RAJENDRA KUMAR v. SUPDT. , DIST. JAIL, AGRA — 1984 DIGILAW 1103 (ALL)

( 1 ) RAJENDRA Kumar Sharma resident of village Bodla, P. S. Jagdishpura, district Agra has by this petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenged his detention made by the District Magistrate, Agra (hereinafter referred to as the detaining authority) by an order dated 2-8-1984 passed under Sec. 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980. ( 2 ) ON 21-7-1984, the petitioner was arrested by the police of P. S. Hariparvat Agra town in connection with Crime No. 267 of 1984 in respect of a hank dacoity case on a charge under S. 395/109, IPC and was sent to jail on 22-7-1984. On a report dated 29-7-1984 of the police officer at Agra (hereinafter referred to as the reporting authority), the detaining authority passed the impugned order on 2-8-1984 which was served on the petitioner on the same day i. e. on 2-8-1984. The detaining authority sent a copy of the order along with his report to the State Government also on the same day which was approved by the State Government on 10-8-1984. On 9-8-1984 two representations were made against the impugned order. One was made by the petitioner from jail which was sent to the detaining authority who forwarded the same to the State Government on the next day, i. e. on 10-8-1984 and it was received there on 13-8-1984. The other was a Joint representation purported to have been made by five persons including Mahesh Upadhya, M. L. A. The State Government called for the comments of the detaining authority on the representations. The detaining authority sent his comments thereon on 23-8-1984 which was received there on24-8-1984. Both these representations were rejected by the State Government on 30-8-1984. The representation of the petitioner which was received by the State Government on 13-8-1984 was examined by the assistant of the Section concerned on 16-8-1984. i. e. the day following the Independence Day. He then placed the papers before the Joint Secretary concerned on 23-8-1984. The Joint Secretary placed it before the Home Secretary on 26-8-1984. It was thereafter that it was rejected on 30-8-1984 along with the representation received by the State Government, from Mahesh Upadhya, M. L. A. and others. i. e. the day following the Independence Day. He then placed the papers before the Joint Secretary concerned on 23-8-1984. The Joint Secretary placed it before the Home Secretary on 26-8-1984. It was thereafter that it was rejected on 30-8-1984 along with the representation received by the State Government, from Mahesh Upadhya, M. L. A. and others. ( 3 ) IN the meantime, i. e. on 21-8-1984, the petitioner made a second representation (described by him as supplementary representation) which was sent by the detaining authority to the State Government on 23-8-1984 and was received there on the same day. This representation was also considered along with the other two representations mentioned above and was rejected by the State Government on 30-8-1984. ( 4 ) THE representation of the petitioner was also received by the Advisory Board on 16-8-1984 who gave a hearing to the petitioner on 10-9-1984. On receipt of the report from the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the detention order on 22-9-1984. The State Government had also sent its report to the Central Government under Sec. 3 (5) of the National Security Act on 13-8-1984. ( 5 ) THE grounds on which the detention of the petitioner has been ordered by the detaining authority are as under ( 6 ) WE shall first examine the question whether the aforesaid grounds are or any one of them is germane to the public order. We shall examine this question with respect to each of the aforesaid grounds separately. ( 7 ) GROUND No. 1 relates to an incident that took place on the evening of 11-6-1983. On that evening Umesh Kumar Lavania took possession of a piece of land on account of which the Harijan Jatav residents of village Khatauna Naubasta went on a hunger strike. At about 9-30 p. m. the petitioner reached there with his father and other companions and abused the Harijan Jatav community in general. They also beat the hunger strikers. They also caused grave injuries to several of them by firing with a pistol and set fire to their houses and shops. They also burnt one Chet Ram after sprinkling kerosene oil on him who is lying in a critical condition. On account of these activities of the petitioner and his associates, the residents of the locality in Agra are agitated and living in terror. They also burnt one Chet Ram after sprinkling kerosene oil on him who is lying in a critical condition. On account of these activities of the petitioner and his associates, the residents of the locality in Agra are agitated and living in terror. The petitioners activities are consequently subversive of public order. A case under Sees. 147, 148, 149, 307, 447 and 395, I. P. C. was also registered in P. S. Jagdishpura (Crime Case No. 97-A/83) which is being investigated by the Crime Section of the State. ( 8 ) A scrutiny of the above allegations leave no room for doubt that the persons affected by the alleged activities of the petitioner are not individuals but a section of the community of Harijan Jatav of a particular village (if not the entire community) who went on a hunger strike on the night of the incident to protest against the occupation of a piece of land by Umesh Kumar Lavania which they claimed to be the land of a grave-yard. Thereafter the hunger strikers are alleged to have not only been abused, assaulted, shot at and their houses and shops burnt, but attempts were also made to burn one of them, viz. Chet Ram causing him critical burn injuries. It scarcely requires an argument to say that these activities are nothing but activities which affect, not individuals, but a section of the community and accordingly they are subversive of public order. