S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of revision applications a short question has been referred for our consideration. The said question reads as follows. Whether after the report of the Public Analyst gets superseded by the certificate of the Director Central Food Laboratory who examines the part of the sample of food article collected under the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it is open to the accused to plead that if there is any variance between the aforesaid two reports the prosecution must explain the said variance or otherwise fail. 7 before embarking upon the consideration of the question posed for our decision it will be advantageous to have a birds eye view of the relevant provisions of the statute governing the field. The Act has been enacted by the Parliament with a view to making provisions for prevention of adulteration of food. Sec 2 (v) defines food to mean any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes: (A) any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food (b) any flavouring matter or condiments; and (c) any other article which the Central Government may having regard to its use nature substance or quality; declare by notification in the Official Gazette as food for the purposes of this Act. ( 2 ) SEC. 11 lays down the procedure to be followed by food inspector functioning under the Act for taking samples of food for analysis. As per sec. 11 (11) (a) the food inspector has to give notice in writing then and there of his intention to have it so analyzed to the person from whom The has taken the sample and to the person if any whose name address and other particulars have been disclosed under sec. 14a. Sub-sec. (1) (b) of sec. As per sec. 11 (11) (a) the food inspector has to give notice in writing then and there of his intention to have it so analyzed to the person from whom The has taken the sample and to the person if any whose name address and other particulars have been disclosed under sec. 14a. Sub-sec. (1) (b) of sec. 11 provides that when the food inspector takes a sample of food for analysis he shall except in special cases provided by rules under the Act divide the sample then and there into three parts mark and seal or fasten up each part in such a manner as its nature permits and take the signature or thumb impression of the person from whom the sample has been taken in such place and in such manner as may be prescribed. As per sec. 11 (1) (c) the food inspector has to send one of the parts for analysis to the public analyst under intimation to the local health Authority and to send the remaining two parts to the local health Authority for the purposes of sub-sec. (2) of this section and sub-secs. (2a) and (2b) of sec. 13. When we turn to sec. 11 (2) we find that it provides that where the part of the sample sent to the Public Analyst under sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) is lost or damaged the local health Authority shall on a requisition made toit by the Public Analyst or the Food Inspector dispatch one of the parts of the sample sent to it under sub-clause. (ii) of the said clause (c) to the Public Analyst for analysis. Sec. 13 of the Act deals with report of Public Analyst. As the resolution of the question posed for our consideration revolves round the relevant provisions contained in the said section it would be profitable to reproduce the said section in extenso as under:"13 (1) The Public Analyst shall deliver in such form as may be prescribed a report to the local health authority of the result of the analysis of any article of food submitted to him for analysis. (2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-sec. (2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-sec. (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated the local health authority shall after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person if any whose name address and other particulars have been disclosed under sec. 14a forward in such manner as may be prescribed a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons as the case may be informing such person or persons that if it is so desired either or both of them may make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to 8et the sample of the article of food kept by the local health authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. (2a) When an application is made to the court under sub-sec. (2) the court shall require the local health authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said authority and upon such requisition being made the said authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the court within a period of five days from the date of receipt of such requisition. (2b) On receipt of the part or parts of the sample from the local health authority under sub-sec. (2a) the court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 are intact and the signature or thumb impression as the case may be is not tampered with and despatch the part or as the case may be one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the part of the sample specifying the result of the analysis. (2c) Where two parts of the sample have been sent to the court and only one part of the sample has been sent by the court to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-sec. (2c) Where two parts of the sample have been sent to the court and only one part of the sample has been sent by the court to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-sec. (2b) the court shall as soon as practicable return the remaining part to the local health authority and that authority shall destroy that part after the certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory has been received by the court; provided that where the part of the sample sent by the court to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory is lost or damaged the court shall require the local health authority to forward the part of the sample if any retained by it to the court and on receipt thereof the court shall proceed in the manner provided in sub-sec. (2b ). (2d) Until the receipt of the certificate of the result of the analysis from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory the court shall not continue with the proceedings pending before it in relation to the prosecution. (2e) If after considering the report if any of the food inspector or otherwise the local health authority is of the opinion that the report delivered by the public analyst under sub-sec. (1) is erroneous the said authority shall forward one of the parts of the sample kept by it to any other public analyst for analysis and if the report of the result of the analysis of that part of the sample by that other public analyst is to the effect that the article of food is adulterated the provisions of sub-sec. (2) (2d) shall so far as may be apply (3) The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-sec. (2b) shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under sub-sec. (1 ). (4) Where a certificate obtained from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-sec. (2b) is produced in any proceeding under this ACt. or under secs. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code it shall not be necessary in such proceedings to produce any part of the sample of food taken for analysis. (5) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst unless it has been superseded under sub-sec. (3 ). or under secs. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code it shall not be necessary in such proceedings to produce any part of the sample of food taken for analysis. (5) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst unless it has been superseded under sub-sec. (3 ). or any Document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act or under secs. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code. Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory not being a certificate with respect to the analysis of the part of the sample of any article of food referred to in the proviso to sub-sec. (1a) of sec. 16 shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Explanation-In this section and in clause (f) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 16 Director of the Central Food laboratory shall include the officer for the time being in charge of any food laboratory (by whatever designation he is known) recognised by the Central Government for the purpose of this section. " ( 3 ) IN all these cases initially a part of the sample was analysed by the Public Analyst but on the request of the concerned accused in each of these cases as per the provisions of sec. 13 (2) parts of the sample were sent to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis and pending trials reports of the Director of the said Laboratory were received. As provided by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 the certificates issued by the said Director superseded the reports given by the Public Analyst under sec 13 in each of these cases. Still the controversy between the parties ranges within a very narrow compass thought all the same it is a very serious controversy. The accused contend that as the reports of the Public Analyst on the one hand and the certificates of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory in each of the cases on the other hand showed marked variance regarding material particulars about the contents of the samples analysed in the absence of any explanation offered by the prosecution regarding this variance the prosecution must fail. The concerned accused leaned heavily in support of their aforesaid contention on a decision of the Division Bench of this court consisting of A. N. Surti and D. H. Shukla JJ. to which we have already made a reference in the earlier part of this judgment. Before we switch over to the consideration of the said judgment it would be necessary to keep in view the statutory settings of sec. 13. A mere look at sec. 13 (3) shows that once the certificate is issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory after analysing part of the sample sent to it far analysis at the request of the concerned accused as laid down by sec. 13 (2) read with sec. 13 (2a) the earlier report of the Public Analyst analysing part of the very same sample gets superseded. The nature and extent of the supersession is highlighted by the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 read with the proviso to the said sub-sec. (5 ). A bare look at sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 shows that document purporting to be a report signed by the Public Analyst can be used as evidence of the facts stated therein even though no formal proof as required by the Indian Evidence Act is adduced provided it is not superseded under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13. Thus prior to its supersession it may hold the field and mere tendering of such report would be enough to bring it on record as evidence of its contents. But the moment it gets superseded under sec. 13 (3) by a superior report so to say of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory on the basis of examination of any part of the same sample as sent to him through court at the request of the accused as provided by sec. 13 (2) read with sec. 13 (2a) it ceases to exist of its own and there would remain no occasion for referring to it as evidence of the facts stated therein. In other words it gets totally exhausted in that eventuality and it is only the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory which would hold the field. Proviso to sec. 13 (5) also indicates that what is stated in the later certificate issued by the Director would be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated in the said certificate. Proviso to sec. 13 (5) also indicates that what is stated in the later certificate issued by the Director would be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated in the said certificate. It is obvious that the facts stated would be with respect to the result of the analysis by the Director and the findings reached therein regarding relevant ingredients of the part of the sample sent for analysis and analysed by the Director of the Central Food laboratory. Once this type of conclusive evidence emerges on record whatever might have been contra-indicated regarding the concerned ingredients of the sample as found in the prior report of the Public Analyst would be totally pushed out of the arena of contest and cannot be looked at. If that is so there would be no question of considering any Variance Between the results of the tests carried out by the Public Analyst on the one hand and the Director of the Central Food Laboratory on the other vis-a-vis two parts of the same sample. Any variation or variance between the different ingredients mentioned in these two reports would pre-suppose comparison between two existing reports on record. But if one of the reports is wholly pushed out of record as enjoined by sec. 13 (3) read with sec. 13 (5) there is no question of resorting to the exercise of comparison between the contents of these two reports with a view to finding out the supposed variance between the existing and operative report of the Director and earlier reports of the Public Analyst which has ceased to exist on record. Once this conclusion is found to clearly follow from the aforesaid statutory scheme of sec. 13 it must logically follow that there can be no question of any variance between the non-existent report of the Public Analyst and existing certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory in connection with analysis of the part of the same sample as initially taken by the Food Inspector. If such a question is ruled out further question as to whether the prosecution should explain the variance at the pain of otherwise falling through would become totally irrelevant and besides the point. ( 4 ) ONCE sub-secs. (3) and (5) of sec. If such a question is ruled out further question as to whether the prosecution should explain the variance at the pain of otherwise falling through would become totally irrelevant and besides the point. ( 4 ) ONCE sub-secs. (3) and (5) of sec. 13 are kept in view it is impossible to countenance the submission of the accused that despite these provisions non-existing report of the Public Analyst can still be looked at for the purpose of finding out the alleged variance between the contents of that report and the superseding certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. The word supersede according to Oxford English Dictionary means to make of no effect to render void nugatory or useless to annul to override to be set aside as useless or obsolete. The word supersede according to Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 83 means to make void or useless or unnecessary by superior power or by coming in the place of to make unnecessary or superfluous to set aside to annul to repeal to suspend. to stay to over-rule to obliterate to neutralise. The word supersede is further defined as meaning to supplant to replace to displace or set aside etc. Therefore when sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 says that the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst under sub-sec. (1) it clearly means that it replaces the Public Analysts report meaning thereby that once the report of the Director is received the earlier report given by the Public Analyst is rendered obsolete and stands wiped out. Sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 also makes this position clear when it says that any document purporting to be a report signed by Public Analyst unless it has been superseded under sub-sec. (3) may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under the Act. It is obvious that once the report of the Public Analyst is superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory after analysing another part of the sample the report of the Public Analyst cannot be used as evidence of facts stated therein. In other words it is rendered nugatory or non est. The proviso to subsec. It is obvious that once the report of the Public Analyst is superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory after analysing another part of the sample the report of the Public Analyst cannot be used as evidence of facts stated therein. In other words it is rendered nugatory or non est. The proviso to subsec. (5) which was inserted in Act 34 of 1976 with effect from 1-4-1976 makes the certificate issued by the Director final and conclusive in regard to the facts stated therein. We are therefore of the opinion that having regard to the language of sub-secs. (3) and (5) of sec. 13 it is not permissible to the court to rely on the report of the Public Analyst once it is superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. In this connection we may usefully refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Association and Others v. Union of India and Another A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2346 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the provisions of sec. 13 (5) and its proviso as they stood in those days. The provision read as under:"any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst unless it has been superseded under sub-sec (3) or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the central Food Laboratory may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceedings under this Act or under secs. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code; provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein". ( 5 ) UPHOLDING the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provision Shah J. speaking for the Supreme Court made the following observations in para 14 of the report:"the vendor when charged with an offence is not thereby compelled to be a witness against himself. Nor can it be said that by making the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein any such infringement is intended. Nor can it be said that by making the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein any such infringement is intended. The provision has been made with a view to secure formal evidence of facts without requiring the Director to remain present and in the interest of Effective administration of the act. the certificate signed by the Director of the central Food Laboratory is made final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. The Director is a highly placed official an expert in determining the nature substance and quality of food and is wholly disinterested in the result of any case coming before the court". ( 6 ) THE question posed for our consideration is squarely covered by a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal v. State of M. P. A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 1387. In that case the accused was convicted for adulteration of oil on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. The certificate of Director of Central Food Laboratory having been brushed aside on the ground that the Director had reported that the specimen impression did not tally with the seal on the container in which sample of oil was sent to him. Conviction was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge as well as by the High Court. Chinnappa Reddy J. speaking for the Supreme Court held that:"under sec. 13 (3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the report of the public analyst stood superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Having been so superseded the report of the public analyst could not therefore be relied upon to base a conviction". ( 7 ) IT was further observed that once supersession takes effect it is not permissible to rely on the report of the Public Analyst for the purpose of basing a conviction. That is so because the report of the Director is made final and conclusive. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that the Public Analysts report stood superseded by the certificate of the Director and once the certificate of the Director was found to be unreliable there would not remain on record any evidence on which accused could be convicted. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that the Public Analysts report stood superseded by the certificate of the Director and once the certificate of the Director was found to be unreliable there would not remain on record any evidence on which accused could be convicted. In the light of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it is obvious that even in a converse case where the accused claims acquittal on the ground of any important variance between the earlier report of the Public Analyst and the later certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory which supersedes it it would not be open to the court to rely upon the contents of the superseded report of the Public Analyst for doubting correctness of the certificate issued by the Director. In our view the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court really clinches the issue and in its wake the question referred to us has to be answered in the negative. ( 8 ) BEFORE we deal with the judgment of the Division Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 1979 which has resulted into this reference we may note certain other judgments of this court which had earlier taken the same view which ultimately found favour with the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in Chetumals case (supra ). ( 9 ) IN the case of Kantilal v. I. G. Patel 13 G. L. R. 725 j. M. Sheth J. repelled the contention on behalf of the accused by which reliance was sought to be placed on the report of the Public Analyst which had been superseded by the certificate issued by the Director. Having considered various judgments on the point the following pertinent observations were made by the learned Judge:"in view of the provisions of sec. 13 of the Act referred to by me earlier it is evident that the certificate ex. 10 issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-sec. (2) will supersede the report ex. 7 given by the public analyst given under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the act. In view of the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 of the Act this certificate shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. I am therefore of the opinion that the court has to take into consideration the facts stated in this report ex. 10. (1) of sec. 13 of the act. In view of the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 of the Act this certificate shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. I am therefore of the opinion that the court has to take into consideration the facts stated in this report ex. 10. It cannot take into consideration the public analysts report which is superseded by this certificate ex. 10. " ( 10 ) IN the case of V. B. Shukla v. Prakash 14 G. L. R. 381 t. U. Mehta J. had an occasion to consider the very question. The learned Judge observed as under:"according to sec. 13 (3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report given by the Public Analyst. It is of course true that on consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case it is always open to the court to reject the report of the Director Central Food Laboratory as unreliable or insufficient for basing conviction but to discard that report simply because the same is inconsistent with the report of the Public Analyst is tantamount to discarding the provision in sec. 13 of the Act which contemplates that it is open to the accused or the complainant to make an application to the court for sending part of the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. The very fact that even though the sample has been analysed by the Public Analyst the Legislature has contemplated the re-examination of that sample by another authority suggests that the legislature has recognised the possibility of both the reports being contradictory. It is to provide for such a contingency that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 has prescribed that certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory should supersede the report given by the public analyst". It is to provide for such a contingency that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 has prescribed that certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory should supersede the report given by the public analyst". ( 11 ) SO far as the aforesaid decision is concerned we must however pause to mention that when the learned Single Judge observes that it is open to the court to reject the report of the Director Central Food Laboratory as unreliable what is really meant is that in a given case even on the basis of the certificate of the Director Central Food Laboratory it may not be possible to base conviction as the prosecution may not be able to establish from the analysis of the sample by the Director that the accused had sold adulterated food irrespective of the fact that the result of the analysis as mentioned in the certificate remained final and conclusive. ( 12 ) IN the case of State v. Kutubuddin Isafali 21 G. L. R. 167 m. K. Shah J. also examined the very same question and after noticing provisions of sec. 13 (3) and (5) observed in para 13 as under: It is thus clear that the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory not only supersedes the one issued by the Public Analyst but it is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. In this view of the matter when there is report of Central Food Laboratory the report of the Public Analyst will for all practical purposes be treated as non-existent. The report of the Central Food Laboratory will be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein and the question therefore of any comparison of that report with the report issued by the Public Analyst which has already been superseded does not arise. There are statutory provisions and they have to be strictly complied with. "the aforesaid decisions of the learned Single Judges of this court have in our view correctly laid down the legal position which ultimately as we have seen above has also been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal (supra ). There are statutory provisions and they have to be strictly complied with. "the aforesaid decisions of the learned Single Judges of this court have in our view correctly laid down the legal position which ultimately as we have seen above has also been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal (supra ). ( 13 ) NOW is the time for us to turn to the consideration of the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 1979 decided by A. N. Surti and D. H. Shukla JJ. on 26-9-1980 the reasoning adopted wherein has resulted in the present reference. The Division Bench was concerned in that case with an appeal against acquittal. The accused in that case was alleged to have committed offences under sec. 7 read with sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act. He was convicted and sentenced to suffer S. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 0 in default to suffer further S. I. for six month by the learned trial Magistrate. The accused carried the matter in appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed his appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence. It was in these circumstances that the appeal against acquittal was moved before this court by the State. While dismissing the acquittal appeal and confirming the acquittal of the accused the learned Judges noted the argument of the learned Advocate for the respondent-accused to the effect that so far as milk solids non-fat contents of the sample were concerned the report of the Public Analyst showed them at 8. 5% whereas the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory indicated them to be 8. 2% and that since there was variance so far as the above contents of the milk sample were concerned it was the duty of the prosecution to explain the variance or difference. The learned Advocate for the accused in support of his contention relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court viz. (i) Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra 1976 F. A. C. 43; and (ii) Tulsiram Kanu v. State A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 1. The learned Advocate for the accused also cited decision of the Maharashtra High Court in the case of B. A. Samant v. State 70 B. L. R. 794. (i) Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra 1976 F. A. C. 43; and (ii) Tulsiram Kanu v. State A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 1. The learned Advocate for the accused also cited decision of the Maharashtra High Court in the case of B. A. Samant v. State 70 B. L. R. 794. These very authorities were relied upon by the learned Advocate for the accused in the appeal before the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the contention of the accused based on the aforesaid decisions. Having noted these judgments the Division Bench speaking through D. H. Shukla J. made the following observations"in view of the authorities above considered the learned Additional Sessions Judge was quite justified in observing I am therefore inclined to think that in view of such a large variation in respect of the fat deficiency found by the public analyst and that of the Directors it was for the prosecution to explain this difference and moreover the difference in milk solids non-fat as found by the Director is 8. 2% shown only 0. 3% below the prescribed standards and as per the public analyst it was Found to be 8. 