ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. - These petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution arising from proceedings under the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act 22 of 1972) hereinafter referred to as the Act) give rise to common questions of fact and law and are hence being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The relevant facts concerning the dispute being similar it is not necessary to refer in detail to each of these petitions. Suffice it may be to refer in brief to the facts as appearing in writ petition No. 323 of 1980. The controversy is traced back to the First War of Independence in the year 1857. The town of Jalaun forming part of the Bundelkhand area was ravaged materially during this period. Upon the British administration regarding ascendency, a plan was chalked out by the then Collector, Jalaun, to rehabilitate and improve the township. It was decided to set up a market complex under the caption of Baithakganj in the heart of the town. With this object in view offers were made to persons who could afford to raise pucca shops of approved specification as per plan on Nazul land. In order to make the scheme attractive, the grant made of different parcels of land was free of rent, no interest was created in the land in favour of the grantees but they were given the right to raise, maintain and also transfer from time to time the shops built over the land. The shops were accordingly raised by the grantees as per specification, these have been transferred successively ever since the year 1982 (1882?) or so and were also from time to time rebuilt or remodelled with the sanction of the local authority. 3. In the month of December 1970 the Nagar Palika, Jalaun moved the prescribed Authority under the U. P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 (U. P. Act 12 of 1959) to evict the petitioners on ground that their right to remain in occupation stands determined and for recovery of damages. The prescribed Authority issued notice to the petitioners (who are transferees of the respective shops) to which they filed objections. In writ petitions 323 of 1980, 10418 of 1979 and 325 of 1980 the Prescribed Authority discharged the notices. The prescribed Authority issued notice to the petitioners (who are transferees of the respective shops) to which they filed objections. In writ petitions 323 of 1980, 10418 of 1979 and 325 of 1980 the Prescribed Authority discharged the notices. In the rest, however, order was made for eviction and recovery of damages. In appeal learned III Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Orai has on October 19, 1979, by separate but on common grounds directed eviction and recovery of damages against all these petitioners. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court seeking the writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the III Additional District Judge dated 19th October, 1979 in each of these cases and the impugned orders of the Prescribed Authority. 5. Let us at the outset have a brief look at the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has for its object the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by recourse to summary, process. `Public Premises' is defined in S. 2(e) as including Nazul land. The expression `unauthorised occupation' is defined as under in S. 2(g). " "unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of-transfer) under which or the capacity in which he was allowed to hold or occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever, and also includes continuance in occupation in the circumstances specified in sub-sec. (1) of S. 7, and a person shall not, merely by reason of the fact that he had paid any amount as rent, be deemed to be in authorised occupation. 6. Local authority may move the Prescribed Authority constituted under S. 3. If the Prescribed Authority is prima facie of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, notice shall issue to them under section 4(1) specifying, inter alia, the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. If the Prescribed Authority is prima facie of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, notice shall issue to them under section 4(1) specifying, inter alia, the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The cause shown is considered by the Prescribed Authority who is also to give reasonable opportunity of being heard and then he may issue order for eviction for reasons to be recorded under section 5 and also require payment of rent or damages in accordance with section 7. An appeal against the order lies under section 9 to the District Judge. Section 15 creates a bar against any suit or proceeding in court in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises of the recovery of arrears of rent or damages. 7. The question is whether the occupation of the petitioners over the public premises in the present is `unauthorised occupation' within the meaning of the Act. The occupation is not of recent origin. There is no dispute that the occupation of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners dated back to over a century. Far back on October 7, 1980 it appears, Government through the Commissioner, Jhansi Division ordered that Nazul land in the town of Jalaun as specified in the order be given to persons agreeing to raise shops thereon and agreement be got executed (vide Annexure 4A to Writ Petition 323 of 1980). The agreement executed by the grantees on March 24, 1981(1881?) is material in its terms. The agreement executed by the grantees on March 24, 1981(1881?) is material in its terms. In Writ Petition No. 323 of 1980 it is Annexure 4B and reads as follows : " eu dh ljnkj flag iq= bZ'ojh flag lkfdu ekStk lqnkj ijxuk tkykSu dk gwaA tks fd ljdkjh cktkj cSB xat esa nks nqdku cukus ds fy;s utqy dh tehu feyh gSA bl fy;s eSa bdjkj djrk gwaA o fy[ks nsrk gwa fd vkjkth etdwj dks ge o; o jgu cxSjg gjfxt u djsxsa o tehu utqy ljdkj jgsxhA vkjkth etdwj esa gekjk ;k gekjs okjlku ;k dk;e eqdkeksa dk fdlh fdLe dk gd iSnk u gksxk ctt blds fd vkjkth etdwj ij nqdkus cuewuk eq;s;uk j[ks jgsA bl okLrs ;g bdjkjukek o nq:Lrh gks'kgok'k vius ds fy[k fn;k fd lun~ jgs oDr ij dke vkosA QDr 28&3&1981( 1881 ) 'kqHkkj [kljko iSekbl 15 uEcj xkSyk dykA rknknjdok 28 ekpZ 1881 izrki ujk;u 1 foLokUlh foLok " 8. Upon analysis it will be noticed that this agreement which is in the nature of a kabuliyat for a grant and is common to the cases under consideration specifies that : (1) the land involved was Nazul of which Government is the sole proprietor, (2) the grant is for the specific object of raising shops thereon, (3) the title to the land shall remain unaffected and continue to vest in Government, (4) there is no interest created in the land in favour of the grantees. The land may not be sold, mortgaged or transferred otherwise. (5) the heirs or assigns of the original grantees would also have (no?) interest in the land except that they shall have the right to raise and maintain shops thereon. 