JUDGMENT P.D. Desai, C.J.—The petitioner was appointed as clerk in a temporary capacity in the Public Works Department of the State of Himachal Pradesh on May 26, 1970 He joined duty on May 30, 1970. On November 17, 1976 the petitioner proceeded on casual leave for four days. It is not in dispute that the petitioner overstayed the period of leaves. The extent of overstay appears to be in dispute between the parties and we propose to express no opinion on that part of the controversy at this stage On April 7, 1977 the petitioner was placed under suspension The suspension order was, however, revoked on March 8, 19/8. The petitioner was then served with a charge-sheet dated July 26, 1978, the annexure to which contained three articles of charges. The gravemen of the charges against the petitioner was that on different occasions he had wilfully absented from duty by proceeding on unauthorised leave and thereby contravened the provisions of rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on August 1, 1978. On June 16, 1979 an Inquiry Officer was appointed to hold inquiry againt the petitioner in respect of the charges levelled against him. On July 7, 1979 the petitioner informed the Inquiry Officer that since he was not paid subsistence allowance, he was in financial difficulties and that under the circumstances it would not be possible for him to participate in the inquiry proceedings Similar intimations were given by the petitioner to the Inquiry Officer on July 15, 1979 and August 10, 1979, The Inquiry Officer made a report on May 18, 1980 in the course of which he inter alia referred to the refusal of the petitioner to participate in the inquiry inspite of notices having been served upon him and proceeded to observe : "It is for your kind information that Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, Clerk, is understood to be staying quite close to my office and he has been deliberately avoiding attendance of inquiry. Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, Clerk, is absent from duty w.e.f. 17-11-1976 and has never tried to resume his duty during the last 4 years. Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, Clerk, is absent from duty w.e.f. 17-11-1976 and has never tried to resume his duty during the last 4 years. He is also not interested to explain anything in his defence before inquiry." The concluding portion of the inquiry report is in the following terms : "The delinquent official Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, has not cared to attend the inquiry on appointed date which shows that he has nothing to say in his defence. Report is submitted to the Superintending Engineer, 2nd Circle, H.P. PWD, Simla-3 for further necessary action." A memorandum (show-cause notice) dated December 26, 1980 was thereafter served upon the petitioner which stated that a copy of the inquiry report was enclosed therewith and called upon him to show-cause why the penalty of removal from service should not be imposed upon him It is pertinent to point out that the penalty in question was proposed to be imposed upon the petitioner on the following ground which is extracted verbatim from the show-cause notice: "On a careful consideration of the enquiry aforesaid report, the undersigned agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer that Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, Clerk, deliberately avoided attendance before the Inquiry Officer on the appointed dates. The undersigned has, therefore, provisionally come to the conclusion that Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood, Clerk is not a fit person to be retained in Government Service and, therefore, proposes to impose on him the under-noted penalty." The petitioner sent two replies to the show-cause notice, one on January 10, 1981 and the other on February 7, 1981. The petitioner appears to have made further representations to the disciplinary authority as well as to the appellate authority, inter alia, pleading that he may be permitted to join duty. The last of such representations appears to have been made on November 7, 1983. On November 26, 1983, that is to say, after a lapse of a period of about three years from the date of the show-cause notice, the following order was passed by the disciplinary authority : "After careful consideration of the inquiry report, Shri Tarsem Kumar Sood has not been found fit for Government Service and as such his services are hereby terminated w.e.f 17-11-1976, i.e. the date from which he has absented himself wilfully.” This is the order which is principally assailed in the present petition. The petitioner has claimed certain other and/or incidental reliefs which need not, however, be set-out in the order which we propose to pass ultimately. The impugned order of termination has been challenged by the petitioner on several grounds. It is not necessary, however, to express our opinion on all those grounds because, in our opinion, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on the short ground that the inquiry against the petitioner has not been held in accordance with law and that the termination of the services of the petitioner could not have been effected on the strength of the findings, if any, recorded in the course of such inquiry. 