Judgment Ramaswamy, J.- All the six appellants have been charged and convicted for offences punishable under sections 148 , 149 and 302 , read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, by the learned Sessions Judge, Krishna Division at Machilipatnam and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years; four years and to imprisonment for life, respectively for causing the death of one Madivada Koteswara Rao for short, ‘the deceased’. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case unfolded at trial is as follows: In Venkanur village in Divi Taluk of Krishna District, there are two factions one led by one Bodagi Ramarao, leader of the prosecution party and the other led by A-1 and Potharaju, leader of the accused party. Bhogadi Rama Rao was murdered in the year 1979. A-1, Ande Venkateswara Rao, brother of A-2 and A-3 and others were accused, but at the trial they were acquitted in the year 1980. Alter the death of Bhogadi Ramarao, Madivada Venkateswararao, brother of the deceased became leader of the prosecution party. On 13th January, 1982, the said Ande Venkateswara Rao was murdered. Madhivada Venkateswara Rao was an accused along with one Bhogadi Venkateswara Rao, an Advocate practising at Machilipatnam, his maternal uncle Security proceedings were also initiated against both the parties and they are pending. All the accused in this case are inter-related. A-2 and A-3 are brothers. A-1's sister Danamma is given in marriage to A-2. A-5 and A-2 are sons of brothers. A-4's grand-father and A-2 are brothers. A-6 married the grand-daughter of the senior paternal uncle of A-2. 3. P.W.1 in this case is the wife of the deceased. P.W.2 is the eldest son and their daughter is Krishna Kumari (L.W.2) (she died before the trial commenced) and their farm-servant is one T.Basavaiah. On 20th March, 1982, at about 8 p.m. they were sitting in the Varandah of their house. The farm-servant was sitting on a ‘Dimma’. The deceased was talking to the farm-servant. He (deceased) was sitting on a stool (M.O.1) P.W.2 was sitting on a bench (M.O.2).P.W.1 the wife and the daughter (L.W.2 Krishnakumari) were sitting near the door steps. There were electric lights burning in the varandah, in the central hall behind the varandah and the back hall. The electric light tied to the Amla tree in the front yard was also burning. There were electric lights burning in the varandah, in the central hall behind the varandah and the back hall. The electric light tied to the Amla tree in the front yard was also burning. At that time, all the appellants formed into an unlawful assembly, armed with tappers knives, spears and sticks, all of a sudden trespassed into the house of the deceased On seeing the accused, the deceased got up. A-1 hit the deceased with a tappers knife on the back of the left shoulder. A-2 and A-3 hit him on the head with spears. A-5 hit the deceased with a tappers knife on the head. A-5 again tried to hit the deceased on the neck. The deceased warded off with his left hand His left ring finger was severed and the left middle finger was cut. Then A-4 hit the deceased on the shoulder near the right clavicle. A-6 hit the deceased on the head with the spear. While they were beating the deceased, he got into the house and went into the northern side of the vasara and then to the store-room and bolted the door from inside. Then the accused entered the house and tried to break open the doorway of the store-room in which the deceased was hiding Then, P.W.1. P.W.2 and their daughter (L.W.2) entreated the accused not to kill the deceased. Then the accused went away. P.W. 4, the second son of the deceased who had taken his food earlier was asleep. On hearing the galata, he woke up from the southern-side room and came cut and saw the accused going away. After the accused left the house, the deceased opened the door, came out and went into the pooja room and fell down. P.Ws.1, 2 and others were crying. In the meanwhile, the mother of the deceased, who was staying in the house of his younger son, Venkateswara Rao, on hearing the cries also came to the scene. They removed the deceased to the house of one Madivada Apparao and laid him on the cot (M.O.4). Blood was oozing. They bandaged the wounds with a cloth to stop bleeding. P.W.3 is the mother-in-law of L.W.2, the daughter of the deceased. L.W.2 was given in marriage in the same village On coming to know of the occurrence through the farm-servant Basavaiah (L.W.4), she came running. She went inside the house and found none. Blood was oozing. They bandaged the wounds with a cloth to stop bleeding. P.W.3 is the mother-in-law of L.W.2, the daughter of the deceased. L.W.2 was given in marriage in the same village On coming to know of the occurrence through the farm-servant Basavaiah (L.W.4), she came running. She went inside the house and found none. On hearing the cries from the house of M.Apparao, she went and saw P.Ws.1, 2, L.W.2 and others, tying the wounds with cloth. They waited for some time and took the deceased on the cot M.O.4 upto the road leading to Avanigadda from Nagayalanka. By that time, it was mid-night They waited for some lorries and a lorry driven by P.W.8 came there. The deceased was taken to the hospital at Avanigadda in that lorry. P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4, L.W.2 and mother of the deceased accompanied the deceased. At about 1-50 a.m. on 21st March, 1982, P.W.11 the doctor, examined the deceased. He sent a requisition Exhibit P-19 to the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Avanigadda (P.W.10) to record the dying declaration of the deceased. The Magistrate (P.W.10) immediately came and recorded the dying declaration. Exhibit P-20, of the deceased from 2-35 a.m. to 3-15 a.m. The injured was conscious and he was in a fit condition to give the statement. It was endorsed under Exhibit P-21 by P.W.11 on Exhibit P-20 itself. 4. In the meanwhile, P.W.14, the Sub Inspector of Police, Avanigadda received a trunk call at 1-35 a.m. from some unidentified person to the effect that a person from Vakanur was brought to the Government Hospital, Avanigadda with injuries. The person who gave the telephone call did not disclose his identification. He made an entry in the General Diary. He went to the Hospital along with a constable. P.C. 1168 carrying the memo-book. He found a parson on the bed in the Hospital with nurses around. He sought to question the victim. In the meanwhile the doctor came and asked him to wait till the first aid is given and handed over the memo Exhibit P-23 through the constable to the medical officer. Then P.W.14 went to the Police Station to inform his superiors. He sought to question the victim. In the meanwhile the doctor came and asked him to wait till the first aid is given and handed over the memo Exhibit P-23 through the constable to the medical officer. Then P.W.14 went to the Police Station to inform his superiors. At 2-15 a.m. he contacted the Inspector of Police (P.W.13) by phone and informed him of what he came to know of the occurrence He also informed by V.S.H.F. to the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Bandar of the occurrence. P.W.14 then went to the Hospital. P.W.13 on receipt of the information, immediately came to the Hospital by jeep. He reached the hospital at about 2-50 a.m. He found P.W.14 in the Hospital compound. When enquired, P.W.14 informed P.W.13 that P.W.10 the Magistrate was recording the dying declaration of the deceased Koteswara Rao. P.W.13 also enquired whether P.W.14 has recorded his statement. P.W.14 informed him in the negative. He was waiting for the Magistrate to come out of the hospital. After P.W.10 completed recording the declaration by 3-15 a.m. and came out, P.W.13 gave a requisition to him to spare him with a copy of the declaration recorded by him. The Magistrate permitted him to take down a copy. P.W.13 copied Exhibit P-20. Then he went to the Police Station and verified the General Diary and found the entry made by P.W. 14 and he registered Crime No. 18 of 1982 under sections 147 , 148 , 307 read with 149 Indian Penal Code and issued Exhibit P-20 First Information Report P.W.13 left the police station at 4-20 a.m. and informed he Deputy Superintendent of Police. 