JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This revision is directed against the order dated 11-9-1984, recorded by Sri D.P. Varshni, learned Vth Addl. District Judge, Meerut in S.C.O. Suit No. 31 of 1981, by which the revisionist was ejected from the premises in dispute and suit for recovery of arrear of rent amounting to Rs. 3400/- was decreed alongwith the mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100/-per month; pendentelite and future damages for use and occupation at a similar rate were allowed subject to payment of requisite court fee on the execution side. Costs were also awarded to the landlord. 2. Admittedly, the revisionist is the tenant of a portion of first floor consisting of a room, a verandah, a kitchen, store room, and bath room as shown in Municipal plan in Begumbagh street, Meerut city paper No. 16-A/C1/2 and indicated at the foot of the plaint. It was alleged by the landlord that U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. XIII of 1972 was inapplicable to the accommodation in dispute as it was constructed in 1972 and was assessed to house tax for the first time in that year The rate of rent was Rs. 100/- per month, which fell due from 1-1-1973. Despite the service of the notice of demand of rent upto 31-10-80 amounting Rs. 340/-, it remained unpaid. 3. The tenant contested the claim on the grounds that the building was old and the aforesaid Act was applicable to it. He was not in arrears of rent; rent was Rs. 10/- per month only; landlord never issued any receipt and intended to get the demised accommodation vacated. 4. The learned trial Judge found that the premises in question were not covered by the provisions of Act No. XIII of 1972. He further found that the rental was Rs. 100/- per month and not Rs. 10/- per month In the result, the claim was allowed in full. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The first point pressed before me in this revision was that assuming for the sake of argument that the disputed accommodation was constructed in 1972, even then, it was not exempted from the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The first point pressed before me in this revision was that assuming for the sake of argument that the disputed accommodation was constructed in 1972, even then, it was not exempted from the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The period of 10 years for which the exemption was allowed to the new building has already expired pending the litigation. Under such circumstances, the tenant-revisionist was entitled to the benefit of provisions of the new Act. 7. In this connection reliance was placed upon Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhava 1984 AWC 128 . In that case the period of 10 years expired pending the litigation and under such circumstances, it was held that the benefit of the new Act will be given to a tenant on expiry of the period of 10 years. Learned Counsel for the Respondent pointed out that the tenant has not deposited any rent u/s 39 of the aforesaid Act alongwith the costs etc. and so he could not avail the benefit of Section 39 of the aforesaid Act. 8. However, there are several provisions like Section 20 Sub-clause (1) which bar a suit for eviction of the tenant except on specified grounds in this section, which may come to the rescue of the tenant in case the aforesaid Act is applicable to the proceedings. However, it shall be for Judge Small Causes Court to apply the new Act and to give the protection of the new Act to the revisionist, who may have an opportunity to deposit the dues contemplated by Section 39 of the new Act, after determination of the question whether any amount is due from the revisionist towards rent as directed by the learned trial Judge. It will entail a remand of the case to the Court below. 9. A perusal of the record shows that it was Plaintiff's case in para 1 of the plaint as well as in his notice dated 19-11-1980 that the Defendant was a tenant in portion of first floor of his house. In his own statement also Sunder Lal PW 1 conceded in cross-examination that he has to pay house-tax of the entire building at the rate of Rs. 112/- and that house-tax was subsequently enhanced to Rs. In his own statement also Sunder Lal PW 1 conceded in cross-examination that he has to pay house-tax of the entire building at the rate of Rs. 112/- and that house-tax was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 259/- from 1976; Defendant stated that the house was old and no portion was constructed in it, from the inception of his tenancy in 1970. A sale-deed by erstwhile landlady Smt. Ramratti Devi dated 11-8-1965 is also on record to show that it was an old building. The learned trial Judge believed the case of tenant that the first floor was constructed in 1972 and sanction for new construction was sought by the landlord on 29-4-1972, which was assessed to house-tax in 1972-73 vide paper no, 16-B/C1. 10. The tenant filed the house-tax assessment of 1961-62 about this house. The annual rental of the house was at Rs. 144/-. 11. The learned trial Judge found that the demised accommodation was not covered by the Act as it was constructed in 1972. 12. The relevant proviso, which is to be construed in this revision is Section 2, Sub-clause 2 and Explanation I of the aforesaid Act, which read as below: Except as provided in Sub-section (5) of Section 12, Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-0 or Sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed.... Explanation I-For the purpose of this Sub-section (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time. Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants; (b) "construction" includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof of the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. 13. So, the important point which was to be determined and which needs reconsideration in revision is whether the disputed accommodation has to be governed by the proviso appended to Explanation I(a) or (b) or (c) of the aforesaid section. In case, it is covered by the proviso of the aforesaid Act, it would have been a new one immune from the operation of this Act, but for the fact that the construction has become more than 10 years old now on account of this durable litigation. 