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has argued that in respect of this very incident, there is a cross case also registered as Crime Case No. 97/83 in which the complainant and the witnesses of this case are accused persons. The papers relating to this cross case were not placed before the detaining authority and, therefore, he was deprived of an opportunity to examine the materials pertaining to Crime Case No. 97/83 also before forming his subjective opinion about the incident reported to him. Therefore, the order of detention which has been passed without consideration of such a relevant material document relating to that cross case is invalid. A copy of the report of this cross case is Annexure-3 of the rejoinder-affidavit. This report is under Secs. Therefore, the order of detention which has been passed without consideration of such a relevant material document relating to that cross case is invalid. A copy of the report of this cross case is Annexure-3 of the rejoinder-affidavit. This report is under Secs. 147, 395, 397, 302 and 436, IPC and was lodged by Umesh Kumar Lavania containing allegations about some incident which had taken place on 11-6-1983 (not on 12-6-1983) at 10-30 a. m. over a land lying in front of Prabhu Cinema. This report is against 32 persons (which do not include the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Sharma) alleging that they came on that land on the aforesaid date and time armed with lathis, dandas, pharsas, knives and kattas, that they assaulted the complainants wife and sons of his Bua, that they with their kattas fired at them and that they looted their houses and shops. This report was made on 11-6-1983 at P. S. Jagdishpura i. e. a day prior to the incident of the report of Crime Case No. 97-A/83. Therefore, the mere fact that this report of the incident of 12-6-1983 was registered as Crime Case No. 97-A/83 does not for purposes of the disposal of this petition necessarily lead to an inference that the two incidents of the said two reports relate to the same transaction containing different versions of the same incident. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the report of the so-called cross was a material which the detaining authority was bound to consider. However, even if it is assumed that the two reports contained different versions of the same incident, it is impossible to conceive that the non-consideration of the report of Crime Case No. 97/83 had in any way prejudiced the petitioner because if the facts disclosed in the report pertaining to Crime Case No. 97-A/83 were sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority about the potentiality of disturbances of public order by the activities of the petitioner, his subjective satisfaction would not be vitiated merely because the complainant and witnesses of this incident are accused of similar activities. The object of preventive detention under Sec. 3 (2) of the National Security Act is to prevent a person from disturbing public tranquillity. The object of preventive detention under Sec. 3 (2) of the National Security Act is to prevent a person from disturbing public tranquillity. It is the activities of a person which are considered by the detaining authority to form an opinion whether the same are indicative of inclination of that person regarding his future activities which are necessary to be prevented for maintenance of public order. If the activities of the person reported by the reporting authority satisfy the detaining authority that the reported activities of such a person are affecting public order and that it is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner in future, the detaining authority will act upon his such subjective satisfaction and exercise his powers under sec. 3 (2) of the National Security Act. The power of detention under this section is a preventive measure taken by way of prosecution to prevent mischief to the community. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, if the activities of the petitioner as reported by the reporting authority satisfies the detaining authority that the petitioner should be prevented from indulging in similar activities in future it is competent to do so even if some other version of the incident reported is not before him while considering his activities. It is not a hard and fast rule that a report of the incident containing a counter version must in all cases be placed before the detaining authority. In some case it may be material in other, it may not be so. Every case is decided on the facts and circumstances peculiar to it. In the instant case, the report of the Crime Case No. 97/83 is not a document which would invalidate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority about the future activities of the petitioner vis-a-vis maintenance of public order after considering his activities as reported by the reporting authority. ( 11 ) SINCE the learned counsel referred to Annexure 3 to the rejoinder-affidavit rather in detail it will not be out of place if we also refer to it in this judgment to demonstrate that the contention of the petitioner in this regard is devoid of merit. Because it does not in any way affect the position in so far as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority vis-a-vis the reported activities of the petitioner is concerned. Because it does not in any way affect the position in so far as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority vis-a-vis the reported activities of the petitioner is concerned. While making this observations, we are not in any way sitting in judgment over the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for affirming it. We have made this observation only to indicate that we have taken into account the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the satisfaction of the detaining authority when examined in the light of Annexure-3. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the incident referred to in this ground is germane to maintenance of public order and the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is in this regard in no way vitiated. ( 12 ) WE will now advert to the second ground. On 30-3-1984 at about 1-15 p. m. seven dacoits had committed dacoits at the United Bank of India, Nehru Nagar, P. S. Hariparvat, Agra and decamped with a booty of about Rs. 66,000/- in a car. During investigation of this case two persons viz. Bhajan Lal alias Bhajna and Bachhan Khan were arrested. Bachhan Khan in his statement revealed that this dacoity was not only planned by the Nisar gang in consultation with the petitioner, the petitioner had also agreed to supply illicit weapons and vehicles and provide necessary shelter to the members of that gang in consideration of 25% of the loot as commission. On this revelation the petitioner was arrested on 21-7-1984 and sent to jail. It cannot be disputed that the offence of dacoity is an offence which affects public tranquillity. Persons who indulge in offences of robberies, and dacoities are persons who are enemies of public in general. Therefore, the bandits who had committed dacoity on 30-3-1984 at the United Bank of India, Nehru Nagar, had undoubtedly indulged in activities affecting public order. If the petitioner has connections with such bandits and is said to be supplying arms, vehicles etc. to their gang the satisfaction of the detaining authority that his activities poses threat to public order cannot be said to be invalid. If the petitioner has connections with such bandits and is said to be supplying arms, vehicles etc. to their gang the satisfaction of the detaining authority that his activities poses threat to public order cannot be said to be invalid. Preventive detention in such cases, as pointed out by Patanjali Shastri, C. J. in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 is largely precautionary and as observed in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 550 while considering a similar provision under Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971, it is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left from and unfettered would be detrimental to the maintenance of public order. In such circumstances, it is reasonably probable for the detaining authority to proceed to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. ( 13 ) IN this connection, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detaining authority while considering the revelation made by the under trial Bachhan Khan did not care to look into the statement which the other arrested person viz. Bhajan Lal alias Bhajan had made before the Investigating Officer. The reporting authority was under duty to place his statement also before the detaining authority for his consideration. We do not agree with this submission of the counsel for the petitioner also. The detaining authority had considered the statement of only that person who had made the relevant revelation before the Investigating Officer about the activities of the petitioner. If the other person arrested by him during investigation had made no such statement about the petitioner, his statement was not relevant or material and the reporting authority was under no duty to place that Statement also before the detaining authority. Therefore, we are of the opinion that this ground is also germane to maintenance of public order and the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not invalid. ( 14 ) WE shall now take up the third ground. There is an inter-State gang of notorious dacoit Surendra alias Daddy registered as I. S. 104. The ground says that the evidence and information gathered about this gang revealed that the brick-kiln of the petitioner at Bodla, P. S. Jagdishpura is one of the places of hiding of the members of this gang. There is an inter-State gang of notorious dacoit Surendra alias Daddy registered as I. S. 104. The ground says that the evidence and information gathered about this gang revealed that the brick-kiln of the petitioner at Bodla, P. S. Jagdishpura is one of the places of hiding of the members of this gang. Further, the petitioner, who is a Block Pramukh also, is a supplier of arms and ammunitions to that gang. Asha prostitute of Sikandara is visited by the members of the gang and is in the regular keeping of the petitioner. These facts suggest that the petitioner has not only connections with the said inter-State notorious dacoits but they thrive also in his protection. The activities of the said gang of dacoits undisputably affect public order. From the nature of allegations against the petitioner it is impossible to conceive that the detaining authority should have regarded the same as activities of merely law and order, since every preventative measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, would be detrimental to the maintenance of public order. It also cannot be denied that in principle preventive actions proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. It is also not possible for the courts to investigate into the circumstances of suspicion on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based for his anticipatory action taken to prevent a mischief which has the potentiality of disturbing public order. Therefore, the aforesaid reported activities of the petitioner which are evidently not matters susceptible of objective determination, could be taken into consideration by the detaining authority for basing his subjective satisfaction about the same being detrimental to the maintenance of public order. The impugned order is, therefore, not invalid on this ground also. ( 15 ) THE last ground is based on two intelligence reports, dated 25-7-1984 and 26-7-1984 of the Local Intelligence Unit, Agra (hereinafter referred to as L. I. U.) that violent demonstrations at large