5. P.W.11, the doctor examined the victim and found as many as seventeen injuries. He issued the wound certificate Exhibit P-26. He referred the injured at 5-30 a.m. to the Head Quarters Hospital at Machilipatnam as his condition was serious under Exhibit P-24 memo. He also sent Exhibit P-25 letter to the Sub Inspector of Police. The injured was taken in a car by P.W.1 and others and reached the Headquarters Hospital at Machilipatnam at 7-20 a.m. P.W.12, the doctor examined the deceased and pronounced him to be dead P.W.12 sent an intimation (Exhibit P-27) to the Station House Officer, Chilakalapudi. 6. P.W.13, after registering the crime came back to the Hospital. He found the condition of the victim deteriorating. He did not record his statement. 6. P.W.13, after registering the crime came back to the Hospital. He found the condition of the victim deteriorating. He did not record his statement. He recorded the statement of P.W.1. P.W.1 handed over the bed-sheet of her husband (M.O.9), her blood-stained saree M.O.7. P.W.13 also examined the daughter of the deceased Krishnakumari (L.W.2). She also handed over her blood-stained sari M.O.6. P.W.13 also examined P.W.2. He also handed over his blood stained shirt (M.O.8). He examined P.W.4 and recorded his statement. Then P.W.13 went to Venkanur., collected the triune officers-P.W.5 and the Village munsif. He inspected the scene of offence at 7-00 a.m. In their presence. He found an electric bulb hanging to an Amla tree. He found in the verandah two benches M.Os.2 and 3 and a stool M.O.1 with blood-stains. He also found blood-stains in the verandah and on the door-frame and the wall. P.W. 13 saw three rooms in one line on the southern side running from east to west and there are three rooms on the northern side. There is a central hall. In the middle there is a hall to the west of the front Verandah and there is another hall in the west of that hall. The Verandah hall has a mudflooring. He drew rough sketch of the scene of offence Exhibit P-3. He also took the measurements. He drew the observation report Exhibit P-1. There are electric bulbs. The house is electrified. P.W.13 noticed blood-stains in the central hall and also on the mud-flooring of the verandah behind the central hall. He also no iced blood stains in the western-most room in the southern side. There were blood-stains on the thereshold of that room on Cuddapah slabs. He seized the blood-stained cuddapah slabs M.Os.11 and 12. He also noticed blood-stains on the floor room in the western-most room on the northern side, which is prayer room. He also noticed blood stains in the back-yard of the house. He seized the blood-stained and control earth in the back yard. They are M.Os.13 and 14. Then he went to the house of Madivada Apparao where the deceased was kept on a cot. He noticed blood stains in the house of M.Apparao. He seized the control earth from the house of Apparao, M.Os.15 and 16. He also seized blood-stained lungi and a sari piece in the house of Apparao which are M.Os. 17 and 18. Then he went to the house of Madivada Apparao where the deceased was kept on a cot. He noticed blood stains in the house of M.Apparao. He seized the control earth from the house of Apparao, M.Os.15 and 16. He also seized blood-stained lungi and a sari piece in the house of Apparao which are M.Os. 17 and 18. P.W.13 got the scene of offence photographed by P.W.7. Exhibits P-3 to P-14 are the negatives and positives 7. On going to the Police Station at Chilakatapudi, on receiving the death intimation. P.W.13 altered the F.I.R. (Exhibit P-33). He went to the Hospital. He held inquest. He examined P.Ws.1, 2 and Krishnakumari at the inquest He drew the inquest report, Exhibit P-2. P.W.6 is the panch witness. He sent the dead body to P.W.12, doctor, for conducting autopsy. 8. P.W. No. 12 conducted autopsy and he found as many as seventeen injuries. He issued the postmortem certificate Exhibit P-29. According to P.W. No. 12, the death was due to shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries. All the injuries are ante-mortem. The cumulative effect of all the injuries is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Injuries Nos. 15 and 16 could have been caused by a sharpedged weapon. Injury No. 8 could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon and Injury No. 3 also could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Injury Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 could be caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Injury Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 could also be caused by a blunt object. These injuries could also be caused by the blunt portion of a spear coming into contact with the body. Injury Nos. 9 to 13 could be caused by the stick portion of the spear or any blunt portion of the spear. 9. P.W. No. 13 and the Sub Inspector, examined P.W. No. 3 and others. He found the accused absconding. The accused surrendered on 14th May. 1982 before the Court at Avanigadda. Then the accused were taken into custody for interrogation. P.W.13 could not find any thing from them. Thereafter, P.W. No. 13 filed the charge-sheet on 9th August, 1982. 10. The prosecution examined in all sixteen witnesses, of whom P.Ws.1 and 2 are the direct witnesses and P.W.4 saw the accused running away from the house of the deceased. Then the accused were taken into custody for interrogation. P.W.13 could not find any thing from them. Thereafter, P.W. No. 13 filed the charge-sheet on 9th August, 1982. 10. The prosecution examined in all sixteen witnesses, of whom P.Ws.1 and 2 are the direct witnesses and P.W.4 saw the accused running away from the house of the deceased. The prosecution relied upon the dying declaration Exhibit P-20 recorded by the Magistrate, P.W. No. 10. When the incriminating circumstances have been put to the accused, in their examination under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, all the accused pleaded innocence. They stated that on account of factions in the village they were falsely implicated. A-1 also pleaded that as he was a direct witness in the murder case of Ande Venkateswara Rao, he was falsely implicated. The learned Sessions Judge believed the evidence of the prosecution and held that there is sufficient motive to commit the murder of the deceased He also believed the evidence of P.W. Nos. 1 and 2, direct witnesses, P.W.4 the tract witness, and P.W.3 who saw P.W. Nos. 1 and 2, at the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused for the offences and sentenced them, as referred to above 11. In this appeal, Sri T.Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that though motive is a double edged weapon on account of the factions the appellants have been falsely implicated. He also contended that admittedly the offence had taken place at 8 p.m. and no steps have been taken to give any report to anybody till 2-30 a.m. P.W. Nos. 1, 2, and 4 were not in the house at that time. P.W. No. 1 was in the house of her parents, though in the same village, but in a different hamlet, which is admittedly at a distance of two miles. P.W. No. 2 went to bring his mother (P.W.1) and they were not at the scene of offence. The fact that Krishna Kumari, the daughter of the deceased was in the house clearly shows that P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 were not in the house and the services of the daughter were requisitioned to prepare food for the deceased. P.W.2 was at the milk centre. The fact that Krishna Kumari, the daughter of the deceased was in the house clearly shows that P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 were not in the house and the services of the daughter were requisitioned to prepare food for the deceased. P.W.2 was at the milk centre. Though Police bundobust was stationed in the village as admitted by P.W.13, no explanation has been given by the prosecution as to why the constables on duty did not send any report. The deceased was admittedly taken to the hospital at about 1-30 a.m. There is sufficient time lag between the time of the occurrence and the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate P.W.10 and this time was utilised to tutor the deceased and to make false implication of all the enemies of the opposite party. The fact that full particulars have been given in Exhibit P-20 clearly shows that the deceased was sufficiently tutored to give a false account of the occurrence to rope in the innocent but at the same time, important persons belonging to the opposite faction. The statement Exhibit P-20 and the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 do not receive corroboration from the medical evidence. Therefore it is not safe to rely upon the declaration Exhibit P-20. He further contended that P.Ws.1 and 2 are not in the house and on the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible to accept their evidence. According to the learned Counsel, their evidence is artificial and it is in line with Exhibit P-20. They had also spoken to certain aspects not found in Exhibit P-20. It shows that they were not in the house at the time of the occurrence. 12. The learned Counsel elaborated saying that in Exhibit P-20 it is mentioned that the door of the house was closed and that means the front door of the house was closed. Now the evidence is that deceased went inside the house and hid himself in the southern most part of the store-room bolting from inside and thereafter all the accused left the house and he came out and fell down in the prayer room. There are all subsequent development brought on record. Exhibit P-20 does not contain all these details. Now the evidence is that deceased went inside the house and hid himself in the southern most part of the store-room bolting from inside and thereafter all the accused left the house and he came out and fell down in the prayer room. There are all subsequent development brought on record. Exhibit P-20 does not contain all these details. The probability would be that the deceased, after bolting the front door, must have run away into the pooja room and found that it is unsafe to hide himself in the pooja room. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relies upon two circumstances, viz., there are no traces of blood on the bolts of the store room as stated by the prosecution witnesses and the cut fingers of the deceased were not recovered under the panchnama. The learned Counsel also contends that in Exhibit P-20 it is mentioned that P.W. 1 and the daughter went to the police station to give the report, but the prosecution has suppressed that evidence and the averment made by them are inconsistent with the statement made by the deceased in Exhibit P-20. The learned Counsel relies upon the omission by P.W.14 to produce the general diary regarding the phone message. All these circumstances put together would go to show that the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the material evidence brought at the earliest point of time and therefore, it must be held that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that there are indications that A-2 and A-3 are falsely implicated. He relies in support thereof that though A-2 and A-3 hit the deceased with spears on the head, there is no corresponding incised injuries and the medical evidence does not corroborate. As they are brothers of Ande Venkateswara Rao, the deceased in the earlier murder case, they are implicated in this case. He further contends that as per the evidence furnished under Exhibit P-20 two or three persons also came there and they must have attacked the deceased and A-2 and A-3 were falsely implicated. The evidence of attack by A-2 and A-3 cannot be accepted. 13. He further contends that as per the evidence furnished under Exhibit P-20 two or three persons also came there and they must have attacked the deceased and A-2 and A-3 were falsely implicated. The evidence of attack by A-2 and A-3 cannot be accepted. 13. Even assuming that the entire case of the prosecution is true, the offence is not one of murder and at the most they had the intention to cause grievots injuries and the accused should have been convicted only for an offence under section 326, Indian Penal Code and therefore the accused are liable to be convicted for that offence. 14. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has reiterated the facts of the prosecution case and relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge. With regard to the offence, he stated that all the accused intended to kill the deceased and attacked the deceased in his own house and the injuries are found to be cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature. Therefore the offence is one of murder punishable under section 302 , Indian Penal Code The Lower Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence under section 302 read with 34, Indian Penal Code. He did not site any authorities. 15. Upon the respective contentions, the first question that arises for consideration is. Whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 16. It is redundant to restate all the material factual aspects referred to above. As stated earlier, the murder of Ande Venkateswara Rao, brother of A-2 and A-3 had taken place on 13th January, 1982 and the present occurrence is equal to the earlier one. All the accused are inter related to Ande Venkateswara Rao. The accused have sufficient motive to kill the deceased and the Lower Court is well justified in finding that there is a motive for commission of the crime. 17. The Doctor P.W.12 stated that the deceased died due to the cumulative effect of all the injuries and the injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. Therefore the deceased died on account of homicidal attack. 17. The Doctor P.W.12 stated that the deceased died due to the cumulative effect of all the injuries and the injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. Therefore the deceased died on account of homicidal attack. It is admitted fairly by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the occurrence had taken place in the house of the deceased at 8 p.m. The evidence on record also clearly establishes that the house is electrified and there were electric bulbs burning at the time when the occurrence had taken place. This aspect also is undisputed. Exhibit P-1 refers to the existence of burning a bulb inside, tied to Amla tree in the front yard The evidence of P.W.5, panch witness, P.W.13 the Inspector of Police and Exhibit P-1 observation report establishes this fact beyond any pale of doubt. 