JUDGMENT Anil Kumar Sen, J: In an appeal preferred by the defendant against an order of injunction, two applications came up for hearing before us. One of the applications is for stay of the order of injunction and had been filed by the defendant-appellant. The other application is by the plaintiff respondent for vacating the ad• interim stay earlier granted by this Court. Since disposal of the applications would involve consideration of issues involved. In the appeal itself, by consent of the parties, we have heard out the appeal itself after dispensing with all other formalities. 2. The plaintiff respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant). The defendant is a Firm. On November 6, 1982 the defendant served a notice upon the plaintiff intimating him that due to shortage/non-availability of levy cement, the volume of work of the company has fallen considerably and in the result, the management had been unable to provide employment to all the employees, including the Sales Staff of the Company. Therefore, on the request of the management, some of the employees had resigned voluntarily and had received their final dues The plaintiff, who was an employee in 1be Stiles branch, was asked to approach to the Company's position and was requested to collect his final dues, obviously on voluntary resignation within' November 15, 1982. The notice went on to say further that failing which "the management will be compelled to retrench you on the ground of surplus to the requirement of the company in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947". 3. The notice went on to say further that failing which "the management will be compelled to retrench you on the ground of surplus to the requirement of the company in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947". 3. In December 1982, the plaintiff instituted Title Suit No 2314 of 1982 against the defendant challenging the above notice on the allegation that the plaintiff had been in the employment of the defendant since June 1972 as the permanent employee but the defendant mala fide and illegally served the above notice on baseless grounds which had been duty controverted by the plaintiff in his reply dated November 13, 1982 and since November 27, 1982 the plaintiff was not being a!1owed to sign the Attendance Register and that such action on the part of the defendant was violative of the service condition to which the employer is bound by law On these allegations, the plaintiff sought for (a) a declaration that the notice dated November 6, 1982 and the subsequent refusal by the defendant to the plaintiff to sign the Attendance Register since November 27, 1982 wore arbitrary, mala fide, illegal and invalid (b) for a further declaration that the plaintiff should be deemed to have been continuing in service, (c) for injunction and other ancillary reliefs. 4. Having filed such a suit, the plaintiff filed an application for injunction restraining the defendant from giving effect to and/or from taking any measure or doing any act or thing in pursuance of or towards implementation of the above notice dated November 6, 1982. 5. The defendant contested the said application for injunction by filing an objection In this objection it was first contended that since the dispute raised is really an industrial dispute and the plaintiff Is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute which is raised before this Court It was further alleged that by a notice dated November 18, 1982 the plaintiff had already been lawfully retrenched with effect from November 27, 1982 and he was duly offered all the necessary retrenchment benefits Which he has refused to accept. According to the defendant the present suit was tiled in suppression of the said fact with due knowledge that the plaintiff had been lawfully retrenched and filed the suit on false allegations with the sole object of restraining giving effect to the order of retrenchment in a collateral measure The defendant further pleaded that the defendant acted bona fide in directing the retrenchment of the plaintiff because in the existing circumstances the plaintiff had because surplus along with a number of other staff who gracefully accepted such retrenchment. All the material allegations made in the application for injunction being denied, the defendant took the defence that the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction. 6. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court by an order dated January 8, 1983 allowed the plaintiff's prayer for injunction. He held that when the plaintiff had asked for a declaration that the notice is arbitrary and mala fide and for an injunction restraining the defendant from implementing it, there is no bar for the Civil Court to entertain such a suit and grant an injunction in consonance with the principle of equity and natural justice He hold further that even if the dispute is one triable by an Industrial Court that does not debar the Civil Court from deciding the matter Since according to the learned Judge refusal of the prayer for injunction would cause great injustice' to the plaintiff, he allowed the said prayer. Being aggrieved the defendant preferred the present appeal. 7. Having heard the Counsel for the parties and on careful consideration of the legal position, we are unable to sustain the order of injunction. The legal position on the point of Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the present nature has now been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v Wadke, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 . It appears that the case wall cited before the learned Judge. It Is only when the dispute raised is an industrial dispute relating to the enforcement or any right or obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, that such a dispute is exclusively triable in the manner and by the authority prescribed by the Act so that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate any such dispute is necessarily excluded Here in the present case, though it has been strongly contended by Mr. Das that the plaintiff is really trying to enforce his rights under the Industrial Disputes Act by challenging in effect the retrenchment itself, it had been rightly pointed out by Mr. Chatterjee that we must confine ourselves to the plaintiff's case made in the plaint. In the plaint, Mr.Chatterjee contended, there is no reference to the retrenchment or to infringement of any right to the plaintiff under the Industrial Disputes Act. According to Mr. Chatterjee the plaintiff has simply challenged the notice dated November 6. 