R. N. Aggarwal, J. ( 1 ) WHAT is prohibited is the indecent riotous or disorderly behaviour in a street or public place and such like places as also the use of threatening abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned. It would thus be seen that Section 93 of Delhi Police Act is wider in sweep in as much as even if there is no intention to provoke a breach of peace but the behaviour is such that it is likely to provoke a breach of peace the offence will be deemed to have been committed. We are making a reference to the aforesaid provisions to indicate that indecent and riotous behaviour having a tendency to provoke others irrespective of the fact whether a person is drunk or not has been made an offence At no place Sections 91/93 Delhi Police Act makes it a precondition that the accused must be found to be under the influence of alcohol. Whether the accused is under the influence of alcohol or not is immaterial if, on the facts of the case he was otherwise found misbe having, abusing or creating nuisance in a public place and if such disorderly behaviour on his. part was likely to occasion a breach of peace. That is all what the requirement of Sections 91 and 93 of Delhi Police Act are. If on the facts of this case we find that the accused did behave in a manner which was prohibited by the aforesaid provisions of law then irrespective of the fact whether he was under the influence of alcohol or not, he would be deemed to have committed the offence. ( 2 ) MR. Chawla came to the conclusion that on the basis of the clinical examination of Public Witness 4 it is impossible to say that the respondent was under the influence of alcohol at the time of commission of offence and in this regard reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bachu Bhai Hasan Ali Kariyani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971 A. C. J. p. 116. The learned Additional Sessions Judge felt that neither the urine test nor the blood test of the respondent was carried in this case to find out if he was really under the influence of alcohol and that it is not possible to say on the basis of the clinical test by Dr. V. Vijay Sarthy that the respondent was drunk. , In the first place we may say that doctors are experts in their own right and when they examine a person and give opinion it does not normally mean that their opinion is not correct. The question that arises in this regard is as to whether such evidence will be deemed to be a sufficient evidence of the fact that the accused was drunk. The ruling referred to by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also disinguishable in as much as in that case the blood of the accused had been sent for chemical examination but the result thereof was suppresed from the court. In such circumstances court would always be justified in disregarding evidence of clinical examination. ( 3 ) NOW this Section by itself does not confer an immunity from prosecution on a police official unless it is specially notified by the Government. We have seen that a Notification to this effect is in existence but it still remains to be determined as to whether. the offence committed by the respondent can be said to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. In view of the peculiar facts of this case we are of the view that the offence committed by the respondent cannot be said to have been committed by him under the colour of duty. In the present case one has to remember that even though the accused was in the possession of a warrant of attachment, he went to exacute the same during the night hours and in a mental state which was highly unbecoming of a police official. The simple fact that he was in uniform and he was in possession of a warrant would not confer a licence upon him to behave in any manner he likes. The simple fact that he was in uniform and he was in possession of a warrant would not confer a licence upon him to behave in any manner he likes. We cannot take wooden attitude in such matters and it can never be said that a police officer is at liberty to abuse and use indecent language and behave in disorderly manner while he is supposed to be on duty. If that view of the matter is taken it would only amount to giving them a licence For commission of offences and that would be an end of rule of law. To our mind the accused in the present case cannot take shelter behind Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code. We are fortified in our view by S. B. Saha and others v. M. S. Kochar, A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1841, wherein it has been held : "the sine qua nol for the applicability of Section 197 as that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him. The words "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" employed in Section 197 (1) are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be". In the wider sense, these words will take under umbrella every art constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to be import of these words lies between these two extremes. In the wider sense, these words will take under umbrella every art constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to be import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the prestection of Section 197 (1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision It is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Section 197 will be attracted. The question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office demands on the facts of each case. One broad test for this purpose is whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office. " ( 5 ) IN the present case on the basis of the material on record we find that the conduct indulged in by the respondent is not even remotely connected with his official duty. It does not fall within the scope and range of his official duties and if the accused were challenged he could never reasonably claim that he abused and indulged in unruly conduct by virtue of his office. We are therefore of the view that the accused. is not entitled to the protection as envisaged by Section 197 and there was no question of any sanction for prosecution in the present case. "facts : The respondent Sube Singh, a constable was found in possession of a warrant of attachment and he had gone in uniform for the execution of the said warrant against Mr. Dalip Singh at his house at B-52, Kidwai Nagar, during night hours. "facts : The respondent Sube Singh, a constable was found in possession of a warrant of attachment and he had gone in uniform for the execution of the said warrant against Mr. Dalip Singh at his house at B-52, Kidwai Nagar, during night hours. As per testimony of Dalip Singh, the respondent was persuaded to go back but then he soon reappeared sometime at 10 P. M. and started indulging in a disorderly and unruly conduct as a result of which a number of people were attracted to the scene and police officers Vijay Kumar, Budh Ram and a constable Abdul Rashid also arrived and found the accused indulging in nuisance and creating a scene by abusing people. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate found the respondent guilty under Sections 91/93/97 of Delhi Police Act and after convicting him had sentenced him to payment of Rs. 100. 00 as fine in default of which the respondent was required to undergo simple imprisonment for 7 days. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in a revision application against this order, acquitted the respondent. The present acquittal appeal is against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. In the present appeal, the acquittal order was set aside, and order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was reaffirmed. "