14. In this connection the learned Trial Judge has referred to Om Prakash Gupta v. D.P. Gupta 1982 AWO 226 SC. Learned Advocate for Respondent also pointed out that inasmuch as the disputed accommodation was a separate allotable unit, so it was governed by the said proviso. In this connection, reliance was placed upon Smt. Sharbatt Devi v. Vth Addl, District Judge, Meerut 1981 ARC 510, which provides that without a ceiling any structure will not amount to a building within the meaning of Section 2 Sub-clause (2) of the aforesaid Act. 15. Reliance was also placed upon Lakshmt Shanker Srtvastava v. Dr. J.C. Sharma 1980 ARC 43, which laid down that in case newly built construction was not assessed date of assessment of old existing building was totally irrelevant. In that case, authorities below found that the newly built construction was exempted from the operation of the Act that finding remained undisturbed by the High Court. 16. J.C. Sharma 1980 ARC 43, which laid down that in case newly built construction was not assessed date of assessment of old existing building was totally irrelevant. In that case, authorities below found that the newly built construction was exempted from the operation of the Act that finding remained undisturbed by the High Court. 16. The next authority relied upon on behalf of the Respondent is Radha Kishan Agarwal v. Xth Addl, District Judge, Allahabad 1979 ARC 6 which laid down that the building as defined under new Act in Section 3(1) has the same meaning as the word accommodation as used in U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act. Similarly Mohammad Shaft v. VII Addl. District Judge, Allahabad (?) ARC 182, cited on behalf of Respondent referred to case related to use of the building in Explanation IV of Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972; the bonafide requirement of landlord u/s 21, Sub-clause (1), Explanation IV of the aforesaid Act. That authority also cited with the approval of Chunno Lal v. Addl. District Judge, Allahabad 1975 AWC 390 . 17. Reliance was also placed upon Prem Chand v. Smt. Pushpawati Devi 1977 AWC 410 in support of the assertion that the building does not mean entire building, but includes a portion also and separate tenement, may constitute a building within the meaning of that definition. 18. On behalf of the revisionist reliance was placed upon para 22 of Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 98. In that case there was question about validity of Section 3 of the Act and the notification dated 31-1-1973, and other notifications, which were found as effective and valid. 19. In the instant case, it has been shown above that according to the averment made in the plaint, notice and stateliest of Plaintiff, the disputed accommodation was not a separate accommodation, but was a portion of house of the landlord, that house was already in existence long before coming into operation of the said Act. The burden to prove the exemption from the operation of the said Act lay on the landlord and not on tenant. 20. It appears that the authority Om Prakash Gupta v. D.P. Gupta 1982 AWC 226 SC was not cited with approval in Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 98 (supra). 21. The burden to prove the exemption from the operation of the said Act lay on the landlord and not on tenant. 20. It appears that the authority Om Prakash Gupta v. D.P. Gupta 1982 AWC 226 SC was not cited with approval in Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 98 (supra). 21. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Shri. Ram Saroop Rai Vs. Smt. Lilavati, AIR 1982 SC 945 . In that case the landlady purchased shop No. 66 in Jhansi City in 1969 from one Brij Mohan and occupied the first floor; tenant was allowed to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a lease-deed, which recited that the building was erected in 1965. In 1975, proceeding for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building was new and Act did not debar eviction from new construction put up within 10 years of the suit, the tenant maintained that the building was constructed 50 years ago. Both the Courts below negatived the defence. 22. All the aforesaid provisions stated above which are directly involved were considered in that case. It was pointed out at page 947 that viewed in this perspective, the failure of the trial court specifically to record when the building was completed and what was the extent of re-building. Whether it was a case of total demolition and reconstruction or such extensive additions as to push the existing building into a minor part, was fatal. These basic issues failed to receive any attention from the courts below. A finding recorded on speculative basis was no finding. 23. In the instant case, also I find that all the relevant papers, from the Municipal Office have not been filed by the landlord to show that the disputed constructions were made in 1972. According to his case the disputed portion is a part of his house and not allottable separately, the portion occupied by tenant, adjoins, another portion occupied by Anil Kumar another tenant. There was common stair case of this portion, which was part of the same building as occupied by the landlord. All these factors could have been relevant to the allotment and release of a vacant building u/s 16 of the aforesaid Act. There was common stair case of this portion, which was part of the same building as occupied by the landlord. All these factors could have been relevant to the allotment and release of a vacant building u/s 16 of the aforesaid Act. The consideration about a common stair case and a portion of the same house could have assumed significance in proceeding for release of the building under occupation of the tenant u/s 21 of the aforesaid Act. Under such circumstances, the approach of the learned Trial Judge was incorrect. No finding has been recorded on the point as to whether the upper portion was an extensive addition to the ground floor to the extent as to push the existing building into a minor part only. Where new additions are made to the existing building but do not convert the existing building into a minor part of the entire building then the whole of the building will be deemed to be old construction only. This aspect of the matter went unnoticed in this case. 24. On behalf of the tenant, it was also pointed cut that there was evidence available in the Municipal Office to show that no new addition was made in the building by the landlord in 1972, but simply some rooms were extensively repaired. However, it is for the learned Trial Judge to decide the matter afresh. 25. In the result, revision is allowed and the case is remitted to the court below for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made by me above. Impugned judgment and decree are set aside. The costs of this Court shall be easy. The interim stay order dated 7-1-1984 is vacated. Send the record atone to the court below for a quick des-patch.