18. Under section 32 of the Evidence Act, a statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in case in which the cause of that person's death comes into question are themselves relevant facts. A dying declaration is not a week piece of evidence It by itself forms a basis for conviction without any further corroboration provided it is truthful and reliable. The truthfulness, reliability and the acceptability of the dying declaration has to be adjudged in the light of attendant facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be subjected to strict scrutiny like any other piece of evidence, either direct or circumstantial. A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate stands on a higher footing than an oral declaration or one recorded by the investigating officer. But it must be remembered that it was recorded in the absence of the accused who are denied of an opportunity to test it on the touchstone of cross-examination to find its credibility. With regard to reliability, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity to the victim to observe his assailants, his capacity to remember the facts stated; his state of mind at the time of making declaration: the consistency of the declaration, if made more than once and whether the declaration was made at the earliest. It has also to be found whether it has been stemmed from tutoring or interference by any other persons. It has also to be found whether it has been stemmed from tutoring or interference by any other persons. The dying declaration is admissible in evidence, as of necessity by way of an exception to the general principle that hearsay evidence is not admissible, by operation of section 32 of the Evidence Act. This is on the premise that great solemnity and sanctity is to be attached to the words of the dying man because a person on the last lap of breath and of dying bed would be unlikely to speak falsehood or be animated to weave out a false version of attack on him excluding his real assailants and implicating innocent persons Court would keep these factors in view while considering and subjecting the declaration to close scrutiny. 19. Keeping these principles in view, we have to consider whether the declaration Exhibit P-20 is truthful and reliable; if it is found to be reliable, it can by itself form the basis for conviction. On the other hand, if the material and integral part of the declaration is untrue or unacceptable, then it would be unsafe to convict the accused on the sole basis thereof without any further corroboration. 20. It is true that several persons have been mentioned as assailants and so the Court has to scrutinize the evidence in respect of each of the accused. It is wrong to think that the dying declaration becomes less credible if several persons are named as assailants. In Harbans Singh and another v. State of Punjab Harbans Singh and another v. State of Punjab (1962) 2 S.C.J. 662: (1962) MLJ. (Crl.) 685: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 439 at 443“, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Das Gupta, J. are held: “The learned Judge has also misdirected himself in thinking that the dying declaration had very little probative value because as many as six accused persons had been named and that no conviction could in law be based on such dying declaration without corroboration. The law does not make any distinction between a dying declaration in which one person is named and a dying declaration in which several persons are named as culprits. A dying declaration implicating one person may well be false while a dying declaration implicating several person may be true. The law does not make any distinction between a dying declaration in which one person is named and a dying declaration in which several persons are named as culprits. A dying declaration implicating one person may well be false while a dying declaration implicating several person may be true. Just as when a number of persons are mentioned as culprits by a person claiming to be an eye-witness in his evidence in Court the Court has to take care in deciding whether he has lied or made a mistake about any of them, so also when a number of persons appears to have been mentioned as culprits in a dying declaration the court has to scrutinise the evidence in respect of each of the accused. But it is wrong to think that a dying declaration becomes less credible if a number of persons are named as culprits”. In The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Sarella Gopal Rao The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Sarella Gopal Rao (1969) 2 A.P.L.J. 105, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mohammed Mirza, J. and Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as he then was) held: “Mere delay in recording dying declaration is of no consequence unless the delay is made use of to induce or prompt or influence the deceased to give false statement There is no rule of law which lays down the manner in which a dying declaration is to be recorded”. In that case the occurrence took place at 7 or 8 p.m. The dying declaration was recorded by the Sub Inspector at 10-30 a.m. on the next day. It was disbelieved by the trial court. On appeal it was accepted and the High Court convicted the accused. 21. The Tehal Singh and others v. State of Punjab Tehal Singh and others v. State of Punjab (1979) Crl.L.J. 1031: (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 1031: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1347 at 1350 their Lordships of the Supreme Court speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J, held. “The dying declaration undoubtedly contains a wealth of details as argued by Dr. Chitaley. The details contained in any statement, depend upon the capacity for observation of the person making the statement, the condition of the person at the time of making the statement, his anxiety to mention the details and the manner in which questions are put and answers elicited. Chitaley. The details contained in any statement, depend upon the capacity for observation of the person making the statement, the condition of the person at the time of making the statement, his anxiety to mention the details and the manner in which questions are put and answers elicited. It may be that in certain situations the very wealth of detail in a statement attributed to a dying man may arouse suspicion. On the other hand the circumstance that a statement contains a wealth of detail cannot necessarily lead to the inference that the statement is a fabricated one”. In Mannu Raja and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh Mannu Raja and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 3 S.C.C. 104 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 376: (1976) 2 S.C.R. 764 : (1976) Crl.L.J. 1718: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2199 at 2201, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) held. “It is well settled that though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. Thus Court must not look out for corroboration unless it comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration suffered from any infirmity by reason of which it was necessary to took out for corroboration.” 23. In Kusa and others v. State of Orissa Kusa and others v. State of Orissa (1980) Crl.L.J. 408: (1980) 2 S.C.C. 207 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 389: A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 559, Fazal Ali J. speaking on behalf of the Court held that where a bare perusal of the dying declaration shows that the coherent and consistent statement was made by the deceased who clearly stated the motive for the occurrence and stated that he and his brother were assaulted by valies and lathis and it was not disputed that the prosecution witnesses and the appellants were armed themselves with weapons, the deceased was not suffering from confusion or hallucination. The names of some of the assailants were mentioned. The dying declaration was accepted and the conviction was confirmed in that case. 24. The names of some of the assailants were mentioned. The dying declaration was accepted and the conviction was confirmed in that case. 24. It must also be remembered that the dying declaration has to be decided on its own strength. It should not be rejected with reference to some improvements made in the oral testimony of the other witnesses. The dying declaration should stand or fall on its own strength. