The plaintiff-petitioner firm, after serving notice of eject­ment as landlord, instituted Title Suit No. 74 of 1972 (old 157 of 1969) for ejectment of the defendeat-respondent Corporation on the ground of default in payment of rents from the month of April, 1966 to October, 1966. The defendant respondent contes­ted the suit stating that it had deposited and had been depo­siting rents due to the plaintiff-petitioner with the Income Tax Department at Gauhati in compliance with the letter of the Income-Tax Department dated 1.12.66 against challans issued by the Department which informed that the plaintiff-peti­tioner was to pay income-lax to the tune of Rs. 30.250/-. The trial Court found that by notice under section 226 (3) of the Income-tax Act (Ext. C) the defendant Corporation was asked to pay to the Income-tax Department the future rent payable to Mis. Dasuram Mirjamal and the defendant Corporation con­tinued to pay the rent upto March, 1966 pending correspondence with the Income-tax Department. By another notice dated 1st Dece­mber, 1966 ( Ext.B) the Income-tax Department asked the defendant Corporation to pay the future rent to the Income-tax Depart­ment instead of paying to the plaintiff-petitioner; but the challan depositing the rent for the period from April, 1966 to December, 1966 (Ext. Gha) was dated 2.12.66 and Ext. Gha (I) shows that the rents were paid for some dues of one Lakshinarayan Keyal, who was not a partner of the plaintiff firm bat was a partner of M/s. Dasuram Mirjamal. The rent was thus not paid within 15 days from falling due as rents for nine months from April, 1966 to December, 1966 were paid only on 2.12.66 by which time the defendant Corporation was already a defaulter within the meaning of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the law did not allow it to ignore its landlord and to pay rent to the Income-tax Department against the dues of one Lakshinarayan Keyal. It was accordingly held to have been a defeaulter and the suit for ejectment was decreed. 2. It was accordingly held to have been a defeaulter and the suit for ejectment was decreed. 2. On appeal by the defendant Corporation the learned lower appellate Court also found that the rent for the period from April, 1966 to October, 1966 had been deposited with the Income-tax Department on 2.12.66 against the income-tax dues of Lakshinarayan Keyal who was the uncle of P.W.1, Shri Kunjalal Agarwalla a partner of the plaintiff firm and the amount was deposited long after the rents for the months fell due. P.W. 1 admitted that he asked the defendant corporation to pay the rent for three months to the Income-tax Department by his letter dated 11.2.66 and rents upto the month of March, 1966 were thus paid. The Court also found that the Income-tax Department had written a letter (Ext. C) to the defendant Cor­poration on 20.11.65 asking it to pay and deposit in future rent payable by it to the firm M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal of Gauhati or its partners, in the Income-tax Department at every month. It also found that the said firm, M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal was lateron bifurcated and the plaintiff-petitioner firm was consti­tuted as a separate firm, but P. W. 1. remained as common partner of both these firms and that the suit premises were stated to have fallen in the share of the plaintiff petitioner firm after bifurcation of M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal. The Court also found that the defendant corporation was asked to deposit the rent due for the suit premises in the Income-tax Office Gauhati every month by letter dated 23.11.65 (Ext. C) to which the plaintiff-petitioner firm had no objection and the defendant Corporation was asked by the petitioner firm to deposit rents upto March, 1966 in compliance thereof and the defendant Corporation being again asked to pay to the Income Tax Depart­ment by subsequent letter dated 112.66 (Ext. B) the defendant was required to pay rent for that period to the Income-tax Department after correspondence and the defendant Corporation could not be held to have been defaulter in the eye of law under the Act. B) the defendant was required to pay rent for that period to the Income-tax Department after correspondence and the defendant Corporation could not be held to have been defaulter in the eye of law under the Act. The Court further found that under Sec. 226 (3) (i) of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer might ask any person from whom money was due to the assessee to pay, the same to the Income-tax Officer by issuing notice to the person concerned and that though there was no evidence to show that a copy of the notice was served on the assessee it appeared from the evidence of P. W. 1 that he was aware of this fact and he himself asked the defendant to pay the rents for 3 months by his letter dated 11.2.66 and the defendant