scale were likely to be staged for protesting against the arrest of the petitioner if and when he is released from jail and in those demonstrations sensational activities subversive of order are also anticipated. The L. I. U. is a local intelligence of the district which collects secret informations of various kinds which include activities of individuals, groups or community which affect public order. It cannot be disputed that the detaining authority is competent to consider reports from L. I. U. and base his subjective satisfaction on its reports. No doubt the reports of L. I. U. are intelligence reports and may not afford adequate basis for justifying a detention but all the same they constitute relevant materials to be taken into consideration while examining the past activities of an individual and their potentialities for future acts of his as well as their impact on the peace of the locality or community at large. If these reports furnish materials relevant for such consideration the detaining authority cannot ignore them while considering the reported activities of the petitioner. In this case also the detaining authority has not considered these reports in isolation but along with the other grounds referred to above. Therefore, his subjective satisfaction is not vitiated on this ground also. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, the impugned order of detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained for the following reasons taken by the petitioner in paras 39 and 40 of his petition. The first ground is that the petitioners representation dated 9-8-1984 against his detention was not disposed of by the State Govt. within a reasonable time. There has been rather an inexcusable delay in its disposal. It is well settled that a constitutional duty is cast upon the State to consider a representation made by a detenu against his detention with utmost expedition. In this case the petitioner submitted his representation on 9-8-1984. This was sent by the detaining authority with its comments to the State Govt. on 10-8-1984. The State Govt. received it on 13-8-1984. For three days i. e. from 13-8-1984 to 16-8-1984 it was processed in the concerned section, of the Secretariat. Out of these days 15-8-1984 was a public holiday. The Joint Secretary of that section was out of station from 16-8-1984 to 22-8-1984. The Joint Secretary then placed the same before the Home Secretary on 26-8-1984. The Home Secretary also took time to examine the same and actually placed it before the Chief Minister on 30-8-1984. The Chief Minister, however, rejected it on the same day. The Joint Secretary of that section was out of station from 16-8-1984 to 22-8-1984. The Joint Secretary then placed the same before the Home Secretary on 26-8-1984. The Home Secretary also took time to examine the same and actually placed it before the Chief Minister on 30-8-1984. The Chief Minister, however, rejected it on the same day. ( 17 ) FROM the above resume of dates it would appear that the representation of the petitioner remained in the concerned office of the Secretariat from 13-8-1984 to 26-8-1984 i. e. for 13 days. Obviously this time taken in the office of Secretariat cannot he held to be expeditious dealing of the petitioners representation by that office. There is an apparent delay and unless this delay is accommodated for by a satisfactory explanation, it will render the continued detention of the petitioner illegal. The State Govt. has tried to explain this delay by dividing the aforesaid period into three parts. The first period is from 13-8-1984 to 16-8-1984 when this representation was processed in the office. Since 15-8-1984 was a public holiday, the officer took two days in processing it i. e. in preparing notes of this representation. On 16-8-1984 this representation was ready for being dealt with but from 16-8-1984 to 23-8-1984 i. e. for 7 days it remained lying idle in that office waiting for the Joint Secretary of that section who was out of station. It was placed before the Joint Secretary only on 23-8-1984. In spite of the fact that the representation remained lying unattended in that office i. e. from 16-8-1984 to 23-8-1984, the Joint Secretary also did not give any priority to it when it was placed before him on 23-8-1984. He took three days for placing it before the Home Secretary. It is, therefore, apparent that this representation was not dealt with a reasonable despatch by the section concerned. It is also important to note that when noting and drafting on the representation was complete on 16-8-1984, no attempt was made to get it pushed so that it could be placed before the Home Secretary with expedition. If the Joint Secretary was out of station for the next 7 days. i. e. from 16-8-1984 to 23-8-1984, some one must be looking after urgent work of that office and such an officer could have attended this matter and placed it before the Home Secretary. If the Joint Secretary was out of station for the next 7 days. i. e. from 16-8-1984 to 23-8-1984, some one must be looking after urgent work of that office and such an officer could have attended this matter and placed it before the Home Secretary. It is difficult to believe that no one was in charge of that section for looking to the urgent work of that office during his absence. And if no such arrangement was really made for looking after the urgent work of that office it only presents another state of affairs which by no means is excusable. In the face of these facts, we are unable to agree with learned State counsel that there was no delay in the dealing of this representation in the section concerned or, if there was any delay, it is satisfactorily explained. On the other hand we find that there was unreasonable delay in the processing of the representation in the section concerned and this delay has not been amply explained. In other words, the explanation submitted