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, if there are any circumstances to doubt the veracity of the statement in the declaration, then corroboration may be sought for from the evidence on record, factual or circumstantial, to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the declaration made is true and to be relied upon or acceptable. If it is found to be reliable and acceptable, then the declaration by itself is sufficient to base a conviction without corroboration and in case of doubt if the declaration receives corroboration it would form basis to convict the accused. 25. The first question is whether the declaration Exhibit P-20 is truthful. It is not in dispute that P.W.10 recorded it and P.W.11 endorsed under Exhibit P-21 regarding fitness of mind and consciousness of the deceased. P.W.10 stated that he put certain questions to the injured. He also disclosed his identity. After satisfying himself that the victim was in a position togive the statement, he recorded the statement from 2-45 a.m. and completed it at 3-15 a.m. In his cross examination, nothing has been brought out to doubt the veracity of the statement given by the injured to the Magistrate P.W.10. None were present at the time Exhibit P-20 was recorded. We therefore hold that the statement made by the deceased in Exhibit P-20 is truthful, he was conscious and it is his statement. The next question is whether Exhibit P-20 is reliable. In this regard, the contention of Sri T.Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants is that it is the result of tutoring. Delay by itself is inconsequential unless there are circumstances to indicate that it was deliberately utilised to rope in innocent persons due to faction. Undoubtedly, the village is ridden with faction and two months preceding the date of occurrence, Ande Venkateswara Rao, brother of A-2 and A-3 was murdered. Security proceedings were initiated against both the parties and they are pending. Undoubtedly, the village is ridden with faction and two months preceding the date of occurrence, Ande Venkateswara Rao, brother of A-2 and A-3 was murdered. Security proceedings were initiated against both the parties and they are pending. The evidence on record also shows that there is police bandobust stationed in the village. Keeping these circumstances in view, we have to scrutinise very carefully the dying declaration made by the deceased in Exhibit P-20. In Exhibit P-20 the deceased stated the time of the occurrence as 8 p.m. He also mentioned the presence of P.Ws.1, 2 and his daughter L.W.2 and his farm servant Basavaiah. He stated that all of them were sitting in the verandah and they were talking. At that time all the appellants trespassed into his house. He gave their names and weapons used. The deceased also stated that immediately on coming, A-1 attacked him with a tappers knife and stabbed him on his left shoulder, A-2 and A-3 hit him on the head with spears. A-5 hurled a tappers’ knife at him. He raised his left hand to ward off, his left ring finger was severed. A-4 and A-6 beat him with sticks on the body, head and eight shoulder, several times. On receipt of these injuries, he went inside the house and bolted the door. Thereupon the accused beat the door of the house with sticks and knives. His wife, daughter and son entreated them not to kill the deceased. Ten minutes thereafter, the accused left the house. His wife, his son, his brother and his farm-servant Besavaiah witnessed the occurrence and the farm-servant ran away from the scene. When P.W.1 and his daughter were crying aloud, the ladies of the neighring houses including his mother and the wife of Apparao came to the house. The deceased was taken away to the house of M.Apparao. The deceased also mentioned the motive-that he was beaten on account of the enmity with his younger brother M.Venkateswara Rao who had killed Ande Venkateswararao. These are the material facts furnished in Exhibit P-20 by the deceased. No doubt, he mentioned that his wife and daughter went to the Police Station to inform the Police as to what had happened. We will deal with that part of the statement at a later stage. Thus, in Exhibit P-20 the deceased had furnished wealth of details. These are the material facts furnished in Exhibit P-20 by the deceased. No doubt, he mentioned that his wife and daughter went to the Police Station to inform the Police as to what had happened. We will deal with that part of the statement at a later stage. Thus, in Exhibit P-20 the deceased had furnished wealth of details. It is true that there is enough delay from the time of occurrence till the recording of the statement Exhibit P-20. The questions are whether 1. the delay was utilised to implicate innocent persons and Exhibit P-20 is the result of any tutoring. From the evidence on record, it appears that though the house of the deceased is situated in the midst of his close relations, none of the male persons appears to have come to lend assistance to the injured to be taken to the hospital. It would take time to pick up courage and take the deceased to the Hospital. Finding that none of the relations have come, the ladies and P.Ws. 2 and 4 carried the deceased to the main road on the cot M.O.4 The distance between the Hospital and the village is two and half miles. They waited for 1/2 an hour for a lorry to come. On securing the service of the driver P.W.8 the deceased was taken to Hospital on the lorry. No doubt, P.W.8 turned hostile. Therefore, we cannot rely upon that part of the evidence. The deceased was taken to the hospital at about 1-30 a.m. on 21st March, 1982 and P.W.10 started recording Exhibit P-20 statement at 2-45 a.m. As could be seen from the evidence, the deceased himself was a respondent in the security proceedings and he was not an accused in any other case anterior to 13th January, 1982, i.e. the date of murder of Ande Venkateswara Rao. One important circumstance to be taken into consideration is that immediately after the deceased was brought to Avanigadda the first attempt made by P.Ws.1, 2 and others is to take him to the hospital and got him admitted. If really the animation to false implication was the permeative factor to delay and to fabricate a false report, they would have straight away gone to Police Station at Avanigadda and would have given the report. If really the animation to false implication was the permeative factor to delay and to fabricate a false report, they would have straight away gone to Police Station at Avanigadda and would have given the report. Their primary concern was to save the life of the deceased It might be possible that the finding that on account of profused bleeding the deceased might be becoming weak, then they thought of taking him to the hospital. No pointed cross-examination was directed in this regard. Probably this must be the circumstance for some delay. He being only a respondent in the security proceedings, not being involved in thick of faction, he was not interested to weave out a false case. From the facts and circumstances, we are satisfied that the delay was not utilised to tutor the deceased. He was not inspired to exclude the real assailants and to involve innocent persons. He stated in detail the facts that had occurred. These are within his immediate knowledge. As stated earlier, the house of the deceased is fully electrified and there was one electric bulb burning, which was tagged to an amla tree and there is no difficulty for the deceased to identify his assailants P.W.10 has stated that the deceased had voluntarily given the statement and P.W.10 had recorded it as narrated by the deceased. None were present at the time when the statement Exhibit P-20 was recorded. We are satisfied from totality of facts and circumstances and hold that the dying declaration Exhibit P-20 is not only truthful but also reliable and we accept the same and we are inclined to place implicit