corporation had no alternative but to deposit the amount with the Income-tax Officer as directed failing which they them­selves would have been deemed to be assessee in default in respect of the amounts specified in the notice. If the plaintiff-petitioner firm was not an assessee the matter could have been taken up with the Income-tax Department which was not done. Accordingly it was held that the defendant-respondent-corporation was not a defaulter and consequently the decree was set aside. The plaintiff-petitioner firm there from filed second Appeal No. 103/78 on 18.7.78. As in L. P. A. No. 11/76 Rames Chandra Basak vs. Deenarayan Prasad it was held that second appeals would not lie under the Act, the Second Appeal was converted to a revision petition and the same has been numbered as Civil Revision No. 143 of 1984. 3. Mr. J. N. Sarma, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner firm, submits, inter alia, that the learned lower appe­llate Court fell into an error in holding that the defendant-respondent corporation was not a defaulter inasmuch as the rent for the period from April, 1966 to October, 1966 was not deposited within 15 days of the rent falling due but was deposited only on 2.12.66 after the plaintiff petitioner firm sent ejectment notice on 28.11,66 which was served on the defendant-respondent-corporation on 30.11.66 and after the 2nd notice of the Income-tax Department dated 1.12.66 (Ext. E) was also received. There can, therefore, be no justification for the defendant-respondent corporation in not paying the rent due fop these months as required under the law. 4. Mr. E) was also received. There can, therefore, be no justification for the defendant-respondent corporation in not paying the rent due fop these months as required under the law. 4. Mr. S. Medhi, the learned counsel for the defendant-Corporation supports the impugned appellate judgment submitt­ing that by Ext. C dated 29.11.65 the defendant-respondent cor­poration was required to deposit all future rents with the Income-tax Office and the plaintiff-petitioner firm itself directed the defendant Corporation to deposit the rents pursuant to this notice upto March, 1966; and the Corporation was in corres­pondence with the Income-tax Department in reply to which by subsequent letter dated 1.12.66 (Ext. E) the Corporation was required, to deposit future rent with the Income-tax Office against challans and the Corporation had to deposit the rents in com­pliance with the letter and had been depositing rent up-to-date against challans issued by the Income-tax Department and it, therefore, committed no default. Mr. Medhi further submits that the suit itself was barred under Section 69 of the Indian Part­nership Act inasmuch as the firm was not registered and the persons suing were not shown in the register of firms as part­ners of the firm. According to him, the plaintiff-petitioner produced the Registration Certificate only at the time of hearing and the respondent-corporation had no opportunity to object to it, but, it is submitted, that this being a question of jurisdiction it is entitled to raise objection in this revision. Mr. Medhi relies on AIR 1969 Guj. 178 , AIR 1970 Mysore 279, and AIR 1971 J. & K. 109. 5. The Registration Certificate No. 168-70 dated 30.4.74 shows that the firm's registration number is 72 of 1958-59 and the name of the firm is M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt Oil & Atta Mills and its date of establishment is 19.4.1966. It shows the names of four partners, namely, (1) Kunjalal Agarwala, (2) Prabhaudayal Agarwalla (3) Debidutta Agarwalla, and (4) Motilal Agarwalla; all joined the firm in April, 1966. 6. Title Suit No. 157/69 was filed in the name of "M/s. Kunjalal Debidutta, a registered firm at Fancy Bazar, Gauhati". The name of the firm, as such, does not tally in full, namely, M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt Oil & Atta Mills. However, it has not been shown by Mr. Medhi that there exists another firm named "M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt" as distinguished from "M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt Oil & Atta Mills". The name of the firm, as such, does not tally in full, namely, M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt Oil & Atta Mills. However, it has not been shown by Mr. Medhi that there exists another firm named "M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt" as distinguished from "M/s. Kunjalal Debidutt Oil & Atta Mills". It has also not been shown that P.W.1 is not a partner of the plaintiff-petitioner firm. As the objection was not raised earlier and the parties proceeded on this basis the mis-description of the firm cannot be held to have been fatal to the maintainability of the suit. The objection on this ground is, therefore, rejected. 