Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U. P — 1984 DIGILAW 1116 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Kamleshwar Nath, J. - This petitioner, under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus to quash the order dated 22-9-1984, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, under S. 3(2), National Security Act, 1980, (in short, the Act), passed by the State Government of U.P., directing the detention of the petitioner Om Prakash Gupta, an order to set Om Prakash Gupta at liberty is also sought. 2. Earlier, Om Prakash Gupta had been detained under order dated 19-6-1984 passed by' the District Magistrate, Sitapur, under S. 3(3) read with S. 3(2) of the Act, and the matter figured before this Court in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 3196 of 1984. Several grounds had been raised by the petitioner, but the writ was allowed on one ground, the remaining grounds were not considered. One of the grounds set forth in the earlier detention order was that on 11-8-1983, in pursuance of a conspiracy with the petitioner to commit the murder of one Chandra Pal Dwivedi, an operator of Telephone Exchange at Barabanki, one Ranjeet Srivastava, accompanied by a few other culprits, had hurled a hand-grenade at Chandra Pal Dwivedi causing injuries to him and several other persons in a public place during Dewa fair in Barabanki. Ranjeet Srivastava was also detained under the Act, but the Advisory Board did not find sufficient cause for his detention, with the result that the order of his detention was revoked under S. 12(2) of the Act. The question raised and decided in that writ petition related to the effect of non-consideration of the release of Ranjeet Srivastava by the State Government while considering the case of the present petitioner. This Court held that the detaining authority was bound to consider the effect of release of a co-detenu on a common ground, not only while considering the ground against the detenu but also at the time of consideration of the question of confirmation of the detention order in consequence. This Court held that the detaining authority was bound to consider the effect of release of a co-detenu on a common ground, not only while considering the ground against the detenu but also at the time of consideration of the question of confirmation of the detention order in consequence. Since the detaining authority was found not to have considered the effect of the release of Ranjeet Srivastava, while considering the case of the petitioner, it was held that there was a failure of the State Government to exercise its mind to that material which had a clear bearing on the question of the petitioner's detention and that under S. 12(1) of the Act the State Government was bound to consider all the material which had a bearing on the matter. The detention order was, therefore, quashed on 18-9-1984. The petitioner was released from detention shortly thereafter. 3. On 22-9-1984 the State Government passed the detention order under S. 3(2) of the Act impugned in this writ petition. All the four grounds, which were subject-matter of petitioner's detention in the earlier writ petition, were repeated, in addition two new grounds were added. Certain properties of the petitioner were attached by the police on 12-11-1984 under the provisions of Ss. 82 and 83, Cr. P.C., read with S. 7 of the Act. On 13- 11-84 the petitioner surrendered in the Court of Session in connection with a sessions trial, and thereupon the impugned detention order was served upon him. 4. The first point raised in this writ petition is that once again the State Government has not applied its mind to the question of release of Ranjeet Srivastava, the co-detenu of the petitioner on common ground No. 1. The learned Additional Government Advocate points out that the very opening pars of the grounds of detention (contained in Annexure- 3 and served upon the petitioner along with the detention order) clearly indicates that the question of release of Ranjeet Srivastava had been considered by the State Government. The learned Additional Government Advocate points out that the very opening pars of the grounds of detention (contained in Annexure- 3 and served upon the petitioner along with the detention order) clearly indicates that the question of release of Ranjeet Srivastava had been considered by the State Government. The Statement of grounds begins with the mention that against the detention order dated 19-8-1984 of the District Magistrate, Sitapur, the petitioner's writ petition had been allowed by the Court's judgment dated 18-9-1984 on the ground that the State Government had not considered the effect of the release of co- detenu Ranjeet Srivastava on common ground No. 1 while confirming his detention under S. 12(1) of the Act. The ground then went on to state (as translated in English) as follows : "It is worth mentioning that in the above matter the Advisory Board had released Ranjeet Srivastava on the ground that the result of investigation of the acts of 11-8-1983 were not known. Now the investigation has been completed and a charge sheet has been submitted to the Court against the accused." The grounds of detention (Annexure-3), do not deal with this part of the matter in any other portion. The contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate is that the observation in the grounds that the detention of Ranjeet Srivastava had been revoked by the Advisory Board, because the result of the investigation had not been received till then, followed by the observation that the investigation had been completed and a charge sheet had been submitted to the Court against all the accused, indicates that the State Government had applied its mind to the circumstances of the release of Ranjeet Srivastava and its effect upon the decision to detain the petitioner under the impugned detention order dated 22-9-1984. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that extracted observation, in the grounds of detention, only indicates that the State Government had just become aware of the circumstances of the release of Ranjeet Srivastava and of the fact of subsequent completion of investigation and submission of charge sheet, but that would not imply that the State Government had also taken a decision that in spite of release of Ranjeet Srivastava the petitioner ought to be detained. 5. 5. We are of opinion that the State Government undoubtedly appreciated that, at the earlier stage, Ranjeet Srivastava had been released because the result of investigation of the crime, committed by him on 11-8-1983, was not known, but subsequently the investigation was completed and prima facie evidence of the commission of the crime by Ranjeet Srivastava and other accused must have come to light, in consequence of which the charge sheet was submitted in the Court against all the accused. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that it is not for this Court to infer that the State Government had appreciated the facts in that light. the State Government itself should say so. Reliance is placed upon the observations contained in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 at p. 746, para 11. There the District Magistrate, while passing the detention order, had mentioned that he was satisfied that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, at the same time quoting the particular provision of the Defence of India Rules, which provided for the ground of public order, and not law and order. It had been urged on behalf of the detenu that the use of the expression "law and order' would show that the District Magistrate was not satisfied that the impugned acts constituted a disturbance of public order. It was contended on behalf of the State that since the District Magistrate had also referred to the particular rule, under which he passed the order, which specifically related to public order and not law and order, the ground of detention should be construed as one relating to public order and not to law and order. The Supreme Court took the view that in any case, it was doubtful whether the District Magistrate was satisfied that the impugned acts related to public order and not to law and order and the benefit of this doubt must go to the detenu. Those facts, we think, are quite different from the facts contained in the grounds of detention under consideration here. Those facts, we think, are quite different from the facts contained in the grounds of detention under consideration here. The State Government had not used any expression in the grounds of detention which would indicate that it was not satisfied that, in the face of release of Ranjeet Srivastava for non-completion of investigation, the present petitioner should not be detained, although subsequently evidence, sufficiently incriminating, had been collected to justify the lodging of the charge sheet in Court. It may be that the State Government did not record specifically that there was material, now available, to establish the guilt of the petitioner and Ranjeet Srivastava, lest such observations cast any reflection upon the proceedings of the pending criminal trial or upon the opinion of the Advisory Board in the case regarding Ranjeet Srivastava. Where the competent authority records a set of facts relatable to an earlier stage and further records another set of facts relatable to further material, subsequently gathered, it would be reasonable to hold that both the sets of facts have been considered. It does not appear to be always necessary to specifically record the result of the consideration. The result may follow by necessary implication. If the result, in a particular case, does not follow by necessary implication, it may constitute a case of doubt, and in that event benefit of the dictum, set forth in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, (supra), may come into operation. It is well recognised that the vesting of discretionary power in the state or public authorities or an officer of high standing is treated as a guarantee that the power will be used fairly and with a sense of responsibility. (See Radha Krishna's case (1979) 2 SCC 249 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1588 ). In this case the power has been exercised by the State Government. We also think that if the relevant material is shown to have been in the notice or such public authorities or State or officer of high standing, they may be presumed to have taken into account those considerations in arriving at their conclusions (See the case of B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, (1983) 4 SCC 582 : AIR 1984 SC 363 . In the present case, the State Government had before them the relevant facts, regarding the release of Ranjeet Srivastava and the renewed proposal for detention of the petitioner, the State Government must be deemed to have considered that material and then to have arrived at the decision that despite the previous release of Ranjeet Srivastava they thought it appropriate to detain the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner then challenged the grounds of detention. According to Ground 1. Ranjeet Srivastava, along with a number of persons, named therein, hurled hand-grenades and fired with country- made pistols at Chandra Pal Dwivedi, who was going in a jeep near Dewa Hospital where the Mela of Nauchandi was going on and devotees had flocked for a view of the Dewa Sharif Mazzar. The incident took place at 9.30 a.m. on 11-8-1983. Chandra Pal Dwivedi was seriously injured. Other also received injuries. The people in the locality were terrorised and got scared and ran for safety. Subsequently, Chandra Pal Dwivedi died. According to Ground No. 1 this murderous assault was made by Ranjeet Srivastava and other in consequence of a conspiracy for the purpose hatched by the petitioner. 