5% and therefore it was as per the prescribed standard. No doubt the report of the Director supersedes the certificate of the Public Analyst but the factual date as above cannot be brushed aside easily. It is in these circumstances that I am of the view that the accused ought to be given benefit of doubt". ( 14 ) HAVING approved the aforesaid observations of the learned Sessions Judge the Division Bench in the next para of the judgment observed:"the above discussion shows that the learned appellate Judge was quite justified in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt against the accused-respondent No. 1 as it failed to explain the substantial variance in the reports of analysis given by two different authorities. In the last part of the judgment it was further observed. There is great force in the first argument advanced by Mr. Adhvaryu on the question of variance in the two reports given by two different authorities and we also find that on that argument the learned Additional Sessions judge has reached to a correct conclusion in accepting it and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them on that basis". Adhvaryu on the question of variance in the two reports given by two different authorities and we also find that on that argument the learned Additional Sessions judge has reached to a correct conclusion in accepting it and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them on that basis". ( 15 ) NOW the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench runs counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal (supra) and hence it must be treated to have been impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court. But even apart from that the learned Judges with respect have not considered the statutory settings of secs. 13 (2) (3) and (5) of the Act and the clear legislative scheme emerging therefrom. Even then earlier judgments of this court reported in 13 and 14 G. L. R. though of learned Single Judges do not appear to have been placed for consideration of the Division Bench Leaving aside this aspect of the matter we may note at this stage that the two decisions of the Supreme Court on which reliance was placed by the Division Bench did not decide the question which has been posed for our consideration and which was on the anvil of inquiry before the Division Bench. In Mangaldas case (supra) there was no question of the Public Analysts report getting superseded by certificate of the Director. Public Analysts report was holding the field. It was not superseded by the certificate of the Director and the only question for consideration was how much evidentiary value should be attached to such report. In that connection the Supreme Court held:"the provision of sec. 13 (5) clearly makes the report admissible in evidence. What value is to be attached to such report must necessarily be for the court of fact which has to consider it. The certificate issued by the Director would then supersede the report given by the public analyst. . . This certificate is not only made admissible in evidence under sub-sec. (5) but is given finality to the facts contained therein by the proviso to that sub-section. It is true that the certificate of the public analyst is not made conclusive but this only means that the court of fact is free to act on the certificate as it thinks fit". (5) but is given finality to the facts contained therein by the proviso to that sub-section. It is true that the certificate of the public analyst is not made conclusive but this only means that the court of fact is free to act on the certificate as it thinks fit". ( 16 ) IT is therefore obvious that the aforesaid decision is not an authority for deciding the question as to whether any reliance can be placed on the contents of Public Analysts report once it is excluded from evidence by the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory. In Mangaldas case (supra) as the report of Public Analyst was not superseded the question of evidentiary value of such report which went in evidence under sec. 13 (5) was the only question which was considered by the Supreme Court. Hence the said decision cannot shed any light on the question which is posed for our consideration. In the case of Tulsiram (supra) the question which cropped up for consideration of the Supreme Court was entirely a different one. It was found on evidence in that case that there was contradiction between the reports of chemical examiner and imperial serologist. It may be noted at this stage that the aforesaid reports were admitted in evidence under sec. 510 Cr. P. C. 1898. There was no question of one of the reports superseding the other. Sec. 510 of the Cr. P. C. 1898 did not contain provisions like secs. 13 (3) and (5) as we find in the present case. As there was no statutory provision for superseding report of the chemical examiner by that of imperial serologist both the reports remained on record for the purpose of appreciation. It is in that light that the Supreme Court made the following observations:" In ordinary circumstances there would be nothing wrong in taking reports of the chemical examiner and imperial serologist on record without examining these persons as witnesses -as permitted by the Criminal Procedure Code. When however there is a difference of opinion in the reports so much so that effect of the one report is to nullify the-effect-of the other the duty to explain the difference is on the prosecution and the mere production of the report does not. under the circumstances prove anything which can weigh against the accused". ( 17 ) THE statutory scheme of secs. under the circumstances prove anything which can weigh against the accused". ( 17 ) THE statutory scheme of secs. 13 (3) and (5) which was not present in the Tulsirams case (supra) clearly reflects a different legislative intention and does not countenance any comparison between the two reports when one of them viz. Public Analysts report elbowed out of record by superseding certificate of the Director. As such legislative scheme was not available in Tulsirams case (supra) the observations of the Supreme Court in that case cannot be of any assistance for resolving the controversy posed before us which as noted earlier has to be resolved in the light of entirely different legislative scheme as projected by the relevant sub-sections of sec. 13. ( 18 ) SO far as decision of the Bombay (Maharashtra) High Court in the case of B. A. Samant (supra) is concerned even that decision does not lend any assistance in resolving the controversy between the parties as raised in the present proceedings. In Samants case (supra) the Public Analyst on analysis of the sample of buffalo milk found fat to be 4. 4 per cent Solids non-fat to be 7. 4 per cent and extraneous water to be 17. 7 per cent. When the sample was sent to the Central Food Laboratory the certificate showed fat to be 5. 4. per cent milk solids non-fat to be 7. 1 per cent and other than starch and milk fat cane-sugar was absent. In the opinion of the Central Food Laboratory the sample of buffalo milk contained 21 per cent of added water. In that connection Vaidya J. of the Bombay High Court observed as under :further a grave doubt arises with regard to the contents of the two samples which were analysed in this case because of the striking discrepancy between the analysis by the public analyst and the one by the Director of Central Food Laboratory with regard to the water contents of the two bottles. . . . But it is difficult to understand how there could be one bottle with 21 per cent of water and the other with 17 per cent. The main question in this case is whether the accused can be convicted merely relying on the evidence of the Food Inspector and the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory for holding that the accused sold adulterated milk. The main question in this case is whether the accused can be convicted merely relying on the evidence of the Food Inspector and the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory for holding that the accused sold adulterated milk. In view of the fact that the Food Inspector did not lead any evidence with regard to the following of the procedure under rule 14 and did not try to explain how this difference in the two reports was caused it will be difficult to convict the accused relying on the evidence of the Food Inspector alone". ( 19 ) IT is difficult to appreciate how the aforesaid decision would render any assistance in deciding the question posed for our consideration. In the aforesaid decision it was realised that the discrepancy regarding water content could be on account of presence of water in the container used. There was no finding that rule 14 had not been adhered to. It also emerged from evidence that witness Gopinath had not seen the empty bottles. Thus on the state of evidence before Vaidya J. it was found that the procedural safeguards were not followed by the Food Inspector while collecting the sample in question. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts it was further observed"the discrepancy in the two reports merely added to the doubt which arose from the other circumstances. That case therefore cannot be taken to be an authority for the proposition that in all cases of discrepancy between the two reports if the prosecution fails to offer a valid explanation the accused would be entitled to benefit of doubt". ( 20 ) A careful reading of the penultimate paragraph of this judgment also makes this position clear. We must however state that to the extent to which the decision of Vaidya J. seeks to spin out the variance between the contents of Public Analysts report and the contents of the certificateof the Director of Central Food Laboratory. It cannot be saidto be lying down good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra ). . ( 21 ) UNDER these circumstances it must be held that the two. It cannot be saidto be lying down good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra ). . ( 21 ) UNDER these circumstances it must be held that the two. decisions of the Supreme Court in Mangaldas case and Tulsirams case as well as decision of the Maharashtra High Court in B. A. Samantcase (supra) relied upon by the Division Bench while deciding Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 1979 could not have been pressed into service for supporting the proposition which is put forward by the Division Bench speaking through Shukla J. for sustaining the acquittal of the accused before the. With respect to the learned Judges who decided the aforesaid case we must hold that the view put forward by them in the aforesaid decision based on the variation between the contents of the report of the Public Analyst on the one hand and the certificate of the director Central Food Laboratory on the other does not reflect the correct legal position. In our view such an exercise is not open to any cart of law as the report of the Public Analyst gets completely superseded by the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory or the combined operation of secs. 13 (3) and sec. 13 (5) of the Act. ( 22 ) WE may now refer to certain other judgments to which ourattention was invited by Mr. Shelat learned Advocate for the complainant in the respective cases. In the case of M. M. Pandya v. Bhagwandas 20 G. L. R. 353 a Full Bench of this court consisting of S. H. Sheth D. P. Desai and A. N. Surti JJ. had an occasion to consider the sheme of the Act and the effect or supersession of the report of the Public Analyst by the certificate issued by the Director of the Central food Laboratory. The Full Bench speaking through S. H. Sheth J. made the following pertinent observations in para 20 of the report :"so far as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the rules made thereunder are concerned the report of the Public Analyst has-been made admissible in evidence without its formal proof. However; the accused is entitled to have public Analyst summoned for cross-examination. The Act and the rules nowhere. However; the accused is entitled to have public Analyst summoned for cross-examination. The Act and the rules nowhere. provide that the accused has a right to bring on record the evidence of a private analyst to rebut what the Public Analyst has stated in his report. Assuming however that he has such a right (and we proceed on the assumption that every accused has a right to defend himself in such manner as he thinks fit) that right is illusory and without any substance because where there is a dispute between the prosecution and the defence touching upon the veracity of the findings recorded by the Public Analyst it is always open to the accused to move the court for sending one of the three samples to the Director Central Food Laboratory at Calcutta for further analysis. The report which the Director makes or the certificate which he issues is final and conclusive and supersedes not only the report of the Public Analyst on account of the fact that finality and conclusiveness have been attached to it will supersede the private opinion expressed in that behalf by private analyst examined by accused. Therefore so far as the prejudice is concerned it can never be said that non-compliance with The time limit specified in rules prejudice in their defence the entire community of Persons accused. offences under the prevention of food Adulteration Act". ( 23 ) WE respectfully concur with the aforesaid reasoning and observations ( 24 ) WE may now briefly refer to judgments of Some other High Courts to which reference was made in the course of arguments by the learned Counsel for the accused. In the case of Food Inspector v. Hameed 1983 Kerala Law Times 901 U. L. Bhat J. of the Kerala High Court took the same view which has been taken by the learned judges of this court in 13 GLR 14 GLR and 21 (2) GLR (supra ). "the observations made by the learned Single Judge in this Connection read as under : The report of the public analyst can be used as evidence by the court of the facts stated therein unless it has been superseded. Supersession could only be by a certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Certificate shall also be final and conclusive evidence of the facts therein. Supersession could only be by a certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Certificate shall also be final and conclusive evidence of the facts therein. The word supersede means to take the place of by reason of superior right to make useless by superior power to set aside etc. If that be so the report of the public analyst shall be replaced or displaced or set aside by the certificate of the Director. In such a case. it will not be open to the court to look at the report of the public analyst and rely on the facts stated therein as evidence". ( 25 ) THE Gauhati High Court also considered this very question in the case of J. L. Roy v. Amritlal Dev and Another 1980 F. A. C. 30. The Division Bench consisting of Baharul Islam Actg. C. J. and Pathak J. speaking through the Actg. C. J. made the following observations on the question in issue :"a perusal of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 shows that the report of the Director supersedes the report of the public analyst under sub-sec. (1) of the section. In other words when on an application by the accused under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 the court sent the sample with the accused to the Director and when the report of the Director is received. the report of the public analyst ceases to exist in the eye of law and cannot be taken any notice of. The learned Magistrate-s comparison of the report of the Director with that of the public analyst and giving the benefit of the variance between the two reports to the accused are illegal and unsustainable in law". ( 26 ) THE Delhi High Court also considered a similar situation in the case of Salim and Co. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1978 Criminal Law Journal 240 F. S. Gill J. speaking for the Delhi High Court made the following observations :"it is correct that there is wide variation in the two reports but according to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 13 of the Act. the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report of the public analyst. The Statute has clearly provided as to what value should be attached to the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory qua that of the public analyst. (3) of sec. 13 of the Act. the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report of the public analyst. The Statute has clearly provided as to what value should be attached to the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory qua that of the public analyst. Thus the report of the public analyst loses all its value after supersession by the certificate of the Director". ( 27 ) IN para 15 it has been further observed"it is the superseded report in which the learned trial Magistrate has tried to put life. For that matter he called the public analyst and examined him as a court witness. This procedure is not warranted by law. Instead of reviving the report of the analyst he should have discarded the same". ( 28 ) IN our view the aforesaid decisions of Kerala Gauhati and Delhi High Courts fall in line with authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal (supra) and lay down the correct legal position. ( 29 ) MR. Adhvaryu learned Advocate for the accused vehemently contended that even if the report of the Public Analyst gets superseded by the certificate issued by the Director even then as laid down by sec. 13 (5) proviso it would be final and conclusive of the facts stated therein meaning thereby the result of the test carried out by the Director as mentioned in the certificate would be final and conclusive but his opinion as to whether the sample analysed by him was adulterated or not will not be final nor will it bind the court. So far as the aforesaid contention is concerned no exception can be taken to it. In case of Mohanlal v. Vipanchandra A. I. R. 1962 Guj. 44 a Division Bench consisting of J. M. Shelat and A. R. Bakshi JJ (as they then were) considered the question of finality attached to the facts found in the certificate of the Director upon analysis of the article of food. Shelat J. speaking for the Division Bench made the following observations in that connection :"the certificate of the Director of Central Food laboratory under sec. 13 contains factual data in respect of the article sent for analysis or test. Under the proviso to sec. Shelat J. speaking for the Division Bench made the following observations in that connection :"the certificate of the Director of Central Food laboratory under sec. 13 contains factual data in respect of the article sent for analysis or test. Under the proviso to sec. 13 (5) of the Act the finality or conclusiveness is thus attributed to these facts stated in the certificate of the Director. It would be then for the court to determine no doubt after considering the facts stated in the certificate whether the article of food in question is adulterated food or not. In other words this would be a question of law which is left to be decided by the court. What is thus final and conclusive in the certificate is the finding on an analysis or test of the constituents in the sample sent their proportions etc. The analyst has merely to give his opinion as to whether the article which he analysed has an excess or deficiency in constituents The vendor would still be entitled to lead evidence or otherwise show that the article of food in question is not adulterated food. For instance if the vendor wants to establish that some of the ingredients of the article (in this case ghee) are liable to get evaporated from having been boiled at high temperature while manufacturing the sweetmeat in question or that some change takes place chemical or otherwise by the ingredients of the ghee used in the preparation being mixed with the other fats or that a change takes place in the article in question owing to lapse of time or delay in making its analysis the vendor can do so inspite of the facts stated in the certificate of the Director though made final and conclusive under the proviso". ( 30 ) IN our view the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench correctly bring out the legal effect of the provisions of the proviso to sec. 13 (5 ). ( 31 ) WE may mention at this stage that a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the case of M. A. Thomas v. P. J. Abraham A. I. R. 1969 Kerala. 