2. Before we proceed to consider this ground, a submission which was made in the forefront on behalf of the respondents might be dealt with. It was-strenuously urged on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order was passed by the competent authority in exercise of the powers under rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 and that the termination of the services of the petitioner having been effected in exercise of such powers, the question as to whether or not the disciplinary inquiry was held in accordance with the relevant rules governing such inquiry is wholly irrelevant. The submission, in other words, was that the termination was not penal in character but termination simpliciter and that even if the disciplinary inquiry held against the petitioner was not defective in any manner, the termination could not be regarded as illegal or invalid because it was not founded on the misconduct, if any, on the part of the petitioner established in the course of such inquiry. The argument has been stated merely to be rejected. The termination order, on the face of it, discloses that the termination is not simpliciter but penal termination founded on misconduct. The order expressly rests on the inquiry report as is evidence from the opening words. The inquiry report is admittedly the one which was submitted on May 18, 1980 at the conclusion of the disciplinary inquiry. The termination order, on the face of it, discloses that the termination is not simpliciter but penal termination founded on misconduct. The order expressly rests on the inquiry report as is evidence from the opening words. The inquiry report is admittedly the one which was submitted on May 18, 1980 at the conclusion of the disciplinary inquiry. This fact alone is sufficient to establish that the misconduct, if any, of the petitioner in overstaying leave, for which disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and which was found to have been established in the course of the inquiry, was the foundation of the order Besides, the concluding portion of the orders to the absence of the "petitioner from duty "wilfully" and if it is read in the proper context and perspective, the clear impression which is left on the mind is that the conclusion as to the unfitness of the petitioner to be retained in Government service was recorded because of such alleged wilful absence. The order, therefore, on the face of it casts a stigma on the petitioner. On both these grounds, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that the termination of the services of the petitioner is penal in character. No other view is possible or permissible. 3. In light of our holding as aforesaid, there is no manner of doubt that the petitioner, who was a Government employee (even if temporary), could not have been removed/dismissed from service except in accordance with the relevant constitutional provisions and rules. Under Article 311 of the Constitution, the petitioner could not have been visited with the major penalty of removal/ dismissal from service except after an inquiry in which he had been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of these charges. Besides, the major penalty of removal/dismissal from service could not have been imposed upon the petitioner without following the procedure for imposing such penalty as prescribed in the relevant rules. If there is any breach of these constitutional or statutory provisions, the removal of the petitioner from service would be vitiated, 4. We do not propose to enter into consideration of the question whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges levelled against him. If there is any breach of these constitutional or statutory provisions, the removal of the petitioner from service would be vitiated, 4. We do not propose to enter into consideration of the question whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges levelled against him. We will confine our attention only to the question whether the procedure as prescribed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called "the Rules") has been followed in the instant case. Rule 14 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties. Sub-rule (11) of rule 14, inter alia, provides that the inquiring authority shall, if the Government servant fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge. Sub-rule (20) provides that if the Government servant to whom a copy of the articles of charge has been delivered, does not submit the written statement of defence on or before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in person before the inquiring authority or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this rule, the inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex pane. On a combined reading of these two rules, it is apparent that in cases where the delinquent, inter alia, fails to appear before the inquiring authority, such authority has the power to hold the inquiry ex parte. However, even in the course of such ex parte inquiry, the inquiring authority is required to call upon the Presenting Officer to present the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, especially when the delinquent has submitted his written statement of defence and denied the charges by controverting the allegations levelled against him The nature of evidence to be led in such cases may, of course, differ from case to case and in certain cases only documentary evidence may be produced to substantiate the charges Mere absence of the delinquent or his refusal to participate in the inquiry cannot, however, be regarded as proof of the charges. The absence or refusal may be for several reasons, whether valid or invalid, but that does not absolve the inquiring authority from its duty to ensure that the minimum safeguard of evidence being presented before it to establish the charges is duly complied with. Indeed, it is inconceivable as to how the inquiring authority can reasonably and bona fide arrive at the conclusion as to the truth of the charges levelled against the delinquent unless material is placed before it to substantiate the charges and as to how it can make a report which must, inter alia, contain an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charges as required by sub-rule 23 (i) (c). 