JUDGMENT - Dharmadhikari J.-This Writ Petition is filed by the management of the school against the order passed by the Director of Education, State of Maharashtra. Pune, informing them that no appeal lies against the order-passed by the Deputy Director in the appeal filed by the management as well as the employee, decided by his order dated 15th July 1981. Since the controversy raised before us lies in a very narrow compass and is based solely on the interpretation of the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act' and the Secondary Schools Code (hereinafter referred to as 'The Code'), it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the factual averments made in the petition. It Appeared that an inquiry was instituted by the petitioner-management against the respondent No. I-teacher, who was the Principal. The Inquiry Committee held that the charges against the teacher were proved and directed that he should be reverted from the post of the Principal to that of a teacher. Being aggrieved by the order of the Inquiry Committee, the respondent-teacher filed an appeal to the Deputy Director under Rule 77.3 (3) (vii) of the Schools Code. It Appeared that the management was also not satisfied with the order of punishment passed by the Inquiry Committee and, therefore, it also filed an appeal to the Deputy Director, under the said Schools Code. Both these appeals were heard together and were decided by the Deputy Director. The Deputy Director allowed the appeal filed by the teacher and dismissed the appeal filed by the management. The Deputy Director directed that the teacher should be reinstated in his original post of Principal. The order passed by the Deputy Director came to be communicated to the parties vide his covering letter, dated 15th July 1981. Being aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Director, the management filed an appeal to the Director of Education under Rule 77.10 (b) of the Schools Code. The said appeal was not entertained by the Director of Education on the ground that after the coming into force of the Act, the Director had no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. It is this order of the District of Education which is challenged in this Writ Petition by the management. 2. The said appeal was not entertained by the Director of Education on the ground that after the coming into force of the Act, the Director had no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. It is this order of the District of Education which is challenged in this Writ Petition by the management. 2. Shri Kulkarni, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended before us that on the appointed day i.e. 15-7-1981, or the date on which the said order was communicated to the management viz. 17th July 1981 or 20th July 1981, the appeal filed by the employee was pending before the Deputy Director. Therefore, in view of the provisions of sec tion 15 of the Regulation Act, the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction tp entertain and decide the said appeal after the appointed day. The said appeal filed by the employee should have, therefore, been transferred to the Tribunal constituted under the Regulation Act. In the alternative, he contended that if it is held that the said appeal could have been decided by the Deputy Director, then under the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code the Director had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal filed by the management since such an appeal is not covered by section 15 of the Act. In support of this proposition, he placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in (Yeshwant Prasad Popular Education Society v. Shashikala D. Vaidya)1. 3. On the other hand, it was contended by Shri Gavnekar, the .learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1-teacher that the Director of Education rightly held that the appeal before him was not maintainable in view of the Circular dated 15th March 1982, issued by the Government of Maharashtra. Thus the controversy raised before us is based on the interpretation of the provisions of section 15 of the Regula tion Act and the relevant provisions of the Schools Code. Section 15 of the Regulation Act reads as under : - “15. All appeals of employees of private schools relating to the matters specified in section 9, which may be pending on the appointed date before the Department or the Director or an Officer subordinate to him, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code, shall be transferred to the Tribunal as soon as it is constituted. The Tribunal shall hear and dispose of every such appeal, as if it were made under section 9, provided that the prescribed fee of Rs. 50 is paid by the employee within one month of the receipt of a notice given to him by the Tribunal for that purpose.” On a bare reading of this section, it is quite clear that it merely deals with the appeals of the employees of private schools. This section nowhere touches the appeals filed by the employers. Section 9 of the Act gives the right of appeal to the employees alone. Therefore, the appeal filed by the management-employer against the decision of the Enquiry Committee could not have been transferred to the Tribunal even if it is held that it was pending on the appointed day. It is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter any further in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court, to which one of us (Dharmadhikari, J.) was a party, in Yeshwant Prasad Popular Education Society v. Shashikala. However, it was contended by Shri Kulkarni that in the present case the appeal was decided on 15-7-1981 or thereafter. Therefore, on the appointed day i.e. 15-7-1981 the appeal filed by the respondent-teacher was pending before the Deputy Director and, therefore, should have been transferred to the Tribunal. After the appointed day the Deputy Director had no authority, power or jurisdiction to deal with the appeal filed by the employee. It is not possible for us to accept this contention for the obvious reason that the letter dated 15-7-1981 is a covering letter by which the order passed by the Deputy Director in appeal was communicated to the management. If the covering letter is dated 15th July 1981, then obviously the order or decision, which is sought to be communicated, was delivered earlier. Therefore, in the present case, it will have to be held that the appeal pending before the Deputy Director was decided prior to the appointed day i.e. 15-7-1981. Hence it is quite clear that the appeal filed by the employee was not pending on the appointed day since it was already decided. If the appeal .was not pending on_the appointed day, then the question of transferring the said appeal did not arise. Hence it is quite clear that the appeal filed by the employee was not pending on the appointed day since it was already decided. If the appeal .was not pending on_the appointed day, then the question of transferring the said appeal did not arise. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Deputy Director in any way without jurisdiction. However, we find much substance in the contention raised by Shri Kulkarni that so far as the appeal filed by the management before the Director is concerned, the Director of Education committed an errors apparent on the face of the record in coming to the conclusion that the said appeal is not maintainable. From the bare reading of section 9 of the Regulation Act, it is quite clear that under the said section, an appeal could be filed before the Tribunal only by the employee. The employer has no right to file such an appeal obviously because the employer is not aggrieved by his own order. The Regulation Act is a complete code in itself which deals with the disciplinary actions etc. and, therefore, after the coming into force of the said Act, action could be taken against the teacher under the Regulation Act. If an order is passed by the management under the Regulation Act, which is covered by section 9, then the employee has a right to fils an appeal. Section 15 of the Regulation Act provides that if any appeal filed by an employee of a private school relating to the matters specified in section 9 was pending on the appointed day before the authorities referred to therein, the same shall stand transferred to the Tribunal as soon as it is constituted. We have already held that no appeal was pending on the appointed day which could have been transferred. In any case, the appeal filed by the employer against the order of the Inquiry Committee under Rule 77.3 (3) (vii) of the Schools Code is not covered by section 9 or section 15 of the Act. Therefore, that could have been decided by the Deputy Directo. In the present case, both the appeals came to be decided by the common order. They were decided before the appointed day. Against this order, the employer filed an appeal to the Director. Therefore, that could have been decided by the Deputy Directo. In the present case, both the appeals came to be decided by the common order. They were decided before the appointed day. Against this order, the employer filed an appeal to the Director. Since the Regulation Act does not deal with the appeals filed by the employers at all, the rights conferred upon the management to file an appeal under the Schools Code are saved, as not covered by the Regulation Act and, therefore, the Director of Education was wholly wrong in coming to the conclusion that even the employer's appeal filed under the relevant provisions of the Schools Code was not maintainable. It cannot be disputed that a right of appeal is a vested right. Such a substantive right may be taken away by a subsequent enactment expressly or by necessary intendment. In the present case, by the Regulation Act, the right conferred upon the employer under the Schools Code is not taken away either expressly or by necessary implication. The Schools Code as a whole is also not repealed. Thus the right conferred by the Schools Code upon the management to file an appeal still survives. It Appeared that the Director of Education has placed reliance on the Circular issued by the Government of Maharashtra in this behalf, a view is taken by the Government that all such appeals stand terminated in the absence of any statutory provision saving them. In our view, this direction issued by the Government of Maharashtra is cased on misunderstanding. By the Regulation Act the Schools Code is not repealed. Therefore, the question of saving clause will aot arise. By the Regulation Act certain rights are conferred upon the employees The private schools. To that extent the provisions of the Schools Code might stand abrogated. But-the matters when are not covered by the Regulation Act and are specifically covered by the provisions of the Schools Code alone cannot be deemed to be repealed even by implication. Even otherwise pending proceedings will be saved in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act as the jurisdiction conferred by the Schools Code is not wiped out or taken away. The Regulation Act does not provide for a new forum where such pre-repeal proceedings can be pursued thereafter, so far as an employer is concerned. Even otherwise pending proceedings will be saved in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act as the jurisdiction conferred by the Schools Code is not wiped out or taken away. The Regulation Act does not provide for a new forum where such pre-repeal proceedings can be pursued thereafter, so far as an employer is concerned. In the absence of repeal of Rule 77.10 (b) of the Schools Code, either expressly or by necessary implication, the right of the employer-management to file an appeal against the order passed by the Deputy Director still survives. It is equally well-settled that it is the function of the Court to construe legislative measures and in reaching the correct meaning of a statutory provision, opinion of executive branch is hardly relevant. Nor can the Court abdicate in favour of such opinion. (See Babaji Kondaji Garad and others v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Nasik and others2.) Therefore, in our opinion, the Director of Education was wholly wrong in coming to the conclusion that after the coming into force of the Regulation Act, the appeal under Rule 77.10 (b) of the Schools Code filed by the employer-management is not maintainable. This being the position in law, the said order passed by the Director of Education will have to be quashed. 4. Hence the Rule is made partly absolute. The order passed by the Director of Education refusing to entertain the appeal filed by the petitioner management against the order of the Deputy. Director is set aside and the Director of Education is directed to entertain, hear and decide the said appeal on merits in accordance with law. Since the matter is pending long, the Director of Education is directed to hear and decide the said appeal as expeditiously as possible. However, in the circumstances of the case, there Will be no order as to costs. Rule partly absolute. ----