13 (5 ). ( 31 ) WE may mention at this stage that a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the case of M. A. Thomas v. P. J. Abraham A. I. R. 1969 Kerala. 146 has relied upon the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Mohanlals case (supra) and has held on this question as under:"what is relevant as evidence in both the report of the public analyst and the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory are only the facts stated therein in other words the data relating to the analysis and not the opinion of the analyst or the Director. Thus whether the certificate is reliable and good evidence and whether it discloses adulteration are questions to be decided by the court. On these questions the certificate is not final and conclusive. excepting that if the court decides to act on the certificate it has to accept the data found by the Director as a result of his test as final and conclusive and must then decide whether the sample is adulterated. On the last question whether there is adulteration on the basis of the data supplied by the Director even other evidence may be allowed and the proviso to sub-sec. (5) of rec. 13 is not a bar to this". ( 32 ) WE concur with the view taken by T. C. Raghavan J. as he then was in the aforesaid decision. ( 33 ) IN this connection it is also profitable to have a look at the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Kacheroo Mal A. I R. 1976 S. C. 394. In that case the Supreme court had considered the evidentiary value of the opinion of the Public Analyst as mentioned in his report. Sarkaria J. speaking for the Supreme court made the following observations in paras 10 and 11 of the report:"the opinion of the public analyst who examines and analyses the sample as to the fitness or otherwise of the sample for human consumption would constitute legal evidence. A public analyst is supposed to be specially skilled in the science of dietetics. As an export in the science he is competent to opine and testify about this fact. A public analyst is supposed to be specially skilled in the science of dietetics. As an export in the science he is competent to opine and testify about this fact. The report of the public analyst including his opinion on this point is per se evidence by virtue of sec. 13 of the Act. But this does not mean that this ipse dexit would be conclusive and binding on the court. To treat it so would be to leave the determination of the guilt of the accused to the whims and fancies of the public analyst. The act would not countenance such abdication of its judicial function by the court leaving the case-as it were-to be tried by the analyst. It is for the court to weigh his opinion and reach its own finding". ( 34 ) IN view of the settled legal position as revealed by the aforesaid decisions the apprehension voiced by Mr. Adhvaryu for the accused that what is made final and conclusive under sec. 13 (5) proviso in connection with the facts stated in the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory might not leave any judicial discretion for the court to go by its own conclusion on facts as to whether the article of food sold by the accused was adulterated or not does not survive. ( 35 ) MR. Adhvaryu for the accused next invited our attention to two unreported decisions of learned Single Judges of this court. In criminal Appeal No. 996 of 1972 decided by A. A. Dave J. on 15-2-1974 the Public Analyst had found the sample of ice-cream to be adulterated as it contained 5% total solid less than the legal standard while the report of the Central Food Laboratory showed that fat contents were 40. 4% and milk fat was 16. 3%. However protein contents were found to be 1. 7% while according to rules it should be 3. 5%. Relying upon report of the Central Food Laboratory the accused was convicted. 4% and milk fat was 16. 3%. However protein contents were found to be 1. 7% while according to rules it should be 3. 5%. Relying upon report of the Central Food Laboratory the accused was convicted. It was argued in appeal before this court by the learned Counsel for the original accused that originally the complaint was based on the footing that article of food was adulterated because it contained 5% total solid and the said content was less than the minimum prescribed under the rules while the conviction was based on the deficiency of protein content as found from the report of the Central Food Laboratory for which there no charge against the accused. In this connection A. A. Dave J. held that it was not the case of the Food Inspector or the Medical Officer in charge of health that the ice-cream supplied by the accused was sub-standard because of deficiency of protein. It was in these circumstances that it was held that the accused could not be convicted of an offence for which the main ingredient of the charge was missing-both in the complaint as well as in the charge itself. It is thereafter that the following observations were made by Dave J. :"that apart the report of the public analyst on which the accused were prosecuted does not seem to be true in view of the report of the Central Food Laboratory both with regard to fat contents and solid contents of the sample. When there is such a divergence in the two reports it would not be proper to convict the accused. The accused had no opportunity to explain about the diffidence of protein". ( 36 ) IT is therefore clear that the aforesaid decision of Dave J. proceeds en the facts of its own and the acquittal is based on the ground that the accused had no opportunity to explain about the deficiency of protein for which there was no charge. The said decision can be of no assistance to Mr. Adhvaryu for the accused as it does not touch upon the question which is posed for our consideration. The said decision can be of no assistance to Mr. Adhvaryu for the accused as it does not touch upon the question which is posed for our consideration. However we must make it clear that if the aforesaid decision is tried to be read as laying down the proposition that divergence between two reports can be demonstrated before the court then we must say that such an exercise would be impermissible as it would fly in the face of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chetumal (supra) as well as the statutory scheme envisaged by secs. 13 (3) and 13 (5) of the Act to which we have made a detailed reference earlier and to that extent the said observations made ill the judgment of Dave J. with result must be treated to be not laying down good law. ( 37 ) MR. Adhvaryu then invited our attention to another decision of M. C. Trivedi J. in Criminal Appeal No. 835 of 1973 decided on ( 38 ) EVEN in that case it was found by Trivedi J. that the conviction rendered by the learned Magistrate was based on facts different from the facts Alleged in the complaint. The complaint was filed on the basis of less fat contents than prescribed while the report of the Central Food Laboratory showed that there was less protein content in the sample and on the basis of less protein content the accused was convicted by the learned Magistrate. It is in these circumstances that Trivedi J. held that the basis of the charge against the accused was entirely different from the offence for which he was ultimately convicted and his conviction was based on facts different from the facts alleged in the complaint and hence it was liable to be set aside. It is on these facts that it was held that the appellantaccused before Trivedi J. could not be held guilty on the basis of the report of the Central Food Laboratory. In this connection Trivedi J. also placed reliance on the judgment of Dave J. to which we have made a reference a short while ago. It is on these facts that it was held that the appellantaccused before Trivedi J. could not be held guilty on the basis of the report of the Central Food Laboratory. In this connection Trivedi J. also placed reliance on the judgment of Dave J. to which we have made a reference a short while ago. Observations of Dave J. have been reproduced in the penultimate para of the judgment of Trivedi J. We have already considered the judgment of Dave J. in detail and consequently it is not necessary for us to reiterate the said consideration over again. We however observe that the decision of Trivedi J. which proceeds on its own facts cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that the court can rely upon the alleged variation between the contents of the report of the Public Analyst and the contents of the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Such an exercise as already observed earlier is completely ruled out on the scheme of relevant sub-clauses of sec. 13. ( 39 ) IN this connection we may also usefully refer to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Ambalal Maganlal 19 G. L. R. 458. The Division Beach consisting of D. P. Desai and M. K. Shah JJ. had to consider the question whether validity of written consent for prosecution given by the concerned authority acting under the Act relying on the report of public analyst would get whittled down on account of the subsequent event of receipt of the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory which may show different nature of adulteration as compared to the adulteration which was earlier found in the sample on account of the analysis made by the Public Analyst. The Division Bench speaking through D P. Desai J. in this connection made the following pertinent observations:under sec. 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the prosecution can be launched by four different authorities mentioned in the section who can themselves institute the prosecution in which case no question of written consent arises The prosecution can also be instituted with the written consent of any of these four authorities. 