5. A reference may be made in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Imperial Tobacco Company of India Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [AIR 1962 SC 1348]. Under the standing orders of the appellant Company in that case, an elaborate procedure was provided for inquiries into charges of misconduct. The respondent-workman, who was facing a disciplinary inquiry instituted by the appellant-Company on certain charges, declined to cross-examine the second witness produced at the inquiry by the appellant-Company and withdrew from the inquiry. The inquiry was thereafter closed and the workman was dismissed. The dismissal gave rise to an industrial dispute and the matter ultimately reached up to the Supreme Court. The main contention on behalf of the respondent workman was that the procedure prescribed for an inquiry was rot followed and, therefore, the dismissal was invalid. The Supreme Court held : "There can be no doubt in this case that the inquiry was not conducted in the manner required by the Standing Orders of the appellant. Even though Akhileshwar Prasad had withdrawn from the inquiry— whether rightly or wrongly—the inquiry should have been completed and all evidence should have been taken ex pane. Thereafter it was the duty of the branch manager to appraise that evidence and record his conclusion as to what misconduct had been proved and also to decide what punishment he intended to inflict. Thereafter he had to ask the employee what he had to say against the intended punishment and it was only after taking the explanation of the employee as to the intended punishment that he could pass an order punishing him. Thereafter he had to ask the employee what he had to say against the intended punishment and it was only after taking the explanation of the employee as to the intended punishment that he could pass an order punishing him. The fact that Akhileshwar Prasad withdrew from the inquiry at an early stage did not absolve the Inquiry Officer from concluding the inquiry by taking evidence ex pane It also did not absolve the branch manager from following the procedure prescribed in Cl. 18 (b) (h ) of the Standing Orders. Even though Akhileshwar Prasad had withdrawn from the inquiry, the branch manager should have appraised the evidence, recorded his conclusions and the punishment he intended to inflict and should have called upon Akhileshwar Prasad to say what he wanted to say against the intended punishment. It was only thereafter that ha could proceed to punish Akhileshwar Prasad. What happened in this case, however, was that as soon as Akhileshwar Prasad withdrew from the inquiry, it was closed and the branch manager proceeded to pass the order of dismissal which we have already set out above, without seeing that the inquiry was completed and all that was required by Cl. 18 (b) (10) to be done was done In the circumstances the labour court was right in holding that the inquiry which resulted in the dismissal of Akhileshwar Prasad in this case was not a valid inquiry as required by the Standing Orders of the appellant." 6. The Rules with which we are concerned herein also lay down a detailed procedure to be followed at a disciplinary inquiry and they specifically provide, as earlier pointed out, that where the delinquent fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, the inquiring authority may proceed ex pane but it must require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which be proposes to prove or substantiate the charges. The decision in Imperial Tobacco Companys case, although given in a matter arising under the Industrial Law, supports the view which we have taken above. 7. The decision in Imperial Tobacco Companys case, although given in a matter arising under the Industrial Law, supports the view which we have taken above. 7. On behalf of the respondents, however, it was strenuously urged that the petitioner having admittedly over-stayed his leave and having failed to appear at the enquiry to explain the circumstances under which he could not resume duty upon the expiry of leave period, there was no need to hold an elaborate enquiry as required by the Rules and that the penalty imposed could not in the aforesaid circumstances be challenged on the ground that the procedure prescribed by the Rules was not followed. Strong reliance was placed in support of this submission on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shahoodul Haque v. The Registrar Cooperative Societies Bihar and another, [AIR 1974 SC 1869]. 8. In Shahoodul Haques case, the delinquent had applied for leave on November 15, 196? to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He left even before the leave was granted to him. Subsequently, on April 27, 1964, he applied for extension of leave from Mecca which was not granted. He came back nearly a year afterwards. According to the delinquent, he resumed duty on October 8, 1964 but was compelled to take leave He fell ill on November 7, 1964 and could not attend his work until he got the order of his removal retrospectively from January 4, 1964. The order of removal was challenged in a writ petition on the ground that the removal was contrary to the constitutional guarantee conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution inasmuch as the removal was without giving him any opportunity to show-cause and without holding any inquiry. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court and the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that even if the appellant was being punished, so that Article 311 could apply, it could not be said that the requirement of rules of natural justice or of Article 311 were contravened. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court and the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that even if the appellant was being punished, so that Article 311 could apply, it could not be said that the requirement of rules of natural justice or of Article 311 were contravened. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court at page 1897 of the report are extracted below : "After having been taken through the assertions made by both sides, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that even if the appellant was being punished, so that Article 311 could apply, he had been, in the circumstances of the case, given sufficient opportunity to explain his conduct. He had failed to avail of that opportunity. It could not, therefore, be said that the requirements of natural justice or of Article 311 of the Constitution had been contravened. In any case, on the facts before us9 we think that it will be useless to afford any further opportunity to the appellant to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post of duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds for his absence, is so glaring that giving biro further to disprove what he practically administered to serve no useful purpose. It could not be benefited him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. It would only prolong his agony." (underlining supplied for emphasis). 9. Now, so far as the submission of the respondents is concerned, we need not repeat what we have observed earlier. Those observations completely answer the submission. So far as the decision in Shahoodul Hague case is concerned, we are unable to see how it helps the respondents. In the first place, the case was decided on the basis that there was no denial of reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 nor was there any breach of rules of natural justice so as to attract Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the first place, the case was decided on the basis that there was no denial of reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 nor was there any breach of rules of natural justice so as to attract Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. That precisely is not the question under consideration in the instant case We have already indicated earlier that we are not examining the question whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges levelled against him and that are confining our attention only to the question whether the rules have been complied with Under the circumstances, the observations in Shahoodul Haque case made in a wholly different context cannot be invoked in aid herein. Indeed the decision more apposite and applicable on the facts and in circumstances of the case is the one in Imperial Tobacco Companys case because the question that was under consideration in that case and herein is identical, namely, whether an ex parte disciplinary enquiry must be held in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the relevant statutory instrument governing the holding of such enquiry. As earlier held, the decision in the said case fully supports the view which we are taking herein In the next place, as the underlined portion in the extract from the decision in Shahoodul Haque case shows, the decision is based on the facts and circumstances found to exist in that case. In para 3 of the said decision it is pointed out that the work of the delinquent was found unsatisfactory and he was repeatedly informed about the same. It was inferred therefrom that he had probably deserted his post of duty because he was unable or unwilling to work Besides, although he was given a number of opportunities to explain his absence for so long from work without permission, he did not care to reply. Even in the affidavit held in the proceedings before the High Court, no attempt was made to explain the absence satisfactorily. Even in the affidavit held in the proceedings before the High Court, no attempt was made to explain the absence satisfactorily. Under these circumstances, it was held that sufficient opportunity was given to the delinquent to explain his conduct and that the undenied and undeniable fact that he had actually abandoned his post of duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds, was so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admitted would serve no useful purpose. Such or similar facts are not present in the instant case and, therefore, the decision cannot aid or assist the respondents. It is well settled that every decision must be applicable to the particular facts existing in the case in hand and that the generality of expressions, if any, which may be found in such decisions are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. They cannot be pressed into service in a totally different case in aid of an argument which may seem to follow logically from those observations. [See Quinn v. Leatham, 1901 Appeal Cases 495, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 6471. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the submission made on behalf of the respondents. 10. Now, in the instant case, it is not in dispute that no material whatsoever was placed before the inquiry authority to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner. We have been shown the original record of the inquiry authority and we find that there is not a little of evidence, not even a shred of paper, on the record to substantiate the charges levelled against the petitioner. It is true that the fact that the petitioner over-stayed his leave is not in dispute. However, mere overstaying of leave cannot, always and in all circumstances, be treated as misconduct. Overstaying may be on account of bona fide or unavoidable reasons, or reasons beyond the control of the delinquent. Besides, the actual period of overstay has also to be established when in dispute as in the instant case. If the Presenting Officer is required to produce evidence in support of the charges, the true state of affairs might, in all probability, be disclosed. Besides, the actual period of overstay has also to be established when in dispute as in the instant case. If the Presenting Officer is required to produce evidence in support of the charges, the true state of affairs might, in all probability, be disclosed. In the present case, nothing of the sort was done. The report of the Inquiry Officer is also laconic. It contains no discussion and gives no reasons and it proceeds to record the finding of misconduct on the footing that mere absence of the petitioner at the inquiry proves the charges. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the inquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and that, therefore, all the proceedings founded on the report submitted pursuant to such inquiry are invalid. 11. It would not be out of place to mention at this stage that even the show-cause notice which was issued to the petitioner proceeds on a ground which is totally extraneous. We have extracted above the relevant portion of the show-cause notice which goes to show that the penalty of removal from service was sought to be imposed on the petitioner on the ground that he had "deliberately avoided attendance before the Inquiry Officer on the appointed dates " This was not and could not have been the charge originally levelled against the petitioner and it could not have been made the ground for the imposition of the proposed penalty. Whether or not such lapse, if any, can ever constitute misconduct and be taken into consideration for imposition of penalty, is yet another matter on which we wish to express no opinion. It would thus appear that the disciplinary authority also has not at all applied its mind and that it has passed the order of termination mechanically on a totally extraneous and irrelevant ground. Even on this ground the impugned order of termination must be held to be invalid. 12. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated November 26, 1983 (Annexure P/12) terminating the services of the petitioner is null and void and that the petitioner is required to be treated as having continued in service as if the order was ineffective or inoperative. 12. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated November 26, 1983 (Annexure P/12) terminating the services of the petitioner is null and void and that the petitioner is required to be treated as having continued in service as if the order was ineffective or inoperative. In view of this relief, the petitioner will be entitled to the relief of back wages and to all other incidental benefits. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are, at this stage, confining the operation of this relief only to the period commencing from the date of the impugned order of termination till the date of his actual reinstatement in service pursuant to this decision which shall take place within a week of the receipt of the writ. There is a valid reason for adopting this course. The major dispute between the parties herein is whether for the entire period the petitioner had overstayed leave or whether for a substantial part thereof he was prevented from joining duty. This is essentially a question of fact which was required to be determined by the Enquiry Officer upon the basis of the material placed before him. However, at the ex pane enquiry no material whatever was placed on record by the disciplinary authority to substantiate its case in that regard. The petitioner too, having abstained from the enquiry, has not been able to support his own version by placing the relevant material before the inquiry Officer. The report of the Enquiry Officer discloses that his mind was not applied to the issue Though the parties have brought on record of these proceedings certain material in support of their rival versions, we do not think it would be just and proper to resolve this highly disputed question of fact on the basis of such material only in exercise of our writ jurisdiction. Since the decision herein does not operate to preclude the respondents from holding a fresh enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law on the same charges, at such enquiry, if and when held, this dispute will have to be resolved after affording to the parties a reasonable opportunity to substantiate their rival cases. Since the decision herein does not operate to preclude the respondents from holding a fresh enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law on the same charges, at such enquiry, if and when held, this dispute will have to be resolved after affording to the parties a reasonable opportunity to substantiate their rival cases. The petitioners entitlement to claim back wages and other incidental benefits for the period in dispute will depend on the ultimate out-come of such enquiry We wish to make it clear, however, that in case no fresh enquiry is instituted within a reasonable time, that is to say, within a period of 3 months from the date of the receipt of the writ, the petitioner will be entitled to back wages and all other and incidental benefits for the period commencing from the day on which his admitted overstay of leave came to an end till the date of the impugned order. We also wish to make it clear that our observations herein are not to be treated as preventing the petitioner from raising all contentions available to him at the fresh enquiry, if and when held, including the contention that no fresh enquiry should have been instituted on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 13. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no orders as to costs, Rule made absolute.