7. On question of default, admittedly, the rents for the mouths from April to October were deposited in the Income-sax Office in the month of December. Mr. Sarma, relying on Ganpat Lodha vs. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, AIR 1978 SC 955 , V. Dhanapal Chetier vs. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 , and Mranalini B. Shah vs. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 submits, inter alia, that a tenant must comply with the condi­tions laid down in the provisions of the Rent Control Act; that the Court cannot exercise discretion in favour of a tenant not fulfilling those conditions as the regularity in payment is mandatory and not directory; and in case of monthly tenancy, the Court has no discretion to treat payment made at irregular intervals as sufficient compliance with the requirements, and as in the instant case rents were not regularly paid and in fact were paid more than 15 days' after those fell due, the Court has no discretion to treat the payment as regular. 8. Under Section 5(1) of the Act, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or exec­uted by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under the Act and performs the conditions of tenancy. But this will not apply where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight from its falling due. In Kalikumar vs. Makhan Lal, AIR 1969 Assam & Nagaland 66, it has been held that if the rent is tendered or deposited in the Court beyond time the tenant could not avoid being a defaulter. This was followed in Smti. In Kalikumar vs. Makhan Lal, AIR 1969 Assam & Nagaland 66, it has been held that if the rent is tendered or deposited in the Court beyond time the tenant could not avoid being a defaulter. This was followed in Smti. Pratima Prova Kalita vs. Arun Kumar Ghosh Dastidar, Civil Revision No. 215 of 1983, disposed of on 1.6.84. However, in the instant case the facts are different and it is not a case of depositing rent in Court. By Ext. C. dated 20. 11. 65 the defendant Corpor­ation was asked "to deposit any future rent" payable to M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal, Gauhati, or its partners" for the suit pre­mises in the Income-tax Office, Gauhati every month. The plaintiff firm instead of objecting to it asked the defendant to comply with it, of course only in respect of rent upto the month of March, 1966. However, once the notice directing to pay any future rent is complied with, it no longer rested with the plaintiff-petitioner firm to stop half-way future payment; but the defendant corporation remained liable to continue to deposit as required by the notice. True, Ext. C demanded deposit of rents due to M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal, or its partners. The plaintiff firm bifurcated from M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal, but P. W. 1 continued to be a partner of M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal and hence the notice remained binding. There is evidence to show that there was some correspondence between the defendant-Corporation and the Income-tax Department. Once the defendant Cor­poration as tenant was required to comply with the notice of the Income-tax Department issued under Section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act it was not open for the defendant Corporation to have disobeyed that notice and pay future rents to the plaintiff-landlord. There is no evidence to show that the plaintiff firm directed the defendant Corporation not to deposit future rents. Once the defendant was required to comply with the notice (Ext. C) issued under Section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, so long the defendant Corporation did not deny that the future rents fell due to the plaintiff firm and the plaintiff firm did not arrange for the defendant corporation to get rid of that obligation to deposit with the Department, it would not be open for the defendant-corporation to pay the rent to the plaintiff firm instead of to the Income-tax Depart­ment in disobedience to the said notice. The subsequent letter dated 1. 12. 66 (Ext.B) was with reference to the defendant Corporation's letter dated 7. 10. 66 and it has to be interpreted as one in reiteration of the earlier notice (Ext.C) and there would be no hiatus between the two. Again the rents for the earlier three months were also not deposited with the Income-tax Depa­rtment within 15 days of their falling due and yet the plaintiff firm did not consider it to be a case of default. Similarly when the rents for the months of April to October, 1966 were depo­sited in December 1966, it was not open for the plaintiff firm to have treated the defendant corporation as having in default. Exts. C and B did not specify the last date for deposit of each month's future rent and the provision of the Act which related to deposit in court could not be superimposed over those of the Income-tax Act, which related to deposit in the Income-tax Office. Rent payable may be garnished, as was held in AIR 1965 S. C. 440 (V.N Vansudeva vs. Koirimal). 