is neither justifiable nor excusable in this connection learned counsel for the State has referred to Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 181 . The case was one under COFEPOSA Act in which 6 days taken by the office concerned in dealing with the representation was held to be satisfactory. On the other hand the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Raj Kishore Pd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 320 in which total number of 20 days in the disposal of the representation of the detenu was held to be inordinate. He pointed out that in this case even the rotation of the files from the Deputy Secretary to the Special Secretary and then the Chief Minister was held to be unjustifiable. It is needless to reproduce facts of these two cases. Needless to say that no two cases present identical facts. In this connection the following observations made in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (1970) 3 SCR 225 are apposite :"no definite time can be laid down within which a representation of detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his representation considered as expeditiously as possible. In this connection the following observations made in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (1970) 3 SCR 225 are apposite :"no definite time can be laid down within which a representation of detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his representation considered as expeditiously as possible. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the appropriate Government has disposed of the case as expeditiously as possible. " ( 18 ) THE question whether the disposal of the petitioners representation by the State was delayed and whether this delay was justified are questions of facts and the decision of these facts will depend upon the facts and circumstances of this case. In this case what is noticeable is that no importance was attached by the section concerned to the expeditious disposal of the petitioners representation after it was received there on 13-8-1984. It was dealt with in a fashion which was in no way swift or despatchful. In other words, it was dealt with by the section concerned unmindful of the constitutional duty of the State demanding its disposal without any delay i. e. lethargically. ( 19 ) IT may further be pointed out that this representation when placed before the Home Secretary on 26-8-1984 could not be placed before the Chief Minister on 30-8-1984. There is no explanation as to why this representation, which took 13 days in travelling from the section concerned to the table of the Home Secretary remained lying for further 4 days at his table. It is not the stand of the State Govt. that representation of the petitioner involved legal intricacies and factual remifactions of such a nature that it needed deep considerations and mutual consultations at different stages. The journey of this representation in the Secretariat of the State from 13-8-1984 to 30-8-1984 has not been swift and there has been needless wastage of time at some stages of this journey. Therefore, the undue delay in disposal of the petitioners representation cannot be justified. The detention of the petitioner is consequently vitiated. ( 20 ) THE other point on which the detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained is failure on the part of the State Govt. to place his supplementary representation dated 21-8-1984 before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of his detention. The detention of the petitioner is consequently vitiated. ( 20 ) THE other point on which the detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained is failure on the part of the State Govt. to place his supplementary representation dated 21-8-1984 before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of his detention. By not placing the second representation before the Advisory Board, the State Govt. has violated Sec. 10 of the Act. In order to demonstrate this we may again refer to some dates. The date of the detention order is 2-8-1984. The period of three weeks from this date expired on 23-8-1984. It is not disputed that, as provided in Sec. 10, the representation of the petitioner against his detention could be placed before the Advisory Board by this date. ( 21 ) ON 9-8-1984 the petitioner made a representation against his detention order. It was placed before the Advisory Board on 16-8-1984, i. e. within three weeks of the detention order. On 21-8-1984 i. e. before the expiry of three weeks from the detention order, the petitioner submitted another supplementary representation. The supplementary representation was no doubt also placed before the Advisor Board which considered it in due course along with the petitioners first representation dated 9-8-1984. It is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that since his second supplementary representation dated 21-8-1984 was not placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of the detention order, there has been a violation of Section 10 of the Act. The order of detention is consequently rendered invalid. ( 22 ) THE learned counsel for the State made an attempt to contend that the second representation of the petitioner was also placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks of the date of detention. This contention does not find support either from the affidavits filed on behalf of the State and the detaining authority nor from the record placed before us. The record placed before us shows that it had reached the State on 23-8-1984. It does indicate that it had reached the Advisory Board also on the same date. No presumption to this effect can be drawn on its basis. Then the affidavits filed by the detaining authority as well as on behalf of the State indicate otherwise. The petitioners allegation in this regard is contained in paragraph 40 of the petition. It does