9. The expression 'arazi mazkur' appears thrice in this document and at every place it has reference to Nazul land referred to in the first sentence. Both the sides before me are agreed and rightly, in my view, that this was the creation of a grant. Taking the character of the land, the title of Government to it, the manner and object of creation and the nature of the right created there could possibly be no other description assigned to the transaction see, State of U. P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 . 10. Taking the character of the land, the title of Government to it, the manner and object of creation and the nature of the right created there could possibly be no other description assigned to the transaction see, State of U. P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 . 10. Sri V. K. S. Chaudhary, assisted by Sri Rajesh Ji Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, contend that nothing contained in the terms of the grant prohibits the grantee from alienating the shops raised on the Nazul land. Transfers have gone on being made in respect of all these shops during the century with the sanction of the local authority and these have therefore changed hands without let or hindrance until recently in or about December 1970 for the first time. The contention in my opinion is well founded. Section 6, Transfer of Property Act lays down that property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided by this Act, or by any other law for the time being in force. The case admittedly does not attract any of the clauses to this section which are in the nature of exceptions. The general rule, it is well settled, is that property of any kind may be transferred as provided in section 6 and it is up to the party contending otherwise to establish the existence of some law or custom which restricts the right of transfer Baijnath Singh v. Chandrapal Singh, AIR 1924 All 795 , Mohd. Ali Mohd. Khan v. Madarisah, AIR 1927 Oudh 297, Bhoopal Rai v. Shiam Sunder Lal, AIR 1929 All 781 . 11. Does the provision of section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (as amended by the U. P. Act 13 of 1960) stand in the way of transfer in these cases is the question next to be considered.? Section 2(as amended) in so far as relevant provides :-' "2(1). 11. Does the provision of section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (as amended by the U. P. Act 13 of 1960) stand in the way of transfer in these cases is the question next to be considered.? Section 2(as amended) in so far as relevant provides :-' "2(1). Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Not to apply to Government Grants - Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whomsoever, and every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed. (3) Certain leases made by on behalf of the Government to take effect according to their tenor : All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any decree or direction of a Court of law of any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding............... " As in section 2 of the parent Act so also in section 2(1) (as amended) the clear provision is that the grant shall take effect irrespective of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which does not mean that all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are inapplicable. This has been the consistent view of this Court and it has received approval of the Supreme Court. In Dost Mohd. Khan v. Bank of Upper India (1904).3 All LJ :29 Richadds, J. speaking for the Division Bench ruled : "In our opinion section 2 does not render all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable to lands' held under grant from the crown, but the meaning of the section is that when the Court is called upon to construe an instrument, granting land by the Crown, it shall construe such grant, irrespective of the provisions as of the Transfer of Property Act. This is manifest from the concluding words of section 2." 12. Another Division Bench applied this same principle to sale of (sic) the suit of a mortgagee. This is manifest from the concluding words of section 2." 12. Another Division Bench applied this same principle to sale of (sic) the suit of a mortgagee. In (1904) 3 All LJ 628 arising between the same parties it was held that by enacting the Crown Grants Act, the Legislature did not intend that unconditional grants, made by the Crown free from restrictions as to alienations, should not be the subject of a sale at the suit of a mortgagee. (See also Munshi Lal v. Gopi Ballabh, AIR 1914 All 120. In Kishan Chand v. Sheo Dutta, AIR 1958 All 879 this Court held that the lessee of nazul land remained in possession after the termination of the lease and therefore there was holding over within the meaning of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention advanced for the State that section 2 of the Government Grants Act rendered the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable was not accepted. The Supreme Court approved this view in State of U. P. v.Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 (supra) and upholding the decision to the same effect by this Court in Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U. P. AIR 1965 All 326 affirmed : "In the present case the High Court correctly found on the facts that the' respondent after the determination of the lease held over. Even if the Government Grants Act applied section. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was not rendered inapplicable. The effect of section 2 of the Government Grants Act is that in the construction of an instrument governed by the Government Grants Act the court shall construe such grant irrespective of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It does not mean that all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are inapplicable. To illustrate, in the case of a grant under the Government Grants Act section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act will not apply because section 14 which provides what is known as the rule against perpetuity will not apply by reason of the provisions in the Government Grants Act. The grant shall be construed to take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not apply." 13. The grant shall be construed to take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not apply." 13. This sets at rest the view taken by the Appellate Authority in the instant case that due to section 2 of the Government Grants Act, all other laws including the Transfer of Property Act are rendered inapplicable. The grant is no doubt to be interpreted according to its tenor but, in this case, as explained above, there is nothing in the terms and conditions of the grant to restrain against alienation of the shops raised in the Nazul land. Acting on the grant, pucca constructions were raised and they have gone to change hands without, however, right, title or interest being created in the land in favour of the successive transferees. Nothing in the grant, in other words, excludes the application of section 6, Transfer of Property Act as respect the shops constructed on the land. 14. Learned Standing Counsel urged that since in terms of the grant, the Nazul land is inalienable there could be no transfer made of the superstructure raised thereon either. If such transfer were permissible, it is submitted, there could be no purpose served behind prohibiting transfer of land as such. This contention to my mind cannot be sustained. Throughout its contents the instrument talks of inalienability of land but does not anywhere restrain transfer of the shops raised thereon. On the contrary, it specifies that the original grantees, their heirs and assigns shall continue to enjoy the right to raise and maintain shops as per specification on this land. This shows too that there was nothing personal in the creation of this grant. It was not designed to benefit or reward an individual as such for the services rendered by him or as favour due to any other consideration. The whole object was to safeguard the user of the land by confining this for purposes of maintaining shops and none else. From the grantor's point of view it was of no consequence whether the shops were run by the original grantees or their successors. If, for any reason, the intention were to stick to particular individuals, even the heirs would not have been brought in and there is in the context no line of demarcation whatever as between the heirs and assigns. If, for any reason, the intention were to stick to particular individuals, even the heirs would not have been brought in and there is in the context no line of demarcation whatever as between the heirs and assigns. Even in regard to pension the view taken is that section 6 Transfer of Property Act does not prohibit the assignment thereof, where pension is not granted or continued by Government on political consideration or on account of past services, or present infirmities or as a compensation allowance Bhoopal Rai v. Shiam Sunder Lal ( AIR 1929 All 781 ). (supra) There is no inconsistency in law as between the right, title and interest in the Nazut land continuing to vest in the State, but the right to occupy the shops raised thereon being continued to be enjoyed by the successors to the original grantees. In order to remain lawfully in occupation of the shops, the occupants need not necessarily have right, title. or interest in the land. This depends indeed on the tenor of the grant. A riyaya could maintain the house in agricultural villages though every inch of the land belonged to the zamindar. It was argued that except in Writ Petition No. 10418 of 1979, the petitioners do not place on record the deeds of sale acquired by them. Let us assume on this account as the learned Standing Counsel contends that the site or land has also been included in these deeds of transfer. Further, as explained above, it is manifest that title to the land could not pass to the alienee by these transfers. But still this does not alter the basic position namely that in terms of the grant itself the petitioner- transferees are within their rights in being in occupation over the shops though the sale to them would be void as concerning the land or the site thereof. I fail to understand how is their occupation over the shops rendered unauthorised within the meaning of the Act. The occupation that commenced with the grant is not determined in terms thereof by any act or omission on their part, The right which was granted initially subsists still with the only difference that B has stepped in place of A and so on. The user of the land has not changed. It is retained for the purpose initially intended. The occupation that commenced with the grant is not determined in terms thereof by any act or omission on their part, The right which was granted initially subsists still with the only difference that B has stepped in place of A and so on. The user of the land has not changed. It is retained for the purpose initially intended. The respondents do not contend that the petitioners have deviated from the plan or design. In the absence of anything to lead to forfeiture of grant, the Government cannot claim to have gained the right to resume possession. 