reliance on it. 26. The only circumstance pressed forth vehemently is that P.W.1 and her daughter went to the Police Station to give a report. P.W.14, Sub Inspector stated that they did not come to the Police Station to give report. Might be, as held by the learned Sessions Judge, that the deceased thought that P.W.1 and the daughter went to the Police Station to give the report. Except this circumstance, and the delay, nothing has been pointed out to doubt Exhibit P-20. As seen earlier the deceased himself mentioned about the presence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and his farm-servant Basavaiah. No doubt the farm-servant has not been examined. His non-examination is not material. Except this circumstance, and the delay, nothing has been pointed out to doubt Exhibit P-20. As seen earlier the deceased himself mentioned about the presence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and his farm-servant Basavaiah. No doubt the farm-servant has not been examined. His non-examination is not material. Sri Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned Counsel also fairly did not contend that failure to examine Basavaiah would constitute any infirmity in the prosecution case. Therefore, we hold that Exhibit P-20 is a truthful and reliable declaration and it can by itself from basis to hold that the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt. 27. Further Exhibit P-20 receives sufficient corroboration from the evidence of the direct witnesses. The circumstantial evidence at the scene of offence as spoken to by P.W.5 the triune officer and also from the medical evidence. Let us examine the evidence of the direct witnesses. 28. No doubt P.Ws.1 and 2 are interested witnesses. But the mere fact that they are interested witnesses by itself is not a circumstance to discredit their evidence. On the other hand they are interested to bring to book the real offenders. In the case of faction, the Court would proceed on a lurking suspicion that there would be incurable tendency to rope in some innocent persons. Therefore to assuage the conscience of the Court, as a matter of prudence not as matter of law seek some corroboration. The evidence of the interested witnesses is to be scrutinised very carefully and closely. The fact that P.W.1 is the wife and P.W.2 is the son would give assurance that they have not excluded the real culprits. But we have to see whether there is any scope to implicate any innocent persons. In this regard, the contention of Sri Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants that P.Ws.1 and 2 were not present at the time when the occurrence took place has to be considered in the first instance. According to him, admittedly on 18th March, 1982 when A-6 committed theft of coconuts in her house, P.W.1 was afraid and went to her mother's house on intimation to her mother-in-law. For that reason P.W.2 was sent to bring her and and since they did not come, their daughter Krishna Kumari came to the house only to prepare food for the deceased. The latter are unfounded assumptions. Mere suggestions have been given to witnesses. For that reason P.W.2 was sent to bring her and and since they did not come, their daughter Krishna Kumari came to the house only to prepare food for the deceased. The latter are unfounded assumptions. Mere suggestions have been given to witnesses. Inferences must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or facts from which to infer the facts that are sought to be established. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if that had been actually observed. In other cases, the inference does not go beyond reasonable suspicion. If there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be drawn, the method of inference fails leaving mere speculation or conjecture or suspicion alone. The question is whether it could be inferred from the facts that P.W.1 went on 18th March, 1982 to her mother's house, that she was absent on 20th March, 1982 when the occurrence took place. No doubt it has been suggested to P.Ws.1 and 2 as well but they have denied the suggestion. The distance between the village and hamlet of her parents, is two miles. It might be that on 18th March, 1982 she might have gone and came back on 19th March, 1982. L.W. 2 being the resident of the same place, might have come to the house of the deceased. P.W.1 was subjected to very minute and searching cross-examination. The defence could not elicit anything useful from her cross-examination. P.W.1 withstood the test of cross-examination and the learned Sessions Judge stated in his Judgment thus: “The demeanour of the witness never gave an impression that they were tutored and never witnessed the incident.” The Sessions Judge had the advantage of witnessing the demeanour of P.W. No. 1 and he was satisfied that she is a truthful witness. The learned counsel has taken us through the entire evidence and on going through the evidence, we are also satisfied that P.W.1 is a truthful witness of the occurrence. No doubt the only place of evidence which gave us an impression is an exaggeration made that A-2 and A-3 hit the deceased on the head by raising the stick portion of the spears above their head. But the injuries inflicted are not fatal. After all the witnesses, during her cross-examination when certain questions were put and answers sought for, perhaps she might have exaggerated the occurrence. But the injuries inflicted are not fatal. After all the witnesses, during her cross-examination when certain questions were put and answers sought for, perhaps she might have exaggerated the occurrence. By that circumstance alone, it cannot be concluded that she had not witnessed the occurrence. As stated earlier, the occurrence took place in the house. In Exhibit P-20 itself, her presence was mentioned. P.W.1 had categorically stated that she was in the house. P.W.3 also stated that she swa P.W.1 near the deceased in the house of M.Apparao. The suggestion given appears to be a desparate attempt to create a doubt regarding her presence. It is hazardous to infer that P.W.1 was not present at the time of occurrence. On the facts and circumstances, we hold that the suggestion has no factual foundation. If that contention is negatived, undoubtedly she is a natural witness to the occurrence and she was spoken to the entire occurrence and her evidence is consistent. It inspires confidence for us to accept her evidence to be truthful. Accordingly we hold that her evidence alone is sufficient to base conviction apart from lending corroboration to the declaration Exhibit P-20. 29. Similar is the evidence of P.W.2, the son of the deceased. He and his father were respondents in the security case with regard to the evidence of P.W.2, it is the contention of Sri Chandra Sekhar Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants that he was working as a clerk in a Milk Co-operative Society and the time of occurrence would be the time to test the milk at the office of the Society and therefore it was not possible for P.W.2 to be in the house and he could not have witnessed the occurrence. We have given our anxious thought to the contention. No doubt P.W.2 was working as a clerk in the Milk Co-operative Society but the deceased himself is the President of the Society and there is another clerk. Therefore it is not impossible or improbable for P.W.2 to be in the house and the other clerk might be attending to the testing of the milk. His presence was stated in Exhibit P-20 and by P.Ws.1 and 3 also. In these circumstances, we hold that P.Ws. 1 and 2 also. In these circumstances, we hold that P.W.2 also was present in the house at the time when the occurrence had taken place. His presence was stated in Exhibit P-20 and by P.Ws.1 and 3 also. In these circumstances, we hold that P.Ws. 1 and 2 also. In these circumstances, we hold that P.W.2 also was present in the house at the time when the occurrence had taken place. If the contention raised by the learned counsel was not accepted, then undoubtedly P.W.2 also is a natural witness. 