Order This revision by the private complainant (P.W.1) is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli in Criminal Appeal Nos. 191 and 197 of 1980. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case which give rise to this revision are as follows: P.W.1 is the widow of one Baliah Nadar. She was in possession and enjoyment of an extent of 27 cents of land inS.No.371/15 in Soorangudi village. A-1 is the son of the elder brother of Baliah Nadar, who died about 2 years prior to the occurrence. On 4-2-1979, both the accused along with four unidentified persons armed with kambu and aruval came to the above land and harvested the paddy raised in the land. P.W.2 gave information to P.W.1, who in turn took P.Ws. 3 and 4 and one another to the field and found the accused and others tying the harvested paddy in bundles. When P.W.1 raised objection, she was threatened by A.1 and A.2 that if she came near, she would be murdered and thereupon, the accused and four others carried the bundles of harvested paddy measuring about 3-1/2 kottaie. P.W.1 reported the matter to the Village Munsif, P.W.5. Thereupon, a case was registered in Crime No.22 of 1979 of Nanguneri Police Station and charge-sheet was filed against the accused under Section 397, Indian Penal Code. In support of the prosecution case, 9 witnesses were examined, 8 exhibits were filed and one material object was marked. 3. The accused when examined under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code denied the evidence of the prosecution and stated that the case has been foisted on them due to enmity. A.1 further contended that he has been in possession of the disputed land as leases. A.2 has stated that since P.W.1 suspected that he was supporting A.1, he has been falsely implicated in this case. A.1 has examined the Tenancy Tahsildar, Tirunelveli, as D.W.I to prove that he has filed a petition on 3-1-1979 to register him as a tenant of the disputed land under the Record of Tenancy Rights Act in Tenance Case No. 163/78 and it is pending enquiry. 4. A.1 has examined the Tenancy Tahsildar, Tirunelveli, as D.W.I to prove that he has filed a petition on 3-1-1979 to register him as a tenant of the disputed land under the Record of Tenancy Rights Act in Tenance Case No. 163/78 and it is pending enquiry. 4. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, convicted the accused under Section 447 , Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo R.I., for one month and also under Section 392 read with Section 397, Indian Penal Code, to undergo R.I., for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs.200/- in default to undergo R.I., for three months. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, set aside the conviction and sentences. Hence, the aggrieved P.W.I has filed this revision. 5. Mr. Shanmughavelyaudham, learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the reasons given by the appellate Court for acquitting the accused are erroneous and that the order of acquittal is unsustainable in law and on facts. 6. Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 contended that the Appellate Court has assigned valid and convincing reasons for setting aside the convictions and sentence passed by the trial Court and that there is no scope for interference with the order of acquittal in this revision. 7. I have gone through the judgments of the Courts below and the evidence on record in the light of the various contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing on either side. The dispute between P.W.1 and A.1 is in respect of an extent of 27 cents of a cultivable land in S.No. 371/15 of Soorangudi Village and the harvest of paddy from the said land. P.W.1 claimed right to the said land through her deceased husband Baliah and the injunction order, Exhibit P-1 dated 26-2-1979. On the other hand, the contention of A.1 was that P.W.1 was not the legally wedded wife of the deceased Baliah Nadar, that she has no title over the land in question, that she was never in possession and enjoyment of the same and that he has already filed a petition before the Tenancy Tahsildar to register him as tenant of the disputed land. The appellate Court relying on the various circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the entry in the adangal, Exhibit P.4, showing the first accused as the cultivator of the land in question and the evidence of D.W.I and the non-seizure of the harvested paddy and also the other improbabilities and in consistencies in the evidence of the prosecution, allowed the appeal of the accused and set aside their conviction and sentence. 