R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application by the original plaintiff arise from the refusal of interim injunction against the order of suspension pending inquiry. In Civil Suit No. 823 of 1983 on 27/09/1983 the learned trial Judge had granted ex-parte interim order and after hearing the other side by the order dt. 25/10/1983 vacated the same. However by an order below ex. 20 the order vacating interim junction was suspended till 27-10-83. On 27-10-83 the District Court had granted the order of status quo as on the date of the suit but it was directed that the appellant was not to attend his office. It is not in dispute that from 27th September till 26/10/1983 the petitioner has worked and he has also been paid for the same. However on 27/10/1983 inspite of the appellate order and which had been continued and despite the interim order of the High Court dt. 12-1-84 to maintain status quo the petitioner has not been paid his salary as if the order of suspension had taken effect. It is clear that from 27th September the order - of suspension was stayed by the trial Court and thereafter the order of status quo by the appellate Court as well as by the High Court has been in operation. Therefore he is not under suspension althroughout this period and he is entitled to his arrears and salary on the basis that he was not under suspension. This is required to be clarified in the present Revision Application. The grievance has been made by the petitioner that the order of the High Court has not been implemented. The leaned Counsel for the opponents has stated that it would have no objection in making that payment. However strong grievance has been made by the respondents that the petitioner has been duly suspended pending inquiry and it cannot be stayed by way of interim order in a suit. ( 2 ) AT the hearing of this Revision Application. I had to inquire from the Counsel as to how long the suspension was likely to continue and whether he would be in a position to indicate as to within what time the inquiry would be initiated and would be finalised. The learned Counsel was not in a position to make any statement. I had to inquire from the Counsel as to how long the suspension was likely to continue and whether he would be in a position to indicate as to within what time the inquiry would be initiated and would be finalised. The learned Counsel was not in a position to make any statement. After much effort the learned Counsel stated that if after the report of the C. B. I. the authority were to come to a prima facie conclusion that minor penalty was likely to be imposed it would take about nine months to finalise the inquiry after the receipt of the report of the C. B. I. However if major punishment was to be imposed the Counsel was not in a position to state any time limit. The Counsel was also unable to state as to within what time C. B. I. would complete the inquiry. Therefore the Court is left with no alternative but to decide the present Revision Application on its merits. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff has contended that the order of suspension is passed without any basis and the allegations pertain to the period while he was working at Nagpur before several years and his work and performance at Junagadh have been found to be fully satisfactory and outstanding and there was no reason or no necessity for suspension because at Junagadh where he was serving he has been serving to the full satisfaction of his superiors and in an outstanding manner and since the alleged or concocted inquiry against him does not relate to anything at Junagadh there is no question of his tampering with any evidence. If for something which had happened in Nagpur in 1979 which had not necessitated the suspension for four years there is no reason why he should be suspended now. It was also pointed out that the respondents had tried to transfer the petitioner to Rajasthan and the same was challenged by the petitioner by way of a Civil Suit in which injunction was not only granted but was confirmed by the trial Court District Court High Court and the Supreme Court and therefore the present suspension has been resorted to. It is therefore clearly colourable exercise of power. It is therefore clearly colourable exercise of power. The trial Court has also held that it would not be improper to suspend the official during pendency of inquiry as it may be necessary to find out the facts from the people working under him or look into the papers which are in his custody and it would be embarrassing and inopportune for both the sides. The learned Judge has not referred to any material. The trial Court has also observed that the plaintiff has obtained interim order against his transfer and the only course which remained open for successful inquiry is suspension. This reasoning is not only erroneous but is perverse Ordinarily the Courts would not interfere in the- matter of transfer of a servant. But when right from the trial Court to the Supreme Court the order of transfer is stayed and his case is confirmed that is a strong indication to show that the insistence of the authorities to transfer the servant was wholly unjustified and it would not be open to any authority to circumvent the injunction against transfer by suspending the employee. The trial Court had also held that the order was already served and therefore the order was effective and its implementation cannot be suspended. The trial Court has not appreciated that by the ex parte impugned order not only the suspension was stayed but it was effectively stayed and in fact the petitioner- plaintiff had been working during pendency of the injunction application in the trial Court. ( 4 ) THE learned Appellate Judge has also held that since the order was already implemented the injunction could not have been issued. The fact that the order was not implemented is clear from the petitioner actual working till 27/10/1983 and it is for the Court to decide depending upon facts and circumstances of each case what type the interim order the court would pass and the court would not be powerless merely on the ground that the suspension order has already been served. If the court finds on merits that a suspension order requires to be stayed or the defendants are required to be restrained from further giving effect to the suspension order it has the power and authority to issue necessary and effective orders. If the court finds on merits that a suspension order requires to be stayed or the defendants are required to be restrained from further giving effect to the suspension order it has the power and authority to issue necessary and effective orders. the lower appellate Court has not gone into any questions whether there is prima facie case or not and only on the question whether the suspension order has been served or not entire matter has been disposed of. The learned Appellate Judge has observed in para 11 of his order that this aspect need not be considered at all because the suspension order having been implemented once the utility of the suit itself would be in question. The possibility of it having become infructuous is clearly indicated In that view of the matter it appeared to the learned Appellate Judge that the plaintiff will have no prima facie case and there can be no injunction against implementation of the order which has been implemented and therefore the court felt that there was no substance in the appeal. ( 5 ) AS held by me earlier the lower Appellate Court has completely and erroneously refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him to consider the matter on merits on the erroneous and misconceived ground that there could be no injunction against the order which is already in effect. Now in the first place the order could not have been said to have been effected in view of the fact that from 27th September to 26th October the petitioner was actually working and if the court on merits finds that the plaintiff had a strong case against suspension the court has ample authority power and duty to make the order of effective justice by issuing appropriate injunction even restraining them from giving further effect to the order of suspension. ( 6 ) SINCE both the courts have failed to consider the case of interim injunction on merits and since they have failed to consider whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case in the suit and whether the injunction should be granted on appreciation of merits I find that the courts below have committed an error I direct the trial Court to rehear the application for injunction and for that purpose the matter is being remanded back However until the trial Court decides afresh the application for interim injunction the status quo shall continue and the petitioners shall be entitled to all his salary and other benefits as if he has not been suspended. ( 7 ) IN the result the Revision Application succeeds and the impugned orders of the lower Courts are quashed and set aside and are substituted by the order that the matter is remanded back to the trial Court for rehearing afresh the interim injunction application and the injunction granted earlier by this court till such fresh decision shall continue. Rule made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute. .