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the prosecution can be launched by four different authorities mentioned in the section who can themselves institute the prosecution in which case no question of written consent arises The prosecution can also be instituted with the written consent of any of these four authorities. Once the written consent to prosecution is given by any of the four competent authorities the institution of prosecution should be regarded as if it is by that authority No further question as regards the validity of written consent as a result of subsequent event would arise in such a case where cognizance of offence is taken by the court". ( 40 ) IT has been further observed in connection with the sample of cows milk as under :"two standards in respect of cows milk prescribed under the rules (under appendix B Item A 11 must be cumulatively satisfied. Therefore if a given sample falls below any of these two standards the article of food is adulterated and the offence takes place. The two standards therefore are integral part of one and the same offence. If in such a case cognizance is taken upon a valid written consent which consent of course is given on the basis that one of the two parts prescribed as standard is not complied with and it is found subsequent to the institution of the prosecution as a result of the certificate of the Director under sec. 13 (2) that that part is complied with but the sample does not comply with the other part which is as integral as the former the offence remains one and the same. The character of the offence does not change. It is only the evidence by which the offence is sought to be proved which is changed. The consent once effectively given cannot become invalid or the cognizance of the offence taken upon a valid consent cannot be vitiated merely because the evidence by which the offence is sought to be proved changes as a result of a subsequent event. Therefore the offence being one and the same another written consent because of difference of opinion between the public analyst and the Director cannot be insisted upon before proceeding with the trial of such a case". . Therefore the offence being one and the same another written consent because of difference of opinion between the public analyst and the Director cannot be insisted upon before proceeding with the trial of such a case". . ( 41 ) THE aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in our view succinctly brings out the correct legal position pertaining to prosecution of accused under the Act for Act offences. ( 42 ) MR. Adhvaryu for the accused tried to seek assistance from the decision of Vaidya J. in B. A. Samants case (supra ). As we have already discussed earlier the aforesaid decision cannot be of any assistance to Mr. Adhvaryu for supporting his contention that it is open to the court to find out variance between the contents of the report of the Public Analyst on the one hand and the certificate of the Central Food Laboratory on the other. We therefore do not dilate upon the ratio of the said decision any further. ( 43 ) 29 We may now refer to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court to which our attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the accused. The said judgment is rendered in the case of Charanji Lal v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 80. In that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the word damaged as used in sec. 11 (2) and sec. 13 (2) proviso of the Act should be given wider meaning as to include damaged due to any cause including decomposition. Sen J. speaking for the Supreme Court held that such a wider meaning is required to be given to the said phrase. The facts in Charanji Lals case (supra) where that the appellant before the Supreme Court was the original accused who ran a sweetmeat shop at Sadar Bazar Moga. On 3-1-1978 medical officer Dr. R. D. Ramnagar visited his shop along with two witnesses. He disclosed his identity and demanded 750 grammes of kutcha khoya for analysis and purchased the same. After following the usual routine procedure of dividing the sample into three parts and adding 18 drops of formalin in each three parts were put in three polythene packs. One part was sent to the Public Analyst Chandigarh whose report showed that fat content was 25%. After following the usual routine procedure of dividing the sample into three parts and adding 18 drops of formalin in each three parts were put in three polythene packs. One part was sent to the Public Analyst Chandigarh whose report showed that fat content was 25%. That sample was found to be adulterated with seasame oil (till oil) besides being insect infested. On the basis of the said report a complaint was lodged against the accused before the learned J. M. F. C. . Moga. The appellant having entered his appearance in court exercised his right under sec. 13 (1) and requested the learned Magistrate to send one of the two parts of the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for the purpose of analysis under sub-sec. (2b) of sec. 13 of the Act. The Director by his letter dated 2-5-1978 intimated that the sample was decomposed and therefore unfit for analysis. It is in these circumstances that the learned Magistrate forwarded the remaining part of the sample to the Director for the purpose of analysis. This part was found to be fit for analysis by the Director and by his report dated 7-12-1978 the Director opined that the sample was adulterated. The fat content was stated to be 33. 12% with a note added that the extracted fat of 20. 37% did not comply with the standards of milk fat for the State of Punjab. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused having taken the view that the report of the Public Analyst was superseded by the certificate issued by the Director where earlier one part of the sample was sent and was found unfit for analysis. In these circumstances the learned Magistrate held that there was no occasion for the court to again send sample for fresh analysis to the Central Food laboratory. In the alternative it was found that even the report of the Director stated that fat content was 33. 12% i. e. in excess over the minimum standard of 20% for khoya prescribed under the rules and therefore the khoya could not be treated to be adulterated and therefore the accused was entitled to be acquitted. On appeal the high Court disagreed with the learned trial Magistrate. The High Court held that it was not possible to narrowly construe the word damaged as used in sec. On appeal the high Court disagreed with the learned trial Magistrate. The High Court held that it was not possible to narrowly construe the word damaged as used in sec. 13 (2c) and consequently sending of the sample for fresh analysis by the Director was held to be legal and valid. The High Courts took the view that the prosecution had proved that the appellant bad sold adulterated food and accordingly convicted him of the offence with which he was charged. On further appeal to the Supreme Court by the appellant-accused the aforesaid decision was rendered by the Supreme Court. Sen J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed in para 8 of the report:"true it is under proviso to sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 of the Act the certificate of the Director Central Food Laboratory Ghaziabad is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein and it states that the sample was adulterated. At the same time the fat content in the report was shown to be in excess of the minimum fat content prescribed under item A. 11-02-17 with a note appended that the extracted fat content did not comply with the standards of milk fat for the State of Punjab". ( 44 ) THERE was no material before the Supreme Court to show that any separate fat content for khoya had been prescribed under item A. 11-02-17 for the state of Punjab and i nspite of giving time to learned Counsel for the State to enlighten the Supreme Court on the subject he was not in a position to do so. It is in these circumstances that the observations in para 9 on which strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the accused carne to be made. These observations read as under:"there are certain aspects of the case which are rather disturbing. It is not clear as to how the fat content of the same article of food the sample of Which according to the report of the public analyst Chandigarh dated 3/02/1978 s was 25% went upto 33. 12% as appears from the report of the Director Central Food Laboratory Ghaziabad dated Dec. 7 1978 Further it is also not clear that when the fat content of the sample was 33. 12% and the R. M. value of the extrated fat was 20. 12% as appears from the report of the Director Central Food Laboratory Ghaziabad dated Dec. 7 1978 Further it is also not clear that when the fat content of the sample was 33. 12% and the R. M. value of the extrated fat was 20. 37% still the Director on analysis found the sample to be adulterated Was it due to the presence of any substance not found in milk like seasame oil (til oil) as found by the Public Analyst Chandigarh or was it that there was a higher fat content prescribed for khoya for the State of Punjab as appears from the appended note ? These are some of the aspects which require investigation. There is no other alternative but to remit the matter to the High Court for as decision afresh. The High Court may call for a clarification from the Director Central food Laboratory Ghaziabad or take such other steps as it deems fit". ( 45 ) NOW a more glance at the aforesaid observations of the supreme Court in para 9 shows that the question whether any reference can be made to the contents. of the report of the Public Analyst when the said report got superseded by the certificate of the Director was not the anvil for Consideration of the Supreme Court. The observations were made with a view to highlighting certain distinctive aspects of the matters. The Supreme Court felt that some clarification was required to be obtained from the Director and it is on that basis that the matter was remitted to the High Court. It is also pertinent to note that earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra) which is directly on the point was not considered in the aforesaid decision in Charanji Lals case (supra ). In fact there was no occasion for the Supreme Court to consider that decision as the question which has been posed for our consideration did not arise for decision of the Supreme Court in the above case. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra) is in no way effected or diluted either expressly or impliedly by the decision of the Supreme Court in Charanji Lals case (supra ). The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra) is in no way effected or diluted either expressly or impliedly by the decision of the Supreme Court in Charanji Lals case (supra ). Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the observations made in para 9 of the report in Charanji Lals case (supra) in any way lay down a proposition that inspite of supersession of the report of the Public Analyst by the certificate of the Central Food Laboratory the contents of the superseded report would still remain a part of the evidence in the case. On the contrary effect of sec. 13 (5) is expressly noted by the Supreme Court in pars 8 of the report. Any general observations in para 9 for supporting the order of remand to the High Court cannot be of any assistance to the learned Counsel for the accused for supporting his case. ( 46 ) BEFORE parting with the discussion on the question posed for our consideration we may refer to an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this court consisting of R. C. Mankad and S. L. Talati JJ in Criminal Appeal No. 1140-A of 1978 decided on 11/12-8-1980 R. C. Mankad J. speaking for the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision considered the question of supersession of the report of the Public Analyst by a certificate issued by the Director. While considering the nature and extent of supersession of the former by the latter under sec. 13 (3) read with sec. 13 (5) the Division Bench speaking through Mankad J. observed as under:"in his report ex. 9 dated 27-8-1976 the public analyst stated inter alia that the 6 of cows milk received from the food inspector of analysis was properly sealed and fastended and that he had found the seal intact and unbroken. The report further stated that the seal on the container and the outer cover of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the food Inspector and that the sample was in a condition fit for analysis. Under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 of the Act any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. It is true that such use of the report cannot be made if it is superseded under sub-sec. Under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13 of the Act any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. It is true that such use of the report cannot be made if it is superseded under sub-sec. (3 ). In other words if the report of the public analyst is not consistent with the certificate issued by the Director it shall stand superseded to the extent it is inconsistent with the certificate. It is not correct to say that once the certificate is issued by the Director the report of the public analyst stands replaced or set aside or it cannot be used for any purpose. In our opinion when the certificate of the director is received the report will not stand in its entirety. It however cannot be gainsaid that the report cannot be read as evidence insofar as it is not consistent with the certificate. In other words the certificate issued by the Director will supersede the report only in respect of these matters for which opinion different from the one expressed in the report is given by the Director. The certificate of the Director. however does not and cannot totally efface the report of the public analyst. In the instant case therefore though the Director has issued a certificate in our opinion the report of the public analyst cannot be ignored or discarded. The certificate of the Director will undoubtedly prevail insofar as there is difference of opinion between the Director and the public analyst. For example in his report. ex. 9 the public analyst has declared the results of analysis as follows :milk solids non fat 6. 1% milk fat. 6. 0% ( 47 ) THE Director has in his certificate given the percentage of milk fat and milk solids non fat as follows :-MILK fat 5. 7% milk solids non fat. 6. 4% ( 48 ) THE Director has however confirmed the opinion of the public analyst that the sample of milk was adulterated. In our opinion the report of the public analyst stands superseded by the certificate of the Director insofar as the percentage of milk fat and milk solids non fat are concerned. 7% milk solids non fat. 6. 4% ( 48 ) THE Director has however confirmed the opinion of the public analyst that the sample of milk was adulterated. In our opinion the report of the public analyst stands superseded by the certificate of the Director insofar as the percentage of milk fat and milk solids non fat are concerned. However the statement to the effect that the sample of milk sent by the food inspector for analysis was properly seated and fastened and seals were found intact and unbroken contained in the report of the public analyst does not stand effaced on account of the certificate issued by the Director. In other words this statement can be read as evidence under sub-sec. (5)of sec. 13-of the Act. The statement of the public analyst that the sample was properly sealed and fastened could not mean that it was properly sealed and fastened in accordance with rule 16. Therefore besides the evidence of the food inspector we have evidence in the shape of the report of the public analyst which shows that the provisions of rule 16 (d) were complied with. In this connection it is also important to refer to the application dated 30/09/1976 made by respondent No. 1 to the learned Magistrate to send the sample bottle to the Director for analysis and the order passed below this application. In the order dated 30/09/1976 passed before this application the learned Magistrate observed that the sample bottle was properly sealed and that it was in good condition. This statement contained in the order of the learned Magistrate also goes to show that sample bottle was properly sealed. Therefore apart from the presumption which could be legitimately drawn there is evidence to establish that the provisions of rule 16 (d) were complied with by the food inspector. The finding of the learned Judge to the contrary therefore deserves to be set aside. ( 49 ) SO far as the said decision is concerned we must say with respect that it is not possible for us to countenance the view that once the report of the Public Analyst is superseded by the certificate issued by the Central Food Laboratory the report does not get totally effaced but it remains operative to the extent its contents are not inconsistent with those of the certificate. In our opinion the view of the Division Bench runs counter to the settled legal position as reflected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chetumals case (supra) and a catena of other decisions on the point. Once there is supersession of the report of the Public Analyst by a superior certificate of the Director the superseded report gets totally effaced and is excluded from evidence whole-hog. Under these circumstances it would not be open to the court to try to salvage the situation by undertaking exercise with a view to finding out as to whether any materials from the report of the Public Analyst are retrievable insofar as they are not inconsistent with what is stated in the superior certificate of the Director. In our view once the Public Analysts report is superseded? it goes by the board. Nothing contained in the said report thereafter can be looked into by the court. The limited extent to which the contents of the report of the Public Analyst can go into evidence is laid down by sec. 13 It is expressly made subject to the contingency. that it is not superseded by the superior report of the Director. Until that eventuality occurs the contents of the report of the Public Analyst may be looked into by the court. But once the report gets superseded it gets totally excluded from evidence and hence no part of the said report can then be considered as evidence of its contents. The entire report gets totally substituted and superimposed by the superior certificate of the Director. If the Public Analyst has anything to say from his personal knowledge as to how he handled the sample for the purpose of analysis or in what physical state he found the sample the Public Analyst concerned has to enter the witness box to establish these facts. But whatever he has stated in his report on these aspects gets totally effaced on account of the supersession of the report by the certificate of the Director. Consequently the contents of the superseded report cannot by themselves be relied upon by the court for any purpose. But whatever he has stated in his report on these aspects gets totally effaced on account of the supersession of the report by the certificate of the Director. Consequently the contents of the superseded report cannot by themselves be relied upon by the court for any purpose. In our view therefore the observations made by the Division Bench as extracted above to the effect that inspite of supersession the contents of the superseded report could be looked into as evidence of the facts stated therein which are other than contrary facts mentioned in the certificate cannot be treated to be laying down good law. Such a truncated supersession of the report of the Public Analyst as envisaged by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision is contra indicated by sec. 13 (3) read with sec. 13 (5) of the Act. ( 50 ) (REST of the Judgment not material for the reports.) Conclusion: As a result of the aforesaid discussion our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. Application dismissed. .