H. N. SETH, J. ( 1 ) BY this application Ghurey Singh, who is accused of committing of offences punishable under sections 302, 307, 452, 325, 147, 148, 149 and 436 I. P. C. prays that he may be directed to be enlarged on bail, during the pendency of his trial in the court below. The applicant along with his co-accused Hukma had, on an earlier occasion also, applied for similar relief by means of Criminal Misc, Bail Application no. 4074 of 1984, but the prayer made by him was refused by this Court, vide order dated 12th of September, 1984. The applicant seeks justification for moving this second application for the same relief by contending that he is doing so on fresh grounds. The Applicant was arrested on 20th of March, 1984, in connection with a case under section 302/149 I. P. C. registered at police station Goverdhan in pursuance of an F. I. R. ladged by one Lakshami Narain. A cross version of the incident was conveyed to the Police at Police station Govardhan by the applicant by means of a written first information report lodged by him on the same days and on the hasis hereof a case under sections 147/148/49 and 307 I. P. C. was registered against Laxmi Narain and others. ( 2 ) WHILE the police was still investigating the case, three of the co-accused with the applicant, namely, Chhittar, Rati Ram and Sheo Ram filed Cr1. Misc. Bail Application No. 3679 of 1984, dated 25th of April, 1984 before this Court on 14th of May, 1984 and prayed that they may be directed to be released on bail. The learned Judge before whom the application came up for orders, after taking into consideration the rival versions set up by the concerned parties as also existence of injuries on both sides, made an order dated 17th of May, 1984 directing that the three accused be released on bail. Thereafter applicant Ghurey Singh along with co-accused Hukma, presented Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 4074 of 1984, dated 19th of May, 1984 before this court, on 6th June, 1984 and on 7th of June, 1984, they were admitted to bail by another learned Judge of this Court. Thereafter applicant Ghurey Singh along with co-accused Hukma, presented Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 4074 of 1984, dated 19th of May, 1984 before this court, on 6th June, 1984 and on 7th of June, 1984, they were admitted to bail by another learned Judge of this Court. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED, one Girdhari Lal moved the Supreme Court of India for the grant of Special Leave to appeal against the orders dated 17th of May, 1984 and 7th of June, 1984 passed by the two learned Judges of this Court. The Supreme Court, vide its order dated 4th of July, 1984 suspended the operation of both the impugned orders and directed that the applicant along with Hukam, Chhittar, Rati Ram and Sheo Ram be arrested forthwith and they be detained in jail. The applicant accordingly surrendered before the Magistrate and was taken into custody on 23rd of July, 1984. According to the applicant while the petition for Special Leave to Appeal against the orders dated 17th of May, 1984 and 7th of June, 1984 was pending, and as the police had not, after completing the investigation, submitted a chargesheet against him and the total period of his detention had exceeded 90 days, he, by means of an application, dated 2nd of August, 1984 approached the Supreme Court and prayed that he be directed to be released on bail as provided by proviso. (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently the police actually lodged the chargesheet against the applicant in the Court of the Magistrate on 7th of August, 1984. The applicant claims that the, Supreme Court did not pass any orders on the aforesaid application filed by him, and eventually, vide its order, dated 24th of August, 1984 it granted special leave to. Girdhari Lal, to appeal against this Courts orders, dated 17th of May 1984 and 7th of June 1984 and after hearing counsel for the parties, set aside the impugned orders granting bail to the applicant and his co-accused and remanded the two bail applications back to this Court for being disposed of by any one of its Judges. ( 4 ) THE two bail applications, namely, Cr1. Misc. Bail Application No. 3679 of 1984 and Cr1. Misc. ( 4 ) THE two bail applications, namely, Cr1. Misc. Bail Application No. 3679 of 1984 and Cr1. Misc. Application No. 4074 of 1984 were put up before me and after hear in learned counsel for the parties with regard to merits of the rival cases set up by the parties, concluded that accused Chhittar, Rati Ram, Sheo. Ram and Hukma deserved to be released on bail, but then it was not a fixed case where a similar order for releasing applicant Ghurey Singh on bail, should be made. At this stage, all the concerned counsel appearing in the case made a request that I should not discuss the reasons for my conclusion in the order lest such discussion may prejudice either of the parties in the criminal trial which was to follow. Accordingly, by order dated 12th of September, 1984, rejected the prayer for bail made by Ghurey Singh and directed that the remaining accused be released on bail. ( 5 ) ONCE again Ghurey Singh has approached this Court with the request that he may be directed to be released on bail. A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the Application shows that his request for bail is founded on following two grounds: (i) That having regard to the circumstances of the case, the prosecution case appears to be improbable and that it stands belied by the material brought on the record, and (ii) That the police did not submit a chargesheet against the applicant within the period of 90 days as specified by section 167 Cr. P. C. Accordingly, the applicant should, in views of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 167, be directed to be released on bail. So far as first of aforementioned two grounds is concerned, I had, before passing the order, dated 12th of September, 1984, taken into consideration this aspect of the case. It was only after doing so that I had come in the conclusion that whereas the prayer for bail made by the applicant deserved to. be rejected and that made on behalf of his co-accused had to be accepted. No fresh circumstances having repercussion on this aspect of the case, which have come into existence subsequent to the order, dated 12th of September 84 have been brought to my notice. be rejected and that made on behalf of his co-accused had to be accepted. No fresh circumstances having repercussion on this aspect of the case, which have come into existence subsequent to the order, dated 12th of September 84 have been brought to my notice. Accordingly, lam not satisfied that any case has been made out justifying reconsideration of my earlier order on merits at this stage. ( 6 ) SO far as the second plea raised on behalf of the applicant is concerned, it will be pertinent to note the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relevant portion whereof runs thus: p167 (1) Whenever any person is arrested the officer incharge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole Provided that (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding (i ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years: (ii) any, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail and every person released on bail under this subsection shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter. (b)Explanation I: For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that not withstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a) the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. (b)Explanation I: For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that not withstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a) the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation II- (2a) ( 7 ) A perusal of the section shows that the Magistrate is, on expiry of the period of ninety days mentioned therein; obliged to direct the release of an accused from jail only if the accused is prepared to, and actually furnishes bail. If he fail to do so, he is to be kept in detention till he furnishes the bail. In the case of Vijay Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. 