1982 under the ordinary law and has sought for relief in relation thereto 8. On the plaintiff's pleading as in the plaint, we may accept the contention of Mr Chatterjee, But if that be the position, then there are two obstacles for the plaintiff in the matter of obtaining an order of Injunction from the Civil Court First of all, he has to make out a prima facie case that the impugned notice being in breach of law is liable to be set aside. But there is hardly any case made out by the plaintiff in this regard Except for a bare assertion that the notice is arbitrary and illegal, there is nothing in the pleading to show how it is so We called upon Mr Chatterjee to satisfy us how it can be held that the notice as service upon the plaintiff can be said to be in breach of any law whatsoever, if it is not in breach of the Industrial Disputes Act It is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the defendant, as the master, could have under the ordinary law terminated the service of the plaintiff but the defendant cannot call upon the plaintiff to resign and threaten to retrench him in the absence of voluntary resignation We find no merit in such a contention of Mr. Chatterjee. By the notice the defendant only gave an option to the plaintiff to resign as done by the other employees who had become equally surplus, so that, if the plaintiff does not opt for resignation. the defendant Can take action by way of retrenchment, if the subsequent retrenchment, is not the subject-matter of the challenge, as is conceded by Mr. Chatterice before 115 at this stage of the impugned notice, it cannot be presumed that the action that would follow would in any way be not in accordance with Jaw. the defendant Can take action by way of retrenchment, if the subsequent retrenchment, is not the subject-matter of the challenge, as is conceded by Mr. Chatterice before 115 at this stage of the impugned notice, it cannot be presumed that the action that would follow would in any way be not in accordance with Jaw. Therefore the offer to exercise the option as above by itself does not render the notice either arbitrary or illegal as suggested by Mr. Chatterjee Or that its implementation or follow up action should be restrained by the Court. On the notice as it stands, it can hardly be said that it is not in accordance with law. 9 The second obstacle for the plaintiff is S. 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act Even assuming for a moment that the notice impugned is illegal, it is a notice as a prelude to the termination of the plaintiff's contract of the service with the defendant If the rights to be enforced are under the ordinary law as claimed by Mr. Chatterjee and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, contract of personal service not being capable of specific performance, no injunction can be g-anted to prevent the alleged threatened breach there of The plaintiff's remedy in that event Would be for damages We have set out the relief claimed in the present suit. Reading the relief with reference to the substance what had been prayed is an order of injunction restraining the defendant from terminating the service of the plaintiff as indicated by the defendant in his letter dated November 6, 1982 Such a relief in our opinion, cannot be granted in view of the provision of the Specific Relief Act referred to hereinbefore Reliance was placed by Mr. Chatterjee on a Privy Council decision in the case of Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan, reported in AIR 1950 PC 81, where the Company removed the managing agents by an ordinary resolution passed in the general meeting contrary to the Articles of Association which was the subject matter of the challenge before the Civil Court. Chatterjee on a Privy Council decision in the case of Ram Kissendas v. Satya Charan, reported in AIR 1950 PC 81, where the Company removed the managing agents by an ordinary resolution passed in the general meeting contrary to the Articles of Association which was the subject matter of the challenge before the Civil Court. The question being raised as to whether such a relief would be barred in view of the provision of the Specific Relief Act, it was observed by the Privy Counsel that the resolution effecting the termination of the, managing agents' appointment was being challenged as contrary to the Articles of Association constituted under the Act. The relief sought for may prevent the dismissal of the managing agents or' termination of the appointment at the instance of the majority in violation of the Articles of Association which the minority are entitled to have observed but as between the company and the managing agents, it has not the effect of enforcing a Contract of personal service. This very fact is the distinguishing feature of the case. As we have pointed out hereinbefore in the present case, the plaintiff has framed the suit in a manner that he claims in substance, relief by way of injunction restraining termination of the contract of service. It is not the case where the notice being contrary to law is declared as such with a result as indicated by the Privy Council in the aforesaid case. The other decision which was relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee is one in the case of Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Kailas, reported in AIR 1964 Gujrat 265. This case, however, is clearly distinguishable because there what was being challenged was an Act contrary to Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) framed under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946. Mr. Chatterjee's own contention is that in this suit the plaintiff is not claiming any relief under the Industrial Disputes Act or under any Rule or Regulation ancillary thereto. Hence, in our opinion, the Civil Court should not have granted any injunction restraining the implementation or the impugned notice on the ground that by such an illegal notice the plaintiff is being threatened with breach of his contract of service with the defendant. 10. Hence, in our opinion, the Civil Court should not have granted any injunction restraining the implementation or the impugned notice on the ground that by such an illegal notice the plaintiff is being threatened with breach of his contract of service with the defendant. 10. These two important aspects were lost sight of by the learned Judge in the City Civil Court when he granted the prayer for injunction merely because according to him the Civil Court possessed the necessary jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. Even when the Court has otherwise jurisdiction to entertain a suit, it must satisfy itself that the plaintiff has also fulfilled the legal requirement for grant of an injunction in his favour. Failure of the learned Judge in this regard has vitiated the order. 11. In the result the appeal is allowed. The impugned order being set aside we dismiss the plaintiff's application for injunction. Since the appeal itself is being allowed the, other two applications become infruotuous and they are disposed of as such There will be no order as to costs. No formal decree need be drawn up Prabir Kumar Majumdar, J : I agree. Appeal allowed.