 1980 All LJ NOC 7. In that case it was held that where a notice under section 4 of the 1972 Act was issued treating the petitioner as an unauthorised occupant on the ground that the said land had already been declared as surplus land under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, such notice could not be sustained. It was also held in that case that since in the Ceiling Act clear provision has been made for evicting such a person from the surplus land, then no resort could be had by issue of a notice under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. The facts in the present case are identical to the facts of that case. In that case it was further held that such land would not fall within the definition of word `premises' as defined under section 2(b)(ii) thereof. 4. The facts in the present case are identical to the facts of that case. In that case it was further held that such land would not fall within the definition of word `premises' as defined under section 2(b)(ii) thereof. 4. Another decision which has relevance to the present case has also been relied on by the petitioners' counsel i.e. Baldeo Raj v. State of U. P. 1984 All LJ 872. In this case also the. question arose as to the meaning of word 'premises' under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. On similar facts as in the present case it was held that since under the U. P. Z.A. & L.R. Act under section 129B there is power to evict such a person, then in such contingency the resort cannot be taken for proceedings to evict the person under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. 5. In Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Bandi Venkatarama AIR 1982 SC 1081 it was held that even if a person is alleged to be in unauthorised occupation of Government land, he cannot be evicted in this summary proceeding where the question of title has been raised. The Supreme Court was dealing with a case under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act. In that Act some remedy for eviction is provided under S. 6. It was held that when a question of title of the land in dispute arose, it could not appropriately be decided in a summary proceeding as contemplated under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act and the long possession of the respondents and their predecessors in title on those plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title. The facts in the present case are also akin, as the petitioners raised the question of title that the said land was sold by one Kesar Singh as far back as in the year 1958 and they are in possession since thereafter. The long possession and payment of revenue by the petitioners are not even disputed by the respondents, on the contrary, they have been admitted. In view of these facts also even this case applies with full force. The long possession and payment of revenue by the petitioners are not even disputed by the respondents, on the contrary, they have been admitted. In view of these facts also even this case applies with full force. In fact, under the aforesaid 1960 Act a clear provision for eviction of such a person who is said to be in possession of surplus land is provided in section 14(8) of the Unamended Act and section 14(1) after its 1 amendment. 6. In view of the aforesaid facts, I find that the impugned two orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The judgments dated 20th June, 1975 and 24th October, 1975 passed by respondents 2 and 1 respectively are hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed with costs.