1 a Division Bench of this Court has ruled that the proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 Cr. P. C. is applicable only to recognizance stage of a case and that the said stage comes to an end as soon as chargesheet is submitted. The provisions contained in proviso (a) to subsection (2) of Section 167 to the effect that an accused, released on bail under this sub-section, will be deemed to have been so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for purposes of that Chapter makes it clear that in appropriate cases such bail can also be can celled. It is also obvious that once such bail granted to an accused is cancelled, there would be no question of making any further orders under this subsection directing release of an accused on bail on the ground that the police has failed to submit a chargesheet even though the period of ninety days stipulated in the section has expired. Further, section 167 (2) does not in any way inhibit the exercise of powers conferred upon the Court of Sessions and the High Court to direct the release of at accused on bail either at the stage covered by section 167 (2) of the Code or at any other stage. It is also clear that once the Court of Sessions or the High Court grants bail to an accused at the stage contemplated by Section 167 (2) either before or after expiry of period of ninety days specified therein, no question of any further applicability of proviso (a) to subsection (2) of Section 167 remains and the accused has thereafter to be dealt with in accordance with other provisions contained in the Code. It may be that in a case where an accused invokes the jurisdiction of the Court, under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before expiry of the period of ninety days envisaged by proviso (a) to subsection (2) of Section 167, but his application comes up for hearing after expiry of the said period but before a, chargesheet is submitted by the police, the Court of Sessions or the High; Court, as the case may be, may take the provisions of section 167 (2) into consideration and admit the accused to bail without looking into any other aspect of the case. Likewise the Court of Sessions and the High Court may also dispose of the, application for bail in a similar manner when its jurisdiction under section 439 has been invoked in cases in which the police has failed to submit the chargesheet within the period of ninety days envisaged by section 167 (2) but before the stage at which the said section ceases to be operative is reached. I am, however, clear that while dealing with a bail application under section 439 Cr. P. C. moved after the stage at which Section 167 (2) has ceased to be operative, the consideration mentioned in that sub-section would not at all be relevant. In cases where the accused either did not or was, for any reason, not in a position to avail the benefit of proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 at the relevant stage, his application for bail under section 439 Cr. P. C. when it comes up for hearing after such stage has ceased to exist, has to be dealt with in accordance with the normal principles governing consideration of such applications. ( 8 ) I find that in the case before me, the applicant was arrested on 20th of March, 1984, and the period of ninety days mentioned in proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 expired on or about 18th of June, 1984. However, before arrival of that date, the applicant moved this Court and on 7th of June, 1984 obtained an order directing that he be released on bail. However, before arrival of that date, the applicant moved this Court and on 7th of June, 1984 obtained an order directing that he be released on bail. In as much as the High Court had, before expiry of the period of ninety days stipulated by proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code, already made an order releasing the applicant on bail, no question of any further applicability of proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 remained. Subsequently the bail granted to the applicant by the High Court was cancelled by the Supreme Court, vide its order, dated 4th of July, 1984. It cannot be doubted that once the bail granted to the applicant was cancelled by the Supreme Court on 4th of July, 1984, it was not open to the Magistrate to, as between that date and 7th of August, 1984 i. e. the date on which the charge sheet was; according to the applicant, submitted before the court, invoke his jurisdiction under section 167 (2) and to direct that the applicant be released on bail for the reason that no chargesheet had been; as contemplated by Section 167 (2) of the Code, submitted before the court within the period of ninety days. Afortiori while rejecting the applicants application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 12th of September, 1984, the High Court too could not take that factor into consideration. In as much as the present application for bail has. been filed after the stage mentioned in proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 has ceased to exist, no question of taking the said factor into consideration remains and the applicant is not entitled to be released on bail on that ground. There is, however, one more aspect which deserves consideration in this regard. As stated earlier, the applicant had, after expiry of the period of ninety days specified ill clause (a) (i) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 and before the chargesheet was submitted by the Investigating Officer, applied for bail before the Supreme Court on 2nd of August, 1984. As stated earlier, the applicant had, after expiry of the period of ninety days specified ill clause (a) (i) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 and before the chargesheet was submitted by the Investigating Officer, applied for bail before the Supreme Court on 2nd of August, 1984. Despite that application, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal to Girdhari Lal enabling him to appeal against the order, dated 17th of May, 1984 and 7th of June, 1984 and eventually it set aside those two orders and directed the High Court to consider the said bail applications afresh. Had it found any merit in applicants contention, was at that stage entitled to the benefit of proviso (a) to subsection (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would have upheld High Courts order, dated 17th of June, 1984 releasing him on bail and would not have remanded the case to it for fresh consideration. This indicates that even if the Supreme Court did not pass any specific order on the applicants application, dated 2nd of August, 1984, it had by necessary application, rejected the said application. Once such an application did not find favour with the Supreme Court, it will not be apt to countenance similar submission while considering the present application for bail by the applicant. In the result, I am not satisfied that any case has been made out for directing the release of the applicant on bail at this stage this application accordingly fails and rejected. Bail application rejected. .