indicate that it had reached the Advisory Board also on the same date. No presumption to this effect can be drawn on its basis. Then the affidavits filed by the detaining authority as well as on behalf of the State indicate otherwise. The petitioners allegation in this regard is contained in paragraph 40 of the petition. Paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed by Nem Chand Sharma on behalf of the State shows that the State had not placed any copy of this supplementary representation before the Advisory Board on 23-8-1984. This paragraph says that:"the so-called supplementary representation was sent by the District Magistrate, Agra, to the State Govt. as well as to the Advisory Board on 23-8-1984. . . . . . . . "it is clear from the above fact that the supplementary representation of the petitioner was sent to the Advisory Board by the detaining authority (and not by the State) on 23-8-1984 as he had sent it to the State Govt. In fact the State Govt. which had received the supplementary representation on 23-8-1984 itself could not (sic) have placed it before the Advisory Board on the same date. The record before us does not show that a copy of it (which was intended to be sent to the Advisory Board) was really sent to the Board by the detaining authority. If such a copy was actually sent to the Advisory Board and received there on 23-8-1984 the detaining authority could not have avoided to make an assertion in this behalf in his affidavit. Instead of making such an assertion he has stated in para 18 of his affidavit. "that paragraph 40 of the petition shall be suitably replied by the State Govt. "from the above facts it is only reasonable to infer that the copy of the supplementary representation which was meant for sending to the Advisory Board by the detaining authority was actually not despatched from there or, if despatched, it did not reach there on 23-8-1984 as it was received in the office of the Secretariat. ( 23 ) THE next question which has been raised by the State Counsel is whether S. 10 placed a duty on the State Govt. to place the supplementary representation of the petitioner also before the Advisory Board within three weeks of the detention order. ( 23 ) THE next question which has been raised by the State Counsel is whether S. 10 placed a duty on the State Govt. to place the supplementary representation of the petitioner also before the Advisory Board within three weeks of the detention order. Sri Girdhar Malviya, the learned counsel for the State, referred to Sec. 8 (1) of the National Security Act (which is identical reproduction of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution) and Section 10 of the Act in support of his contention that the representation referred to in Sec. 10 of the Act envisages one and only one representation. Section 8 (1) of the Act reads as under :-"when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. "section 10 of the Act reads as under :"save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3, also the report by such officer under sub-sec. (4) of that Section. " ( 24 ) IT is submitted by the learned counsel that the word "a" before the word "representation" in Sec. 8 (1) and the words "if any" after the word "representation" in sec. 10 indicate the intention of the legislature that section 10 has placed a duty on the State to place only one representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board before the dead line fixed by this section. The subsequent representation, if made by a detenu, is merely a continuation of his earlier representation or its part. 10 indicate the intention of the legislature that section 10 has placed a duty on the State to place only one representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board before the dead line fixed by this section. The subsequent representation, if made by a detenu, is merely a continuation of his earlier representation or its part. By sending the first representation within the time schedule, the State complied with the requirement of Sec. 10, when the State places the second supplementary representation it only perform its duty of ensuring fair play and justice so that the same may be considered by the Advisory Board along with his first representation and the interest of the detenu may not be prejudiced. The words "if any" also lead to the same inference as these words in the section are not redundant. ( 25 ) WE do not agree with the above contention of the learned State counsel that Sec. 10 envisages only one representation by a detenu. No doubt the word "representation" in section 8 is proceeded by the word "a" in sec. 8 but it does not intend to restrict the number of representation which can be made by a detenu for convincing the State that the power under the Act exercised against him was not justifiably exercised. It only requires the detaining authority to serve upon the detenu the grounds of his detention so that he can make "a" representation for challenging his detention. Thus the word "a" in this section only recognises the right of the detenu to challenge his detention by means of a representation. The word is not placed before the word "representation" with the intention of depriving the detenu of his right to convince the State Govt. about the illegality or incorrectness of his order of detention by representation more than one. ( 26 ) SECTION 10 of the Act also does not lead to any such inference. It is evident from the language of Sec. 10 itself (already extracted above) that its plain object is to ensure that the grounds of detention, the report of the detaining authority, as well as the representation made by the detenu, must reach the Advisory Board not later than three weeks from the date of detention order. It is evident from the language of Sec. 10 itself (already extracted above) that its plain object is to ensure that the grounds of detention, the report