9. Under Section 226(3) (i) of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer may, at anytime or from time to time, by notice in wri­ting require any person from whom money is due or may become due to the assessee or any person who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of the assessee to pay to the Income-tax Officer either forthwith upon the money becoming due of being held or at or within the time specified in the notice (not being before the money becomes due or is held) so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the amount due by the assesses in respect of arrears or the whole of the money when it is equal to or less than that amount. Under clause (iv) of sub-section (3) of S.226 save as otherwise provided in this sub­section, every person to whom a notice is issued under this sub-section shall be bound to comply with such notice. Under clause (iv) of sub-section (3) of S.226 save as otherwise provided in this sub­section, every person to whom a notice is issued under this sub-section shall be bound to comply with such notice. Under clause (iv) where a person to whom a notice under this sub­section is sent objects to it by a statement on oath that the sum demanded or any part thereof is not due to the assessee of that he does not hold any money for or on account of the assessee, then nothing contained in this sub-section shall be deemed to require such person to pay any such sum or part thereof, as the case may be, but if it is discovered that such statement was false in any material particular, such person shall be personally liable to Income-tax Officer to the extent of his own liability to the assessee on the date of the notice, or to the extent of the assesee's liability for any sum due under the Act, whichever is less. Under clause (x) if the person to whom a notice under this sub-section is sent fails to make payment in pursuance thereof to the Income-tax Officer, he shall be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the amount specified in the notice and further proceedings may be taken against him for the realisation of the amount as if it were an arrear of tax due from him, in the manner provided in Sect­ions 222 to 225 and notice shall have the same effect as an attachment of a debt by the Tax Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Section 222. In The III Income-tax Offi­cer vs. M. Damodar Bhat, AIR 1969 SC 08 it has been held that for issue of notice under S.226 (3) the assessee need not be in default. However, in the instant case the assessee was stated to have been in default to the tune of Rs. 30,250/- on the relevant date. No objection was filed by the garnishee. On the other hand the plaintiff firm being garnished asked the defendant corporation to make payment in compliance with the notice. However, in the instant case the assessee was stated to have been in default to the tune of Rs. 30,250/- on the relevant date. No objection was filed by the garnishee. On the other hand the plaintiff firm being garnished asked the defendant corporation to make payment in compliance with the notice. Under clause (viii) the Income-tax Officer shall grant a receipt for any amount paid in compliance with a notice issued under this sub-section, and the person so paying shall be fully discharged from his liability to the assessese to the ex­tent of the amount so paid. Admittedly, in the instant case the defendant-corporation obtained receipts by making the payment against challans issued by the Income-tax Department and as such under clause (viii) the defendant corporation shall be fully discharged from its liability to the assessee to the extent of the amount so paid. It is not denied that P.W. 1 continued to be a partner of M/s. Dasuram Mirzamal. Indeed the defen­dant corporation states that even to-day it has been depositing the rents with the Income-tax Department and this fact has not been controverted by the plaintiff. Mr. Sarma, however, submits that the total amount so deposited has far exceeded the amount of Rs. 30,250/- as was originally stated; but that could be an objection in respect of a period after October, 1966 and it is for the plaintiff firm to have taken up the matter with the Income-tax Department. At any rate in so far as the period from April to October, 1966 is concerned it could not be said that the defendant corporation committed default in depositing the rent in the Income-tax Department in December, 1966 against challans and obtaining receipts which discharges the defendant corporation from the liability to the plaintiff firm. 10. For the reasons stated above I do not find any error or infimity relating to jurisdiction in the impugned judgment so as to merit interference in this civil revision, which is accordingly dismissed, but without costs. The Rule is discharged.