15. Controversy was raised by the learned standing Counsel in regard to the meaning of the expression "Qaim Moqaman" appearing in the grant in question. It was argued that this excluses a transferee inter vivos. This in my judgment is untenable both taking into account the ordinary and the natural meaning of the words as well as the context. In Urdu - Hindi Shabdakosh (edited by the U. P. Hindi Sansthan (1937) at page 113) cited for the petitioners the words "Qaim Moqam" are explained as meaning "Jo Kisi dosre ke pad ya Asthan Par Niyukt ho" Similar is the meaning assigned in Manak Hindi Kosh edited by Dr. Ram Kumar Verma, relied by the Standing Counsel. The meaning given therein is "Jo Kisi ke asthan par Aa - asthai roop sey athwa Pratinidhi ban kar kaam karta ho". This, therefore, denotes a person who stands for or represents the estate for the time being. The learned standing counsel made reference to section 4(24-A) of the U. P. General Clauses Act and urged that the `legal representative' for purposes of interpretation of the U. P. Acts shall have the same meaning as in the Code of Civil Procedure. In section 2(1), C.P.C. the expression `legal representative' is defined as meaning, inter alia, a person, who in law represents the estate of a deceased person. The submission is that a tranferee inter vivos should on this account be excluded as was held in Chacko Pyali v. lype Varghese, AIR 1956 Tax Cas 147 (FB). It seems to be overlooked by the learned counsel that these definitions are in the context of Order 22, C.P.C. pertaining to substitution on the death of a party to the suit. It seems to be overlooked by the learned counsel that these definitions are in the context of Order 22, C.P.C. pertaining to substitution on the death of a party to the suit. These definitions by no means govern the meaning to be assigned to the words "Qaim Moqaman" in the context where they appear herein. In the present these words are placed side by side with the words referring to the original grantees and their heirs, the words in question take colour from these expressions and have to be read conjointly bearing also in mind all the same that, as discussed above, there is no element of personality involved. For the purpose of effectuating the grant in other words it is immaterial whether the benefit enjoyed is by the original grantee himself, his heirs or one who has stepped in by virtue of a transfer made during his lifetime. In Mohsin Ali v. State of M. P. (1975) 2 SCC 122 at p. 126 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1518 at p. 1521), Sarkaria, J. referred to the rule in case of Royal grants that they are usually construed favourably for the Crown. At the same time His Lordship laid down that this general rule is capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. In para 17 (of SCC) : (Para 17 of AIR) the law on the subject was stated to be : "This general rule is, however, capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. If the intention of the Sovereign is obvious from the document which in precise, unequivocal terms defines the extent and nature of the benefit conferred, it must take effect. No question of seeking extrinsic aid to its construction arises. If the grant is for valuable consideration it must be construed strictly in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign and where two constructions are possible one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit. Where, however,r, two interpretations may be given to the grant, both of which are good, that which is most favourable to the Crown is in many cases preferred.*" Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 7 paragraph 669 and 670 pages 314-316. 16. Where, however,r, two interpretations may be given to the grant, both of which are good, that which is most favourable to the Crown is in many cases preferred.*" Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 7 paragraph 669 and 670 pages 314-316. 16. This is also the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Delhi Development Authority. v. M/s. Nehru Place Hotels Ltd. AIR 1984 NOC 61 (Delhi) pointing that a grant has to be read as a whole in order to ascertain the real intention of the grant. If there is any ambiguity, the benefit thereof must be given to the grantee. It is permissible to consider the surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which the grant was made. If two constructions are possible, one which would make all the provisions of the deed valid and the other which would make some or all of the provisions of the deed void, then that construction which would give effect to all the provisions of the deed has to be preferred. In case of ambiguity, the benefit of ambiguity must be given to the grantee and not to the grantor. The case in the present stands on a higher footing since the grant in question may not be said to suffer from ambiguity inasmuch as the right of the grantee to transfer the shops raised on the land is unrestricted. Reading the instrument as a whole in any case and considered in the light as to how the property has been dealt with for such a long number of years, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no bar against such transfer. 17. Sri S. N. Upadhya, learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Palika urged that since the appellate authority has not considered the aspect of the petitioners being entitled to maintain the construction despite having no title to the land, this Court may remand the case back to the appellate authority in order to have the benefit of opinion expressed by it and since in the absence of consideration in this respect it cannot be claimed that there is an error manifest on the record. This in my view is only to be stated to be rejected. This in my view is only to be stated to be rejected. The tenor of the objections raised from the side of the petitioners-before the Prescribed Authority has throughout been that they acquired the right to the shops by virtue of the transfers made thereof. There is nothing new being brought in so far as the relevant facts are concerned. The contention for the Nagar Palika itself has been that there could be no alienation made of the Nazul land by the grantees. The question necessarily arises, assuming this to be correct, as to what is the effect thereof in regard to the relief sought in these petitions. This evidently is implicit in the question raised and considered by the authorities below. It would consequently be pointless and without justification direct a remand to the appellate authority on this count. 18. Having regard to the discussion made in the above, the decision arrived at by the Appellate Authority and the impugned orders of the Prescribed Authority directing eviction and recovery of damages from the petitioners in these proceedings under the Act cannot be sustained. 19. The petitions, therefore, succeed and are allowed accordingly. The decision of the III Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Orai dated October 19, 1979 and the impugned orders of t1,e Prescribed Authority are quashed. There s1t 1l, however, be no order as to costs.