30. In Exhibit P-20 the presence of P.W. 2 was mentioned to be a person sitting along with the deceased on a bench and witnessed the occurrence, From these circumstances, we hold that P.W.2 also is a witness to the occurrence. We have carefully gone through his evidence and his evidence inspires confidence to be acceptable. 31. Now coming to the evidence of P.W. 4 another son of the deceased, no doubt he professed to be a witness having seen the accused running away from the scene. His name was not mentioned in Exhibit P-20. His evidence appearance to be artificial. Therefore, his evidence is not of much help to the prosecution case. Therefore, we hold that we cannot accept his evidence that he had identified any of the assailants while going away from the scene of occurrence. 32. Then remains the evidence of P.W.3. Her evidence lends corroboration to the presence of P.Ws.1 and 2 at the time when the occurrence bad taken place. She stated that immediately on being informed by Basavaiah, the farm-servant of the deceased, she came running and she is the mother-in-law of Krishna Kumari, the daughter of the deceased. She had spoken to the presence of P.W.1 and 2, Therefore the evidence of P.W.3 lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1 and 2to the extent that they were present at the time of the occurrence. 33. The medical evidence a so clearly lends corroboration to the evidence not only in Exhibit P-20 but also to the direct witnesses. The circumstantial evidence also lends corroboration to the evidence of the prosecution not only Exhibit P-20 but also the direct witnesses. In Exhibit P-20 the deceased no doubt mentioned that he closed the door. His condition was becoming serious. Obviously what he was referring is only the door in the southern most storeroom. The fact that the deceased went to the Pooja room and fell down also gets corroboration from blood stains recovered. In Exhibit P-20 the deceased no doubt mentioned that he closed the door. His condition was becoming serious. Obviously what he was referring is only the door in the southern most storeroom. The fact that the deceased went to the Pooja room and fell down also gets corroboration from blood stains recovered. The evidence of P.W.5, the Panch witness corroborates the evidence of Investigating Officer P.W. 13 and the observation report, Exhibit P-1 establishes the fact that here are trail or blood, stains at all places where the deceased roamed in the house and back-yard. From these circumstances also, the version of the prosecution gets sufficient corroboration. The contention that the presence a participation of A-2 and A-3 is false lacks force and did not convince us. They are real persons who have motive. Their brother Ande Venkateswararao was done to death only on 13th January, 1982. This would be a nursing intention to take vengeance. Thus, the prosecution has established the presence and participation of the appellants in the commission of the offence, i.e. causing the death of the deceased, beyond any shadow of doubt. 34. The next question is, what is the offence the prosecution has proved that the accused have committed. In this regard, it is necessary to notice the medical evidence. According to the doctor (P.W.12) who conducted the autopsy, injury No. 8 is a wound of 8”, found on the left shoulder of the deceased. Injury No. 8 is as follows: “Injury No. 8: A sutured wound of 8“is found on the left shoulder. It is oblique in direction. It is extending from the top of the shoulder to backwards and downwards, on cut opening the sutures the depth of the wound is about 4”. The muscles and the vessels are cut. Blood clots are found in the wound.” This is the first injury inflicted by A-1. There are other injuries viz. four lacerated injuries on the head. The distal plalnx of the left finger is chopped off. The medial side of the medial phalanz of the left middle finger was cut. An incised wound of 8 x”1/4/” found was found crossing the upper part of the back of the chest. A sutured injury of 3” bone deep cut on the left frontal region. There are several abrasions i.e. seven in total. The medial side of the medial phalanz of the left middle finger was cut. An incised wound of 8 x”1/4/” found was found crossing the upper part of the back of the chest. A sutured injury of 3” bone deep cut on the left frontal region. There are several abrasions i.e. seven in total. The doctor P.W.12 has stated that the cumulative effect of all these injuries is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 35. Sri Chandrasekhara Reddy, learned Counsel contended that the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased. He submitted that if they really had the intention to cause the death, when they were armed-A-1 and A-5 with tappers’ knives, A-2 and A-3 with spears and A-4 and A-6 with sticks, as stated in Exhibit P-20 or spears as per the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, they would not have left the deceased with six lacerated injuries without causing fatal injuries. He there by contends that their common object or intention could at best be only to cause grievous hurt but not murder. In support of this contention he relied upon a Division Bench Judgments of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 1978 and Cri Appeal No. 148 of 1979 dated 6th February, 1980. 36. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the offence committed in this case is one of murder. 37. In view of these rival contentions, the question that arises for our consideration iswhether the prosecution has established that the offence is one murder. It is futile to parade the learning of the distinction between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and the murder since it has been succinctly stated in the latest case on the topic by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Punnayya and another State of Andhra Pradesh v. Punnayya and another (1976) 4 S.C.C. 382 : (1977) Crl.L.J. 1: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 659: (1977) 1 S.C.R. 601 : A.I.R. 1977. S.C. 45. In para 33, Sarkaria, J, speaking on behalf of the Court has held that the crux of the matter is whether the facts establish that the case comes within clause thirdly of section 300 Indian Penal Code. S.C. 45. In para 33, Sarkaria, J, speaking on behalf of the Court has held that the crux of the matter is whether the facts establish that the case comes within clause thirdly of section 300 Indian Penal Code. This question involves the consideration of a two-fold issue, viz., whether the vital injuries on the body of the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the accused, and if so, whether they are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If these elements are satisfactorily established, the offence will be ‘murder’ irrespective of the fact whether the intention on the part of the accused to cause death has or has not been proved. In that case, the assailants had given beating only on the hands and legs of the deceased and the deceased died due to the cumulative effect of all the injuries and no vital part of the body was involved. This Court had convicted the accused for the offence under section 304 Part-II Indian Penal Code. Their Lordships however, considered the evidence and held that all the injuries were cumulatively sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and the offence thereby comes within Clause thirdly of section 300 Indian Penal Code, Accordingly the accused were convicted for an offence under section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life. While considering that question, their Lordships have said in para 16: “In clause 3 of Section 300 , instead of words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of section 299 and Clause (3) of section 300 is one ofthe degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word likely in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word likely in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words ‘bodily injury’ sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ mean that death will be the ‘most probable’ result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. For cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.” 