P. S. POTI, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioner before me is a partnership Firm of Income-tax and Sales-tax Practitioners functioning at Rajkot and the respondent was admittedly doing transport business at Rajkot. The revision arises out of the dismissal of a suit filed by the revision petitioner as plaintiff for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1 750 claimed as due to the plaintiff Firm by way of fees from his client-the defendant. It has been found that the claim to the fees has been proved but the plea of limitation set up by the defendant has been accepted and the suit dismissed. So the sole question that arises in this revision concerns the question of limitation. 2 The Small Cause Suit by the petitioner firm was one claiming that the firm had attended to the income-tax work of its client-the respondent for the assessment years 1963-64 to 1976-77 in all for 14 years and for such professional work done by the firm accounts are said to have been settled by the respondent with the petitioner on 26 at Rs. 125. 00 per year thus in all amounting to Rs. 1 750 The bill said to have been prepared on 26-12-1978 is said to have been given to the respondent but the respondent is said to have failed to pay the same for a pretty long time. Thereafter there was a registered notice on 14-4-1979 demanding payment and on non-payment the suit was filed on 20-6-1980. Though the case of the defendant that he had paid off the fee from time to time was not accepted evidently the Court did not also accept the case of settlement for in that event the suit would be within three years and therefore there would be no scope for dismissal. It therefore found that the claim being beyond three years from the date when the work was done was time-barred. ( 2 ) THE question arises as to what Article of the Limitation Act applies. The case of the revision petitioner is that no specific Article in the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 (36 of 1963) would apply to the case in question and therefore the residuary Art. 113 should apply and if that be so the right to sue will survive for a period of three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. He has further stated that the right to sue accrues only when the demand for payment for the work done was made and such demand was refused and in this case the bill having been served only in 1978 and that having been not honored thereafter a suit filed in 1980 would be within the period of three years. The case of the respondent is that Art. 18 of the Schedule would apply in this case since this is a case where the plaintiff is suing for the price of work done to the defendant at the defendants request and no time had bee fixed between the parties for payment. In such a case the period would be three years from the date when the work was done. ( 3 ) THE residuary Article would come in for application only if no other Article would suit the facts of the case. It is not that the application of the residuary Article would ultimately make any difference in this case for assuming the residuary Article applies it would certainly be not right to say that the cause of action accrues only when the plaintiff chooses to present the bill and thereupon the defendant refuses. If say for a period of 30 or 40 years a person does not demand an amount which is due to him but chooses to make his demand thereafter and it is not respected it does not mean that the cause of action would arise then. That would that the plaintiff could keep his cause of action alive for all time by postponing making a demand. Cause of action in a case where there are mutual obligations arises on such mutual obligations coming into existence. If A expressly or impliedly agrees to pay B for services done by him on A performing his services the obligation of B to pay arises unless it be that parties stipulate to postpone payment to some other date or or. demand. It may be that parties contemplate the obligation of one party to arise on the performance by the other only on the happening of a contingency in which case it would arise on the happening on such contingency. demand. It may be that parties contemplate the obligation of one party to arise on the performance by the other only on the happening of a contingency in which case it would arise on the happening on such contingency. But it will be senseless to say that wherever no time for payment is fixed cause of action would arise despite mutual obligation having already arisen only on demand being made by one party and that could be at any point of time. Therefore even assuming that Art. 113 is the Article appropriately applicable to the case the commencement of the cause of action would not be on the issue of the bill as contended but on the obligation to pay arising as against the defendant. Under Art. 18 of the Schedule also the starting point would be identical except in a case where parties stipulate as to time for payment. There is no case that there is any such stipulation or agreement here. Therefore if the case falls under Art. 18 the cause of action would arise when the work is done by the plaintiff for it would give rise to the obligation on the defendant to pay in the absence of a stipulation of time for payment. That would be the time the cause of action would arise even under the residuary Article. Therefore in effect it would make no difference. ( 4 ) ALL the same I must say that on tine facts of the case Art. 18 would apply. That is because the plaintiff firm as one practising income tax and attending to matters concerning income-tax relating to the defendant agrees to take up the responsibility of piloting the affairs of the defendants assessment with the income-tax Officer year after year for which the firm expects to be remunerated. It is not a Case where the work is on any specific day but the work is done continuously and unless the law provides what payment must be made at stages or the parties agree that payments would be made at stages it would be natural to expect the party doing the work to claim payment on Performance of the full work. In other words so long as there is no special agreement to remunerate for part performance it would normally be that when the work for an assessment of a year is over the Income-tax practitioner could make his claim for payment and that should be respected. ( 5 ) THIS brings to the more interesting question the significance of Which has been thoroughly the lost sight of by the Court below but is quite relevant; in determining the question of limitation. Evidently the Court has not bothered to understand the nature of the work that an income-tax practitioner has to undertake. The fact that the income-tax Officer is handling the assessment files of an assessee for the year 1976 does mean that his work is during the course of that year. In fact his work would normally commence only after the expiry of the year. The obligation to file return is after the expiry of the year. This would be followed up by the obligation to substantiate the returns if called for to respond to all notices issued to appear before the Income- tax Officer and attend to all matters until the assessment is finalised and the practitioner tells his client that his assessment for that year is over. The services of the Income-tax practitioner cover this: Therefore the expiry of the assessment year will not be the starting point for a claim for fees for that assessment year. He can claim his fees in the normal course when for an assessment year his client whom he represents has been taxed the assessment order has been received by him and that is communicated to his client. Then he could very well say that his engagement for that year is over and if there are supplementary proceedings for that year such as rectification or-opening he may very well say that it is independent proceedings for which he may be paid afresh. Therefore when an income-tax practitioner claims fees consolidately for a period of 14 years how much of it is within time and how much of it is beyond time cannot be determined on the basis of the assessment years but only with reference to evidence as to the completion of the assessment work by the tax practitioner in respect of specific years. If such completion of assessment work by him as I have detailed above in respect of any year falls within the three years of the suit he would certainly be entitled to make a claim for his work is done within three years and his claim for remuneration arises thereon and such claim is within time. Only in cases where his assessment work is over before a period of three years prior to the date of the suit does his claim become barred by limitation. Therefore merely by reference to the years 1964- 1977 the Court could not have said that the suit is barred by limitation. The parties too have not understood the matter in this way as I see that the evidence has not been adduced in this perspective despite the fact that the plaintiff firm is an income-tax practitioner. ( 6 ) HENCE I set aside the decree of the Court below and remit the case back for considering the question of limitation keeping in view what I have said about the approach to the case made as to the date of commencement of the cause of action. The determination should be whether in the case or any particular year for which claim is made for fee the claim has arisen more then three years prior to the date of suit. The claim would so arise not merely by the assessment year being over which in fact is irrelevant but plaintiffs services in connection with the assessment year would be complete in that plaintiff would have done whatever is expected to be done as the income-tax practitioner for that 5tear for the assessee. What part of the claim is barred and what part of the claim is not is to be decided after remand. If parties so desire they may adduce fresh evidence in the case. The case is posted before the trial Court for appearance of the parties on 3/05/1984. Return the records to the Court below immediately. ( 7 ) RULE made absolute to that extent. The parties will suffer cost upto this stage. (JBS) Rule made absolute to some extent .