7. Ground No. 2 relates to an incident which took place on 30-9-1983 at about 6 p.m. in Lalbagh Bazar, Sitapur, when bombs were hurled inside the jewellery shop of Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi causing injuries to Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi, his 3 sons, a lady, and several other persons, who were present in the market It was market hour and a large number of people were present in the market area. The ground went on to say that the two culprits were saying that they had been sent by the petitioner to commit the act and that if any person interceded, he would also face the same consequences. Terror and fear spread through the market and the people ran helter skelter. Subsequently, Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi died. 8. Reports had been lodged with the police in respect of both these incidents. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that on the dates of both the incidents, the petitioner was already in jail and therefore, there was no question of the petitioner entering into any conspiracy with the rest of the culprits. Subsequently, Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi died. 8. Reports had been lodged with the police in respect of both these incidents. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that on the dates of both the incidents, the petitioner was already in jail and therefore, there was no question of the petitioner entering into any conspiracy with the rest of the culprits. It is urged that the satisfaction of the State Government that the petitioner was one of the conspirators, is wholly arbitrary and mala fide because in view of the detention of petitioner no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion that the petitioner could have been a participant in the conspiracy in consequence of which the offence was committed. 10. The learned Additional Government Advocate contends that in consequence of the F.I. Rs. in those offences, investigations were made and in the course of those investigations specific evidence came forward that the petitioner had conspired to commit those offences and at his instigation and in consequence of the conspiracy these two acts had been committed He refers to the statement of Mahesh Prasad, under S. 161, Cr. P.C., according to which about 4 or 5 days before the arrest of Om Prakash Gupta, the petitioner, the latter had called Ranjeet Srivastava and associates at his house at Sitapur and had told Ranjeet Srivastava that during the time he (the petitioner) stayed in jail, Chandra Pal Dwivedi should be murdered for which he agreed to pay Rs. 1,0,000/-. The petitioner also agreed to pay th in advance to Ranjeet Srivastava. This statement of Mahesh Prasad is a direct evidence of conspiracy between the petitioner and Ranjeet Srivastava and associates for the murder of Chandra Pal Dwivedi, entered into before the petitioner was arrested and confined to jail. Another statement is said to have been made by Ranjeet Srivastava himself who stated the same thing, and admitted having gone to the house of the petitioner where he had agreed with the petitioner to kill Chandra Pal Dwivedi for which he would take Rs. 1,20,000/- from the petitioner, but the petitioner had paid very insufficient amount. There are statements of other persons also under S. 161, Cr. P.C. who speak of having been told by Mahesh Prasad, aforesaid about the conspiracy. 11. 1,20,000/- from the petitioner, but the petitioner had paid very insufficient amount. There are statements of other persons also under S. 161, Cr. P.C. who speak of having been told by Mahesh Prasad, aforesaid about the conspiracy. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the statement of Ranjeet Srivastava, a co-accused, or of other witnesses under S. 161, Cr. P.C., are of very little evidentiary value and, for the purposes of trial, are not legal evidence at all. The criticism, in our opinion, has no legal support because it is well established that the statements made in the course of investigation, under S. 161, Cr. P.C., may be considered by the detaining authority to satisfy itself whether, or not grounds for making of an order of detention exist. As pointed out by the Additional Government Advocate no investigation is permissible under the law to find out the truth or falsehood of the facts stated in the grounds of detention as held in the case of Sheo Raj Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1975 SCC (Cri) 239 : AIR 1975 SC 1143 . 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the so-called statements under S. 161, Cr. P.C., are purely fictitious because they do not contain any date on which they were made or the name of the police officer to whom they were made. While, it is admitted that copies of these statements were made available to the petitioner, along with the grounds of detention, these statements have not been challenged in the writ petition on the contended grounds, otherwise specific statement in that respect would have been made in the counter affidavit or, at any rate, the case, diaries could have been summoned to check up the statements. Since these statements contained material of the formation of conspiracy before the petitioner was arrested and confined to jail, the argument that the petitioner could not have been a party to that conspiracy, for that reason is not capable of being accepted. 13. It is not disputed that the facts as set forth in the F.I.R. and in the statements under S. 161, Cr. 13. It is not disputed that the facts as set forth in the F.I.R. and in the statements under S. 161, Cr. P.C., would indicate that the offence was committed in a public place in the midst of a large number of people who were scared and terrorised and ran for safety, the even tempo of life of the community was disturbed and, therefore, it was a case of disturbance of public order. 14. In respect of Ground No. 2 the F.I.R. and the statements under S. 161, Cr. P.C., furnished to the petitioner, do not contain a direct account of the conspiracy of the petitioner with the two unknown persons who hurled hand-grenades in the shop of Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi. The learned Additional Government Advocate, however, emphasised two factors in this connection appearing from the said material : 1. The unknown culprits had declared at the spot that they had been sent by the petitioner; and 2. The deceased Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi was the own brother of Chandra Pal Dwivedi. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that no reasonable man could have believed as true the allegation that at the time of hurling the hand-grenades, the two unknown culprits were saying that they had been sent by the petitioner and that the mere fact that Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi was brother of Chandra Pal Dwivedi could not similarly satisfy any person reasonably that the attack on Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi was a result of conspiracy with the petitioner. Learned Additional Government Advocate says that satisfaction of the detaining authority is a subjective satisfaction, into which this Court cannot go. That contention can be accepted only subject to the test of reasonableness as recognised under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 (para 70 onwards) it held that the various provisions of part III of the Constitution are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, an order providing for preventive detention must satisfy the test of Article 14. So tested, the National Security Act has been found to be valid, but the necessary corollary of the decision is that every satisfaction of the detaining authority under the Act must also be shown to satisfy the test of Article 14. So tested, the National Security Act has been found to be valid, but the necessary corollary of the decision is that every satisfaction of the detaining authority under the Act must also be shown to satisfy the test of Article 14. Article 14, inter alia, strikes at arbitrariness, there is a series of the decisions of the Supreme Court to support that position, it is not necessary to cite them here. 16. Now the test of arbitrariness is the test of reasonableness. This reasonableness may not extend to that kind of reasonableness which is expected of a judicial authority or even a quasi-judicial authority. But, it must, nevertheless, satisfy the test of what a man of ordinary prudence would have believed as true while acting in good faith. Good faith implies honesty with care. Care would involve the existence of adequate linking material to a fact and honesty would involve a fair consideration of the material to the point in issue. If it can be found that there is a material, and further that that material can lead to a particular inference fairly, then that inference must be considered to have been arrived at reasonably. This test of reasonableness is not confined to the provisions contained in the Law of Evidence as known to the Courts, it takes within its ambit a fair conclusion arrived at on considering a fair material. If a particular conclusion does not stand this test of reasonableness, it is bound to be struck down as arbitrary as known to Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. Learned Additional Government Advocate referred to the case of Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 8 , for the view that this Court is only to see whether the formalities enjoined by Article 22(5) of the Constitution have been complied with by the detaining authority, and if they are found to be so complied with, the Court cannot examine the material before it and find that the detaining authority should not have been satisfied on the material before it for, the Supreme Court observed that it would be the function of an appellate Court. The expression "formalities enjoined by Article 22(5) of the Constitution" cannot be confined to the requirement of forms alone, they must extend to substance also, for if that was not so, the mere fact of furnishing of grounds, so as to enable the detenu to make a representation, would have satisfied the requirements of law. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981) 4 SCC 216 : AIR 1981 SC 2005 the view taken is that if the order of detention has been based on material on record, the Court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not, which is the function of an appellate authority or Court. It was held that the Court could examine the material on record only for the purposes of seeing whether the order of detention has been based on no material. This decision was followed in the case of State of Gujarat v. Ismail Juma, AIR 1982 SC 683 . The question is what is the true concept of an order being "based on material" or "based on no material". It cannot merely signify that if there is 'any material' on the record, the detention order may not be examined by the Court. The material must be relevant and stand the test of reasonable acceptability without judicial acceptability. The above pronouncements by the Supreme Court, we think, have to be considered in the light of earlier important decisions of the Supreme Court on the law of preventive detention. In the case of Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1974 SC 806 it was observed in pars 11 that the power, conferred by law of preventive detention, has to be exercised "with extreme care". In pars 12 it was observed that the requirement of care and scrupulous confines of the bounds of law is only an application "of the insistence of fairness when power is exercised to affect others right particularly the most sensitive of all rights - personal freedom". It was observed that the concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. It was observed that the concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. In pars 14 it was observed that the important point is that the subjective satisfaction of the public functionary, so subjective, must be real and rational, not colourable, fanciful, mechanical or unrelated to the object enumerated in the Act. 18. In the case of Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81 : AIR 1975 SC 550 , it was held that the detaining authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of detention. Laying down the various tests of subjective satisfaction in this connection, it was observed in para 10 that when it is said that something was to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law and not humour. The action is not to be arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular. It was held that the Courts enquire whether the grounds are such that any reasonable person could possible arrive at such satisfaction. If the authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, the Courts can interfere. The legitimate inference would be that either the authority did not honestly form that view, or that in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts. This, it was observed, was not an exercise of appellate authority. 