of the detaining authority, as well as the representation made by the detenu, must reach the Advisory Board not later than three weeks from the date of detention order. ( 27 ) THE words "if any" used after the word "representation" does not deprive a detenu from making a representation subsequent to the reference made by the State Govt. to the Advisory Board. These words have been provided in the section to emphasise upon the State Govt. to make the reference not later than three weeks from the date of detention order even if no representation is made by the detenu during that period. The right of the detenu to make representation or representations survives even after that reference. In other words these words also do not restrict right of the detenu to make a supplementary representation in continuation of his earlier representation, if he finds that his earlier representation was incomplete or lacking in particulars or clarification. ( 28 ) FOR reasons given above we do not agree with learned State counsel that sec. 10 of the Act envisages only one representation of a detenu to be placed before the Advisory Board within the time schedule fixed by it. On the other hand a detenu has a right to file a supplementary representation also after he has made one representation against his detention. In that event, the duty placed by Sec. 10 will apply with all its force to the supplementary representation also even though it is a continuation of his earlier representation. This view finds support from an unreported decision of this Court in Criminal Misc. H. C. Petn. No. 13987 of 1983, Gama alias Lambu v. State of U. P. (decided on 16-3-1984) in which it has been held that:". . . . . . . . . THE supplementary representation made by the detenu was in continuation of his first representation and the State Government was thus bound to place the same before the Advisory Board within the stipulated period; i. e. within 21 days from the date of the detention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE supplementary representation made by the detenu was in continuation of his first representation and the State Government was thus bound to place the same before the Advisory Board within the stipulated period; i. e. within 21 days from the date of the detention. . . . . . . . "in that case also the stand taken in the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate was that "the supplementary representation" was not a representation as contemplated by the statute and thus he was not bound to place the same before the Advisory Board. ( 29 ) IN the above view of the matter, the State was bound to place the supplementary representation dated 21-8-1984 of the petitioner also before the Advisory Board by 23-8-1984 i. e. within three weeks from the detention order as stipulated by Sec. 10 of the Act. Consequently there is a violation of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 10 of the Act. As held in Faishal Malik v. State of U. P. (1984) 1 Crimes 518 , non-compliance of this provision of Sec. 10 renders the detention of a detenu invalid. Therefore, we are of the opinion that on this ground also the detention of the petitioner is invalid. ( 30 ) BEFORE parting with this case we would like to refer to one more submission which was made by learned counsel for the petitioner with which we do not agree. He has argued that the grounds on which the petitioner has been detained is stale. He particularly referred to the incident of ground No. 1 which had taken place in the year 1983 and contended that the petitioner was available for detention when this incident had taken place but he was not then detained. Similar was the case when the incident of ground No. 2 had taken place in the year 1984. Therefore, his detention on the basis of those incidents made in August 1984 throws a doubt on the genuineness of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Consequently the grounds on which the petitioner has been detained are stale and, therefore, his detention is bad. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention of the petitioners counsel because satisfaction of the detaining authority is not based on these two grounds alone. Consequently the grounds on which the petitioner has been detained are stale and, therefore, his detention is bad. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention of the petitioners counsel because satisfaction of the detaining authority is not based on these two grounds alone. The incidents referred in these two grounds have not been considered in isolation but along with other grounds also. These two grounds assumed importance when the petitioner was arrested on 21-7-1984 in crime case No. 267 of 1984 i. e. in connection with the bank dacoity case when his involvement in that case was revealed during investigation of that case. Not only this, but his connections with a notorious gang of dacoits, as reported by the reporting authority, also came to light during that investigation. Therefore, the incidents of ground Nos. 1 and 2 had not become stale for consideration by the detaining authority nor he satisfied himself about the necessity for exercising powers under the National Security Act against the petitioner. After his arrest on 21-7-1984 the petitioner is continuing in jail i. e. he is not thereafter free to repeat the activities reported against him by the reporting officer either in his individual capacity or as an associate of the gang of dacoits. We are, therefore, of the opinion that genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority resulting in the detention of the petitioner cannot be doubted on this ground. However, for the reasons already stated above, continued detention of the petitioner is not valid and cannot be upheld. ( 31 ) THE petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be kept in jail in connection with any other case. Petition allowed. .