ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendant's writ petition arising out of a suit under S. 209 of Act No. 1 of 1951. 2. The plaintiff opposite party had claimed bhumidhari right in the disputed land and it had been asserted that Mahant Chhabiram Das had no right to transfer the property of the plaintiff and that the defendant No. 3 had got his name entered over the disputed land in collusion with Mahant Chhabiram Das who did not file a suit for ejectment of defendant No. 3, hence the present suit for ejectment of the defendant No. 3. The defence in the case was that a valid lease was executed in favour of defendant No. 3 by defendant No. 4 Mahant Chhabiram Das and various other pleas were taken to negative the claim of the plaintiff. All the revenue courts have given judgments against the defendant-petitioner. Aggrieved by their judgments the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Sri G.N. Verma, counsel for the petitioners, has contended before me that the present suit was not brought within three years and it involved cancellation of lease in favour of the defendant petitioner executed by Mahant Chhabiram Das, Manager of the plaintiff, hence the revenue courts have patently erred in decreeing the suit. 4. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that by mere execution of lease by Mahant Chhabiram Das in the present case the interest of the plaintiff became extinguished in the disputed land and that the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Sections 163, 166 and 189 etc. of Act No. I of 1951. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in 1975 All LJ 62 Sabbir Ahmad v. Faimullah Jolsha. My attention has been drawn to the ruling reported in 1975 All LJ 316 Balbir Singh v. Indra Kumar and it has been contended that the defendant-petitioner was immune from ejectment as the transfer in his favour was not against the public policy, but the revenue courts have patently erred in decreeing the plaintiffs suit. 5. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was somewhat attractive. 5. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was somewhat attractive. It was contended that under general law of limitation a suit for cancellation of lease in favour of the petitioners could be brought only within three years, yet the revenue courts have applied six years rule of limitation provided for a suit under S. 209 of the U.P. Z. A. and L.R. Act at relevant time, hence their judgments need be quashed. On scrutiny and finding of fact it is evident that the lease was executed in favour of the defendant-petitioner by Mahant Chhabiram Das treating the disputed property as his, hence the lease was characterised by the revenue courts as void document. The disputed property really belonged to the plaintiff-opposite party and it was not bhumidhari of Mahant Chhabiram Das, hence he had no authority to execute the lease in favour of the defendant-petitioner describing the disputed property as his bhumidhari. If the aforesaid Mahant Chhabiram Das had executed lease on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners may have assumed significance but when the disputed property was treated by Mahant Chhabiram Das as his bhumidhari, which was not his, it would lead to an inference that the lease was executed by a person having no right and title to the disputed land. Therefore, the lease would be a void document and it can be ignored by the revenue courts without cancelling the same. Therefore, the limitation provided under general law for cancellation of lease would not stand in the way of the revenue courts in granting decree for ejectment of the defendant-petitioner in a suit under S. 209 of U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act when the document is void and not voidable. In the circumstances of this case the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners has no significance and cannot help the defendant- petitioner in negativing the claim of the plaintiff opposite party. 6. As regards the second contention the ruling reported in 1975 All LJ 62 Shabbir Ahmad v. Faimullah Jolsha is against the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In the aforesaid ruling it has been indicated that a sirdar transferor can obtain bhumidhari right in the land sold by him. 6. As regards the second contention the ruling reported in 1975 All LJ 62 Shabbir Ahmad v. Faimullah Jolsha is against the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. In the aforesaid ruling it has been indicated that a sirdar transferor can obtain bhumidhari right in the land sold by him. In this view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that by mere execution of lease the interest of the plaintiff-opposite party became extinguished in the disputed land is no, acceptable to me. The aforesaid ruling does not help the defendant-petitioner in any manner. Moreover in the present case the lease was executed by Mahant Chhabi Ram Das treating the disputed property as his hhumidhari and not hhumidhari of the plaintiff-opposite party hence there was no valid transfer in favour of the defendant-petitioner and the document being void did not extinguish the right of rightful tenure-holder. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard stands answered by the ruling cited by himself. I think that in the circumstances of the present case the lease in favour of the petitioners executed by Mahant Chhabiram Das treating the disputed property as his bhumidhari did not extinguish the title of the plaintiff-opposite party in the disputed land. 7. The ruling referred to by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner and reported in 1975 All LJ 316 Balbir Singh v. Indra Kumar is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the aforesaid ruling the transaction was only voidable hence an observation has been made that the interest of the transferee remained unimpaired as operative till the suit for ejectment was brought by the Gaon Sabha. In the present case the lease deed in favour of the petitioners being void was rightly ignored by the revenue courts and the decree passed by the revenue courts cannot be termed as suffering from any error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. 8. In the present case the lease deed in favour of the petitioners being void was rightly ignored by the revenue courts and the decree passed by the revenue courts cannot be termed as suffering from any error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. 8. Lastly it was suggested that the revenue courts have not examined the question of limitation involved in the present suit, but on scrutiny it has been found that the defendant's possession started from 1367 Fasli and on the date of the suit the defendant-petitioner had not matured right or title to the disputed land hence he was rightly ordered to be ejected from the disputed land. 9. The decree for ejectment and damages passed by the revenue courts appears to be a quite valid decree and it needs no interference. The findings of fact recorded by the revenue courts do not suffer from any error of law. 10. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.