JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanti, J. - By a short order dated 5-4-1984, we allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant of the charge under section 302, I.P.C. we shall now proceed to give our reasoned judgment. 2. This is a prisoner's appeal against his conviction under section 302, I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment for life. 3. The appellant and the deceased Kandagori Agadhu were neighbours. It was alleged that on 21-3-1979 at about 8 a. m. while the deceased and his wife (p. w. 9) were playing,with their children on the outer courtyard of their house the appellant,came there and asked the deceased and his wife as to why they were laughing at him. The deceased replied saying that they were playing with their children and were not laughing at him. Thereupon the appellant immediately entered into his house and brought a Baram Badi (M.O.I) and dealt one blow with it on the head of the deceased as a result of which he fell down with a bleeding injury on his head. Then the appellant left the place with the M.O.I. P. ws. 2, 3 and 9 took the deceased to his house. P. w. 9 reported the incident to her father-in-law (p. w. 1) who came and found the deceased lying injured. On the day following, p. w. 1 reported the incident to p. w. 5, the Ward Member of the village. On the advice of p. w, 5, he went to the Police Station along with the deceased and lodged F.I.R. Then the deceased was carried to the Rayagada Hospital for treatment. P. w. 8, the Lady Assistant Surgeon admitted the deceased into the Hospital and the deceased expired at the Hospital on 25-3-1979 at 5.15 p. m. 4. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and contended that the case was foisted against him by p.w s. 2,3, and 4 out of previous enmity. 5. At the trial, prosecution examined 13 witness of whom p. ws. 2, 3, 4 and 9 were cited as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge relying on the evidence of these four ' witnesses convicted the appellant and awarded the sentence as aforesaid. 6. That the deceased died a homicidal death is clearly established by the medical evidence. It is also not disputed by by the appellant. 7. 2, 3, 4 and 9 were cited as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge relying on the evidence of these four ' witnesses convicted the appellant and awarded the sentence as aforesaid. 6. That the deceased died a homicidal death is clearly established by the medical evidence. It is also not disputed by by the appellant. 7. The main question for consideration is whether the appellant is the author of the crime. P. ws. 2, 3, 4 and 9 gave evidence in Court that in the night of occurrence while the deceased and his wife were playing with their children on the Danda of their house, the appellant appeared there and questioned the deceased as to why he was laughing at him. When the, deceased replied that he was playing with his children and was not laughing at him, the appellant entered into his house, came out with a Baram Badi and dealt a blow with it on the head of the deceased as a result of which he fell down with bleeding injury on his head and subsequently died as a result of that injury. P. ws. 2, 3 and 4 had given different versions before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rayagada during their examination under section 164, Cr. P.C P. w. 2 had stated that on the date of occurrence he along with p. w. 3 Kumurika Gajila and p. w. 9 Khandagiri Miti went to a hillock where the deceased was lying injured and they brought the deceased to his house from the hillock (vide Ext. I). The statement of p. w. 3 before the S.D.J.M. was that on the date of occurrence he along with p. ws. 2 and 9 and the deceased went near a hillock where the appellant assaulted the deceased by means of a lathi. Out of fear he left the place and came home. Subsequently, p. w. 9 requested him and p. w. 2 to carry the deceased to his house. They went to the hillock and brought the deceased to his house (vide Ext. 2). The version given by p. w. 4 before the S.D.J.M. was that in the night of occurrence he heard about some quarrel and assault between the deceased and appellant and learnt from p. w. 9 that her husband had been assaulted by the appellant. Although p. ws. 2). The version given by p. w. 4 before the S.D.J.M. was that in the night of occurrence he heard about some quarrel and assault between the deceased and appellant and learnt from p. w. 9 that her husband had been assaulted by the appellant. Although p. ws. 2, 3 and 4 had given different version at different stages, the learned Sessions Judge relied on their evidence for convicting the appellant. The reasoning adopted by him is that their evidence finds independent corroboration from the other evidence on the record. According to him, the following items of evidence afforded independent corroboration to the evidence of p. ws. 2, 3 and 4. (i) The evidence of p. w. 9 who is also an eye-witness to the occurrence ; (ii) The evidence of the post-occurrence witnesses p. ws. 1 and 5 ; and (iii) The medical evidence and the seizure of M. O.I, blood stained earth and sample earth coupled with the reports of the Serologist and Chemical Examiner. 8. In our opinion, the learned Sessions Judge misdirected himself in relying on the evidence of p.ws. 2, 3 and 4 and making use of the aforesaid items of evidence as independent corroboration of the evidence of those witnesses. Inconsistency in the statements of a witness made at different stages makes his evidence in Court unreliable. P. ws. 2, 3 and 4 having discredited themselves by their own contradictory statements before the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge, their evidence should have been rejected as unreliable. 9. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have entertained some doubt about the recording of the statements of p. ws. 2 and 3 under section 164, Cr. P.C. In paragraph 7 of his judgment he has mentioned that the statements of p. ws. 2 and 3 were recorded by the Magistrate through an interpreter though in fact the witnesses were able to depose in the Oriya language and were examined in the Court of Session without the help of an interpreter. Accordingly he has observed:- "It is, therefore, not understood how the Magistrate recorded the statements of these witnesses through an interpreter" On a reference to the records of the Magistrate, it appears that he has mentioned in his order dated 31-3-1979 that he had to engage an interpreter as p. ws. 2 and 3 deposed in Kondh language. Accordingly he has observed:- "It is, therefore, not understood how the Magistrate recorded the statements of these witnesses through an interpreter" On a reference to the records of the Magistrate, it appears that he has mentioned in his order dated 31-3-1979 that he had to engage an interpreter as p. ws. 2 and 3 deposed in Kondh language. Apparently this has escaped the notice of the learned Sessions Judge. Section 277, Cr. P.C. enables a witness to give evidence either in the language of the Court or in any other language. From the certificates appended by the learned Magistrate at the foot of the statements under section 164, Cr. P.C it is seen that the statements which had been taken down in English were explained to the witnesses and acknowledged by them to be correct. No objection can, therefore, be taken to the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate. 10. It would appear from the following observations of the learned Sessions Judge that he has made use of the statements of p. ws. 2 and 3 under section 161, Cr P.C. for the purpose of corroboration of their evidence "....In their earlier statements, i. e. during their examination under section 161, Cr. P.C. both these witnesses had stated about the incident that took place in the Danda and in the court they have stuck to those versions. Section 162, Cr. P.C. absolutely bars the use of statements of witnesses before the Police except for the limited purpose of contradiction of the prosecution witnesses. They cannot be used for corroboration of prosecution witnesses. 11. The learned Sessions Judge relied upon the evidence of p. ws. 2, 3 and 4 on the ground that it gains "independent corroboration" from the items of evidence enumerated above. There is no rule as to what would constitute independent corroboration in a particular case. The evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, independent corroboration means corroboration by some independent evidence on some material particulars going to the offence itself and implicating the accused. The evidence which is supposed to afford independent corroboration must be itself reliable. 12. The evidence of p. w. 9 has been made use of by the learned Sessions Judge as an independent corroboration of the evidence of p. ws. 2. 3 and 4. The evidence which is supposed to afford independent corroboration must be itself reliable. 12. The evidence of p. w. 9 has been made use of by the learned Sessions Judge as an independent corroboration of the evidence of p. ws. 2. 3 and 4. P. w. 9 is none else but the widow of the deceased. Her evidence require careful scrutiny. During her examination under section 164, Cr. P.C. she simply stated that while she and her husband were playing with their children the appellant came with a lathi and gave blows with it on the person of her husband (vide Ext. IV). She did not refer to any conversation between the appellant and the deceased before the assault took place. Though during her examination under section 164, Cr. P.C. she stated that the weapon of offence was the lathi, she gave a different version in Court. Her statement in Court was that the appellant dealt a blow on her husband with the sharp side of a Baram Badi. In the F.I.R. which was lodged on the basis of information given by p. w. 9 it has been, mentioned that the appellant dealt blows on the deceased by means of a Kati (Knife). M.O.I was produced before us at the time of hearing of the appeal and we found that it is a weapon consisting of a long wooden handle with an iron plate attached to one of its ends. If actually p. w. 9 had seen M.O.I at the time of occurrence, she would not have described it as a knife. According to the evidence of p. w. 1. Kati and Baram Badi are two separate weapons. It was contended before the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution case should not be accepted as true on account of discrepancies in the description of the weapon of offence. But he repelled the contention on a flimsy ground. It appears from the evidence of p. w. 1 that when he asked p. w. 9 about the manner of assault she denied any knowledge about the same. If actually p. w. 9 had seen the assault as narrated by her in Court she would not have denied knowledge about the manner of assault before p. w. 1. On a careful scrutiny, we are not inclined to place any reliance on her evidence. P. ws. If actually p. w. 9 had seen the assault as narrated by her in Court she would not have denied knowledge about the manner of assault before p. w. 1. On a careful scrutiny, we are not inclined to place any reliance on her evidence. P. ws. 1 and 5 are post-occurrence witnesses and their evidence does not connect the appellant with the crime. The evidence of these two witnesses is hearsay as it is not based on their own personal knowledge or observation. The medical evidence and the seizure of M.O.I and bloodstained earth do not connect the appellant with the commission of the crime. The Chemical Examiner detected blood on M. O. I, but origin of the blood could not be determined. Similarly, blood was detected on the earth said to have been seized from the spot, but its origin could not be determined. In our opinion, the prosecution has failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. 13. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and acquit the appellant of the charge under section 302, I.P.C. D. Pathak, C.J. - I agree. Final Result : Allowed