8. The dispute is in respect of the piece of land belonging to the deceased Balaiah Nadar and admittedly, P.W.1 has filed a suit in a Civil Court to establish her title and possession against A.1 and it is pending. Similarly, A.1 also filed a petition to register him as a tenant long prior to the date of occurrence and it is pending enquiry. Further, the marriage of P.W.I with the deceased Balaiah Nadar was also disputed. A.1 is admittedly the brother's son of the said Balaiah Nadar. The cultivation adangal (Exhibit P.4), would show the name of A.1 as joint pattadar. It was not made out that patta has been transferred in the name of P.W.1 after the death of Baliah Nadar. P.W.6 has deposed that after the life time of Balaiah Nadar, it was only the first accused who has been in enjoyment of the land in question. The evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6 also did not establish the actual possession of P.W.1 at the time of occurrence. Thus, there is a bona fide civil dispute between P.W.1 and A.1. The non-seizure of the harvested paddy or any weapons from the accused was also taken into consideration by the appellate Court while acquitting the accused. As observed by the Appellate Court, it is highly improbable that the accused along with 4 others harvested the paddy crops at 11.30 p.m., in the midnight. 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that though Exhibit P.1, the order was passed on 26.2.1979, the interim injunction granted by the District Munsif already was in force at the time of the occurrence and hence, the acquittal was improper. Admittedly, final order in the injunction application was passed only after the occurrence and the main suit is pending. Similarly, the petition filed by A.1 to register him as a tenant was also pending at the time of occurrence. Admittedly, final order in the injunction application was passed only after the occurrence and the main suit is pending. Similarly, the petition filed by A.1 to register him as a tenant was also pending at the time of occurrence. Hence, merely because the interim injunction was in force, it will not automatically prove the offence under Section 397, Indian Penal Code. 10. The scope of revisional powers of this Court has been considered in various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. The Supreme Court in D. Stephens v. Nosilbolla D. Stephens v. Nosilbolla (1951) S.C.J. 269: 64 L.W. 541: (1951) S.C.R. 284: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 196 has observed as follows: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417, it could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily be invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record……” 11. In State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu (1979)2 S.C.J. 1: (1979) MLJ. (Crl.) 456: (1979)1 S.C.C. 328 : (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.)283: (1979) Crl.L.J. 594: (1979)2 S.C.R. 442 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 663 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows: “….although the revisional power of the High Court under Section 439 read with Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is as wide as the power of a Court of Appeal under Section 423 of the Code, it is now well-settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice.” 12. In Mulwa v. State of M.P. Mulwa v. State of M.P. (1976)1 S.C.C. 37 : (1975) S.C.C. (Crl.) 759: (1976) Crl.L.J. 717: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 989 the Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is well-settled that in the absence of any material irregularity, manifest error or illegality; the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal, merely because it thinks that it would, sitting as a trial Court, have taken the other view of the evidence”, 13. The Supreme Court has - further held in Satyendra Nath v. Ram Narain Satyendra Nath v. Ram Narain (1975)2 S.C.R. 743 ; (1975) 3 S.C.C. 398 : (1975) S.C.C. (Crl.) 24: (1975) Crl.L.J. 577: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 580 as follows: “Section 439 (1) of the Code, which deals with the revisional powers of the High Court provides that in toe exercise of revisional jurisdiction the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal. As the Court of Appeal is entitled under Section 428(l)(a) to reverse an order of acquittal or to direct a re-trial, the High Court in the exercise of its revisional powers would also be entitled to record a conviction by reversing the order of acquittal. But sub- section (4) of Section 439 provides expressly that nothing contained in the Section” shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, where the judgment of the Sessions Judge did not suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court the setting aside of the acquittal and ordering a retrial is a transgression of the narrow limits of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 439(4) and hence the order has to be quashed.” 14. On a careful consideration of the materials placed before me, I do not find any manifest illegality or irregularity or any glaring defect in the procedure which has consequently resulted in gross miscarriage of justice warranting interference in this revision with the order of acquittal passed by the appellate Court, 15. In the result, the order of acquittal passed by the appellate Court is confirmed and this revision is dismissed. R.S.R. ----- Revision Petition dismissed.