19. Such being the law, we think that the observations contained in the case of Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 8 (supra) do not absolve this Court of its responsibility of examining whether the detaining authority had acted fairly, according to rules of reason and justice and on the test of a reasonable person arriving at the conclusion in question. 20. 20. In the present case, so far as Ground No. 1 is concerned, there was a witness available (Mahesh Prasad) as also the conspirator (Ranjeet Singh) who made direct statement of conspiracy with the petitioner 4 or 5 days before the petitioner was arrested and, therefore, even though those statements may not have been admissible as legal evidence in a judicial proceedings, the detaining authority would have noticed the direct evidence contained therein and could have honestly come to a satisfaction that there was a conspiracy as alleged. So far as Ground No. 2 is concerned, the detaining authority should have noticed that if there was a conspiracy for the murder of Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi, it might perhaps have been part of conspiracy with Ranjeet Srivastava when it was allegedly decided to kill Chandra Pal Dwivedi. The investigating authorities have not been able to find who the culprits were who hurled hand-grenades at Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi. The alleged statements of those unknown culprits, at the time the incident was committed, is so out of place that no man of ordinary prudence would have acted upon the supposition that it could be true. The petitioner had been continuously in jail for more than three months when the attack on Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi took place. In the absence of any better or more proximate material, no person could have been satisfied that the attack on Shambhu Dayal Dwivedi was a part of the conspiracy with the petitioner who could not have an effective opportunity of meeting the allegation. The satisfaction of the detaining authority on this ground, therefore, appears to be arbitrary and, as such, the ground cannot be sustained. 21. According to Ground No. 3, on 26-5-1984 at about 3 P.M. the petitioner pulled down one Munna Lal from a Rickshaw and robbed him of a Jhola containing Rs. 3,000/-. A report of offence under S. 394 I.P.C., was lodged against the petitioner. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the alleged offence was a stray incident which could not affect the public order and, therefore, cannot be a ground for detention as held in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 . 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the alleged offence was a stray incident which could not affect the public order and, therefore, cannot be a ground for detention as held in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 . Learned Additional Government Advocate says that the offence was committed in a market place which, being a public place, would constitute it to be an incident of public order and not merely law and order. There is no material to indicate that in consequence of the alleged robbery of Munna Lal by the petitioner; any disturbance in the public, at the place of the incident, took place. In short, there is no material to show that there was any disturbance in the even tempo of life of the community in the locality. We would agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the incident falls within the scope of Arun Ghosh's case (supra) and, therefore, it is not a ground of disturbance of public order. 23. According to Ground No. 4, hand- grenades were hurled on 4-6-1984 at about 9 p.m., on a public road near the Transport Crossing in the city of Sitapur, at one Alok Kumar Srivastava, who is the General Secretary of the Labourers Union of Harak Chand Flour Mill, Sitapur. One Ram Krishna Pandey is said to have hurled the hand-grenade on the prompting of K. D. Bajpai causing injuries to Alok Kumar Srivastava and his cousin brother Umesh Chandra Bajpai. When the people around chased K. D. Bajpai and Ram Krishna Pandey, the latter again hurled hand-grenade at the people at large on account of which they stayed back. F.I.R. of this incident was lodged the same day at 9.45 P.M. by Alok Kumar Srivastava. In the course of investigation, Munna Lal and Tej Ram stated, under S. 161, Cr. P.C., that they had heard the petitioner accompanying Ram Krishna Pandey and K. D. Bajpai, telling the Manager of the mill earlier on 4-6-1984, in the mill premises, that the latter should rest assured that there would be no strike in the mill, that the petitioner would consign Alok Kumar Srivastava to his proper place, and that in the event of the strike, dead bodies would be littered all around. According to F.I.R. and these-statements, Alok Kumar Srivastava has threatened Manager with a labourers strike in connection with certain demands. One Munni Lal stated under S. 161, Cr. P.C., that the same day he had heard the petitioner sitting in a motor car outside his house, telling Ram Krishna Pandey and K. D. Bajpai to kill Alok Kumar Srivastava wherever the latter might be found, to which Ram Krishna Pandey and K. D. Bajpai agreed, affirming that the desired would be done. Copies of the F.I.R. and all these statements were furnished to the petitioner along with the grounds. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the material contained therein does not indicate that there was any disturbance of, public order, because it is not shown that the people were scared or reacted in a violent manner. It is not possible to accept the contention because the material not only indicated an active direction by the petitioner to his associates, Ram Krishna Pandey and K. D. Bajpai, to kill Alok Kumar Srivastava, but also contained a threat that in the event of a strike coming through in the mill dead bodies would be littered all around. In pursuance of this-threat, not only hand-grenades were hurled at Alok Kumar Srivastava, but also at public at large which tried to apprehend Ram Krishna Pandey and K. D. Bajpai. The offence was committed at a public place. There can be absolutely no doubt that the offence had the potentiality of disturbing the public order. We hold, therefore, that the incident was a relevant material germane to the question of disturbance of public order and the detaining authority had bona fide reasons to be satisfied that the acts of the petitioner were likely to disturb public order. 25. According to Ground No. 5, when the petitioner was brought for hearing before the Advisory Board in connection with the earlier detention order on 26-7-84, former Inspector of Kotwali, Sitapur, Ram Chandra Singh, is alleged to have told S. O. Anand Prakash Tewari of Kotwali, Sitapur, that the petitioner had told his associates, who had arrived to see him, that they need not get nervous and should keep their morale high and that when he would be released, he would take revenge from each one of the persons who had got him detained and that he would create hell in Sitapur. 26. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the allegation is so grossly improbable that no man of reason could have accepted it as true and that there is no record by Ram Chandra Singh himself about the alleged conversation between the petitioner and his associates. The only record on the point consists of the report of S. O. Anand Prakash Tewari at P. O. Kotwali, Sitapur, who had gone in the Pairvi of the case before the Advisory Board. The petitioner was at that time in detention in Varanasi. Anand Prakash Tewari did not record that he himself had heard the petitioner talking to his associates as aforesaid. The result is that the only material available is, so to say, a third-hand account, that is to say, the version of Anand Prakash Tewari of what Ram Chandra Singh told him about what the latter heard being talked about between the petitioner and his associates. This material, in our opinion, could not be fairly and honestly used for the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The satisfaction recorded on this ground, we hold, was arbitrary and must be struck down. 27. According to Ground No. 6, when the petitioner was brought to the High Court on 24-8-1984 in connection with his earlier writ petition, S. O. Anand Prakash Tewari heard the petitioner telling his supporters that he would stay in Lucknow and that from Lucknow itself he would exterminate his enemies residing in Sitapur, where he would create hell. The material in support of this allegation consists of the report recorded by S. O. Anand Prakash Tewari at P. S. .Kotwali, Sitapur, the same day. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that apart from inherent incredibility of the statement, the petitioner's threats, if any, while residing at Lucknow, could not have the potentiality of destroying his enemies or of creating hell at Sitapur. So far as the credibility of the information is concerned, it was a direct statement by S. O. Anand Prakash . Tewari who had himself heard the conversation between the petitioner and his supporters and, therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in treating the material as credible. So far as the credibility of the information is concerned, it was a direct statement by S. O. Anand Prakash . Tewari who had himself heard the conversation between the petitioner and his supporters and, therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in treating the material as credible. Nevertheless, there seems to be substance in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the alleged statement could not be reasonably interpreted to make out a potentiality of disturbing public order in Sitapur while the petitioner throughout continued to live in Lucknow. The threat to enemies is in the nature of a threat to unnamed individuals; the threat to raise hell in Sitapur is too vague to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation in that respect. We are of opinion, therefore, that this ground is not sustainable in the eye of law. 28. These are all the grounds and while we are satisfied that Grounds Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 must fail, Grounds Nos. 1 and 4 must be held to be adequately established. The facts contained in these two grounds undoubtedly disturbed public order and, therefore, were valid grounds. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that.although the impugned detention order was passed on 22-9-1984, it was not enforced till 12-11-1984 when the petitioner's property was attached under the provisions of Ss. 82 and 83, Cr. P.C., read with S. 7 of the Act. On the contrary, it has been stated in Para 9 of the counter-affidavit that-after being released from jail on the revocation of the previous detention order by this Court, the petitioner went underground and became untraceable, that the detention order dated 22-9-1984 was sent to District Magistrate, Sitapur, for service, that the S. O. concerned and his subordinates made efforts for service of detention order at the petitioner's house on 23-9-1984, 25-9-1984 and 2-10-1984 and 3-10-1984 and again from 14-10-1984 to 20-10-1984 and 21-10-1984 but the petitioner was not traceable. According to the counter-affidavit the petitioner was sought for not only at Sitapur, but also at Misrikh, Maheli, Lakhimpur, Barabanki and Lucknow and he could not be found. Finally, on 29-10-1984 the District Magistrate sent a report to the State Government who, on being satisfied that the petitioner was absconding, or was concealing himself, issued orders under S. 7(i)(a) of the Act. Finally, on 29-10-1984 the District Magistrate sent a report to the State Government who, on being satisfied that the petitioner was absconding, or was concealing himself, issued orders under S. 7(i)(a) of the Act. On 7-11-1984 the State Government also made a proclamation order directing the petitioner to appear before the C.J.M. within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification. It is urged by the learned Additional Government Advocate that although this proclamation was not published in the official gazette, action had already been taken on orders passed under S. 7(i)(a) of the Act, in consequence of which the petitioner's property was attached on 12-11-1984 and the petitioner surrendered on 13-11-1984. 30. These facts, set forth in the counter- affidavit, establish that ever since the passing of detention order effort was being made, with due diligence, to serve it upon the petitioner, but the efforts did not succeed because the petitioner could not be found. It cannot be said, therefore, that there was any delay in the execution of the detention order which could either be avoided or which has remained unexplained. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that in issuing the process for the arrest of the petitioner the State Government did not apply its mind because orders could not have been passed both under S. 7(i)(a) of the Act and S. 7(i)(b) of the Act the same time. The simple answer of the learned Additional Government Advocate is that although a proclamation was issued on 7-11-1984 under S. 7(i)(b) of the Act, it was not followed up by its actual publication in the official gazette because in the meantime the orders, issued under S. 7(i)(a) of the Act became effective, and the petitioner, having surrendered on 13-11-1984, was served with the detention order. This contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate, in our opinion, is sound. It cannot be said that the process of execution of the warrant of arrest was gone through by the State Government without application of mind. This contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate, in our opinion, is sound. It cannot be said that the process of execution of the warrant of arrest was gone through by the State Government without application of mind. In the case of Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2353 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, no explanation for more than two months' delay in arresting the petitioner was given in the affidavit-in-reply, filed by the District Magistrate, the detaining authority, and, therefore, it was held that there was considerable doubt in the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate. As already indicated, in the present case, explanation for the delay has been given. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the petitioner joined Sanjay Vichar Manch, a political party, which had declared in the Press that the petitioner would be their candidate in the Lok Sabha elections from Sitapur Constituency and it appeared that the decision to arrest and detain the petitioner was taken after the political decision to hold the General Elections. The contention is that, in these circumstances, the order of petitioner's detention was mala fide. 33. These allegations were denied in the counter-affidavit and it was urged that the intention of the petitioner contesting election from Sitapur, as a candidate of Sanjay Vichar Manch, was not relevant so far as detention was concerned. It was pointed out that while in Central Jail Varanasi, the petitioner had moved this Court to be taken to Sitapur from Central Jail, Varanasi, in order to enable him to file nomination papers and for taking oath, but an application for interim relief in that direction was rejected by the Division Bench of this Court, with the observation that there were provisions in the Representation of the People Act which provided, inter alia, for nomination through proposer without personal appearance of the candidates before the Returning Officer and that the Superintendents of Jail had been authorised to administer oath of affirmation for the purpose in the jail itself. The submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate is that the order of detention was passed before the decision to hold the General Elections to the Lok Sabha was taken and that the actual arrest and detention of the petitioner did not prevent him, in the eye of law, for being nominated as a candidate seeking election to the Lok Sabha. In that event, it is urged there was no question of any mala fides in the passing of the detention order. The contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate, in our opinion, is correct. The grounds of detention were pre-existing grounds and do not seem to have had any connection with the candidature of the petitioner for election to the Lok Sabha. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the District Administration had become inimical to the petitioner because he had been actively campaigning for redress of the grievances of the weaker sections of society for which he had raised his voice against various corrupt practices of the District Administration. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the District Magistrate should have filed a counter-affidavit to rebut those allegations, in the absence of which, the allegations may be accepted as correct. The noticeable feature is that the allegations in Para 3 of the writ petition are against "District Administration" and not "District Magistrate". In pars 5 of the counter-affidavit, filed by the State Government, it was stated that the allegations made against the District Administration were denied. In this situation, there is adequate rebuttal of the allegations relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 35. The last ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that S. 5A, National Security Act, 1980, as introduced by the National Security (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1984, is.ultra vires. It is well known that the satisfaction of the detaining authority under S. 3 of the Act, is a subjective satisfaction. The well-settled law was that if one or more of the grounds of detention were found to be unsustainable, the entire detention order failed because it was not possible for the Court to hold that the detaining authority would have been satisfied, as provided under S. 3 of the Act, with reference to the remaining grounds. Section 5A as inserted in the Act purports to meet this situation. Section 5A as inserted in the Act purports to meet this situation. Section 5A runs as follows "5-A. Grounds of detention severable where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention (whether made before or after the commencement of the National Security (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1984) under S. 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly, (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are : (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in S. 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; (b) The Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds." 36. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that this provision has the effect of curtailing the powers of the High Court to strike down the detention order in the light of well settled law that failure of one ground vitiates the entire detention order. In our opinion, the contention ignores the position that the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act are intended to create a sort of presumption about the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. There can be no doubt that when a detaining authority records two or more grounds for the detention of a person, it is satisfied of the existence of the grounds. If it was not so satisfied, it would not include such grounds as a basis for the order of detention. In addition to the satisfaction of the existence of the grounds, the detaining authority is further to be satisfied that the grounds are such that an order of detention should be passed. If it was not so satisfied, it would not include such grounds as a basis for the order of detention. In addition to the satisfaction of the existence of the grounds, the detaining authority is further to be satisfied that the grounds are such that an order of detention should be passed. If the detaining authority, while considering each ground, went on to add at the end of each ground that it was not only satisfied about the existence of the ground, but also of the sufficiency of that ground as a basis for the order of detention, the difficulty which the Courts felt in holding that the detaining authority would have been satisfied as provided in S. 3 of the Act, might have been obviated. S. 5-A of the Act, so to say, gets over the necessity for the detaining authority to record separately a finding of its satisfaction of sufficiency of the grounds, for the purposes of detention, separately for each of the grounds. This is done by creating the two presumptions. In the first part of the section it is set out that "such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds." The presumption seems to be quite reasonable, because once the existence of the facts, considered by the detaining authority in a particular ground, is established, which the detaining authority considers to be sufficient for establishing disturbance of public order, it is only fair that it considered each of the grounds to justify the detention of the person involved. It is only a corollary, to this position, that, as set out in Cl. (a), the order of detention could not be considered to be invalid or inoperative because of invalidity of one or some of the grounds for the reasons set out in sub-cls. (i) to (iv) or for any reason whatsoever, as set out in sub-cl. (v) of S. 5-A of the Act. In the second place, it also fairly follows that, as set out in Cl. (b) of S. 5-A of the Act the detaining authority shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under S. 3 of the Act after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. In the second place, it also fairly follows that, as set out in Cl. (b) of S. 5-A of the Act the detaining authority shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under S. 3 of the Act after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. In our opinion, these presumptions do not curtail powers of the Court in considering the order of detention or the grounds therefor, nothing in S. 5-A of the Act seems to prevent the Court to hold that despite the presumption, a detention order could be invalid not only for non-performance of the other requirements of the law as provided by the Act, but also where in a particular case which may be rare - the Court still finds that the detaining authority could not have been satisfied, in accordance with law, with any of the grounds. We do not think that S. 5-A of the Act could be struck down on the allegation that it curtails the powers of this Court, in-any manner, in dealing with the question of detention under the Act. 37. These are all the points raised in the writ petition which, for reasons recorded, deserves to fail. 38. The writ petition is dismissed. 39. Parties shall bear their own costs. 40. Immediately after the delivery of our judgment, request is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 41. We are satisfied that no substantial question of law of general importance, which needs decision by Hon'ble Supreme Court, arises out of our decision, the points are mostly concluded by the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court. 42. The prayer is rejected.