38. In Anda v. State of Rajasthan Anda v. State of Rajasthan (1966) 1 S.C.J. 170: (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 128: (1966) Crl.L.J. 171: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 148, their Lordships of the Supreme Court speaking through Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) were called upon to consider a case where the deceased was attack only with sticks on the bands and legs and the deceased died as a result of the cumulative effect of all the injuries. While considering that question, their Lordships have held: “Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body in which the injury caused, and sometimes both are relevant. The determinant factor is the intentional injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, that is to say the probability of death is rot so high, the offence does not fall within culpable homicide not amounting to murder or something less. The illustration appended to the Clause 3rdly reads; “(C)A intentionally gives Za sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Here, A is guilty of murder although he may not have intended to cause Z's death.” The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature is the gist of the clause irrespective of an intention to cause death. Here again, the exceptions may bring down the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 39. Here again, the exceptions may bring down the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 39. Considering the facts of the instant case in the light of the law as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the question is whether the offence of murder has been made out. The facts established by the prosecution are as follows: The accused formed into an unlawful assembly went in a body armed with tapper's knives, spears and sticks; trespassed into the house of the deceased and when they found the deceased sitting on a stool, A-1 who was armed with a tapper's knife, stabbed the deceased on his left shoulder and thereafter all the accused attacked the deceased on the head and other parts of tie body. When the deceased ran into the house, the accused chased him and when the deceased hid himself after bolting the door from inside, they returned in a body only after their object of further attack was frustrated and went back in a body. From these circumstances, the question is whether they intended to inflict the injuries and those injuries proved to have been inflicted are sufficient to cause death and the offence would come under clause thirdly of section 300 , Indian Penal Code or whether it is only grievous hurt coming under section 326 Indian Penal Code as contended for. 40. They have chosen the house of the deceased as the place of attack so that there may not be an escape for the deceased; they attacked him immediately unprovoked with deadly weapons caused severe injuries and they pursued the deceased even after he went into the house. Though they did not cause any injury to any of the vital parts of the body., the injuries are now proved, from the medical evidence of the doctor (P.W. 12), to be cumulatively sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. From these circumstances, it must be held that the prosecution, proved that the accused committed the offence of murder attracting clause thirdly of sections 300 Indian Penal Code and therefore, the lower Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence of murder. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants is distinguishable on facts. It is now well settled that no case is an authority on facts. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants is distinguishable on facts. It is now well settled that no case is an authority on facts. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, the learned Judges confirmed the conviction of the accused for an offence under section 326 Indian Penal Code and we do not find sufficient assistance to hold that the facts in that case would apply to this case. The ratio should be confined to the facts in that case. Considering from this perspective, it must be held that the accused have committed nothing less than an offence of murder punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge has given a finding that the accused were the members of an unlawful assembly, and they intended to kill the deceased and accordingly the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the accused for the offence under section 202 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. In view of the fact that all the accused armed with deadly weapons, formed into an unlawful assembly came in a body, trespassed into a dwelling house attacked the deceased and went back in a body, they have been rightly held to haveshared the common object or common intention tokill the deceased. Therefore, from either perspective, the accused were not only the members of an unlawful assembly whose common object was to kill the deceased, but they also shared the common intention to kill the deceased by participating in the attack on the deceased. Under these circumstances, the accused are liable to be convicted for an offence under section 302 read with section 149 or section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code either way. The Lower Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence of murder. 41. The learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri Chandrasekhara Reddy contended that A-2 and A-3 did not intend to kill the deceased though they were armed with spears and that they are entitled to the benefit of doubt. We are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellants for the reason that the presence and participation of the accused has been established beyond any reasonable doubt. We are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellants for the reason that the presence and participation of the accused has been established beyond any reasonable doubt. It is clearly established that they attacked the accused on the head with spears and though the injuries are found to be not serious, yet that circumstance alone would hot give rise to any doubt with regard to their presence any participation, and once it is held that they were present and participated in attacking the deceased, they are constructively liable for the offence of murder along with other accused and therefore they are also rightly convicted by the Lower Court. Accordingly we hold that the prosecution has established that the accused not only committed the offence, but has also proved that they have committed the offence of murder, and the Lower Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offences referred to above. We hold that no case has been made out warranting interference. 42. Accordingly, we confirm the convictions of the appellants-accused of all the offences and the sentences awarded to them. This Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed. 43. An oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is made. We do not find any grounds to certify it as a fit case for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Articles 134 and 134(a)of the Constitution of India. Hence leave is refused. Appeal dismissed.